Ex Parte Nguyen et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Sep 25, 2009

11454092 (B.P.A.I. Sep. 25, 2009)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte PHUONG VIET NGUYEN and ASHISH GARG
____________

Appeal 2008-004834
Application 11/454,092
Technology Center 2100
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Decided: September 25, 2009
____________

Before LEE E. BARRETT, JOSEPH L. DIXON, and
HOWARD B. BLANKENSHIP, Administrative Patent Judges.

BLANKENSHIP, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1-9, 22-26, 46-54, 59-66, and 69, which are all of the
claims remaining in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We affirm.
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Application 11/454,092

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Invention
Appellants’ invention relates to a device that stores a plurality of
applications and a list of associations for those applications. The
applications are preferably stored within a secondary memory of the device,
and once launched each application is loaded into RAM. Each application is
preferably associated to one or more of the other applications. Preferably,
no applications are launched when the device is powered on. A user selects
an application, which is then launched by the device, thereby loading the
application from the secondary memory to RAM. Whenever an application
is determined to be associated with a currently active state application, and
that associated application has yet to be loaded from secondary memory to
RAM, the associated application is pre-launched such that the associated
application is loaded into RAM, but is set to an inactive state. Abstract.

Representative Claims
1. A method to optimize system resources within an application
device, the method comprising:
setting a first application in an active state;
selecting a second application related to the first application,
wherein selecting the second application is performed by the
application device;
launching the second application, thereby setting the second
application in an inactive state while the first application remains in
the active state;
selecting the second application for use;
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de-activating the first application, thereby setting the first
application in the inactive state; and
activating the second application, thereby setting the second
application in an active state.

22. A method to optimize system resources within an application
device, the method comprising:
powering on an application device;
selecting a first application by a user;
launching the first application such that the first application is
loaded from a secondary memory to a random access memory
(RAM), thereby setting the first application in an inactive state within
the RAM;
activating the first application;
selecting a second application by the user;
de-activating the first application, thereby setting the first
application in the inactive state;
launching the second application such that the second
application is loaded from a secondary memory to a random access
memory (RAM), thereby setting the second application in an inactive
state within the RAM; and
activating the second application.

Appeal 2008-004834
Application 11/454,092

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Prior Art
Yoshida 5,226,149 Jul. 6, 1993
Menand 5,563,648 Oct. 8, 1996
Flynn 5,907,702 May 25, 1999
Emer 6,675,192 B2 Jan. 6, 2004

Examiner’s Rejections
Claims 22-26, 59-66, and 69 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
as being anticipated by Menand.
Claims 1, 2, 8, 9, 46, 47, 53, and 54 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Flynn and Emer.
Claims 3-7 and 48-52 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Flynn, Emer, and Yoshida.

Claim Groupings
Based on Appellants’ arguments in the Appeal Brief, we will decide
the appeal on the basis of claims 1 and 22. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

ISSUES
(1) Have Appellants shown that the Examiner erred in finding that
Menand describes each and every limitation of claim 22?
(2) Have Appellants shown that the Examiner erred in finding that
the combination of Flynn and Emer teaches the invention of claim 1?

FINDINGS OF FACT
We rely on the Examiner’s findings stated in the Final Rejection and
the Examiner’s Answer.
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Application 11/454,092

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PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Claim Interpretation
During examination, claims are to be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with the specification, and the language should be
read in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary
skill in the art. In re Amer. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). The Office must apply the broadest
reasonable meaning to the claim language, taking into account any
definitions presented in the specification. Id. (citing In re Bass, 314 F.3d
575, 577 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).

Anticipation
“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in
the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior
art reference.” Verdegaal Bros. Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814
F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

Obviousness
The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying
factual determinations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art,
(2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, and
(3) the level of skill in the art. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17
(1966). “The combination of familiar elements according to known methods
is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007).
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Application 11/454,092

