Ex Parte Ngo et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 14, 2017

12755347 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 14, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/755,347 04/06/2010 Huey Jiun Ngo P3514US01 8441
30671 7590 02/16/2017
DITTHAVONG & STEINER, P.C.
Keth Ditthavong
44 Canal Center Plaza
Suite 322
Alexandria, VA 22314
EXAMINER
LANIER, BENJAMIN E
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2437
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/16/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket@dcpatent.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte HUEY JIUN NGO, NATHAN JOEL MCNEILL,
DAVID WILLIAM DURHAM, and NATHAN WHITEFORD
CROMER
Appeal 2016-004877
Application 12/755,347
Technology Center 2400
Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, THU A. DANG, and
LARRY J. HUME, Administrative Patent Judges.
DANG, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’
Final Rejection of claims 1—25. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We affirm.
Appeal 2016-004877
Application 12/755,347
A. INVENTION
Appellants’ claimed invention relates to a method and apparatus for
providing vendor remote support and management. (Spec., Title.)
B. ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIM
Claim 1 is exemplary:
1. A method comprising:
establishing one or more vendor portals hosted on a
remote support and management appliance for controlling one
or more devices of a customer by a plurality of vendors,
wherein the remote support and management appliance
manages traffic among a vendor system, a representative
system, and a customer system, the representative system being
configured to provide remote support services to the customer
from the plurality of vendors, and
wherein the representative system is further configured to
communicate with the vendor system and/or the customer
system via the remote support and management appliance; and
remotely controlling and accessing one or more of the
devices via one or more of the vendor portals on the remote
support and management appliance, in accordance with one or
more security policies to control access rights, and remote
control permissions, wherein the remote support and
management appliance is under the control of the customer, and
wherein the one or more security policies are directly
transmitted to at least one of the plurality of vendors via at least
one of the vendor portals.
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C. REJECTIONS
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art as evidence in
rejecting the claims on appeal:
Hagen US 2002/0075844 A1 June 20, 2002
Kojima US 2003/0004791 A1 Jan. 2, 2003
Smith US 2005/0190769 A1 Sept. 1, 2005
Del Sordo US 2010/0154009 A1 June 17, 2010
Claim 25 stands rejected under 35U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as
being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the
subject matter which applicant regards as the invention.
Claims 1—7, 9-15, 17—22, and 25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over the teachings of Smith and Hagen.
Claims 8, 16, and 23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the teachings of Smith, Hagen, and Del Sordo.
Claim 24 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over the teachings of Smith, Hagen, Del Sordo, and Kojima.
II. ISSUE
The principal issue before us is whether the Examiner erred in finding
the combination of Smith and Hagen teaches or would have suggested
1) “establishing one or more vendor portals hosted on a remote support and
management appliance” that “manages traffic among a vendor system, a
representative system, and a customer system;” and 2) “remotely controlling
and accessing one or more of the devices” in accordance with “one or more
security policies to control access rights, and remote control permissions,'1'’
wherein the “one or more security policies are directly transmitted to at least
one of the plurality of vendors.” (Claim 1 (emphasis added).)
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III. FINDINGS OF FACT
Smith
1. Smith teaches a system used in a software maintenance and
support application allowing remote, controlled access by the software
maintenance and support company to a customer’s system which is
controlled by the server and not the remote user. (| 14.)
2. A support representative or vendor is coupled to a remote support
server. A support representative initiates a connection to the support server.
(112; Fig. 1.)
3. Smith’s system and method allows remote, controlled access by
the software maintenance and support company to a customer's system
where another PC desktop remotely controlled and controlled access to a
server and other network devices are provided. 10, 12, 14.)
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Hagen
4. Hagen’s gatekeeper redirects the subscriber’s access if the
subscriber’s service plan is incompatible with the resource provider’s
policies concerning access. (1183.)
IV. ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph
The Examiner rejects claim 25 under § 112. (Final Act. 4.) However,
Appellants do not address this § 112 rejection in their Brief. Arguments not
made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). Accordingly, we
summarily sustain the Examiner’s § 112 rejection of claim 25.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
Regarding claim 1, Appellants contend:
Smith is silent within the related text of the Specification as to a
claimed “representative system” and is only a switchboard
“between a connection initiated by the customer/user23 and a
connection initiated by the at least one support representative
32” (| [0019]). Where the “support representative” as best
understood could only be correlated to the claimed “vendor
system”. Nowhere in Smith is a “support representative” even
differentiated from a “vendor” other than in the text of [FJigure
1. . . . As such, Smith does not in any way, shape, or form,
contemplate differentiated claimed “representative systems”
and “vendor systems”.
(App. Br. 9.)
Appellants specifically contend:
[Cjlaim 1 requires “the remote support and management
appliance is configured to manage traffic among a vendor
system, a representative system, and a customer system” which
Smith’s switchboard fails to do, as Smith only manages between
customers and vendors, but not among the “support
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representatives” of Smith as would be required. As such, Smith
fails to teach the above-recited feature of claim 1.
(Id. at 11.)
Appellants further argue:
Smith does not teach that the “one or more security policies” are
“to control access rights, and remote control permissions” as
recited in claim 1. Where, at best, Smith discloses “access
rights” but not “remote control permissions”.
(Id. at 12.)
Furthermore, Appellants assert:
Hagen does not disclose “one or more security policies are
directly transmitted to at least one of the plurality of vendors,”
as recited in claim 1. . . . [T]he combination of Smith and
Hagen, at best, provides an error message and not a security
policy itself since there is no rationale provided to replace the
error message with the “policy information” is provided in
paragraph [0183] of Hagen
(Id.)
Appellants also set forth a “teach away” argument:
Hagen would not have been combined with Smith since
different locations for servers result in different security
requirements and keeping the physical location of a server in a
specific provides for fewer security requirements. . . .
Accordingly, the combination of Smith and Hagen is improper
because the references teach away from such a combination.
(App. Br. 14—15.)
We have considered all of Appellants’ arguments and evidence
presented. However, we disagree with Appellants’ contentions regarding the
Examiner’s rejections of the claims. We agree with the Examiner’s findings,
and find no error with the Examiner’s conclusion that the claims would have
been obvious over the combined teachings.
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We give the claim its broadest reasonable interpretation consistent
with the Specification. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir.
1997). However, “limitations are not to be read into the claims from the
specification.” In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(citations omitted).
As the Examiner points out, the Specification does not provide any
explicit definition for the disputed limitation “representative system” recited
in claim 1. (Ans. 4.) Thus, although Appellants contend Smith is silent
within the related text of the disclosure as to a claimed “representative
system” (App. Br. 9), we find no error with the Examiner’s reliance on
Smith’s support representatives 32 to teach or at least suggest a
“representative system.” (Ans. 2; FF 1—3.) In particular, we agree with the
Examiner’s finding “Smith clearly shows a ‘representative system’ in the
form of the support representatives (Figure 1, element 32) being configured
to communicate with the customer system (Figure 1, element 23) via the
remote support and management appliance.” (Ans. 3; FF 3.)
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that element 32 “could
only be correlated to the claimed ‘vendor system’” (App. Br. 9). As shown
in Figure 1 of Smith, for example, each element 32 is alternatively labeled as
“support representative or vendor.” (FF 2—3.) We find no error with the
Examiner’s broad but reasonable interpretation of “representative system” as
encompassing at least one of Smith’s “support representative or vendor”
systems 32. (Ans. 3.) As the Examiner finds, in Smith, “the support
representatives (Figure 1, elements 32) provide support services to the
customer’s system connected via the remote support server.” (Id.; FF3.)
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We also find no error with the Examiner’s finding that Smith teaches
not only a vendor and customer system, as Appellants admit, (App. Br. 11
(“Smith only manages between customers and vendors”)), but also teaches a
representative system as an alternative. (Id.) As the Examiner finds “the
support representatives (Figure 1, elements 32) perform the functions
specified in the claim to be considered equivalent to the claimed ‘vendor
system’ and the claimed ‘representative system.’” (Ans. 3). That is, the
support representatives 32 “perform the identical function specified in the
claims in substantially the same way, and produce substantially the same
results as the corresponding ‘vendor system’ and ‘representative system.’”
(Id. at 5.) As the Examiner points out, “Smith shows multiple support
representatives,” wherein “the support representatives of Smith (Figure 1,
elements 32) have been shown to be equivalent to both the claimed ‘vendor
system’ and the claimed ‘representative system.’” (Id. at 5—6.)
On this record, we are unconvinced that the Examiner erred in finding
Smith teaches or at least suggests a “representative system” as well as a
“vendor system.”1 (Id.)
We are also not persuaded by Appellants’ arguing “remote control
permissions” is not taught because these also include “rights to directly
control the customer’s system.” (App. Br. 12.) In particular, as the
Examiner points out, Appellants are arguing limitations (i.e., “rights to
directly control the customer’s system”) not specifically recited in the
1 “[T]he question under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is not merely what the references
expressly teach but what they would have suggested to one of ordinary skill
in the art at the time the invention was made.” Merck & Co., Inc. v. Biocraft
Laboratories, Inc., 874 F. 2d 804, 807—808 (Fed. Cir. 1989). (Emphasis
added).
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claims. (Ans. 7.) Nevertheless, we agree with the Examiner that Smith’s
providing of support representatives with remote control access to
customer’s computers teaches and suggests controlling the customer’s
system and the disputed limitation “remote control permissions.” (FF 3;
Ans. 8.)
Further, we are unpersuaded by Appellants’ argument that Hagen does
not disclose “one or more security policies are directly transmitted to at least
one of the plurality of vendors.” (App. Br. 12.) As the Examiner finds,
“Hagen discloses providing an explanation of the requester’s access policy
by providing the requester with a detailed explanation of when they will be
able to access the system.” (Ans. 8.) Further, “Hagen describes upgrades to
the user’s access policy that can be purchased in order to grant the user with
more immediate access.” (Id.)
As to Appellants’ “teach away” argument (App. Br. 14—15), a
teaching of something different is not a teaching away. See Syntex (U.S.A.)
LLCv. Apotex, Inc., 407 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005). When
combining references to establish obviousness, the appropriate consideration
is whether the proposed combination would work for its intended purpose.
See DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
Here, Appellants appear to view the combination in a different
perspective than that of the Examiner and are arguing the references
separately. The Examiner finds that the only proposed modification of
Smith in view of Hagen is for “the level of access information in Smith to
have been provided directly to the companies providing support so that the
companies are aware of the boundaries of their permitted access as
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suggested by Hagen.” (FF 4; Final Act. 3.) Thus, the issue here is not
whether the skilled artisan would have bodily incorporated Hagen’s access
policy information as directly provided to access requesters into the entire
system of Smith. Rather, the issue is whether the ordinarily skilled artisan,
upon reading Smith and Hagen, would have found it obvious to modify
Smith’s system to include Hagen’s permitted access.
Here, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that “Hagen shows that it
would have been obvious ... for the support representatives/vendors to have
been provided a notification of their access/security policy, as defined by the
customer’s in Smith,” so that “the support representatives/vendors are aware
of the boundaries of their permitted access in a manner similar to the general
access awareness described in Hagen.” (Ans. 8.) We are unpersuaded that
Smith discredits or discourages the inclusion of Hagen’s permitted access.
In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
On this record, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding
that the combination of references teaches or suggests the contested
limitations. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
independent claim 1 and claims 2—7, 9-15, 17—22, and 25, not argued
separately, and thus falling therewith.
We also affirm the obviousness rejections of claims 8, 16, and 23 over
Smith, Hagen and Del Sordo and of claim 24 over the combination of Smith,
Hagen, Del Sordo and Kojima because Appellants do not present further
substantive and separate arguments regarding these claims. Arguments not
made are waived.
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CONCLUSION AND DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claim 25 under 35 U.S.C.
§112, second paragraph.
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—25 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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