Ex Parte Nevill-Manning

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jan 19, 2012

10608270 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 19, 2012)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
10/608,270 06/27/2003 Craig Nevill-Manning 0026-0150 8305
44989 7590 01/19/2012
HARRITY & HARRITY, LLP
11350 Random Hills Road
SUITE 600
FAIRFAX, VA 22030
EXAMINER
CHANNAVAJJALA, SRIRAMA T
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2157
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/19/2012 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte CRAIG NEVILL-MANNING
____________

Appeal 2009-005209
Application 10/608,270
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, CARLA M. KRIVAK, and DENISE M.
POTHIER, Administrative Patent Judges.

JEFFERY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1-4, 6-14, 17-26, 28-36, 39-44, 46-58, and 60. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm-in-part.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s invention provides definitions for received phrases in an
order based on a ranking of documents containing the definitions. See
generally Spec. 1-2. Claim 1 is illustrative:

Appeal 2009-005209
Application 10/608,270

2
1. A system for providing definitions, comprising:

a server configured to receive a phrase to be processed and select a
plurality of documents each containing at least one definition for the phrase;
and

a user interface configured to present one or more of the definitions
for the phrase in an order determined based on a ranking of the documents
that contain the presented one or more definitions.

The Examiner relies on the following as evidence of unpatentability:
Beeferman US 6,701,309 B1 Mar. 2, 2004
(filed Apr. 21, 2000)
Lindblad US 2004/0073541 A1 Apr. 15, 2004
(filed June 13, 2003;
provisional application
filed June 13, 2002)
Kapur US 2004/0249801 A1 Dec. 9, 2004
(filed Apr. 5, 2004;
provisional application
filed Apr. 4, 2003)
Coden US 6,922,809 B2 July 26, 2005
(filed June 27, 2001)

Klavans US 2005/0234709 A1 Oct. 20, 2005
(filed Sept. 26, 2002)

Martin Maurer, Google.Public.Labs.Glossary, Newsgroup Posting, How To
Get a Site Listed in Google Glossary??? Google Groups (2003) (“Maurer”).

Appeal 2009-005209
Application 10/608,270

3
THE REJECTIONS
1. The Examiner rejected claims 1-4, 6, 8, 9, 13, 14, 17, 23-26, 28,
30, 31, 35, 36, 39, 46-49, 52-55, 58, and 60 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Kapur and Klavans. Ans. 3-12.1
2. The Examiner rejected claims 7 and 29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Kapur, Klavans, and Maurer. Ans. 12-13.
3. The Examiner rejected claims 10-12, 32-34, 50, and 56 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kapur, Klavans, and Lindblad.
Ans. 13-16.
4. The Examiner rejected claims 18, 19, 40, and 41 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Kapur, Klavans, and Coden. Ans. 16-17.
5. The Examiner rejected claims 20-22, 42-44, 51, and 57 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kapur, Klavans, and Beeferman.
Ans. 17-19.

THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OVER KAPUR AND KLAVANS
The Examiner finds that Kapur’s system provides definitions by
enabling the user to retrieve definitions from a selected document by
entering phrases in a universal dialog box. Ans. 3-4, 20-29. According to
the Examiner, Kapur discloses every recited feature of representative claim 1
except for definitions from plural documents. The Examiner, however, cites

1 Throughout this opinion, we refer to (1) the Appeal Brief filed April 18,
2008; (2) the Examiner’s Answer mailed July 2, 2008; and (3) the Reply
Brief filed September 2, 2008.
Appeal 2009-005209
Application 10/608,270

4
Klavans as teaching this feature in concluding that the claim would have
been obvious. Ans. 3-4, 20-29.
Appellant argues that the cited prior art does not teach or suggest a
user interface configured to present one or more definitions for a phrase in
an order based on ranking documents containing the presented definitions,
let alone a server for selecting documents containing at least one definition,
as claimed. App. Br. 7-14; Reply Br. 4-8. Appellant also contends that
Kapur’s Paragraph 176 and Figure 8 (relied upon by the Examiner) are not
supported by Kapur’s corresponding provisional application and therefore
do not constitute prior art. Id. Appellant adds that the Examiner’s basis for
combining Klavans with Kapur is merely conclusory and therefore
improper. App. Br. 11-14. Appellant also argues other dependent claim
limitations indicated in the issue statement below. The issues before us,
then, are as follows:

ISSUES
1. Under § 103, has the Examiner erred by finding that Kapur and
Klavans collectively would have taught or suggested:
(i) (a) a server configured to select plural documents each
containing at least one definition for a received phrase, and
(b) a user interface configured to present one or more
definitions for the phrase in an order based on ranking documents containing
the presented definitions, as recited in claim 1?
Appeal 2009-005209
Application 10/608,270

5
(ii) performing a search based on a query including a predetermined
term indicative of a presence of definitions as recited in claim 4?
(iii) (a) means for determining plural documents each containing at
least one definition, and
(b) means for presenting one or more definitions based on a
means for matching the phrase to the definitions in an order based on
ranking documents containing the presented definitions as, recited in claim
46?
(iv) (a) a search engine identifying plural documents based on a
search query including terms indicative of a presence of definitions, and
storing information regarding each identified document, and
(b) a search front end matching a phrase for which a definition
is sought against the stored information for each document, returning one or
more matching definitions based on this matching, and presenting each
matching definition in an order based on a ranking of the documents
containing the presented definitions as recited in claim 47?
(v) searching a structure of the documents for indications of presence
of a definition as recited in claim 49?

2. Is the Examiner’s reason to combine the teachings of Kapur and
Klavans supported by articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning
to justify the Examiner’s obviousness conclusion?

Appeal 2009-005209
Application 10/608,270

6
FINDINGS OF FACT (FF)
1. The present application was filed June 27, 2003. Kapur was filed
April 5, 2004 and its corresponding Provisional Application No. 60/460,222
(“the ‘222 application”) was filed April 4, 2003.
2. Kapur’s system enhances information retrieval via a universal
interface. In one embodiment, server system 160 provides search results and
media content (e.g., web pages) to client system 120 responsive to received
search queries. The server can reference various ranking technologies for
classifying and ranking web pages. Kapur, Abstract; ¶¶ 0025-27; Fig. 2.
3. Kapur notes that many search terms have different meanings
depending on the context. For example, the term “Java” can refer to (1) the
Java computer language; (2) the island of Java; or (3) coffee. As such,
Kapur’s server (1) contextually analyzes search queries and/or results, and
(2) groups results in contexts for display at the user’s computer with or
without associated page links. Kapur, ¶¶ 0028, 0127.
4. Clients can enter actionable information (e.g., URLs, search
requests, lookups, updates, links, etc.) via a single entry search box or
universal dialog box (UDB). The UDB can be a thin window on one side of
a browser window, and can be used for dictionary features. Kapur, ¶¶ 0043-
0044, 0047, 0134, 0152.
5. In one example, after entering the code “travel!” in UDB 500 in
Kapur’s Figure 6, a web page (“Yahoo! Travel”) is provided. Since the user
in this example wants to obtain a definition of the term “quantity” (i.e., the
“argument” of the “define” function), the user enters the text term “define
Appeal 2009-005209
Application 10/608,270

7
quantity” in the travel page’s UDB. The system then finds the dictionary
definition, and provides it to the user as a separate web page as shown in
Figure 8. The system also searches the argument (“quantity”) and provides
the results below the definition. Kapur, ¶ 0176; Figs. 6-8.
6. Kapur’s provisional application has only four figures (Figs. 1-4)
which correspond to Figures 1-4 of Kapur’s published application. Kapur’s
Figures 6-8 and the corresponding description in Paragraph 0176 do not
appear in the provisional application.
7. Paragraphs 0041-42 of the ‘222 application correspond to
Paragraphs 0047-48 of Kapur.
8. Appendix C of Kapur’s provisional application describes
functionality of the UDB including the availability of a dictionary. ‘222
application, at 19.
9. Paragraphs 0019-22 of the ‘222 application correspond to
Paragraphs 0025-28 of Kapur.
10. Klavans automatically generates a dictionary from full-text
articles by (1) extracting pairs and storing them as
dictionary entries in a database. Klavans, Abstract, ¶¶ 0007-08, 0027-29;
Fig. 1.
11. Kapur’s query processing engine can (1) decompose queries into
constituent units; (2) implement concept discovery and analysis; and (3)
perform context analysis, disambiguation, and other processes that enhance
the quality of search results. Kapur, ¶ 0031.

Appeal 2009-005209
Application 10/608,270

8
ANALYSIS
Claims 1-3, 8, 9, 13, 14, 17, 23-25, 30, 31, 35, 36, and 39
We begin by addressing the key threshold question in dispute, namely
whether certain passages relied upon by the Examiner in Kapur qualify as
prior art. Notably, Kapur’s utility application was filed and published after
the present application’s filing date. FF 1. Therefore, to constitute prior art,
the relied-upon passages in Kapur must be supported by Kapur’s earlier-
filed provisional application (the ‘222 application) in accordance with
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. See In re Giacomini, 612 F.3d 1380, 1383-
85 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Ex parte Yamaguchi, 88 USPQ2d 1606, 1609
(BPAI 2008) (precedential); MPEP §§ 2136.03(III), 706.02(VI)(D).
On this record, we agree with Appellant (App. Br. 9-10; Reply Br. 4-
5) that the particular Yahoo! search example in Kapur’s Paragraph 0176 and
Figure 8 is not reasonably supported by the eight passages in the ‘222
application cited by the Examiner (Ans. 22) as alleged support for this
functionality. Notably, Kapur’s Figures 6-8 and the corresponding
description in Paragraph 0176 pertaining to the web sites illustrated in that
example do not appear in the provisional application. See FF 5-6.
These cited passages do, however, reasonably support Kapur’s UDB
functionality that enables the user to search for content via a single search
box—functionality that can include dictionary features. See FF 4, 7-8; see
also Ans. 22 (citing page 19 of Appendix C of the ‘222 application in
connection with using the UDB for dictionary features).
Appeal 2009-005209
Application 10/608,270

9
Notably, the Examiner also relies on Kapur’s Paragraphs 25, 26, and
28 in connection with the disputed limitations of claim 1 (Ans. 3-4). The
disclosure of these paragraphs is supported by Kapur’s provisional
application (FF 9), and we find these paragraphs at least suggest the disputed
limitations. While we find the Examiner’s reliance on the particular search
example in Kapur’s Figures 7 and 8 problematic as lacking provisional
application support, we nonetheless find no error in the Examiner’s position
which relies on the functionality disclosed in Kapur’s Paragraphs 25, 26, and
28.
Kapur notes that since many search terms have different meanings
depending on the context (e.g., the term “Java” can mean (1) a computer
language; (2) an island; or (3) coffee), Kapur’s system groups search results
and their associated links in appropriate contexts for display. FF 3. We see
no reason why this grouping would not present at least one “definition” (i.e.,
a search result in a particular context) for a search phrase (e.g., “Java”) in an
order based on a ranking of documents that contain the presented definitions
(i.e., identifying and grouping the displayed documents according to
context). See FF 2-3. In this regard, not only does Kapur at least suggest
ranking the corresponding web pages for each context group, but the very
act of grouping and displaying the results corresponding to particular
contexts would present these “definitions” in an order based on a context-
based ranking. See id.
We reach this conclusion emphasizing that since the recited term
“definitions” merely describes the content of data, it therefore constitutes
Appeal 2009-005209
Application 10/608,270

10
non-functional descriptive material as it does not further limit the claimed
invention functionally. Such non-functional descriptive material does not
patentably distinguish over prior art that otherwise renders the claims
unpatentable.2 In any event, even if we were to give the term patentable
weight, the recited “definitions” are hardly limited to dictionary definitions,
but rather broadly construed as the “[a]ct of ascertaining and explaining the
signification; a description of a thing by its properties; an explanation of the
meaning of a word or term . . . .”3 Based on this construction, we see no
reason why search results having a particular context for a received phrase
would not “define” that phrase, at least with respect to its context—a context
that represents or explains a particular meaning of the phrase. See FF 3.
Thus, Appellant’s arguments (App. Br. 7-14; Reply Br. 4-8) are not
commensurate with the scope of the claim.
We find Kapur itself at least suggests the limitations of claim 1 as
noted above, and see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Klavans merely
to show that definitions can be associated with plural documents (Ans. 4,
23)—a finding reasonably supported by Klavans’ generating dictionary
entries from plural articles. FF 10. Although technically cumulative to
Kapur, we nonetheless see no reversible error in the Examiner’s reliance on

2 See In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Ex parte
Nehls, 88 USPQ2d 1883, 1887-89 (BPAI 2008) (precedential) (discussing
cases pertaining to non-functional descriptive material).
3 WEBSTER'S REVISED UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (1913), at 382, available at
http://machaut.uchicago.edu/?resource=Webster%27s&word=definition&us
e1913=on (defining “definition”).
Appeal 2009-005209
Application 10/608,270

11
Klavans for this limited purpose. Nor are we persuaded of error in the
Examiner’s combining Klavans with Kapur as proposed since skilled
artisans would recognize that enhancing stored definitions via content from
plural documents would at least provide a more comprehensive and
complete set of stored definitions as the Examiner indicates. Ans. 23-24.
We therefore find the Examiner’s reason to combine the teachings of Kapur
and Klavans supported by articulated reasoning with some rational
underpinning to justify the Examiner’s obviousness conclusion.
We are therefore not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
(1) representative claim 1; (2) claim 23 which recites commensurate
limitations;4 and (3) claims 2, 3, 8, 9, 13, 14, 17, 24, 25, 30, 31, 35, 36, and
39 not separately argued with particularity.

Claims 4, 6, 26, and 28
We will not, however, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 4
since the Examiner relies solely on the functionality of Kapur’s Paragraph
0176 and Figure 8 in connection with this claim (Ans. 5, 29)—an example
that is not reasonably supported by the ‘222 application as noted previously.
Although Kapur’s provisional application supports entering search terms in
the UDB to retrieve definitions (see FF 3-4, 7-9), the Examiner nonetheless
relies solely on the “define (argument)” function shown in Kapur’s Figures 7

4 Although Appellant nominally argues independent claim 23 separately
(App. Br. 18-24), the arguments are similar to those for claim 1. We
therefore treat claim 23 accordingly.
Appeal 2009-005209
Application 10/608,270

12
and 8 and described in Paragraph 0176, which is not supported by the ‘222
application. See FF 6. That is, the Examiner maps the term “quantity” in
Figures 7 and 8 (corresponding to the argument of the “define” function) to
the recited predetermined term indicative of the presence of definitions.
While this may be true, the “define (argument)” function is nonetheless not
supported by Kapur’s provisional application; therefore, the Examiner erred
by relying solely on this functionality. To the extent that the entered search
terms in connection with Kapur’s searching and retrieving context-based
results noted above (FF 2-3) at least suggests the recited predetermined
terms indicative of the presence of definitions has not been articulated on
this record, nor will we engage in this inquiry here in the first instance on
appeal.
We are therefore constrained by this record to reverse the Examiner’s
rejection of (1) claim 4; (2) claim 26 which recites commensurate
limitations; and (3) dependent claims 6 and 28 for similar reasons.5 Since
this issue is dispositive regarding our reversing the rejection of these claims,
we need not address Appellant’s other arguments pertaining to claims 6 and
28 (App. Br. 16-17, 25-26; Reply Br. 9-10).

5 Although claim 28 depends from claim 23, it nonetheless further limits
“the predetermined term,” a limitation first recited in claim 26. Since the
term “the predetermined term” has no antecedent basis in claim 23, we
therefore presume that claim 28 depends from claim 26 to provide proper
antecedent basis as was done for commensurate claim 6 which depends from
claim 4—not claim 1. Compare claim 28 with claim 6.
Appeal 2009-005209
Application 10/608,270

13
Claim 46
We will, however, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claim 46 essentially for the reasons indicated previously regarding claim 1.
Moreover, as noted above, we see no error in the Examiner’s position based
on Kapur’s Paragraphs 25 and 28 (Ans. 8, 32-34) which, by retrieving,
organizing, and displaying search results according their context, at least
suggests an equivalent means for (1) determining documents containing at
least one definition, and (2) presenting the definitions based on a means for
matching the phrase to the definitions in an order based on ranking
documents containing the presented definitions, as claimed. See FF 2-3.
Thus, Appellant’s arguments regarding the supported relied-upon passages
of Kapur and Klavans (App. Br. 27, 29-32) are unpersuasive and not
commensurate with the scope of the claim.
We are therefore not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 46.

Claims 47, 48, 52-54, 58, and 60
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of representative claim 47
essentially for the reasons indicated previously regarding claim 46 and by
the Examiner (Ans. 9-11, 36-39). We find no error in the Examiner’s
reliance on Kapur’s supported disclosure in connection with the
functionality of Paragraphs 25, 26, and 30 as it pertains to the recited search
engine and front end (Ans. 9-11, 36-39)—functionality that at least suggests
returning one or more matching definitions. See FF 2-3. We reach this
Appeal 2009-005209
Application 10/608,270

14
conclusion particularly in light of Kapur’s retrieving, organizing, and
displaying search results according to their context, as noted above. See id.
Based on this functionality, skilled artisans would recognize that retrieving
results tailored to a particular search phrase’s context as noted above would
involve some sort of search “front end” that (1) matches the phrase against
stored information for each document; (2) returns matching definitions based
on this matching; and (3) presents each matching definition in an order
based on a document ranking. See id. Appellant’s arguments in this regard
(App. Br. 32-33, 35-39) are not commensurate with the scope of the claim
that does not preclude Kapur’s context-based retrieval and presentation of
search results. Nor are we persuaded of error in the Examiner’s combining
Klavans with Kapur for the reasons noted previously.
We are therefore not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
(1) representative claim 47; (2) independent claims 53 and 60 reciting
commensurate limitations;6 and (3) claims 48, 52, 54, and 58 not separately
argued with particularity.

Claims 49 and 55
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of representative claim 49
reciting searching a structure of the documents for indications of presence of
a definition. We find no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Kapur’s

6 Although Appellant nominally argues independent claims 53 and 60
separately (App. Br. 41-47, 49-55), the arguments are similar to those for
claim 47. We therefore treat claims 53 and 60 accordingly.
Appeal 2009-005209
Application 10/608,270

15
supported disclosure in Paragraphs 0025 and 0031 (Ans. 11, 40) for at least
suggesting searching a document structure for definitions as claimed, since
Kapur’s query processing engine performs not only concept discovery and
analysis, but also context analysis to enhance search result quality. FF 11.
This functionality at least suggests searching the documents’ structure as
claimed with respect to Kapur’s context-based retrieval and presentation of
search results noted previously. Appellant’s arguments (App. Br. 39-40) are
therefore not commensurate with the scope of the claim.
We are therefore not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 49 and claim 55, which recites commensurate limitations.7

THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS OVER KAPUR, KLAVANS, AND LINDBLAD
Regarding representative claim 50, the Examiner finds that Kapur and
Klavans teach all recited features except for parsing the identified
documents to identify occurrences of the phrase for which a definition is
sought. The Examiner, however, cites Lindblad for teaching this feature in
concluding that the claim would have been obvious. Ans. 13-15, 41-42.
Appellant argues that (1) the cited passages from Lindblad do not
teach or suggest parsing to identify occurrences of the phrase for which a
definition is sought as claimed, and (2) the Examiner’s rationale for

7 Although Appellant nominally argues claim 55 separately (App. Br. 47-
49), the arguments are similar to those for claim 49. We therefore treat
claim 55 accordingly.
Appeal 2009-005209
Application 10/608,270

16
combining the references is merely conclusory. App. Br. 57-60. The issues
before us, then, are as follows:

ISSUES
(1) Under § 103, has the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 50 by
finding that Kapur, Klavans, and Lindblad collectively would have taught or
suggested parsing the identified documents to identify occurrences of the
phrase for which a definition is sought?
(2) Is the Examiner’s reason to combine the teachings of these
references supported by articulated reasoning with some rational
underpinning to justify the Examiner’s obviousness conclusion?

ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT
12. Lindblad’s XQuery server 200 generates step queries and results
from documents 202 and stores them in a database. In one embodiment, the
documents are parsed documents created by an XML parsing process that
(1) accepts XML textual inputs; (2) analyzes the document element
structure; and (3) outputs a data structure representing the input document as
a linked collection of element nodes. Lindblad, ¶ 0042; Fig. 9.

ANALYSIS
Based on the record before us, we find no error in the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection of representative claim 50 which recites, in pertinent
part, parsing the identified documents to identify occurrences of the phrase
Appeal 2009-005209
Application 10/608,270

17
for which a definition is sought. We see no reason why skilled artisans
could not use a parser, such as that disclosed by Lindblad, in connection
with Kapur’s search and retrieval functionality as the Examiner indicates
(Ans. 13-15, 41-42), particularly since Lindblad teaches parsing documents
to generate queries and query results, and storing them in a database. See FF
12. Such a technique would be advantageous to identify phrase occurrences
using Kapur’s technique in a structured document (e.g., an XML document)
as in Lindblad. See id. Such an enhancement merely predictably uses prior
art elements according to their established functions—an obvious
improvement. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). We
therefore find the Examiner’s reason to combine the teachings of the cited
references supported by articulated reasoning with some rational
underpinning to justify the Examiner’s obviousness conclusion.
We are therefore not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
(1) representative claim 50; (2) claim 56 which recites commensurate
limitations;8 and (3) claims 10-12 and 32-34 not separately argued with
particularity.

THE REMAINING OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS
We also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of claims

8 Although Appellant nominally argues claim 56 separately (App. Br. 60-
62), the arguments are similar to those for claim 50. We therefore treat
claim 56 accordingly.

Appeal 2009-005209
Application 10/608,270

18
18-22, 29, 40-44, 51, and 57. Ans. 12-13, 16-19. Appellant does not
particularly identify error in the Examiner’s reasoning to overcome the
Examiner’s obviousness conclusion for these claims, but rather reiterates
similar arguments made previously. App. Br. 56, 63-65. We are not
persuaded by these arguments, however, for the reasons previously
discussed.
We do not, however, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 7 over
Kapur, Klavans, and Maurer (Ans. 12-13) since we previously reversed the
rejection of claim 4 from which claim 7 depends.

CONCLUSION
Under § 103, the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1-3, 8-14,
17-25, 29-36, 39-44, 46-58, and 60, but erred in rejecting claims 4, 6, 7, 26,
and 28.

ORDER
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-4, 6-14, 17-26, 28-36, 39-
44, 46-58, and 60 is affirmed-in-part.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

rwk