Ex Parte Nettles et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 24, 2014

10992962 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 24, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte STEVEN C. NETTLES, ACHIM FELBER,
MARLIN L. SHOPBELL, JOERG LUEBKE, and LOK TAU1
____________________

Appeal 2011-007847
Application 10/992,962
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, and
LARRY J. HUME, Administrative Patent Judges.

HUME, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Final
Rejection of claims 1, 2, 7-9, 11-13, 16-21, 23-30, 32-38, 40-46, 50-54, 57-
77, 79-81, 84-87, 93, 94, 96-98, and 101-137. Appellants have previously
canceled claims 3-6, 10, 14, 15, 22, 31, 39, 47-49, 55, 56, 78, 82, 83, 88-92,
95, 99, and 100. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 The Real Party in Interest is Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. App. Br. 2.
Appeal 2011-007847
Application 10/992,962

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
The Invention
Appellants’ invention relates to automated manufacturing
environments and, more particularly, to scheduling in an automated
manufacturing environment. Spec. 2:6-7 (“FIELD OF THE INVENTION”).
Exemplary Claims
Claims 1, 16, 46, 76, and 87, reproduced below, are representative of
the subject matter on appeal (emphases added to disputed limitations):
1. A method for use in scheduling in an automated
process flow, the method comprising:
scheduling a material transport in the process flow; and
requesting a staging of a vehicle for the material
transport a predetermined time period prior to the material
transport.

16. The method of claim 1, wherein requesting the
staging of the vehicle for the material transport the
predetermined time period prior to the material transport
includes requesting the staging of the vehicle to arrive for the
material transport just in time for the material transport.

2 Our decision refers to Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed
Sep. 1, 2010); Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Jan. 21, 2011); Examiner’s
Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Nov. 24, 2010); Final Office Action (“FOA,”
mailed Dec. 22, 2009); and the original Specification (“Spec.,” filed
Nov. 19, 2004).
Appeal 2011-007847
Application 10/992,962

3
46. A method for use in scheduling in an automated
process flow, the method comprising:
scheduling on behalf of a first portion of a plurality of
manufacturing domain entities for a consumption of processing
services provided by a second portion of the manufacturing
domain entities; and
influencing the scheduling through a management of the
second portion of the manufacturing domain entities.

76. A method for use in scheduling in an automated
process flow, the method comprising:
scheduling a material transport in the process flow;
executing the scheduled material transport; and
dynamically reallocating a port assignment at the
scheduled destination during the execution of the scheduled
material transport.

87. A method for use in scheduling in an automated
process flow, the method comprising:
determining a port assignment and a port availability
time for a proposed material transport; and
providing the port assignment and the port availability
time for use in scheduling a material transport; and
scheduling the material transport in the process flow for
delivery to the assigned port at the port availability time.
Appeal 2011-007847
Application 10/992,962

4
Prior Art
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art in rejecting the
claims on appeal:
Lin US 2004/0039469 A1 Feb. 26, 2004
Akiyama US 2007/0150085 A1 June 28, 2007
J. Sun & D. Xue, A Dynamic Reactive Scheduling Mechanism for
Responding to Changes of Production Orders and Manufacturing
Resources, 46 COMPUTERS IN INDUSTRY 189 (2001) [hereinafter Xue].3
Rejections on Appeal4
R1. Claims 1, 2, 7, 9, 11, 13, 19-21, 23-30, 33, 37, 38, 41, 45, 46,
50, 51, 53, 54, 57-59, 61-67, 69-74, 87, 93, 94, 96, 98, 101, 103, 120-123,
125, 126, 128-132, 134, 135, and 137 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(e) as being anticipated by Lin. Ans. 4.
R2. Claims 1, 8, 18, 30, 32, 36, 38, 40, and 44 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Akiyama. Ans. 16.
R3. Claims 12, 52, 60, 68, 75-77, 79-81, 84-86, 97, 102, 104-119,
124, 127, 133, and 136 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the combination of Lin and Xue. Ans. 17.

