Ex Parte NIEJADLIK et alDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMay 30, 201912795586 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 30, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 12/795,586 17169 7590 Stephen M. De Klerk MatterLight IP 2033 Gateway Place 5th Floor San Jose, CA 95110 06/07/2010 06/03/2019 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Martine NIEJADLIK UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. BOKU-P020 1234 EXAMINER MACASIANO, MARILYN G ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3688 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/03/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ariana@matterlightip.com s tephen @matterlightip.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte MAR TINE NIEJADLIK, MICHAEL WILLIAMS, and JONATHAN MICHAEL KINGSTON Appeal2018-003177 Application 12/795,586 Technology Center 3600 Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, JAMES R. HUGHES, and CATHERINE SHAING, Administrative Patent Judges. COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1-19, which are all the claims pending in this application. 1 Claim 20 is canceled. We have jurisdiction over the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We affirm. 1 The real party in interest is Boku, Inc. App. Br. 3. Appeal2018-003177 Application 12/795,586 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction Appellants' claimed invention "relate[ s] to mobile communications in general and, more particularly but not limited to, mobile communications to facilitate online transactions." Spec. ,r 2. Exemplary Claim 1. A computer-implemented method, comprising: storing, by at least one server computer, information identifying an item and a seller of the item, the item to be presented in an advertisement to a mobile phone at a phone number; embedding in the advertisement a reference to an interchange to generate a purchase request to the interchange computer when the advertisement is selected, the advertisement further having an indication of the item offered in the advertisement; embedding a phone number of a mobile phone in the advertisement; transmitting, with the server computer, the advertisement to the mobile phone at the phone number with the phone number of the mobile phone and the reference embedded in the advertisement such that, when the advertisement is selected on the mobile phone, the mobile phone transmits the purchase request with the phone number of the mobile phone to the interchange due to the reference embedded in the advertisement and the interchange receives the phone number of the mobile phone due to the phone number of the mobile phone embedded in the advertisement; receiving, at the interchange, the purchase request generated in response to the advertisement being selected in the mobile phone, the purchase request including the indication of the item and the phone number of the mobile phone due to the phone number of the mobile phone being embedded in the 2 Appeal2018-003177 Application 12/795,586 advertisement and transmission of purchase request with the phone number due to selection of the advertisement; identifying, by the interchange, the seller based on the indication of the item and the information stored by the server computer; and communicating, by the interchange, with a server of the seller to electronically purchase the item on behalf of a user of the mobile phone, using the funds associated with the phone number of the mobile phone via the interchange. Appeal Br. 27-28, "Claims Appendix." (emphasis added regarding claim terms pertaining to advertising, marketing or sales activities.). Rejection 2 Claims 1-19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as being directed to a judicial exception, without significantly more. ANALYSIS We have considered all of Appellants' arguments and any evidence presented. To the extent Appellants have not advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). 2 The Examiner withdrew the rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) in the Answer (2). Therefore, these rejections are not before us on appeal. 3 Appeal2018-003177 Application 12/795,586 Principles of Law-35 U.S.C. § 101 An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a "new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: "[L Jaws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas" are not patentable. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012) (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court's two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Alice Corp. v. CLS Banklnt'l, 573 U.S. 208, 217-18 (2014) (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75-77). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is "directed to." See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 ("On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk." (emphasis omitted)); see also Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) ("Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners' application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk."). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219-20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594--95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as "molding of rubber products" (Diehr, 450 U.S. at 193); "tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores" 4 Appeal2018-003177 Application 12/795,586 (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267---68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that "[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 ("We view respondents' claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula."). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim "seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract ... is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, ... and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment." Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 ("It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection."). If the claim is "directed to" an abstract idea, we tum to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where "we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an 'inventive concept' sufficient to 'transform' the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application." Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 ( quotation marks omitted). "A claim that recites an abstract idea must include 'additional features' to ensure 'that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea]."' Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 5 Appeal2018-003177 Application 12/795,586 566 U.S. at 77). "[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention." Id. Subject Matter Eligibility- 2019 Revised Guidance The USPTO recently published revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) ("2019 Revised Guidance"). This new guidance is applied in this opinion. Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: ( 1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, mental processes, or certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice or managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining Procedure ("MPEP") §§ 2106.05(a}-(c), (e}-(h)). 3 See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51-52, 55. A claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application applies, relies on, or uses the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. When the judicial exception is so integrated, then the claim is not directed to a judicial exception and is patent eligible under § 101. Id. Only if a claim: (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not 3 All references to the MPEP are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 08-201 7 (rev. Jan. 2018). 6 Appeal2018-003177 Application 12/795,586 integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then evaluate whether the claim provides an inventive concept. See 2019 Revised Guidance at 56; Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18. For example, we look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not "well-understood, routine, conventional" in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Because there is no single definition of an "abstract idea" under Alice step 1, the PTO has recently synthesized, for purposes of clarity, predictability, and consistency, key concepts identified by the courts as abstract ideas to explain that the "abstract idea" exception includes the following three groupings: 1. Mathematical concepts-mathematical relationships, mathematical formulas or equations, mathematical calculations; 2. Mental processes-concepts performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion); and 3. Certain methods of organizing human activity-fundamental economic principles or practices (including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions). 7 Appeal2018-003177 Application 12/795,586 See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. According to the 2019 Revised Guidance, "[ c ]laims that do not recite [subject] matter that falls within these enumerated groupings of abstract ideas should not be treated as reciting abstract ideas," except in rare circumstances. Even if the claims recite any one of these three groupings of abstract ideas, these claims are still not "directed to" a judicial exception ( abstract idea), and thus are patent eligible, if "the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application of that exception." See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53. For example, limitations that are indicative of "integration into a practical application" include: 1. Improvements to the functioning of a computer, or to any other technology or technical field - see MPEP § 2106.05(a); 2. Applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine - see MPEP § 2106.05(b ); 3. Effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing - see MPEP § 2106.05(c); and 4. Applying or using the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception - see MPEP § 2106.05(e). In contrast, limitations that are not indicative of "integration into a practical application" include: 1. Adding the words "apply it" ( or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or merely include instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea - see MPEP § 2106.05(±); 8 Appeal2018-003177 Application 12/795,586 2. Adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception - see MPEP § 2106.05(g); and 3. Generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use - see MPEP 2106.05(h). See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54--55 ("Prong Two"). 2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A, Prong One 4 The Judicial Exception Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, we begin our analysis by first considering whether the claims recite any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas, in particular: (a) mathematical concepts, (b) mental steps, and ( c) certain methods of organizing human activities. Turning to independent claim 1, we observe the word "advertisement" is recited fourteen times. The word "advertisement" is also recited fourteen times in remaining independent claim 19. We have emphasized above (in italics) the specific claim terms "advertisement", "seller", and "purchase request" in claim 1. Given the use of these transactional terms, we agree with the Examiner (Final Act. 3) that an abstract idea is recited in claim 1, i.e., a fundamental economic practice, including commercial interactions, further including advertising, and related marketing or sales activities, such as selling and purchasing. 4 Throughout this opinion, we give the claim limitations the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 9 Appeal2018-003177 Application 12/795,586 Moreover, we conclude the recited step of identifying ("identifying, by the interchange, the seller based on the indication of the item and the information stored by the server computer"), could be performed alternatively as a mental step. Therefore, we conclude the step of "identifying" also recites an abstract idea. 5 Independent claims 1 and 19. Because the claims recite an abstract idea, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong Two. 2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A, Prong Two Integration of the Judicial Exception into a Practical Application As noted above, we conclude the advertising, selling, and purchasing limitations of claim 1 recite an abstract idea that is a fundamental economic practice. Under MPEP § 2106.05(a) ("Improvements to the Functioning of a Computer or to Any Other Technology or Technical Field"), Appellants contend: 5 If a method can be performed by human thought alone, or by a human using pen and paper, it is merely an abstract idea and is not patent eligible under§ 101. CyberSource Corp., 654 F.3d at 1372-73; see also Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1146-47 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("While the Supreme Court has altered the § 101 analysis since Cy her Source in cases like Mayo and Alice, we continue to 'treat[] analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category.'" (brackets in original) (quoting Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 ("That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson."). 10 Appeal2018-003177 Application 12/795,586 the claims at issue are not directed to an abstract idea within the meaning of Alice. Rather, they are directed to a specific improvement to the way computers operate, embodied in [the] Customer mobile phone number embedding by a merchant, transmission to a mobile phone, selection on the mobile phone and transmission to an interchange including the phone number. Appeal Br. 12 ( emphasis omitted and added). However, we conclude Appellants' claims merely rely on generic computer hardware, including generic mobile phones, servers, and networks. For example, as described in Appellants' Specification: In one embodiment, advertisements are sent to mobile phones to enable the users of the mobile phones to purchase items via the interchange (101). For example, a merchant can send an advertisement message via wireless technology ( e.g., cellular telecommunications, wireless wide area network (WW AN), wireless local area network (WLAN), wireless personal area network (WP AN), Bluetooth) to the mobile phone (117) of the user. For example, the advertisement can be selected and sent to the mobile phone (117), based on the location of the mobile phone (11 7), when the user approaches the merchant. The user can purchase the item presented on the advertisement via the interchange (101 ). [00205] In one embodiment, merchants can send out mobile messages to alert users about deals on their sites. If the user simply replies to that message, the interchange ( 101) can bill the purchase to the mobile phone (117). Spec. ,r 204. Additionally, "[i]n one embodiment, merchants can send out mobile messages to alert users about deals on their sites. If the user simply replies to that message, the interchange ( 101) can bill the purchase to the mobile phone (117)." Spec. ,r 205 ( emphasis added). Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that, without more, "the additional computer elements, which are recited at a high level of generality, 11 Appeal2018-003177 Application 12/795,586 provide conventional computer functions that do not add meaningful limits to practicing the abstract idea." Final Act. 3. In support of the contention that the claims on appeal are not directed to an abstract idea, Appellants cite to McRo, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016): An "improvement in computer-related technology" is not limited to improvements in the operation of a computer or a computer network per se, but may also be claimed as a set of "rules" (basically mathematical relationships) that improve computer-related technology by allowing computer performance of a function not previously performable by a computer. App. Br. 19-20 ( emphasis added). However, for the reasons which follow, we do not find persuasive Appellants' attempt to analogize the claims on appeal to the subject claims considered by the court inMcRO. Id. We note the subject claim considered by the McRO court concerned a method for automatically animating lip synchronization and facial expressions. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1303. The McRO court concluded the subject claims did not recite an abstract idea because the computer animation improved the prior art through the use of rules, rather than artists, to set morph weights and transitions between phonemes. Id. at 1308. Thus, the claimed invention in McRO allowed for computer performance of animation steps that previously had to be performed by human animators. Id. at 1309. The subject claims in McRO used "limited rules in a process specifically designed to achieve an improved technological result" over "existing, manual 3-D animation techniques." Id. at 1316 (emphasis added). 12 Appeal2018-003177 Application 12/795,586 Here, Appellants' claimed invention does not apply positively recited rules, per se. The invention on appeal merely adapts to a technological setting ( comprising generic servers and mobile devices) the known concept of using advertisements to sell goods that are offered for purchase by a seller. See independent claims 1 and 19. Thus, we agree with the Examiner (Ans. 4) that Appellants' claims merely implement generic technology ( e.g., servers and mobile devices) to perform the recited method steps. We emphasize that McRO also guides: "[t]he abstract idea exception prevents patenting a result where 'it matters not by what process or machinery the result is accomplished."' 837 F.3d at 1312 (quoting O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 (1854)) (emphasis added). MPEP § 2106.05(b) Particular Machine MPEP § 2106.05(c) Particular Transformation Appellants contend, "that the improvement is not defined by reference to 'physical' components does not doom the claims. To hold otherwise risks resurrecting a bright-line machine-or-transformation test, cf Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010)." App. Br. 16. Although Appellants mention the Bilski machine-or-transformation test (id.), Appellants advance no arguments applying the Bilski machine-or- transformation test to any claims on appeal. Nor on this record have Appellants established that the recited "at least one server computer" and "a mobile phone" (independent claims 1 and 19) are "particular" machines under MPEP § 2106.05(b). Arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). 13 Appeal2018-003177 Application 12/795,586 MPEP § 2106.05(e) "Other Meaningful Limitations." As noted above, the Examiner finds: "the additional computer elements, which are recited at a high level of generality, provide conventional computer functions that do not add meaningful limits to practicing the abstract idea." Final Act. 3 ( emphasis added). Appellants advance no arguments in the Appeal Brief pertaining to any specific claim limitations that purportedly provide a meaningful limitation beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment. We conclude Appellants' recited "mobile phone" and "at least one server computer" are merely generic computer components. Appellants' claim 1 limitations are completely unlike the case in Diehr, in which the claim was directed to the use of the Arrhenius equation ( an abstract idea or law of nature) for use in an automated process for operating a rubber-molding press. See 450 U.S. at 177-78. See MPEP § 2106.05(e) "Other Meaningful Limitations." We additionally note that several steps of claim 1 merely perform insignificant extra-solution or post-solution activity, such as storing, embedding, transmitting, receiving, and communicating. See MPEP § 2106.05(g) "Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity." Thus, under Step 2A, Prong Two (MPEP §§ 2106.05(a}-(c) and (e}-(h)), we conclude claims 1-19 do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Therefore, we proceed to Step 2B, The Inventive Concept. 14 Appeal2018-003177 Application 12/795,586 The Inventive Concept - Step 2B Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, only if a claim: ( 1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not "well-understood, routine, conventional" in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05( d)); or, simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. Under Step 2B, we find Appellants' analogy to BASCOM 6 is unavailing. App. Br. 20-21. The Federal Circuit held in BASCOM that the claimed Internet content filtering, which featured an implementation "versatile enough that it could be adapted to many different users' preferences while also installed remotely in a single location," expressed an inventive concept in "the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces." BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350 (emphasis added). Here, Appellants have not shown a non-conventional arrangement regarding the generic (known, conventional) "at least one server computer" and "a mobile phone" (Independent claims 1 and 19). Therefore, it is our view that Appellants' claims do not involve any improvements to another technology, technical field, or improvements to the functioning of the computer or network, as was seen by the court in Bascom. 6 BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 15 Appeal2018-003177 Application 12/795,586 Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) We note Berkheimer was decided by the Federal Circuit on February 8, 2018. The Examiner's Answer was mailed on October 5, 2017 and Appellants did not file a Reply Brief. On April 19, 2018, the PTO issued the Memorandum titled: "Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.)" (hereinafter "Berkheimer Memorandum"). 7 The Berkheimer Memorandum provided specific requirements for an Examiner to support with evidence any finding that claim elements ( or a combination of elements) are well-understood, routine, or conventional. In reviewing the prosecution history, we recognize that the Appellants have not yet had an opportunity to advance arguments based upon the change in the law effected by Berkheimer. Thus, Berkheimer (881 F.3d at 1369) and the USPTO Berkheimer Memorandum are intervening authorities. However, regarding the use of the recited generic "at least one server computer" and "a mobile phone" as recited Appellants' claims 1-19, the Supreme Court has held "the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention." Alice, 573 U.S. 208, 223. Our reviewing court provides additional guidance, including in FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("the use of generic computer elements like a microprocessor or user interface do not alone transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter"), and OIP Techs., Inc. v. 7 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo- berkheimer-20180419 .PDF. 16 Appeal2018-003177 Application 12/795,586 Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (claims reciting, inter alia, sending messages over a network, gathering statistics, using a computerized system to automatically determine an estimated outcome, and presenting offers to potential customers found to merely recite "'well- understood, routine conventional activit[ies]'" by either requiring conventional computer activities or routine data-gathering steps (alteration in original, internal citation omitted)). Accordingly, on the record before us, we are not persuaded that claims 1-19 add a specific limitation, beyond the judicial exception, that is more than what was "well-understood, routine, and conventional" in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)). See Final Act. 5 ("The 'server computer', 'interchange' and 'mobile phone' are recited at a high level of generality and are recited as performing generic computer functions routinely used in computer applications."). In light of the foregoing, we conclude, under the 2019 Revised Guidance, that each of Appellants' claims 1-19, considered as a whole, is directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea that is not integrated into a practical application and does not include an inventive concept. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we sustain the Examiner's Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of claims 1-19.8 CONCLUSION The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1-19, under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as being directed to a judicial exception, without significantly more. 8 To the extent the Appellants have not advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). 17 Appeal2018-003177 Application 12/795,586 DECISION We affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1-19 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(±). AFFIRMED 18 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation