Ex Parte O

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jan 30, 2007

10408875 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 30, 2007)

The opinion in support of the decision being entered today was not
written for publication and is not binding precedent of the Board.

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte KEVIN A. O’DEA
____________

Appeal No. 2006-2012
Application No. 10/408,875
Technology Center 3600
____________

ON BRIEF
____________

Before OWENS, BAHR and FETTING, Administrative Patent Judges.
OWENS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This appeal is from a rejection of claims 1-7, 9-17 and 19-
25, which are all of the pending claims.
THE INVENTION
The appellant claims a method, computer readable medium and
system for controlling a motor vehicle’s braking system when a
“coefficient condition”, i.e., a split coefficient surface
condition, exists.1 Claim 1 is illustrative:
A method of controlling a brake system of a vehicle,

1 The appellant’s specification states that “[a] split coefficient road
surface is one where the coefficient of friction on one side of the vehicle is
significantly different than that on the other side. A road with ice or snow
partially covering its surface is an example of a split coefficient road
surface” (page 1, lines 13-15).
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the method comprising:
determining a coefficient condition;
determining vehicle yaw;
determining a driver’s corrective action;
determining a brake pressure control response based on
the coefficient condition, vehicle yaw, and the driver’s
corrective action.

THE REFERENCE
Hartmann et al. (Hartmann) 5,388,896 Feb. 14, 1995
THE REJECTION
Claims 1-7, 9-17 and 19-25 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Hartmann.
OPINION
We affirm the aforementioned rejection.
The appellant states that the claims stand or fall together
(brief, page 4). We therefore limit our discussion to one claim,
i.e., claim 1. See 37 CFR § 41.37(c)(1)(vii)(2004).
Hartmann discloses a method for braking motor vehicle wheels
on a split coefficient road surface where a yawing moment tends
to turn the motor vehicle in the direction of the higher
coefficient of friction (col. 1, lines 11-21). Hartmann
determines a maximum permissible rate of yaw with the aid of the
steering angle and the vehicle speed, compares that maximum
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permissible rate of yaw to the actual rate of yaw, and uses the
calculated deviation to determine wheel-brake slippages and
braking pressures (col. 4, line 60 – col. 5, line 2).
The appellant argues that Hartmann does not determine the
driver’s corrective action but, rather, uses steering angle as a
continuous input into the brake regulation system (brief, page 5;
reply brief, page 3). Hartmann does not disclose that the
steering angle is a continuous input to the brake regulation
system. What Hartmann discloses is that the maximum permissible
rate of yaw is calculated with the aid of the steering angle
(col. 4, lines 64-66). Regardless, whether or not Hartmann’s
steering angle is a continuous input, the steering angle is the
driver’s corrective action to the split coefficient condition.
Thus, its determination meets the appellant’s claim 1 requirement
of “determining a driver’s corrective action”.
The appellant argues, without providing any support, that
“corrective action”, as that term is used by those skilled in the
art, is limited to response to a split coefficient road surface
and excludes merely driving around a corner or a curve (reply
brief, page 2). The appellant’s argument is not persuasive even
if it is correct, because Hartmann’s method does not pertain to
merely driving around a corner or a curve but, instead, deals
with correcting for a split coefficient road surface condition
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(col. 1, lines 15-19; col. 2, lines 23-25). Hence, Hartmann’s
corrective action is the type of action which, according to the
appellant’s argument, falls within the meaning of “corrective
action” to those of ordinary skill in the art.
The appellant argues, in reliance upon Hartmann’s column 5,
lines 3-7, that “Hartmann continuously regulates brake pressure,
before and after any μ-split braking condition, and independent
of whether the driver takes corrective action” (brief, page 6).
The portion of Hartmann relied upon by the appellant does not
state that the brake pressure is regulated continuously, before
and after any μ-split braking condition, or independently of
whether the driver takes corrective action. Instead, that
portion states that a signal is generated when a μ-split-braking
situation is recognized. That is what the appellant’s method
does; if and only if a μ-split condition is detected is the
driver’s corrective action and corresponding brake pressure
control response determined (specification, page 4, lines 7-14).
The appellant argues that “determining a driver’s corrective
action is not the same as calculating a maximum permissible rate
of yaw, although both may use steering angle as input” (brief,
page 5). The relevant issue is whether Hartmann determines a
driver’s corrective action, not whether determining a driver’s
corrective action is the same as calculating a maximum
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permissible rate of yaw. Like the appellant (specification,
page 4, lines 11-13), Hartmann indicates the driver’s corrective
action by the steering angle (as discussed above).
The appellant argues, in reliance upon Hartmann’s column 1,
lines 24-26 and column 2, lines 25-27, that Hartmann slows the
build-up of yawing moment enough to require relatively light
countersteering at the beginning of the braking operation,
thereby giving the driver time to countersteer, whereas the
appellant’s method takes advantage of the driver’s corrective
action to decrease stopping distance when the driver is
correcting (brief, pages 5-6). Thus, the appellant argues,
Hartmann facilitates countersteering, whereas the appellant’s
method takes advantage of countersteering (brief, page 5). In
the appellant’s method, if the driver does not correct or stops
correcting, brake pressure is controlled to reduce yaw
(specification, page 4, lines 17-19). As in Hartmann’s method
(col. 2, lines 4-9), that yaw reduction gives the driver time to
countersteer. Only if the driver countersteers is the
appellant’s brake pressure allowed to increase such that the
motor vehicle stops more quickly (specification, page 4,
lines 14-17). Hartmann likewise takes the steering angle into
account in determining the pressures applied to the brakes
(col. 4, line 62 – col. 5, line 2). Hence, the argued
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distinction between the methods of the appellant and Hartmann
does not exist.
For the above reasons we find the appellant’s claimed
invention to be anticipated by Hartmann.
DECISION
The rejection of claims 1-7, 9-17 and 19-25 under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) over Hartmann is affirmed.

No time period for taking any subsequent action in
connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 CFR
§ 1.136(a).

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Application No. 10/408,875

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AFFIRMED

)
TERRY J. OWENS )
Administrative Patent Judge )
)
)
)
) BOARD OF PATENT
JENNIFER D. BAHR ) APPEALS
Administrative Patent Judge ) AND
) INTERFERENCES
)
)
)
ANTON W. FETTING )
Administrative Patent Judge )

DELPHI TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
M/C 480-410-202
P.O. BOX 5052
TROY, MI 48007

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