3 For clarity, we adopt the name “Xue” to refer to the non-patent literature
reference above so as to conform to the Examiner’s final rejection (see
FOA 16) and the statement of the rejection in the Answer (see Ans. 17).
Appellants contrarily refer to the Xue reference as “Sun.” App. Br. 10, 20.
4 We note claims 61 and 103 stand rejected as being anticipated by Lin;
however, these claims depend from claims 60 and 102, respectively, which
stand rejected as being unpatentable over the combination of Lin and Xue.
Because Appellants do not separately argue claims 61 and 103, we find there
to be only harmless error in the Examiner’s mistaken statement of the
rejection of claims 61 and 103. See Ans. 4, 17.
Appeal 2011-007847
Application 10/992,962

5
R4. Claims 16, 17, 34, 35, 42, and 43 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lin. Ans. 22.
CLAIM GROUPING
Appellants set forth various claim groupings, with representative
claims proposed for each claim under a common rejection. App. Br. 11. For
the purpose of deciding this Appeal, we establish the following claim
groups:
Rejection R1: Anticipation Rejection over Lin
Group A (Claim 1): Claims 1, 2, 7, 9, 11, 13, 19-21, 23-30, 33,
37, 38, 41, and 45 stand or fall with independent claim 1;
Group B (Claim 46): Claims 46, 50, 51, 53, 54, 57-59, 61-67, and
69-74 stand or fall with independent claim 46;
Group C (Claim 87): Claims 87, 93, 94, 96, 98, 101, 103, 120-
123, 125, 126, 128-132, 134, 135, and 137 stand or fall with independent
claim 87.
Rejection R2: Anticipation Rejection over Akiyama
Group D (Claim 1): Claims 1, 8, 18, 30, 32, 36, 38, 40, and 44
stand or fall with independent claim 1.
Rejection R3: Unpatentability Rejection over Lin and Xue
Group E (Claim 76): Claims 12, 52, 60, 68, 75-77, 79-81, 84-86,
97, 102, 104-119, 124, 127, 133, and 136 stand or fall with independent
claim 76.
Appeal 2011-007847
Application 10/992,962

6
Rejection R4: Unpatentability Rejection over Lin
Group F (Claim 16): Claims 16, 17, 34, 35, 42, and 43 stand or
fall with dependent claim 16.
ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
We only consider those arguments actually made by Appellants in
reaching this decision, and we do not consider arguments which Appellants
could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs so that any such
arguments are deemed to be waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).
We disagree with Appellants’ conclusions with respect to claims 1, 2,
7-9, 11-13, 16-21, 23-30, 32-38, 40-46, 50-54, 57-77, 79-81, 84-87, 93, 94,
96-98, and 101-137, and we adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons
set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken and
(2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s
Answer in response to Appellants’ Arguments. However, we highlight and
address specific findings and arguments regarding claims 1, 16, 46, 76, and
87 for emphasis as follows.
A. Anticipation Rejection of Group A (Claim 1) Over Lin
Issue 1
Group A includes claims 1, 2, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 19, 20, 23-30, 33, 37,
38, 41, and 45, which stand or fall with independent claim 1. Appellants
argue (App. Br. 11-14; Reply Br. 2-3) that the Examiner’s rejection of claim
1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Lin is in error. These
contentions present us with the following issue:
Appeal 2011-007847
Application 10/992,962

7
Did the Examiner err in finding that Lin discloses the limitation of
“requesting a staging of a vehicle for the material transport a predetermined
time period prior to the material transport,” as recited in claim 1?
Analysis
Appellants generally contend Lin fails to teach anything regarding the
limitation in dispute, i.e., “staging of a vehicle for the material transport.”
App. Br. 11; Reply Br. 2. Specifically, Appellants contend paragraph 38 of
Lin, relied upon by the Examiner in making the rejection (FOA 3; see Ans.
4), teaches, in conjunction with paragraph 28 of Lin,
something completely different from a “material transport” [and
w]hat ¶[0028] relates is called a “load” in the present
application. . . . [and,] once the [front-opening unified pod]
FOUP containing the lots has been delivered, it waits until the
tool indicates that there is an empty port—that is the “move in
request”—and so it has nothing to with a material transport.
App. Br. 12.
Appellants refer to their Specification in attempting to provide a
definition of the phrase “staging of a vehicle,” i.e., “having an empty vehicle
at the source location for the move at the move start time.” App. Br. 13
(quoting Spec. 9:22-24). Appellants conclude by contending:
The Office has therefore misconstrued Lin. Lin does not
teach anything regarding the staging of a vehicle for a material
transport. Even the most pertinent disclosure in Lin describes
only the loading of the tool, which necessarily occurs after or at
the end of a material transport. Thus, not only does Lin not
teach “requesting a staging of a vehicle for the material
transport a predetermined time period prior to the material
transport”, it does not even describe a context in which such a
limitation could even be disclosed. Lin therefore does not
Appeal 2011-007847
Application 10/992,962

