Ex Parte Neumann

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 15, 2013

11040062 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 15, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte MICHAEL NEUMANN
____________________

Appeal 2011-001613
Application 11/040,062
Technology Center 2600
____________________

Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, THU A. DANG, and HUNG H. BUI,
Administrative Patent Judges.

BUI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant
1
seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 15-19 and 25-29.
2
We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
3

1
Real Party in Interest is BSH Bosch und Siemens Hausgerate, GmbH.
2
Claims 22 and 23 have been indicated as containing allowable subject
matter. Claims 30-34, 36 and 37 have been indicated as being allowed.
Claims 1-14, 20, 21, 24 and 35 have been canceled and are not on appeal.
3
In the event of further prosecution, claim 1 should be re-evaluated for
compliance under 35 U.S.C. §112, 2
nd
paragraph, as there is no antecedent
basis for the term “said locking device;” a lock should be amended as –a
locking device—to avoid questions of ambiguities.
Appeal 2011-001613
Application 11/040,062

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s Invention
Appellant’s invention relates to a household appliance such as a
refrigerator or a freezer including at least one interior space 15 closed by an
appliance door 2, and a lock or locking device 5, 6 configured to hold the
appliance door 2 closed. A biometric person-identifying device 20 is
configured to control the locking device 5, 6, such as to lock and unlock the
appliance door 2. Spec., p. 5, l. 23 – p. 6, l. 27, and FIG. 1. The biometric
person-identifying device 20 may be operated by at least one of a fingerprint
recording device (person’s fingerprint), a speech recording device (voice
characteristics), and an iris recording device (iris pattern). Spec., p. 7, l. 5 –
p. 8, l. 5, FIG. 2 and Abstract.
Illustrative Claims
Claim 15, the only independent claim on appeal, is illustrative of the
invention and is reproduced below with disputed limitations emphasized:

15. A household appliance, comprising:
at least one interior space closed by an appliance door;
a lock configured to hold closed said appliance door;
a biometric person-identifying device configured to
control said locking device.
4

Evidence Considered
Webb, Sr. US 4,019,763 Apr. 26, 1977
Yulkowski US 6,259,352 B1 Jul. 10, 2001
Bingle US 6,485,081 B1 Nov. 26, 2002

4
Claims 22 and 23 have been indicated as containing allowable subject
matter. Claims 30-34, 36 and 37 have been indicated as being allowed.
Claims 1-14, 20, 21, 24 and 35 have been canceled and are not on appeal.
Appeal 2011-001613
Application 11/040,062

3

Mase US 6,532,399 B2 Mar. 11, 2003
Cenedese US 2004/0117274 A1 Jun. 17, 2004
Faro US 2006/0139148 A1 Jun. 29, 2006

Examiner’s Rejections
(1) Claims 15-17, 19 and 29 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§103(a) as being unpatentable over Mase and Cenedese. Ans. 4-5.
(2) Claim 18 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Mase, Cenedese, and Yulkowski. Ans. 5
(3) Claim 25 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Mase, Cenedese, and Webb. Ans. 5-6.
(4) Claims 26 and 27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as
being unpatentable over Mase, Cenedese, and Faro. Ans. 6.
(5) Claim 28 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Mase, Cenedese, Bingle, and Faro. Ans. 6-7.

ISSUES
Based on Appellant’s arguments, the dispositive issues on appeal are:
(1) Whether the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 15-17, 19, and
29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over Mase and Cenedese,
because, according to Appellant, Mase does not disclose a “biometric lock”
and the Examiner’s characterization of a lock as described by Mase as a
“biometric lock” is without support from Mase and “could only be derived
in hindsight in view of Appellant’s own disclosure” (App. Br. 6); and
(2) Whether the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 18 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over Mase, Cenedese and Yulkowski,
because, according to Appellant, “Yulkowski does not disclose a biometric
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person-identifying device that controls a lock on an appliance door” (App.
Br. 8).

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments that the Examiner has erred.
We disagree with Appellant’s conclusion. We find that the Examiner
has provided a comprehensive response, supported by sufficient evidence, to
each of the contentions raised by Appellant. We highlight and address
specific findings and arguments for emphasis as follows.

§ 103(a) Rejection of Claims 15-17, 19 and 29
With respect to independent claim 15, Appellant contends that Mase
does not disclose a “biometric lock” and the Examiner’s “characterization of
[a] lock described in Mase as a ‘biometric lock’ is entirely without support
from Mase and “could only be derived in hindsight in view of Appellant’s
own disclosure.” App. Br. 6. In addition, Appellant acknowledges that Mase
discloses a biometric-type identification device as an input means, but
argues that “the use of such a device does not serve to arbitrarily combine
the input means for entering access data and the lock into a purported
‘biometric lock.’” App. Br. 6.
However, Appellant’s arguments are misplaced. First, Appellant’s
independent claim 15 simply requires a lock, and not a “biometric lock.” As
correctly noted by the Examiner, Mase discloses a household appliance such
as a refrigerator 200 comprising a lock (shown in FIG. 3) 210 configured to
hold closed a door 220. Ans. 4 (citing Mase, col. 3, ll. 48-59).
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FIG. 3 of Mase is reproduced below:

FIG. 3 shows an example refrigerator 200 using a lock (or locking
system) 210 for locking and unlocking purposes.

In addition, the Examiner finds that Mase discloses “an input means
associated with a lock for inputting data for locking and unlocking the lock.”
Ans. 7 (citing Mase, col. 3, ll. 60-64). The Examiner further finds that
Mase discloses that:
“the input means can be of any known technology such as a
keyhole, a [sic] alphanumeric keypad, a keyboard, a touch
screen, a computer mouse, a coded card reader, a magnetic strip
reader, a bar code scanner, a token receptacle, or even
biometric-type identification devices such as those that identify
a user by fingerprints, hand scans, retina scans, iris scans, voice
prints or other body features and the like.”

Ans. 7 (citing Mase, col. 3, l. 63 – col. 4, l. 3) (emphasis added).
In other words, an input means associated with a lock as described by
Mase comprises a biometric-type identification device as defined by
Appellant’s independent claim 15. In view of these teachings of Mase, we
find no error in the Examiner’s findings and the Examiner’s positions that:
(1) “a lock that uses a biometric input means to lock and unlock the lock is
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considered a biometric lock” (Ans. 7-8), and (2) Appellant’s claim 15 recites
no limitation regarding the integration of the biometric input means and the
lock, and, therefore, the biometric input means as disclosed by Mase reads
on the claim limitation (Ans. 8).
Moreover, “[w]hen a patent ‘simply arranges old elements with each
performing the same function it had been known to perform’ and yields no
more than one would expect from such an arrangement, the combination is
obvious” under the law of 35 U.S.C. § 103. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). Such is the case here.
Each of the claimed elements of Appellant’s claim 15 is disclosed by
Mase and Cenedese. Appellant’s own description of biometric-person
identification is written only in generalities. Mase discloses common use
and interchangeability of different input means, including biometric-person
identification to control a lock or locking device.
We find that Mase shows that one of ordinary skill in the art at the
time of the invention would have been familiar with using biometric-person
identification information interchangeably with or in lieu of known locking
mechanisms with locks and corresponding keys to authenticate users and
gain access to household appliance. As such, we conclude that one of
ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to update the prior art
locking device with the modern biometric authentication component and
thereby gain, predictably, the commonly understood benefits of such
adaptation, that is, a secure and reliable authentication procedure.
Appellant has not presented sufficient evidence or argument that
combining Mase and Cenedese would have been “uniquely challenging or
difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art” or “represented an unobvious
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step over the prior art.” See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485
F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418-19).
For the reasons set forth above, we sustain the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection of claim 15 and its respective dependent claims 17, 19,
and 29, which were not separately argued, under 35 U.SC § 103(a).
With respect to claim 18, Appellant argues that “Yulkowski does not
disclose a biometric person-identifying device that controls a lock on an
appliance door.” App. Br. 8. However, Appellant’s argument is also
misplaced.
As correctly noted by the Examiner, Mase discloses an input means
such as a biometric person-identifying device configured for controlling the
locking device to unlock the appliance door. Ans. 5 (citing Mase, col. 5, ll.
14-17, col. 5, ll. 59-60). Yulkowski is simply cited for a disclosure that the
use of such identifying means to lock as well as to unlock the door. Ans. 5
(citing Yulkowski, col. 4, l. 65 – col. 5, l. 2). In view of these teachings, we
find no error in the Examiner’s findings and conclusion that “it would have
been obvious … to modify the locking mechanism of Mase as disclosed by
Yulkowski et al. because using the biometric device to lock the appliance
ensures that locking of the appliance door is only carried out by an
authorized user.” Ans. 5. Accordingly, we also sustain the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection of claim 18 under 35 U.SC § 103(a).

CONCLUSION
On the record before us, we conclude that, because the references
disclose or suggest all the disputed claim limitations, the Examiner has not
erred in rejecting claims 15-19 and 25-29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
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Application 11/040,062

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DECISION
As such, we AFFIRM the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 15-19
and 25-29.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

ELD