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ANALYSIS
§ 102(b) rejection of claims 22-26, 59-66, and 69
(Claim 22 representative)
Appellants contend that Menand does not teach selecting a first
application by a user, thereby setting the first application in an inactive state
in RAM (Br. 7-8). In particular, Appellants contend that first, in order to
make a selection, the user must be aware of alternative selections, and
second, the user selection of pressing ACTIVATE sets an application to an
active state rather than an inactive state.
However, the Examiner finds that the claim term “selecting” is not
limited to consciously selecting from known alternatives (Ans. 18-19). The
Examiner also finds that the program selected in Menand is in an inactive
state (Ans. 19). Appellants have failed to show error in these findings by the
Examiner.
Appellants contend that Menand does not teach launching the first
application such that the first application is loaded from a secondary
memory to RAM, thereby setting the first application in an inactive state
within RAM (Br. 9-10). In particular, Appellants contend that Menand does
not teach a specific meaning for the term “launch,” and Menand does not
teach a specific meaning for the term “secondary memory” (Br. 9).
However, the Examiner finds that the claim term “launch” reads on
loading an application into RAM in an inactive state as disclosed by Menand
(Ans. 20). The Examiner also finds that Appellants’ Specification does not
explicitly define “secondary memory”; therefore, the memory of Menand
that stores the program data before loading it into memory is “secondary
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memory” within the meaning of claim 22 (Ans. 20-21). Appellants have
failed to show error in these findings by the Examiner.
Appellants contend that Menand does not teach selecting a second
application by the user, deactivating the first application, thereby setting the
first application to the inactive state (Br. 11).
However, the Examiner finds that Menand’s description of changing
the channel corresponds to “selecting a second application by the user”
(Ans. 4), and suspending the previously executing program corresponds to
“setting the first application in the inactive state,” as recited in claim 22
(Ans. 21-22). Appellants’ contend that changing a channel is not selecting
an application. That position is unpersuasive because, as noted by the
Examiner, the claim term “selecting” is not limited to consciously selecting
from known alternatives (Ans. 18-19). Appellants also contend that “when a
second application is selected by a user in the present invention, the first
application is set to the inactive state so that the code associated with the
second application remains loaded in memory where it is immediately
available without reloading from secondary memory if selected again by the
user” (Br. 11). However, this limitation is not expressly found in claim 22
and Appellants have provided no basis for reading this limitation into claim
22.
Appellants contend that Menand does not teach launching the second
application such that the second application is loaded from a secondary
memory to RAM, thereby setting the second application in an inactive state
within the RAM and activating the second application (Br. 11-12).
Appellants also contend that applications are automatically loaded in the
system described by Menand before the user presses the activate button (id.).
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However, the Examiner finds that Menand discloses loading the
second application into RAM and setting it in an inactive state (Ans. 4). We
agree with the Examiner’s finding.
Appellants contend that Menand does not teach launching a second
application related to the first application such that the second application is
loaded from the secondary memory to the RAM, thereby setting the second
application in the inactive state within the RAM (Br. 12). Claim 22 does not
recite “a second application related to the first application.” Furthermore,
the Examiner finds that the commercial disclosed by Menand is a second
application related to the first application (Ans. 24). Appellants have failed
to show error in this finding by the Examiner.
Appellants contend that Menand does not teach optimization of
system resources within an application device (Br. 13-14). The Examiner
finds that the term “optimize system resources within an application device”
is recited only in the preamble of claim 22 and is therefore not given
patentable weight (Ans. 24). Appellants have failed to show error in the
relevant findings by the Examiner, and have failed to provide a line of
reasoning or basis for giving patentable weight to the preamble recitation.
Appellants present arguments for claim 59 that are similar to the
arguments for claim 22 which we find unpersuasive.

§ 103(a) rejection of claims 1, 2, 8, 9, 46, 47, 53, and 54
(Claim 1 representative)
Appellants contend that Flynn does not teach launching a second
application related to a first application (Br. 16). The Examiner agrees and
uses Emer to teach this limitation (Ans. 10).
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Appellants contend that Emer does not teach setting a first application
in an active state, selecting a second related application, launching the
second application, de-activating the first application, and activating the
second application (Br. 17-18). The Examiner relies on Flynn to teach these
limitations (Ans. 9-10).
Appellants contend that the combination of Flynn and Emer does not
teach user selection of either a first or second application (Br. 18). The
language “user selection of either a first or second application” is not
expressly recited in claim 1, and Appellants have provided no evidence or
persuasive argument for reading this limitation into claim 1.
Appellants contend that the combination of Flynn and Emer does not
teach selecting a second application related to the first application (Br. 19).
In particular, Appellants contend that Emer does not teach selection of a
thread for execution based upon its relatedness to another thread.
However, claim 1 does not recite “selection of a thread for execution
based upon its relatedness to another thread.” Claim 1 recites “selecting a
second application related to a first application.” The Examiner finds that
Flynn teaches selecting thread applications, and Emer teaches that the thread
applications can be related; therefore, the combination teaches selecting a
second thread application related to the first thread application within the
meaning of claim 1 (Ans. 10-11). Appellants have failed to show error in
these findings by the Examiner.
Appellants present arguments for claim 46 that are similar to the
arguments presented for claim 1 which we find unpersuasive.

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Application 11/454,092

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§ 103(a) rejection of claims 3-7 and 48-52
Appellants have not provided separate arguments for claims 3-7 and
48-52, but instead rely on the arguments for claims 1 and 46 that we find
unpersuasive.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(1) Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in finding
that Menand describes each and every limitation of claim 22.
(2) Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in finding
that the combination of Flynn and Emer teaches the invention of claim 1.

DECISION
The rejection of claims 22-26, 59-66, and 69 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
as being anticipated by Menand is affirmed.
The rejection of claims 1, 2, 8, 9, 46, 47, 53, and 54 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Flynn and Emer is affirmed.
The rejection of claims 3-7 and 48-52 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Flynn, Emer, and Yoshida is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).

AFFIRMED

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