8
anticipate any of 1-2, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 19-20, 23-30, 33, 37-38,
41, and 45.
App. Br. 14 (emphasis omitted). We disagree with Appellants’ conclusions
for the reasons discussed below.
First, we decline to import limitations into the claims from the
Specification. SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870,
875 (Fed. Cir. 2004). A dictionary definition that is instructive as to the
ordinary usage of “staging” is “the moving of . . . matériel forward in several
stages.” See Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/staging (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). Appellants’
Specification does not offer a definition of “staging” that modifies or
narrows the ordinary meaning. We find Appellants’ use of “staging” in the
Specification, while not a definition per se, is at least consistent with the
dictionary definition cited above. Spec. 9:22-24 (i.e., “having an empty
vehicle at the source location for the move at the move start time”). Further,
we see nothing in the context of the claim that would further modify or
narrow the meaning of “staging.” Accordingly, we construe “staging a
vehicle” broadly to encompass the ordinary meaning as set forth in the
dictionary definition supra, and as recited in the claims.
Second, we find Lin discloses identifying the status of manufacturing
equipment and, if the equipment’s load port is available, loading a transport
system with a Front Opening Unified Pod (FOUP), which is transferred
directly either to the load port, to a sorter, or to a buffer holding area. Lin
¶¶ [0027], [0028], [0034], [0042], [0060], [0061]. We agree with the
Examiner’s finding (Ans. 23-25) that the above-described approach in Lin
discloses material transport in a vehicle, i.e., the “FOUP” and, more
Appeal 2011-007847
Application 10/992,962

9
particularly, discloses the recited “requesting a staging of a vehicle for the
material transport,” because transferring a transport vehicle to the
manufacturing equipment port, either directly or via a holding area, can
reasonably be construed as first requiring “requesting a staging of a vehicle,”
as recited in claim 1.
In their Reply, Appellants argue, “Lin fails to teach any form of
material transport scheduling,” because Lin does not schedule the material
transport, but rather, “if the FOUP for a lot on the pre-dispatch list is
available, a material transport is immediately initiated.” Reply Br. 2.
Appellants also contend Lin provides no discussion of how its system
operates, at least in the passages in Lin identified by the Examiner, i.e.,
paragraph 60, and “[t]he lots listed on the pre-dispatch or WIP lists are
merely lots that are available for processing,” and do not represent material
transports scheduled for these lots. Id.
We disagree with Appellants’ contentions because Lin teaches when a
piece of equipment is available, then a FOUP is loaded into the overhead
transport system and then sent to a sorter for the pickup or “staging” of the
material. Lin, ¶ [0060]. In addition, Lin discloses tool control system (TCS)
10 prioritizes sent lots as first on the WIP list 38, without asking the pre-
dispatch (PD) portion to prioritize the lots and, “whenever the piece of
fabrication equipment 18 is available to process a next lot, the top priority
lot 76 will be picked and will be inserted into the overhead transport system
16 ahead of any lots in the WIP list 38.” Lin, ¶ [0059]. We are unpersuaded
by Appellants’ arguments in the Reply, cited supra, and find these passages
of Lin disclose the recited “material transport scheduling.”
Appeal 2011-007847
Application 10/992,962

10
Accordingly, Appellants have not provided sufficient evidence or
argument to persuade us of any reversible error in the Examiner’s reading of
the contested limitations on the cited prior art. Therefore, we sustain the
Examiner’s anticipation rejection of independent claim 1. As claims 2, 7, 9,
11, 13, 19-21, 23-30, 33, 37, 38, 41, and 45 stand or fall with claim 1, we
similarly sustain the Examiner’s rejection of these claims under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(e).
B. Anticipation Rejection of Group B (Claim 46) Over Lin
Issue 2
Group B includes claims 46, 50, 51, 53, 54, 57-59, 61-67, and 69-74,
which stand or fall with independent claim 46. Appellants argue (App. Br.
14-15; Reply Br. 3) that the Examiner’s rejection of claim 46 under 35
U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Lin is in error. These contentions
present us with the following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding that Lin discloses the limitation of
“influencing the scheduling through a management of the second portion of
the manufacturing domain entities,” as recited in claim 46?
Analysis
Appellants generally contend Lin does not teach influencing
scheduling, and particularly contend (App. Br. 14-15) paragraph 26 of Lin,
cited by the Examiner on page 7 of the Final Rejection, merely teaches
“wafer dispatch responsive to a trigger and is irrelevant to scheduling of any
kind[,] much less that of the subject limitation . . . [such that Lin has been]
misconstrued . . . in this respect.” App. Br. 14. Appellants further contend
Appeal 2011-007847
Application 10/992,962

11
(App. Br. 15) the Examiner has missed an important point of their argument,
i.e., claim 46 requires the scheduling be influenced “through a management
of the second portion of the manufacturing domain entities.” Appellants
allege that is not what Lin discloses, because paragraph 65 of Lin states,
“[t]he triggering event occurs when the first load port tool for the piece of
fabrication equipment 18 becomes empty (step 90).” Id. Appellants
conclude this disclosure does not involve “management of the second
portion of the manufacturing domain entities” – only reporting their
activities. Id.
We find Lin anticipates the limitation in dispute by disclosing the
influence of Lin’s Operation Management Interface 12 (see Lin, Fig. 2;
¶¶ [0023], [0026], [0049]) on the scheduling of the wafer to a specific piece
of equipment, and the interaction of the Operation Management Interface
with other Operation Management Interfaces, which further “influences” the
material scheduling. Id. at ¶ [0051]. Therefore, we find, in agreement with
the Examiner (Ans. 26), Lin does teach the limitation in dispute, i.e.,
“influencing the scheduling through a management of the second portion of
manufacturing domain entities,” as recited in claim 46.
In their Reply, Appellants argue, “[d]ispatching wafers [as disclosed
by Lin] in response to a triggering event is simply not scheduling,” and,
“[s]ince[] there is no actual scheduling, there can be no influencing of the
scheduling ‘through a management of the second portion of the
manufacturing domain entities.’” Reply Br. 3.
We disagree with Appellants’ arguments in the Reply and, in addition
to the Examiner’s findings with which we agree (Ans. 26 (citing Lin
Appeal 2011-007847
Application 10/992,962

12
¶¶ [0049], [0051])), we also find Lin discloses, inter alia, “[w]afer orders
within a PD list are manually added by an operation job supervisor (OJS) to
the TCS in a manner optimally minimizing downtime within the system”
(Lin, ¶ [0047]) and “[t]he [pre-dispatch] PD list 60 provides a list of
individual orders or PD lots 62 that are preferably prioritized prior to
dispatch, each order 62 is classified according to a preset number, an order
number, a FOUP number, and a specific date and time” (id. at ¶ [0056]).
We find the “scheduling” limitation in claim 46 reads on the above-cited
disclosure of Lin, e.g., prioritizing individual orders or PD lots discloses the
recited “scheduling.”
Accordingly, Appellants have not provided sufficient evidence or
argument to persuade us of any reversible error in the Examiner’s reading of
the contested limitation on the cited prior art. Therefore, we sustain the
Examiner’s anticipation rejection of independent claim 46. As claims 50,
51, 53, 54, 57-59, 61-67, and 69-74 stand or fall with claim 46, we similarly
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).
C. Anticipation Rejection of Group C (Claim 87) Over Lin
Issue 3
Group C includes claims 87, 93, 94, 96, 98, 101, 103, 120-123, 125,
126, 128-132, 134, 135, and 137, which stand or fall with independent
claim 87. Appellants argue (App. Br. 15-16; Reply Br. 3) that the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 87 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being
anticipated by Lin is in error. These contentions present us with the
following issue:
Appeal 2011-007847
Application 10/992,962

13
Did the Examiner err in finding that Lin discloses the limitation of
“determining . . . a port availability time for a proposed material transport,”
as recited in claim 87?
Analysis
Appellants contend Lin does not disclose “port availability time for a
proposed material transport,” because the material transport occurs without
regard to when a port might be available and because the FOUP, when it
arrives at the port, merely waits until the port is empty. App. Br. 16.
We disagree with Appellants’ arguments and find Lin discloses a
triggering event in response to an empty load port tool at a piece of
fabrication equipment and that the triggering event causes wafers to be sent
to the fabrication equipment. See Lin, ¶¶ [0026], [0065].
We find Appellants’ arguments are not commensurate with the scope
of claim 87. For example, the limitation in dispute merely requires
“determining a port assignment and a port availability time for a proposed
material transport” and using the port availability time to schedule the
material transport. As a matter of claim construction, we find there is no
temporal requirement levied by the claim recitations, i.e., the “determining”
step is not required to be accomplished at any particular time in advance of
the recited “scheduling” step such that a notification of an available port
could immediately trigger, and thus “schedule” the proposed material
transport.
In their Reply, Appellants argue, “[d]ispatching a material transport to
the open port after being notified of its availability simply does not equate to
scheduling a material transport for delivery at the port availability time.”
Appeal 2011-007847
Application 10/992,962

14
Reply Br. 4. We disagree with Appellants and find the above-cited portions
of the Specification support our finding that the recited “port availability
time” may reasonably be construed as a variable parameter that need not
correspond precisely to one particular time, but instead equates to a range of
time.5
In response, we note Appellants’ Specification discusses port
availability time by stating, “[i]n effect, port availability time is configurable
anywhere from ‘just-in-time’ for a processing appointment to a significant
amount of time prior to the processing appointment.” Spec. 19:3-4. The
Specification further states:
The occurrence of these occasions [conflicts with
occupied ports] can be lessened by imposing some minimum
delay between scheduled moves related to a particular port.
This delay can be imposed during scheduling of the move
appointments described above, since bids for processing
appointments, processing appointments, and move
appointments include port and port available time attributes.
The delay should be of sufficient duration that the move off the
port can make the port available for the move onto the port.
Spec. 36:14-19.
Accordingly, Appellants have not provided sufficient evidence or
argument to persuade us of any reversible error in the Examiner’s reading of

5 During examination, a claim must be given its broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with the specification, as one of ordinary skill in the
art would interpret it. Because the applicant has the opportunity to amend
claims during prosecution, giving a claim its broadest reasonable
interpretation will reduce the possibility that the claim, once issued, will be
interpreted more broadly than is justified. In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569,
1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (“During patent examination the pending claims must be interpreted
as broadly as their terms reasonably allow.”).
Appeal 2011-007847
Application 10/992,962

15
the contested limitations on the cited prior art. Therefore, we sustain the
Examiner’s anticipation rejection of independent claim 87. As claims 93,
94, 96, 98, 101, 103, 120-23, 125, 126, 128-132, 134, 135, and 137 stand or
fall with independent claim 87, we similarly sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).
D. Anticipation Rejection of Group D (Claim 1) Over Akiyama
Issue 4
Group D includes claims 1, 8, 18, 30, 32, 36, 38, 40, and 44, which
stand or fall with independent claim 1. Appellants argue (App. Br. 17-19;
Reply Br. 4-5) the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)
as being anticipated by Akiyama is in error. These contentions present us
with the following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding that Akiyama discloses the limitation
of “requesting a staging of a vehicle for the material transport a
predetermined time period prior to the material transport,” as recited in
claim 1?
Analysis
Appellants contend Akiyama “focuses on the transfer of the wafer—
and especially the timing of such transfers—between the vehicle and the tool
rather than on the move itself as is apparent from the ‘Abstract’.” App.
Br. 17. Appellants further contend, “[t]here is no mention of staging any
vehicle, and so cannot disclose the subject limitation.” App. Br. 18. In
addition, Appellants argue, “the tool loading is different from the material
transport, the wafer is different from the vehicle, and the use of the vehicle is
Appeal 2011-007847
Application 10/992,962

