Ex Parte Nomula

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 18, 2017

12880476 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 18, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/880,476 09/13/2010 Jagdeshwar Reddy Nomula 2043.856US1 9199
49845 7590 12/20/2017
SCHWEGMAN LUNDBERG & WOESSNER/EBAY
P.O. BOX 2938
MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55402
EXAMINER
PATEL, DIPEN M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3688
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/20/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
USPTO@SLWIP.COM
SLW @blackhillsip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JAGDESHWAR REDDY NOMULA
Appeal 2016-0037571
Application 12/880,4762
Technology Center 3600
Before HUBERT C. LORIN, ANTON W. FETTING, and
MATTHEW S. METERS, Administrative Patent Judges.
MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1, 5, 6, 10, 11, 15, 16, and 20-27. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Br.,” filed
July 27, 2015), the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed October 29, 2015),
and Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed March 23, 2015).
2 Appellant identifies eBay Inc., as the real party in interest (Br. 3).
Appeal 2016-003757
Application 12/880,476
CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellant’s claims relate “generally to the technical field of data
management and, in one specific example, to generating a user interface
based on predicted yield” (Spec. 11).
Claims 1,11, and 21 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1
reproduced below, with minor formatting changes and added bracketed
notations, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal:
1. A method comprising:
[a] in response to a first request for a first set of secondary
content for display with a selected item to a user, identifying a
graphical user interface (GUI) having a first set of available slots
to be populated with the first set of secondary content and a
second set of available slots to be populated with a second set of
secondary content, criteria for populating the first set of available
slots being different from criteria for populating the second set
of available slots;
[b] identifying a first plurality of pieces of secondary
content, each of the first plurality of pieces of secondary content
comprising, in accordance with the criteria for populating the
first set of available slots, a description of an item for sale that is
a related product for the selected item;
[c] identifying a second plurality of pieces of secondary
content, each of the second plurality of pieces of secondary
content comprising, in accordance with the criteria for
populating the second set of available slots, a description of an
item for sale identified based on a search history of the user;
[d] calculating, using one or more processors, a revenue
yield for each of the respective first plurality of pieces of
secondary content based on the first set of available slots in the
GUI, the revenue yield for each of the respective first plurality
of pieces of secondary content based on the price of the item for
sale described by the respective piece of secondary content;
[e] analyzing the revenue yields for the first plurality of
pieces of secondary content according to a combinatorial
optimization algorithm;
2
Appeal 2016-003757
Application 12/880,476
[f] populating the first set of secondary content with
selected ones of the first plurality of pieces of secondary content
based on the analysis of the revenue yields for the first plurality
of pieces of secondary content;
[g] calculating a revenue yield for each of the respective
second plurality of pieces of secondary content based on the
second set of available slots in the GUI;
[h] analyzing the revenue yields for the second plurality of
pieces of secondary content according to the combinatorial
optimization algorithm;
[i] populating the second set of secondary content with
selected ones of the second plurality of pieces of secondary
content based on the analysis of the revenue yields for the second
plurality of pieces of secondary content;
[j] generating instructions to place the first set of
secondary content in the first set of available slots; and
[k] generating instructions to place the second set of
secondary content in the second set of available slots.
REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 5, 6, 10, 11, 15, 16, and 20-27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter.
Claims 1, 5, 6, 10, 11, 15, 16, and 20-27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Muthukrishnan (US 2010/0198694 Al, pub.
Aug. 5, 2010), Lin (US 2008/0097838 Al, pub. Apr. 24, 2008), Caron (US
2011/0196748 Al, pub. Aug. 11, 2011), and Gupta (US 6,487,538 Bl, iss.
Nov. 26, 2002).
3
Appeal 2016-003757
Application 12/880,476
ANALYSIS
Non-statutory subject matter
Independent claims 1, 11, and 21, and dependent claims 5, 6, 10, 11, 15, 16,
20, and22—27
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a patent may be obtained for “any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof.” The Supreme Court has “long held that
this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice Corp. Pty.
Ltd. v. CLS Bank Inti, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting Assn for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116
(2013)).
