Ex Parte O et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardNov 28, 201714354674 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 28, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/354,674 04/28/2014 David P. O'Connell DON09 P-1952 5177 15671 7590 11/30/2017 Gardner, Linn, Burkhart & Flory, LLP 2851 Charlevoix Dr., SE, Suite 207 Grand Rapids, MI 49546 EXAMINER ORTIZ CRIADO, JORGE L ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2489 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 11/30/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): sytsma@glbf.com patents @ glbf.com clark@glbf.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte DAVID P. O'CONNELL, KENNETH C. PETERSON, and KEITH D. FOOTE1 Appeal 2017-007029 Application 14/354,674 Technology Center 2400 Before ALLEN R MacDONALD, IRVIN E. BRANCH, and BETH Z. SHAW, Administrative Patent Judges. BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a rejection of claims 1— 19, 22, and 23. Claims 20 and 21 are canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 The real party in interest is said to be Magna Mirrors of America, Inc. App. Br. 2. Appeal 2017-007029 Application 14/354,674 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to vehicle vision systems. See Spec. Abstract. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A vision system for a vehicle, said vision system comprising: an exterior rearview mirror assembly; an imaging sensor having a field of view exterior a vehicle equipped with said vision system; a video display screen operable to display video images captured by said imaging sensor; wherein said exterior rearview mirror assembly and said video display screen are part of a mirror and display module that is mountable as a unit at a door of the equipped vehicle; and wherein, with said mirror and display module mounted at the vehicle door as a unit, said exterior rearview mirror assembly is disposed at an exterior portion of the vehicle door and said video display screen is disposed at an interior portion of the vehicle door. REFERENCES AND REJECTIONS Claims 1—11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Desai (US 20008/0106389 Al, published May 8, 2008 and Secor (US 5,289,321, issued Feb 22, 1994). Final Act. 4—8. Claims 12—19, 22, and 23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Desai, Secor, and 1A Auto Parts (“How To Install Replace Side Rear View Mirror,” 3:32 — 3:38, uploaded July 5, 2011, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= TThWaAFsAHY). Final Act. 8-11. 2 Appeal 2017-007029 Application 14/354,674 OPINION Claim 1 Contentions The Examiner finds Desai discloses all limitations of claim 1 except that Desai does not disclose that the “video display screen is disposed at an interior portion of the vehicle door” and the “mirror and display module are mounted at the vehicle door as a unit.” Final Act. 4—5 (citing Desai Fig. 1, 117-8, 17, 20-21, 37 and Secor col. 1,11. 2A-36 and col. 4,11. 22^18). The Examiner finds that “the exact location of the display within the vehicle amounts to mere rearrangement of parts, and does not limit the scope of the claim” and that “since the mirror and display both serve similar functions and are meant to be simultaneously used by the driver, they are part of the same ‘module’ and ‘unit’ as claimed.” Id. at 5 (citing MPEP § 2144.04(V) and MPEP § 2144.04(VI)). The Examiner concludes that modifying Desai’s display by moving it to the interior of the vehicle as taught by Secor would have been obvious “in order to take advantage of the safety features disclosed by Secor.” Id. (citing Secor col. 1,11. 24—36). Appellants argue the combination of Secor and Desai does not disclose disposing a display screen at an interior portion of a vehicle door or providing a mirror and display as a unit, the references teach away from one another and the claimed invention, and the motivation for combining Desai and Secor results from impermissible hindsight reasoning. App. Br. 14—21, Reply Br. 2—6. Analysis Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 14—21) do not persuade us of error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 (Final Act. 4—5). We adopt the Examiner’s findings and conclusion that claim 1 is obvious (id.) and the 3 Appeal 2017-007029 Application 14/354,674 Examiner’s response (Ans. 2-4) to Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 14—21), which Appellants do not persuasively rebut (see, generally, Reply Br. 2—7). We highlight the following for emphasis. Appellants do not persuasively rebut the Examiner’s finding that disposing a display screen at an interior portion of a vehicle door is not a patentable distinction because it involves the mere rearrangement of parts. See Final Act. 5 (citing MPEP § 2144.04 (VI)), In re Japikse, 181 F.2d 1019, 86 USPQ 70 (CCPA 1950) (Claims to a hydraulic power press which read on the prior art except with regard to the position of the starting switch were held unpatentable because shifting the position of the starting switch would not have modified the operation of the device.). Appellants do not dispute the Examiner’s finding that Secor discloses multiple possible display locations in the interior of the vehicle. Ans. 2. As in Japikse, we find insufficient persuasive argument or evidence that locating the display at the interior portion of the vehicle door, as opposed to one of the locations disclosed by Secor, would modify operation of the device, or would be beyond the skill of the ordinarily skilled artisan. See KSR Int 7 Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (“if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill”). See also Moscovitch,2 Fig. 15 (cited by the Examiner (Ans. 2) as evidence that placing a display anywhere within a vehicle, including at a vehicle door interior, was well known). 2 US 2008/0149796 Al, published June 26, 2008. 4 Appeal 2017-007029 Application 14/354,674 We also find unpersuasive of error Appellants’ contention that the cited references do not teach or suggest “wherein said exterior rearview mirror assembly and said video display screen are part of a mirror and display module that is mountable as a unit at a door of the equipped vehicle,” when the “video display screen is disposed at an interior portion of the vehicle door.” App. Br. 16—21. Desai (see, e.g., Fig. 1) clearly discloses the argued limitation except for the interior mounting of the display, which is taught by Secor (see, e.g., Fig. 3). Hence, the combined teachings of the references, together with the knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in the art (see, e.g., Moscovitch, Fig. 15 (evidencing that mounting a display anywhere in a vehicle, including the door, was well known)) renders claim 1 obvious, as the Examiner concludes (Final Act. 4—5). See KSR Int 7 Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (“if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.”). We also find unpersuasive Appellants’ contentions that “Desai teaches away from an interior display element by its teaching that the mirror location of the blind spot video image display is provided so that the driver may readily view the blind spot area via the exterior rearview mirror (see paragraph [0007] of Desai),” “Desai clearly discloses the importance of providing the display in the respective exterior rearview mirror assembly, and teaches away from providing an interior display,” and “Secor clearly discloses that its display eliminates the need for an exterior rearview mirror and thus teaches away from combining its display with Desai's exterior rearview mirror.” App. Br. 16—17. “A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference would be led in a 5 Appeal 2017-007029 Application 14/354,674 direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Haruna, 249 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Appellants provide insufficient persuasive argument or evidence to convince us that the references’ alternative teachings amount to “teaching away.” Teaching another way is not teaching away. See DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Appellants’ contention that the Examiner relies on hindsight {see, e.g., App. Br. 20) also is unpersuasive because the contention is unsupported by sufficient persuasive argument or evidence that the Examiner impermissibly relied on hindsight reasoning. As long as an obvious rejection “takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure,” reasoning based on hindsight reconstruction is permissible. In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395, (CCPA 1971). Notably, Appellants have not persuasively rebutted that Secor’s “safety features” (col. 1,11. 24—36) would have motivated a person having ordinary skill in the art to combine the reference teachings in the manner claimed as the Examiner finds (Final Act. 5). Secor discloses in order to look at the rearward traffic conditions in the right side mirror, the operator has to take his or her eyes off the road ahead and instead divert his or her attention onto the small view provided by the outside mirror. This is often done even while traffic conditions ahead are rapidly changing. However, for safe vehicle operation the need to divert one’s attention from the road should be minimized. Also, the outside mirror adjustment depends on the operator position, and so if the driver adjusts the 6 Appeal 2017-007029 Application 14/354,674 seat upwards or downwards, or back or forth, the outside mirrors also have to be readjusted. Secor col. 1,11. 24—36. Appellants incorrectly reason that Secor’s safety features would lead a skilled artisan to “eliminate the exterior mirror from the vehicle.” This overlooks that relocating what the mirror displays (i.e., “rearward traffic conditions”) to, for example, an interior-mounted display, rather than eliminating the mirrors, also is in line with Secor’s disclosure. In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner’s decision to reject claim 1. Claims 2—19, 22, and 23 We have reviewed Appellants’ arguments alleging error of the Examiner’s rejections of claims 2—19, 22, and 23. App. Br. 21—42, Reply Br. 7—18. We are unpersuaded of error for the reasons stated by the Examiner. Ans. 4—11. We adopt the Examiner’s findings and conclusion that claims 2—19, 22, and 23 are unpatentable (Final Act. 5—11) and the Examiner’s response to Appellants’ arguments (Ans. 4—11), which Appellants do not persuasively rebut (Reply Br. 7—18). DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1—19, 22, and 23. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 7 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation