Ex Parte Oh et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 19, 2015

11796466 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 19, 2015)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/796,466 04/27/2007 Jae-Kwon Oh 678-2979 4380
66547 7590 06/22/2015
THE FARRELL LAW FIRM, P.C.
290 Broadhollow Road
Suite 210E
Melville, NY 11747
EXAMINER
LAGOR, ALEXANDER
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2491
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/22/2015 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte JAE-KWON OH, WUK KIM, and SANG-KYUNG SUNG
____________

Appeal 2013-005509
Application 11/796,4661
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before HUNG H. BUI, NATHAN A. ENGELS, and
KEVIN C. TROCK, Administrative Patent Judges.

TROCK, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Introduction
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final rejection of
claims 1–10 and 15–19. Claims 11–14 are cancelled.2 We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 Appellants indicate the Real Party in Interest is Samsung Electronics Co,
Ltd. App. Br. 1.

2 App. Br. 12.
Appeal 2013-005509
Application 11/796,466

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Invention
The claimed invention relates to “a system and method for performing
a delegation operation that can authorize a delegated client for requesting an
operation and a delegating client for delegating authority to the delegated
client in a target system”. Spec ¶ 2.

Exemplary Claim
Exemplary claim 1 is reproduced below with disputed limitations
emphasized:
1. A system for performing a delegation operation,
the system comprising:
a delegated client for sending a request message for
requesting that a server should execute an operation for a
resource to the server, the request message including an identity
(ID) of the delegated client, an ID of a delegating client, and
information of the requested operation;
the server for determining whether the delegating client
has delegated authority to the delegated client for requesting
execution of the operation using the delegated client ID and the
delegating client ID included in the request message received
from the delegated client, and for executing the requested
operation when the delegated client is authenticated according
to a result of the determination;
wherein the delegating client has authority to request
execution of the operation included in the request message, and
the execution of the operation comprises modifying a document
stored in the server.

Applied Prior Art
Swift US 7,113,994 B1 Sept. 26, 2006
Leppisaari US 2007/0136475 A1 Jun. 14, 2007
Chan US 2007/0245414 A1 Oct. 18, 2007
Applicant Admitted Prior Art (“AAPA”)
Appeal 2013-005509
Application 11/796,466

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Rejections
Claims 1–3, 6–8, 10, and 15–19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Swift and Chan.
Claim 4 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Swift, Chan, and AAPA.
Claims 5 and 9 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Swift, Chan, and Leppisaari.

ISSUE
Did the Examiner err in finding the combination of Swift and Chan
teaches or suggests a
server for determining whether the delegating client has
delegated authority to the delegated client for requesting
execution of the operation using the delegated client ID and the
delegating client ID included in the request message received
from the delegated client . . . and the execution of the operation
comprises modifying a document stored in the server,

as recited in independent claim 1?

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections and evidence of record
in light of Appellants’ arguments the Examiner has erred. We disagree with
Appellants’ arguments and conclusions. We adopt as our own: (1) the
findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this
appeal is taken (Final Act. 4–10); and (2) the findings and the reasons set
forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer (Ans. 3–16). We concur
with the conclusions reached by the Examiner and further highlight specific
findings and argument for emphasis as follows.
Appeal 2013-005509
Application 11/796,466

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Independent Claim 1
Appellants contend the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1, arguing
Swift fails to disclose a server that receives a request message, determines
authority, and executes the requested operation. App. Br. 4. Appellants also
argue Swift fails to disclose that the authentication data includes client
identification (IDs) or operation information. App. Br. 5. Finally,
Appellants argue Chan fails to disclose that a delegated client sends a
message which requests modifying a document stored in a server. Id.
The test for obviousness is what the combined teachings of the
references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. In re
Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Accordingly, one cannot show
non-obviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections
are based on combinations of references. Id.
Here, the Examiner relies on the combination of Swift and Chan to
teach or suggest the disputed elements of claim 1. The Examiner finds, and
we agree, Swift teaches that a session ticket may be used to directly
authenticate to a target service. Ans. 10; Final Act. 4 (citing Swift, col. 10 ll.
29–34). The Examiner also finds, and we agree, the session ticket in Swift is
sent from a proxy client (the claimed “delegated client”) to a target service
(the claimed “server”). Ans. 10–11; Final Act. 4 (citing Swift col. 5, ll. 20–
55).
The Examiner also finds, and we agree, Swift teaches the
authorization data field of the proxy ticket contains the name of the client
that sent the request along with the security identifier (SID) of the client.
Ans. 11–12 (citing Swift col. 10, ll. 1–12). Moreover, the Examiner finds,
and we agree, Swift teaches that the session ticket is a “ticket-granting
Appeal 2013-005509
Application 11/796,466

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ticket” or “TGT” and finds that it is well known in the art that under the
Keberos protocol taught by Swift (see Swift col. 5, ll. 56–58; col. 6, ll. 22–
30 and 37–55) that a TGT includes identification (IDs) of all the parties.
Ans. 11.
Finally, the Examiner finds, and we agree, it is well known in the art
that a network service can comprise an online document processing service.
Ans. 13. The Examiner finds, and we agree, Chan teaches network (server)
access to productivity services, such as word processing, which may be
provided for the client in lieu of applications that were traditionally executed
locally by the client. Ans. 13 (citing Chan ¶ 36); Final Act. 6 (citing Chan
¶¶ 20, 36).
Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner’s finding the combination
of Swift and Chan teaches or suggests the disputed limitations recited in
independent claim 1, as well as independent claim 6, which recites similar
limitations.

Dependent Claims
Appellants purport to separately argue the patentability of dependent
claims 2–5, 7–10, and 15–18, but with respect to these claims Appellants
merely repeat the same or similar arguments already raised with respect to
independent claim 21 or merely recite the language of the particular claim
and assert the cited prior art references do not teach or suggest the claim
limitations. See App. Br. 6–8. Without independent arguments, such
contentions fail to constitute a separate issue of patentability.
In comparing a prior art reference to the claimed invention, the
important comparison is the substance of the claim, under its broadest
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Application 11/796,466

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reasonable interpretation in light of the specification, and the substance of
the corresponding relied-upon disclosure in the prior art reference. That is,
to show error in the Examiner’s position, Appellants must explain why the
relied-upon disclosure does not teach or suggest the claimed feature under its
broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification, rather than
merely alleging that the feature is not shown or is different because it is
described in different terms. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv); In re Lovin,
652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Nonetheless, we have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections of these
claims in light of Appellants’ arguments the Examiner has erred. We
disagree with Appellants’ conclusions. We concur with the findings and the
conclusions reached by the Examiner. Ans. 14–16.

CONCLUSION
The Examiner did not err in finding the cited prior art teaches or
suggests the claim limitations discussed above. We therefore sustain the
rejection of independent claim 1, along with independent claim 6 which
recites similar limitations, as well as dependent claims 2–5, 7–10, and 15–
19.

DECISION
We AFFIRM the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–10 and 15–19.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136.

AFFIRMED