16
different from its staging, which is still different from the request for its
staging.” Id. Further, Appellants argue the recited staging should be defined
by a particular embodiment discussed in their Specification, i.e., “[t]he
method 200 then requests (at 206) a staging of a vehicle 160 (i.e., having an
empty vehicle at the source location for the move at the move start time) for
the material transport a predetermined time period prior thereto.” App.
Br. 19 (quoting Spec. 9:21-24). That is, Appellants argue the recited
“staging” should be interpreted as requiring an empty vehicle at a particular
location at a particular time. As discussed supra with respect to the
anticipation rejection of claim 1 over Lin, we decline to read such a
limitation into the claim.
In response, the Examiner relies upon Akiyama’s Abstract (Ans. 16),
as well as other portions of the prior art reference. Ans. 28 (citing Akiyama
Fig. 1a, element 3; ¶¶ [0104], [0116]). Akiyama’s Abstract states, in
pertinent part, “[t]he method comprises the steps of: making a
communication between the [automated guided vehicle] AGV and the
prober to decide respective timings of deliveries of the objects to/from the
load port; and transporting the objects between the AGV and the prober via
the load port.” Paragraph 116 of Akiyama similarly discloses, “the
conveyance method of the present invention comprises the steps of, making
a communication between the AGVs 3, 3’ and the prober 2 to decide
respective timings of deliveries of the wafers W to/from the load port 23.”
We find this disclosure in Akiyama of communication between the AGVs
and prober “to decide respective timings of deliveries of the wafers”
broadly, but reasonably, meets the limitation in dispute, i.e., “requesting a
Appeal 2011-007847
Application 10/992,962

17
staging of a vehicle for the material transport a predetermined time period
prior to the material transport.”
In their Reply, Appellants reiterate their contention the Examiner
erred by stating Akiyama’s movement of an automated guided vehicle
(AGV) to the stocker to pick up a wafer-containing carrier is not equivalent
to the recited “requesting a staging of a vehicle.” Reply Br. 4. We are not
persuaded, for the reasons given above.
Accordingly, Appellants have not provided sufficient evidence or
argument to persuade us of any reversible error in the Examiner’s reading of
the contested limitations on the cited prior art. Therefore, we sustain the
Examiner’s anticipation rejection of independent claim 1. As claims 8, 18,
30, 32, 36, 38, 40, and 44 stand or fall with independent claim 1, we
similarly sustain the Examiner’s rejection of these claims under § 102(e).
E. Unpatentability Rejection of Group E (Claim 76) Over Lin and Xue
Issue 5
Group E includes claims 12, 52, 60, 68, 75-77, 79-81, 84-86, 97, 102,
104-119, 124, 127, 133, and 136, which stand or fall with independent
claim 76. Appellants argue (App. Br. 20-23; Reply Br. 6) the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 76 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over
the combination of Lin and Xue is in error. These contentions present us
with the following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of Lin and Xue
teaches or suggests the limitation of “dynamically reallocating a port
Appeal 2011-007847
Application 10/992,962

18
assignment at the scheduled destination during the execution of the
scheduled material transport,” as recited in claim 76?
Analysis
Appellants contend Lin merely discloses a technique for loading a tool
from a waiting vehicle in which the vehicle waits until the tool indicates its
port is empty and that Lin does not discuss the move itself. App. Br. 20.
Appellants also contend Xue6 merely addresses a scheduled vehicle move to
a particular destination in which a machine malfunction necessitates
rescheduling of the move or a general solution in which delivery is
rescheduled to another tool. App. Br. 21. Appellants further argue, “Sun
[Xue] does not discuss the mechanics of the lead end of the move” (id.), and
contends “[t]echnically, Sun [Xue] does not teach port reallocation and even
if it did so, it would not be ‘at the scheduled destination’.” App. Br. 22.
Appellants elaborate by stating,
[W]hen rescheduling, Sun tries to transfer the appointment to
another destination, and that destination is another tool
(“resource”) rather than another port at the same resource. Sun
does this because it cannot reallocate to another port at the
scheduled destination since the scheduled destination is
unavailable. Accordingly, Lin and Sun in combination do not
teach “dynamically reallocating a port assignment at the
scheduled destination”, and therefore do not render obvious . . .
claim[] 76.
Id. (emphases omitted).
In response, the Examiner finds Xue teaches emergency maintenance
due to machine breakdown may require reallocation of scheduled jobs, either
at the same machine at a different time or at another machine. Ans. 31

6 Appellants refer to the Xue reference as “Sun,” as discussed supra.
Appeal 2011-007847
Application 10/992,962

19
(citing Xue § 4.2; Fig. 6). In addition, the Examiner finds the term
“destination” does not necessarily equate to only one machine, but instead
broadly encompasses a group of machines. Id. We agree with the
Examiner, because claims must be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation during prosecution (see Zletz, 893 F.2d at 321) and, by
reallocating the material to a port of working piece of equipment of the
destination (group of machines) such as in Lin, which teaches multiple
pieces of equipment each having a plurality of ports, it would have been
obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art “that using the teachings of
reallocating a material to a different resource (piece of equipment) would be
sending the material to different load port within the same destination.”
Ans. 31.
In the Reply, Appellants argue,
Sun only teaches reallocation to a different resource, in
effect, a different destination [and n]either Lin nor Sun teaches
or suggests changing the port assignment at the same
destination for an in-process material transport [such that t]he
construction proffered by the Office disregards the features of
the claimed subject matter, and therefore is in error.
Reply Br. 6.
However, giving the claim its broadest reasonable interpretation as
discussed above, we find Lin in view of Xue teaches or suggests the
limitation, “dynamically reallocating a port assignment at the scheduled
destination,” as recited in claim 76.
Accordingly, Appellants have not provided sufficient evidence or
argument to persuade us of any reversible error in the Examiner’s reading of
the contested limitations on the cited prior art. Therefore, we sustain the
Appeal 2011-007847
Application 10/992,962

20
Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 76. As Appellants
have not provided separate arguments with respect to independent claims
104 and 112, or dependent claims 12, 52, 60, 68, 75, 77, 79-81, 84-86, 97,
102, 105-111, 113-119, 124, 127, 133, and 136, all rejected on the same
basis as independent claim 76, we similarly sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
F. Unpatentability Rejection of Group F (Claim 16) Over Lin
Issue 6
Group F includes claims 16, 17, 34, 35, 42, and 43, which stand or fall
with dependent claim 16. Appellants argue (App. Br. 19-20; Reply Br. 5-6)
that the Examiner’s rejection of claim 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Lin is in error. These contentions present us with the
following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding that the cited prior art combination
teaches or suggests the limitation of “requesting the staging of the vehicle to
arrive for the material transport just in time for the material transport,” as
recited in claim 16?
Analysis
With respect to the Examiner’s finding that just-in-time transport and
early arrival of transports is “very well known in the art” (FOA, 24;
Ans. 29), Appellants contend the Examiner’s “rejection rests on assertions of
fact that are wholly unsupported in the record.” App. Br. 20. Appellants
further allege “just in time transport” is irrelevant because the claims discuss
“just in time staging” of the vehicle used for a material transport such that
Appeal 2011-007847
Application 10/992,962

