Ex Parte Nicholson

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 26, 2016

12636074 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 26, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
12/636,074 12/11/2009 James 0. Nicholson
109712 7590 09/28/2016
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
c/o Davidson Sheehan LLP
8834 North Capital of TX Hwy
Suite 100
Austin, TX 78759
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
l 458-TT6352 1574
EXAMINER
MCCARTHY, CHRISTOPHER S
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2113
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/28/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
docketing@ds-patent.com
beatrice. zepeda@ds-patent.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JAMES 0. NICHOLSON
Appeal2013-008818 1
Application 12/636,074
Technology Center 2100
Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, MONICA S. ULLAGADDI, and
JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges.
ULLAGADDI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the Examiner's final
rejection of claims 1, 3-5, 11, 16-19, 21, and 24--26. 2 We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We reverse.
1 Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Advanced Micro Devices,
Inc. App. Br. 1.
2 The rejections of claims 6-9 and 20 are withdrawn by the Examiner. Ans.
4. Claims 22 and 23 were objected to as being dependent upon a rejected
base claim, but were indicated to be allowable if rewritten in independent
form. Final Act. 6. Claims 2, 10, and 12-15 are cancelled. App. Br. 16-19
(Claims App'x).
Appeal2013-008818
Application 12/636,074
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claim 1, reproduced below with reference numerals and formatting
added, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method, comprising:
performing a first error detection for a first data word
using first ECC checkbits associated with the first data word;
performing a second error detection for a second data word
using second ECC checkbits associated with the second data
word; and
in response to [L 1] the first error detection indicating an
error in a symbol of the first data word and the second error
detection indicating an error in a symbol of the second data word
at a location in the second data word corresponding to a location
of the symbol of the first data word, [L2] storing a first corrected
data word as valid data, wherein the first corrected data word
comprises the first data word after being corrected based upon
the first ECC checkbits.
REFERENCES and REJECTION
Claims 1, 3-5, 11, 16-19, 21, and 24--26 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Quach (US 2004/0199851
Al; pub. Oct. 7, 2004) and Kirscht (US 2006/0248411 Al; pub. Nov. 2,
2006). Final Act. 2-7.
ANALYSIS
The Examiner finds Quach teaches the "first error detection" and
"second error detection" limitations recited in claim 1. Final Act. 2 (citing
(Quach i-fi-155, 56). The Examiner also finds Quach teaches the "storing"
limitation L2, and that the "storing" is responsive to some condition
precedent. Ans. 9 (citing Quach i-fi-151, 53, 56); compare id. with, Final Act.
2:
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Application 12/636,074
Kirsct [sic] teaches in response to the first error detection
indicating an error in a symbol of the first data word and the
second error detection indicating an error in a symbol of the
second data word at a location in the second data word
corresponding to a location of the symbol of the first data word.
(Emphasis added). The Examiner finds Kirscht teaches the condition
precedent recited in limitation LI. Ans. 8-9 (citing Kirscht i-fi-16, 14, 15, 21).
Based on these findings, the Examiner concludes the combination of Quach
and Kirscht would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art "as a
means for reducing memory errors" and because "both references use data
outputs in symbol form to achieve the reduction of errors." Id. at 9-10.
First, Appellant contends neither Quach nor Kirscht, nor the
combination thereof, teaches or suggests performing the "storing" recited in
limitation L2 in response to the condition precedent recited in limitation L 1.
App. Br. 6-7. Second, Appellant contends the Examiner's rationale for
combining Quach and Kirscht is deficient and impermissibly relies on
hindsight reconstruction:
As the proposed modification to Quach has no connection with
the logging process of Kirscht, the Office has not adequately
established how the proposed modification to Quach would
result in the reduction of memory errors as alleged. Neither
Quach nor Kirscht teach that there is any relationship between
symbols with errors in the same cacheline, and thus it is not
apparent that there would be a reduction in memory errors, or
any other benefit for that matter, by making the storing of
corrected data as valid data in the system of Quach dependent
on determining whether there are two single symbol errors in a
single cache line as taught by Kirscht.
Id. at 8. Appellant supports this contention by pointing to Kirscht's
teaching that "two different single symbol errors ... may appear in a
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Appeal2013-008818
Application 12/636,074
single cacheline (e.g., align) during a memory access to form an
uncorrectable error." Id. at 7 (citing Kirscht i-f 14) (internal quotations
omitted).
With regard to Appellant's first argument, we note that the Examiner
divides the chain of causation between the condition precedent recited in
limitation L 1 and the action recited in limitation L2 between the Quach and
Kirscht references, as discussed above. We agree that neither reference
alone teaches or suggests the complete chain of causation (i.e., performing
the action recited in limitation L2 in response to the condition precedent
recited in limitation L 1 ).
Moreover, with regard to Appellant's second argument, we are
persuaded that the Examiner's reasoning that combining the teachings of
Quach and Kirsch would reduce memory errors is not supported in the
record by a sufficient rational underpinning. See KSR Int 'l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) ("[R]ejections on obviousness grounds
cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be
some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the
legal conclusion of obviousness."). Even assuming, arguendo, Kirscht's
teaching of two single symbol errors in a single cacheline could be
considered to teach or suggest the condition precedent recited in limitation
LI, on this record, we find the Examiner has not established that the
ordinarily skilled artisan would have modified Quach with the condition
precedent taught by Kirscht, because Kirscht specifically discloses that these
symbol errors are "uncorrectable." See App. Br. 8 (citing Kirscht i-f 14).
For the foregoing reasons, we are persuaded that the ordinarily skilled
artisan would not have combined Quach and Kirscht in the manner proffered
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Appeal2013-008818
Application 12/636,074
by the Examiner without impermissibly relying on Appellant's claims as a
guide. The U.S. Supreme Court has clearly stated: "[a] factfinder should be
aware, of course, of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be
cautious of argument reliant upon ex post reasoning." KSR, 550 U.S. at 421
(citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966)). This reasoning is
applicable here, given that: (1) the Examiner has divided the chain of
causation between the Quach and Kirscht references; and (2) the Examiner's
reasoning for combining Quach and Kirscht is not supported by the express
or implied teachings of Quach or Kirscht, or by findings regarding the
knowledge of the level of one of ordinary skill in the art.
In view of the above, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Quach and
Kirscht. In rejecting claims 16 and 21, the Examiner cites the same portions
of Quach and Kirscht and proffers the same rationale for combining these
references as set forth with respect to claim 1. Final Act. 4---6; Ans. 8-11.
For the reasons discussed above with respect to claim 1, we are persuaded
the Examiner's rationale for combining Quach and Kirscht is not supported
by sufficient rational underpinning to sustain a conclusion of obviousness.
Accordingly, Appellant has persuaded us the Examiner erred in rejecting
claims 16 and 21under35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Quach
and Kirscht.
Because we reverse the 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of each independent
claim, we also reverse the 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of each dependent claim
on appeal.
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DECISION
The Examiner's decision to reject claims 1, 3-5, 11, 16-19, 21, and
24--26 is reversed.
REVERSED
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