The Supreme Court in Alice reiterated the two-step framework, set
forth previously in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 78—79 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-
eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. The first
step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed
to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. If so, the second step is to
consider the elements of the claims “individually and ‘as an ordered
combination”’ to determine whether the additional elements “‘transform the
nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (citing Mayo, 566
U.S. at 79, 78).
In other words, the second step is to “search for an ‘inventive
concept’—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to
ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. (alteration in original) (citing
4
Appeal 2016-003757
Application 12/880,476
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72—73). The Court acknowledged in Mayo, that “all
inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of
nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.” Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71. We,
therefore, look to whether the claims focus on a specific means or method
that improves the relevant technology or are instead directed to a result or
effect that itself is the abstract idea, and merely invoke generic processes and
machinery. See Enfish, LLCv. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
In rejecting claims 1, 5, 6, 10, 11, 15, 16, and 20-27 as being directed
to an abstract idea, the Examiner finds
claims 1,11, and 21 are directed to abstract idea of presenting
targeted advertisements, based on “apply it” type instructions,
implemented on a generic computer. The targeted
advertisements (a way to organize human activities between
buyers and seller to drive sales, which is in a way fundamental
economic practice) are retrieved from databases based on criteria
(abstract ideas) implemented on a generic computer.
(Final Act. 3 4). The Examiner further finds “[t]he claim merely amounts to
the application or instructions to apply the abstract idea on a computer, and
is considered to amount to nothing more than requiring a generic computer
system to merely carry out the abstract idea itself’ {id. at 4).
In response, Appellant argues that “the Examiner has not presented
‘substantial evidence’ in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act
to substantiate the rejections of claims 1, 5, 6, 10, 11, 15, 16, and 20-27
under 35 U.S.C. § 101” (Br. 17—18) because the Examiner’s rejection “rests
on mere conclusory statements without any relevant articulated reasoning”
(id. at 18—19). More particularly, Appellant argues that the Examiner
“provides no citation, argument, or reasoning supported by rational
5
Appeal 2016-003757
Application 12/880,476
underpinnings but merely alleges an abstract idea in naked isolation” (id. at
19-21 (citing Ex parte Renald Poisson, Appeal 2012-011084, slip op. at 5
(PTAB Feb. 27, 2015)). However, we agree with the Examiner that the
claims are directed broadly to the abstract idea of “presenting targeted
advertisements” (see Final Act. 3). And, to the extent Appellant argues that
the Examiner erred in adequately supporting this determination by providing
analysis (see Br. 16—21), Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive.
At the outset, we note Poisson is not a precedential decision, and as
such, we are not bound by it. Moreover, we do not consider the decision in
Poisson to be on point to the issue in this case. In Poisson, the Board
rejected the Examiner’s conclusion that the claims were directed to an
abstract idea of a new set of rules for playing a card game (see Poisson, slip
op. at 5). In making that determination, the Board found that the claims
involved playing a game of football “using a table and cards,” and, thus,
reversed the Examiner’s rejection because the Examiner did not provide
adequate findings of fact “on which to base the Alice analysis” (id.). Thus,
the Board concluded that the facts and evidence relied upon by the Examiner
did not support a finding that the claim was an ineligible abstract idea (see
id.). In contrast to the Poisson case, here, the Examiner provides adequate
findings of fact, as identified above, that the claims are directed to an
abstract idea (see, e.g., Final Act. 3—5; see also Ans. 4—5). We note that
Appellant’s Appeal Brief does not identify any particular deficiency with the
Examiner’s findings; it rather merely asserts that “the Examiner has cited no
support or evidence and has provided no argument or reasoning as to why”
the claims are directed to an abstract idea (see Br. 17—18).
6
Appeal 2016-003757
Application 12/880,476
More importantly, there is no requirement that Examiners must
provide evidentiary support in every case before a conclusion can be made
that a claim is directed to an abstract idea. See, e.g., Section IV “July 2015
Update: Subject Matter Eligibility'1'’ to 2014 Interim Guidance on Subject
Matter Eligibility (2014 IEG), 79 Fed. Reg. 74618 (Dec. 16, 2014) (“The
courts consider the determination of whether a claim is eligible (which
involves identifying whether an exception such as an abstract idea is being
claimed) to be a question of law. Accordingly, courts do not rely on
evidence that a claimed concept is a judicial exception, and in most cases
resolve the ultimate legal conclusion on eligibility without making any
factual findings.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).3 We agree that
evidence may be helpful in certain situations where, for instance, facts are in
dispute. But it is not always necessary. Based on the above analysis set
forth by the Examiner, we are unpersuaded it is necessary in this case.
Instead, we need only look to other decisions where similar concepts
were previously found abstract by the courts. See Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v.
Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Instead of a
definition [for what an ‘abstract idea’ encompasses], then, the decisional
mechanism courts now apply is to examine earlier cases in which a similar
or parallel descriptive nature can be seen—what prior cases were about, and
which way they were decided.”).
To that end, as noted above, the Examiner finds the claims are
directed to the abstract idea of “presenting targeted advertisements” (Final
Act. 3), and more particularly, finds the claims are directed to “targeted
3 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-july-
2015-update.pdf.
7
Appeal 2016-003757
Application 12/880,476
advertisements (a way to organize human activities between buyers and
seller to drive sales, which is in a way fundamental economic practice) [that]
are retrieved from databases based on criteria (abstract ideas) implemented
on a generic computer” (id. at 3 4). Broadly, we agree that the Examiner is
correct.
According to Appellant’s disclosure, the present application relates to
“[a] method and a system to place secondary content in predetermined slots
in a graphical user interface based on a predicted revenue yield” (see
Abstract; see also Spec. 113). The Specification identifies that “[t]he
revenue yield may be used to calculate an improved way to populate the
slots in an interface with the secondary content” (Spec. 113). The
Specification further discloses that “[t]he ‘revenue yield’ of a piece of
secondary content displayed in a particular slot is defined as an anticipated
revenue to be derived from the user’s interaction with the piece of secondary
content when it is placed in the particular slot” (Spec. 113) using well-
known factors (see, e.g., id. 124) and calculated by known methods such as
“using a weighted average, a normalization factor, or the like” (id. 124).
And, taking independent claim 1 as representative, the claimed subject
matter is generally directed to “[a] method” that “in response to a first
request for a first set of secondary content for display with a selected item to
a user” includes steps for “identifying a [GUI] having a first [and second] set
of available slots to be populated with the first [and second] set of secondary
content” using different criteria for populating the first and second available
slots, “identifying a first [and different second] plurality of pieces of
secondary content” for populating the first and second available slots in
accordance with their criteria, “[calculating ... a revenue yield for each of
8
Appeal 2016-003757
Application 12/880,476
the respective first [and second] plurality of pieces of secondary content
based on the first [and second] set of available slots in the GUI,” “analyzing
the revenue yields for the first [and second] plurality of pieces of secondary
content according to a combinatorial optimization algorithm,” “populating
the first [and second] set of secondary content with selected ones of the first
[and second] plurality of pieces of secondary content based on the analysis
of the revenue yields for the first [and second] plurality of pieces of
secondary content,” and “generating instructions to place the first [and
second] set of secondary content in the first [and second] set of available
slots.”
In this regard, the concept of “presenting targeted advertisements,” to
which claim 1 has been found to be directed to, is similar to the fundamental
economic and conventional business practices our reviewing court have
deemed ineligible. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 713
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (using advertisement as currency); Intellectual Ventures I
LLCv. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(tailoring information presented to a user based on particular information);
and Affinity Labs of Texas, LLCv. Amazon.com, Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1271
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (customizing a user interface to have targeted advertising
based on user information). The presenting of targeted advertisement based
on a predicted revenue yield is similar to these abstract ideas, and, thus, we
determine that the claims are directed to an abstract idea.4 We also note that
4 See also Morsa v. Facebook, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1014 (C.D. Cal.
2014) (claims directed to “targeting advertisements to certain consumers,
and using a bidding system to determine when and how advertisements will
be displayed” held to be directed to an abstract idea), aff’d, 622 F. App’x
915 (Fed. Cir. 2015). As noted by the court in Morsa, matching consumers
9
Appeal 2016-003757
Application 12/880,476
the claims involve nothing more than displaying advertisements, i.e.,
populating slots, by identifying and analyzing information, without any
particular inventive technology — an abstract idea. See Elec. Power Grp.,
LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353—54 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (when “the
focus of the asserted claims” is “on collecting information, analyzing it, and
displaying certain results of the collection and analysis,” the claims are
directed to an abstract idea). See also Accenture Global Servs., GmbHv.
Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (claims
reciting “generalized software components arranged to implement an
abstract concept [of generating insurance-policy-related tasks based on rules
to be completed upon the occurrence of an event] on a computer” not patent
eligible).
We also are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the claims
are not directed to an abstract idea because “the claims preempt the entire
field of ‘presenting targeted advertisements’ in a particular technological
environment (e.g., online)” (Br. 22—23; see id. at 26—27). Although the
Supreme Court has described “the concern that drives this exclusionary
principle^ i.e., the exclusion of abstract ideas from patent eligible subject
matter,] as one of pre-emption” {Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354), characterizing
pre-emption as a driving concern for patent eligibility is not the same as
with a given product or service “has been practiced as long as markets have
been in operation.” Id. (quoting Tuxis Technologies, LLC v. Amazon.com,
Inc., No. CV 13-1771-RGA, 2014 WL 4382446, at *5 (D. Del. Sept. 3,
2014)); see also OpenTV, Inc. v. NetflixInc., 76 F. Supp. 3d 886, 893 (N.D.
Cal. 2014) (“The concept of gathering information about one’s intended
market and attempting to customize the information then provided is as old
as the saying, ‘know your audience.’”).
10
Appeal 2016-003757
Application 12/880,476
characterizing pre-emption as the sole test for patent eligibility. “The
Supreme Court has made clear that the principle of preemption is the basis
for the judicial exceptions to patentability” and “[f]or this reason, questions
on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis.” Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354). Although “preemption may signal patent
ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not
demonstrate patent eligibility.” Id.', cf. OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com,
Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362—63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[Tjhat the claims do not
preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the
e-commerce setting do not make them any less abstract.”), cert denied, 136
S. Ct. 701 (2015).
We also find unpersuasive Appellant’s argument that the claims are
not directed to an abstract idea because “the claims at issue solve a
technological problem in conventional industry practice of, for example,
using GUIs with multiple sets of slots to be filled using different criteria”
(Br. 34). In DDR Holdings, LLCv. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256
(Fed. Cir. 2014), the Federal Circuit determined that the claims addressed
the problem of retaining website visitors who, if adhering to the routine,
conventional functioning of Internet hyperlink protocol, would be
transported instantly away from a host’s website after clicking on an
advertisement and activating a hyperlink. DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257.
The Federal Circuit, thus, held that the claims were directed to statutory
subject matter because they claim a solution “necessarily rooted in computer
technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm
of computer networks.” Id. In contrast, there is no indication here that the
11
Appeal 2016-003757
Application 12/880,476
claimed invention requires something other than the normal, conventional
computer functions of identifying, determining, and presenting data.
Step two is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself.’” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (alteration in original) (citing
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73).
Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, we are not persuaded
by Appellant’s arguments that “[a]n analysis of the relevant factors weighs
in favor of the subject matter eligibility of the claims at issue” (Br. 28).
Instead, we agree with the Examiner that “[t]he elements of the instant
process, when taken in combination, together do not offer substantially more
than the sum of the functions of the elements when each is taken alone”
(Final Act. 4 (emphasis omitted)). More particularly, we agree with the
Examiner that
the elements involved in the recited process undertake their roles
in performance of their activities according to their generic
functionalities which are well-understood, routine and
conventional. The elements together execute in routinely and
conventionally accepted coordinated manner and interact with
their partner elements to achieve an overall outcome which,
similarly, is merely the combined and coordinated execution of
generic computer functionalities which are well-understood,
routine and conventional activities previously known to the
industry.
(Id. (emphasis omitted)).
Appellant argues that “the method claims at issue in this case not only
recite ‘one or more processors’ to perform various operations, but also ‘a
graphical user interface’” (Br. 28—29), and “[g]iven the disclosure in the
12
Appeal 2016-003757
Application 12/880,476
[Specification, it is clear that the claims recite a specially-configured
computer” {id. at 29). However, Appellant does not point to a particular
portion of the Specification to show where the Specification discloses a
“specially-configured computer” that transforms the abstract idea into
patent-eligible subject matter. Nor does Appellant provide adequate
evidence or technical reasoning that the claims improve some existing
technological process or solves some technological problem in conventional
industry practice, such as in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). See
Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (finding that the “claims recit[ed] a commonplace business method
aimed at processing business information despite being applied on a general
purpose computer”), cert, denied, 136 S. Ct. 2510 (2016); see also Alice,
134 S. Ct. at 2359.
Here, we find the steps of identifying, determining, and presenting
data amount to nothing more than mere instructions to implement the
abstract idea on a computer—none of which add inventiveness because they
merely require the application of conventional, well-known analytical steps.
See Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716 (“[T]he claimed sequence of steps
comprises only ‘conventional steps, specified at a high level of generality,’
which is insufficient to supply an ‘inventive concept.’” (citing Alice, 134
S. Ct. at 2357)). In this regard, the Specification discloses that the claimed
process may be implemented on “a general-purpose processor” (see Spec.
143) in a wide variety of machines {see id. 45—47) using well-known
factors {see, e.g., id. 124) and known methods (id.) to determine a “revenue
yield.” Thus, each limitation does no more than require a generic computer
to perform generic computer functions.
13
Appeal 2016-003757
Application 12/880,476
And, considered as an ordered combination, the computer components
of Appellant’s independent claim 1 add nothing that is not already present
when the limitations are considered separately. Viewed as a whole,
Appellant’s claims simply recite the concept of “placing] secondary content
in predetermined slots in a graphical user interface based on a predicted
revenue yield” (see Abstract). The claims do not, for example, purport to
improve the functioning of the computer itself. Nor do they effect an
improvement in any other technology or technical field. Instead, the claims
at issue amount to nothing significantly more than an instruction to apply the
abstract idea of “presenting targeted advertisements” (Final Act. 3), which
under our precedents, is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a
patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360.
In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 101 of independent claim 1, 11, and 21.
Appellant also argues separately dependent claims 5, 6, 10, 15, 16, 20,
and 22—27 (see Br. 21—22). As we find, however, that dependent claims 5,
6, 10, 15, 16, 20, and 22—27 merely describe further characteristics of the
underlying concept and lack additional elements that would render the
claims patent-eligible, we also sustain the rejection under § 101 of these
dependent claims on the same basis as the independent claims from which
they depend. In particular, the dependent claims merely recite variations
related to the calculation of the “revenue yield,” which we discern sits
squarely within, and does not alter appreciably, the broader concept of
“presenting targeted advertisements.”
14
Appeal 2016-003757
Application 12/880,476
Obviousness
Independent claims 1, 11, and 21, and dependent claims 5, 6, 10, 15, 16, 20,
and 22—27
Appellant argues claims 1, 5, 6, 10, 11, 15, 16, and 20—27 as a group
(see Br. 13—16). We select independent claim 1 as representative. Claims 5,
6, 10, 11, 15, 16, and 20—27 stand or fall with independent claim 1. See
37C.F.R. §41.37(c)(l)(iv).
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner
erred in rejecting independent claims 1 and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
because the combination of Muthukrishnan, Lin, Caron, and Gupta does not
disclose or suggest limitation [a] of independent claim 1, and similarly
recited by independent claim 21 (Br. 13—14). Instead, we agree with, and
adopt the Examiner’s findings and rationales (see Final Act. 5—13 (citing
Muthukrishnan || 2, 3, 21—25, 28, 32—34, 37 46, 47, 51, 56, Figs. 1, 2, Table
2; Caron || 2, 38, 42, 45, 57, 58, Figs. 1, 2; Gupta, col. 6,11. 23—45; col. 9,
11. 14—25; and col. 12,11., 8—22); see also Ans. 6—13 (citing Muthukrishnan
7, 16)). We add the following discussion for emphasis.
Muthukrishnan is directed to an auction subsystem that “identifies an
optimal slot configuration based on bids received from content providers”
(Muthukrishnan 116). More particularly, Muthukrishnan discloses that “the
optimal slot configuration is the slot configuration that maximizes a
cumulative value of the slots to the content providers that are allocated the
slots” (id.; see also id. H 45—51). In this regard, Muthukrishnan discloses
[t]he slot can be an advertisement slot and a slot configuration
can be an advertisement slot configuration. Each advertisement
slot configuration can define an advertisement type that is
eligible to have a corresponding bid for the advertisement slots.
15
Appeal 2016-003757
Application 12/880,476
Each slot configuration can define a unique number of slots.
Each slot configuration can define a unique orientation of slots.
(Id. 17). Muthukrishnan further discloses
[t]he advertisement slot configuration defines a unique number
and/or unique orientation of advertisement slots in the webpage.
The advertisement slot configuration can also define an
advertisement type that is eligible to have a corresponding bid
for the advertisement slots. A publisher 106 can define the
advertisement slot configuration for each of the publisher's
webpages. In turn, the requested advertisements can be
presented in the advertisement slots defined by the advertisement
slot configuration.
(Id. 125). Muthukrishnan discloses “configuration data can specify a
number of advertisement slots and/or an orientation of the advertisement
slots in the optimal advertisement slot configuration” (id. 1104).
Caron is directed to “an advertising account management interface”
that “allows a user to define a number of variables and to specify multiple
values for each of the variables” (Caron, Abstract). Caron further discloses
[t]he interface also allows the user to create one or more
advertising account entry templates (e.g., campaign template, ad
group template, advertisement template, and keyword template)
by specifying invariable advertising parameters for some input
fields of the templates and variable advertising parameters for
other input fields of the templates.
(Id/, see also id. 142). Caron discloses that “advertisements can be
dynamically selected and served on publishers’ webpages according to the
various targeting criteria specified by the advertiser” (id. 13; see also id.
145). Caron further discloses
[i]n addition to keywords, for each ad group, the advertiser can
also specify a number of advertisements for selection by the ad
server when an advertising opportunity becomes available and
matches the budget, ad schedule, maximum bids, keywords, and
16
Appeal 2016-003757
Application 12/880,476
targeting criteria specified for the ad group. Different types of
ads can be included in an ad group, such as a text ad, an image
ad, a local business ad, a mobile ad, and so on.
(Id. 1 57).
Gupta is directed to a system “for local advertising on the [IJntemet”
(Gupta, col. 5,11. 66—67; see also id. at col. 8,11. 49-57). Gupta discloses
that its system “collects] and store[s] information regarding particular users
in a user profile” {id. at col. 6,11. 23—45; see also id. at col. 9,11. 14—25).
Gupta further discloses that “[o]nce desired databases are established, a
policy for selecting the advertisement to insert may be utilized” {id. at col.
12,11. 8—9). For example, “a policy that displays the most expensive
advertisements for a particular slot” or “the advertisement may be selected
based on the number of advertisements placed by an advertiser” {id. at col.
12,11. 9-22).
Appellant argues that each of Muthukrishnan, Lin, Caron, and Gupta
is directed to “various ways of selecting content for presentation” (Br. 14),
and as such, “do not teach or suggest having ‘a first set of available slots to
be populated with a first set of secondary content’ according to ‘criteria’ and
‘a second set of available slots to be populated with a second set of
secondary content’ according to ‘different. . . criteria’ as claimed” {id.).
However, we agree with the Examiner that, in Muthukrishnan, “it is possible
that two different advertisers win” bids for advertisement slots (Ans. 6
(citing Muthukrishnan 116)) and “[e]ach advertisement slot configuration
can define an advertisement type that is eligible to have a corresponding bid
for the advertisement slots” (Ans. 7 (citing Muthukrishnan 17)).
Muthukrishnan further discloses
17
Appeal 2016-003757
Application 12/880,476
[t]he advertisement slot configuration can also define an
advertisement type that is eligible to have a corresponding bid
for the advertisement slots. A publisher 106 can define the
advertisement slot configuration for each of the publisher's
webpages. In turn, the requested advertisements can be
presented in the advertisement slots defined by the advertisement
slot configuration.
(Muthukrishnan 125). Therefore, in contrast to Appellant’s argument that
“the Examiner ignores the difference between having criteria associated with
a GUI and criteria associated with an advertising campaign” (Br. 14), we
agree with the Examiner that Muthukrishnan discloses different criteria5
associated with a GUT
In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of independent claim 1, and claims 5, 6, 10, 11, 15, 16,
and 20-27, which fall with independent claim 1.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 5, 6, 10, 11, 15, 16, and 20-27
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 5, 6, 10, 11, 15, 16, and 20-27
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
5 We note that the term “criteria” does not appear in Appellant’s
Specification.
18