21
the “rejections therefore fail because Lin fails to teach ‘requesting a staging
of a vehicle for the material transport a predetermined time period prior to
the material transport.’” Id.
In the Reply, Appellants contend the Examiner’s equating of just in
time vehicle staging to just in time material transport, and his finding that
just in time material transport is well known in the art are both unsupported
opinions, and not accurate characterizations of the references because Lin
teaches dispatching in which material transports are not initiated until
needed. Reply Br. 5. Appellants further contend this is merely reactive
material transport and not just in time material transport. Id. Further in this
regard, Appellants contend the material transport in Lin “cannot be just in
time, because it is not even initiated until after the ‘time’ has passed.” Id.
Therefore, Appellants conclude, “[a] dispatching model is reactive not
predictive [so that] Lin cannot teach or suggest requesting the staging of a
vehicle to arrive just in time for a scheduled material transport, when the
material transport has not been scheduled.” Reply Br. 5-6.
We agree with the Examiner’s finding that just-in-time (JIT) transport
is well known in the art, and that “just in time staging” is still a material
transport, as recited in claim 16, i.e., “requesting the staging of the vehicle to
arrive for the material transport just in time for the material transport.”
Ans. 57. We agree with the Examiner because a person with skill in the art
at the time of the invention would appreciate and be motivated by the known
JIT transport concept which allows for efficient transport with reduced or no
down time waiting for a vehicle to arrive, i.e., the vehicle would arrive and
transport the material as soon as possible. Ans. 29. We further note Lin
teaches direct and immediate transport of wafers, which at least teaches or
Appeal 2011-007847
Application 10/992,962

22
suggests the recited “just in time” transport. See Lin, ¶¶ [0059]-[0060],
[0062]. For example, Lin teaches prioritizing transport to a piece of
fabrication equipment to optimize wafer fabrication, i.e.:
The configurable queue allows for multiple lots 62 from a PD
list 60 to be sent to a specified piece of fabrication equipment in
a prioritized manner; allows for coordination between a
maximized PD lot or order to be processed by a corresponding
piece of equipment; allows for operators to prevent shortages
by manually inserting additional lots into the predispatching
list; and allows for operators to automatically change the
predispatching list to optimize wafer fabrication.
Lin, ¶ [0062].
We note Appellants’ Specification does not provide a definition of
what is meant by “just in time for the material transport,” as recited in
claim 16. We find a common, dictionary definition of the phrase to be “just-
in-time: denoting or relating to an industrial method in which waste of
resources is eliminated or reduced by producing production-line
components, etc, as they are required, rather than holding large stocks.”
Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/just-in-time (last
accessed Feb. 14, 2014). We find this definition to be sufficiently on point
such that the Examiner’s findings concerning the well-known nature of just
in time material transport are reasonable, and fully in support of the legal
conclusion of obviousness.
Accordingly, Appellants have not provided sufficient evidence or
argument to persuade us of any reversible error in the Examiner’s reading of
the contested limitations on the cited prior art. Therefore, we sustain the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 16. As Appellants
have not provided separate arguments with respect to dependent claims 17,
Appeal 2011-007847
Application 10/992,962

23
34, 35, 42, and 43, rejected on the same basis as dependent claim 16, we
similarly sustain the Examiner’s rejection of these claims under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a).
CONCLUSIONS
(1) The Examiner did not err with respect to the anticipation
rejections of claims 1, 2, 7, 9, 11, 13, 19-21, 23-30, 33, 37-38, 41, 45-46, 50-
51, 53-54, 57-59, 61-67, 69-74, 87, 93-94, 96, 98, 101, 103, 120-123, 125-
126, 128-132, 134-135, and 137 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) over Lin, and we
sustain the rejection.
(2) The Examiner did not err with respect to the anticipation
rejections of claims 8, 18, 30, 32, 36, 38, 40, and 44 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(e) over Akiyama, and we sustain the rejection.
(3) The Examiner did not err with respect to the unpatentability
rejection of claims 12, 52, 60, 68, 75-77, 79-81, 84-86, 97, 102, 104-119,
124, 127, 133, and 136 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combination of
Lin and Xue, and we sustain the rejection.
(4) The Examiner did not err with respect to the unpatentability
rejection of claims 16, 17, 34-35, and 42-43 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over
Lin, and we sustain the rejection.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 2, 7-9, 11-13,
16-21, 23-30, 32-38, 40-46, 50-54, 57-77, 79-81, 84-87, 93-94, 96-98,
and 101-137.
Appeal 2011-007847
Application 10/992,962

24
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED

bab