Ex Parte NGO et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardOct 9, 201411844224 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 9, 2014) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte DUNG NGO, GRANT I. CAMPBELL, and BETH MCGREEVY1 ____________ Appeal 2012-004899 Application 11/844,224 Technology Center 2100 ____________ Before ERIC B. GRIMES, ULRIKE W. JENKS, and TINA E. HULSE, Administrative Patent Judges. HULSE, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 involving claims relating to creating a trouble ticket pertaining to an information technology (IT) incident. The Examiner rejected the claims at issue as lacking patentable subject matter, as anticipated, and as obvious. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm-in-part. 1 Appellants identify the Real Party in Interest as Hewlett-Packard Development Company, LP. (Appeal Br. 2.) Appeal 2012-004899 Application 11/844,224 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE In many enterprises, an Information Technology (IT) organization is charged with maintaining the operability of the IT assets of the organization. (Spec. ¶ 5.) When an IT asset malfunctions, or some other incident occurs, IT personnel can be alerted about the incident through the generation of “trouble tickets.” (Id. ¶ 6.) The trouble ticket typically includes a worklog that permits entry of information in diary (i.e., free-flow) form. (Id.) Typical free-flow worklogs, however, can become lengthy and difficult to read. (Id. ¶ 7.) Accordingly, the Specification states that the invention provides a manner “for creation of a trouble ticket having a running worklog that is configured in a manner to increase its readability and usability.” (Id. ¶ 11.) Claims 1–20 are on appeal. (Appeal Br. 4.) Claim 1 is illustrative and is reproduced below: 1. Apparatus for generating a ticket related to an IT, Information Technology, system incident, said apparatus comprising: a work log display generator configured to generate a displayable worklog in which information related to the IT system incident is includable, the worklog forming part of the ticket; and an anchor link generator configured to generate at least a first anchor link associated with a corresponding at least first portion of the information related to the IT system incident that is includable in the displayable worklog generated by said worklog display generator, the first anchor link forming a first table of content entry associate with the corresponding at least first portion of the information. Appeal 2012-004899 Application 11/844,224 3 The claims stand rejected as follows: A. Claims 1–15 and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (Ans. 5–6); B. Claims 1–14, 16–18, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) over Jones (Ans. 6–9);2 C. Claims 15 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Jones and Fish (Ans. 9–10).3 DISCUSSION A. Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. § 101 The Examiner rejected claims 1–15 and 20 as being directed to nonstatutory subject matter.4 The Examiner concluded that the claims do not fall within a statutory category under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Appellants respond, arguing that claims 1 and 20 both recite hardware devices (i.e., a machine) and therefore constitute patentable subject matter. (Appeal Br. 12–13.) Although the U.S. Supreme Court has since issued guidance regarding § 101 in, for example, Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012) and Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014), we need not address any 2 Jones et al., US 6,687,335 B1, issued Feb. 3, 2004. 3 Fish, US 2007/0088625 A1, published Apr. 19, 2007. 4 We note the Examiner did not reject claims 16–19. Should there be further prosecution of this application, the Examiner may wish to review these claims for compliance under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in light of the recently issued preliminary examination instructions on patent eligible subject matter. See “Preliminary Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al.,” Memorandum to the Examining Corps, June 25, 2014. Appeal 2012-004899 Application 11/844,224 4 purported changes in the law to affirm the Examiner’s decision. We are persuaded that the Examiner did not err in finding that claims 1–15 and 20 encompass patent ineligible subject matter under § 101 and are therefore unpatentable. Subject to certain exceptions, an inventor may obtain a patent for “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” See 35 U.S.C. § 101. As the Examiner notes, the “apparatus” comprised of a “work log display generator” and an “anchor link generator” in claim 1, and the “user interface apparatus” comprised of a “work log display generator” and a “content table generator” in claim 20 are not machines or manufacture. (Ans. 5–6.) Rather, the Examiner states that the limitations “appear to be software.” (Ans. 10.) We agree with the Examiner. Nothing in these claim limitations suggests that the “generator” limitations necessarily “exist in some physical or tangible form,” as required for each of the statutory categories except process claims. See Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (defining a machine, manufacture, and composition of matter under § 101) (citation omitted). Appellants argue that the “user interface apparatus” limitation in claim 20 “implies physical devices and machines.” (Appeal Br. 11.) Similarly, Appellants argue that the “apparatus” limitation in claim 1 “is meant to include hardware.” (Id. at 13.) Appellants also rely on the Specification for support, arguing that the Specification states that the “apparatus” of the claims requires hardware. (Id. at 12–13.) Appeal 2012-004899 Application 11/844,224 5 We agree with Appellants that certain embodiments described in the Specification suggest that the “apparatus” and “user interface apparatus” can include hardware. But the Specification also states that “apparatus 18 is functionally represented, implementable in any desired manner, including algorithms executable by processing circuitry.” (Spec. ¶ 32) (emphasis added.) Thus, the Specification makes clear that the claimed “apparatus” of claim 1 may be software (i.e., an “algorithm executable by processing circuitry”). Moreover, the Specification teaches that the “apparatus” of claim 1 includes the claimed “user interface apparatus” of claim 20. (See Fig. 1, showing user interface 20 within apparatus 18.) “A claim that covers both statutory and non-statutory embodiments (under the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim . . . ) embraces subject matter that is not eligible for patent protection and therefore is directed to non-statutory subject matter.” MPEP § 2106(I) (8th ed., rev. 2012); cf. In re Lintner, 458 F.2d 1013, 1015 (CCPA 1972) (citation omitted) (“Claims which are broad enough to read on obvious subject matter are unpatentable even though they also read on nonobvious subject matter.”). Because the scope of claims 1 and 20 encompasses software not tied to any hardware or a nontransitory computer readable medium, we conclude that the claims are directed to nonstatutory subject matter. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 20 under § 101. Because Appellants did not argue separately the patentability of claims 2–15, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of these claims under § 101 for the same reasons. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii). Appeal 2012-004899 Application 11/844,224 6 B. Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) over Jones The Examiner rejected claims 1–14, 16–18, and 20 as anticipated by Jones. (Ans. 6–9.) Jones relates to a user interface to facilitate telephone circuit maintenance and testing. (Jones, 1:12–13.) More specifically, Jones relates to a user interface that “integrates disparate maintenance and testing applications and systems into a single common control interface.” (Id. at 1:13–16.) a. Claims 1–14 and 16–18 The Examiner states that Jones teaches a ticket linked to a work log, and that Jones discloses an operating system that links logical data objects. (Ans. 6–7.) Appellants assert that Jones does not teach or suggest “‘at least a first anchor link associated with a corresponding at least first portion of the information related to the IT system incident’ in which ‘the first anchor link form[s] a first table of content entry associate with the corresponding at least first portion of the information.’” (Appeal Br. 14.) We agree with Appellants. As the Examiner notes, claim 1 requires that the anchor link: (1) is associated with a portion of information related to the IT system incident; and (2) forms a table of content entry associated with the information. (Ans. 11.) The Examiner then states that Jones’s Line Record Display identifier is associated with information related to an IT system incident, and that Jones’s OSSOI window is a list of time-sequenced activities. (Id., citing Jones, 10:46–49, 11:5–10.) Accordingly, the Examiner concludes “that the OSSOI window is comparable to the table of contents claimed; and that the Jones’ Line Record Display identifier is comparable to the link anchor.” (Id. at 12.) Appeal 2012-004899 Application 11/844,224 7 The Examiner’s conclusion, however, is not consistent with the claim language. Claim 1 requires an anchor link that is associated with information related to the IT system incident and that forms a first table of content entry. Thus, under the Examiner’s rationale, if the Line Record Display identifier discloses the anchor link that is associated with the IT system incident, then the Line Record Display identifier must also form the table of content entry. The Examiner has not shown this, and instead cites the OSSOI window as disclosing the table of content entry. Thus, as Appellants note, the Examiner “concedes, that to access this information, if available at all, [Jones] requires the user to access multiple sources from different windows.” (Reply Br. 8.) As our reviewing court’s predecessor stated, for anticipation, the prior art reference “must clearly and unequivocally disclose the claimed compound or direct those skilled in the art to the compound without any need for picking, choosing, and combining various disclosures not directly related to each other by the teachings of the cited reference.” In re Arkley, 455 F.2d 586, 587 (CCPA 1972); see also Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that “unless a reference discloses within the four corners of the document not only all of the limitations claimed but also all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim, it cannot be said to prove prior invention of the thing claimed, and, thus, cannot anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102”). Because the Examiner has failed to show that Jones teaches each limitation of claim 1—as arranged in claim 1—we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 and its dependent claims 2–15 under § 102(b). Appeal 2012-004899 Application 11/844,224 8 Independent claim 16 is a method claim with the same “first anchor link” limitation as claim 1. Thus, for the same reasons as claim 1, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claim 16 and its dependent claims 17–19 under § 102(b). b. Claim 20 Claim 20 recites a user interface apparatus for facilitating generation of a ticket worklog comprising a worklog generator and “a content table generator configured to generate a table of contents that identifies successive parts of the work log formed of the log-entry information, each entry of the table of contents linkable to a corresponding part of the work log.” The Examiner rejected claim 20 as anticipated by Jones “using the same rationale” as claim 1. (Ans. 9.) Appellants assert that Jones does not teach the “content table generator” limitation of claim 20. Appellants contend that Jones teaches that “either the ticket or the worklog, individually and separately, may be accessed without teaching that a table of contents is linked to a corresponding part of the work log.” (Appeal Br. 20.) We are persuaded by Appellants’ argument. As Appellants note, Jones teaches that from the “WFA/C Screens By Ticket” window, a user can select the “WFA/C Work log (OSSLOG)” (Jones, 16:33–47), which “shows a detailed account of activities on an order or trouble report” (id. at 17:20– 23). Nothing in this disclosure, however, teaches or suggests that the OSSLOG constitutes a table of contents, as required by claim 20. That is, the OSSLOG does not “identif[y] successive parts of the work log formed of the log-entry information,” as required by the claim. Nor do entries in the OSSLOG appear to be “linkable to a [different] corresponding part of the work log.” Appeal 2012-004899 Application 11/844,224 9 We, therefore, find that the Examiner has not established that Jones teaches the “content table generator” limitation of claim 20 and reverse the rejection of claim 20 under § 102(b). C. Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Jones and Fish The Examiner rejected claims 15 and 19 as unpatentable over Jones and Fish. (Ans. 9–10.) Claims 15 and 19 depend from claims 1 and 16, respectively, and further recite a spell-checker or spell-checking function. Because Jones does not explicitly teach spell checking, the Examiner only relied on Fish as disclosing this feature. (Id.) Because the Examiner has not shown that Fish cures the deficiencies of Jones explained above, we conclude that the Examiner has failed to satisfy the prima facie burden of establishing claims 15 and 19 are unpatentable as obvious over Jones and Fish, for the reasons stated above. CONCLUSION We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–15 and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for lack of patent eligible subject matter. We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–14, 16–18, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Jones. We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 15 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(2) as obvious over Jones and Fish. SUMMARY The decision of the Examiner rejecting claims 1–20 is affirmed-in- part. Appeal 2012-004899 Application 11/844,224 10 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). AFFIRMED-IN-PART cdc Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation