Ex Parte Nakatsuka

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Feb 4, 2010

10951652 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 4, 2010)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte YUICHIRO NAKATSUKA
____________

Appeal 2009-007076
Application 10/951,652
Technology Center 2100
____________

Decided: February 4, 2010
____________

Before HOWARD B. BLANKENSHIP, JOHN A. JEFFERY, and
STEPHEN C. SIU, Administrative Patent Judges.

BLANKENSHIP, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1-37, which are all the claims in the application.1 We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm-in-part.

1 Via facsimile transmission filed December 17, 2009, Appellant waived
appearance at an oral hearing scheduled for January 13, 2010.
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Application 10/951,652

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Invention
Appellant’s invention relates to a cellular phone and a mail security
processing method by which selected mail folders are not shown on the
display, thereby to protect privacy. Abstract.

Representative Claim
1. A cellular phone having a mailing function, comprising:
a plurality of transmission mail folders for saving transmission
mail including a piece of mail which has not been transmitted yet;
a plurality of received mail folders for saving received mail;
security setting/releasing means, implemented on a computer
readable medium, for a user to select whether an object to which
security is set is one of the transmission mail folders or one of the
received mail folders or to select whether an object from which setting
of security beforehand set thereto is released is one of the
transmission mail folders or one of the received mail folders;
security setting/releasing folder list display means,
implemented on a computer readable medium, for displaying all
folders contained in the transmission or received mail folders selected
by the security setting/releasing means;
security setting/releasing folder selecting means, implemented
on a computer readable medium, in which at least one of the folders
displayed by the security setting/releasing folder list display means is
selected by the user and is set as a security setting objective folder or
as a security releasing objective folder; and
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folder list display means, implemented on a computer readable
medium, for displaying the transmission mail folders or the received
mail folders in the form of a list, wherein:
a mark is assigned to the folder selected for the security
setting by the security setting/releasing folder selecting means
and the folder is displayed by the security setting/releasing
folder list display means and is not displayed by the folder list
display means; and
a mark is removed from the folder selected for the
security releasing by the security setting/releasing folder
selecting means and the folder is displayed by the security
setting/releasing folder list display means and the folder list
display means.

Prior Art
Bradfield 2003/0023725 A1 Jan. 30, 2003

Examiner’s Rejections
Claims 1-37 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being
anticipated by Bradfield.

Claim Groupings
Based on Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief, we will decide
the appeal on the basis of claims 1 and 7. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

Appeal 2009-007076
Application 10/951,652

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FINDINGS OF FACT
We refer to, and rely on, the Examiner’s findings set forth in the
Answer.

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
“Anticipation requires the presence in a single prior art reference
disclosure of each and every element of the claimed invention, arranged as
in the claim.” Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. American Hoist &
Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

ANALYSIS
Claim 1
The Examiner finds that Bradfield describes, consistent with instant
claim 1, that the user of a mobile device 140 (Fig. 1) may set access
restrictions on a folder, file, or application contained in shared memory
144a. Bradfield ¶ [0020]. As shown in Figures 3 and 4, the user can set a
password 315b (Fig. 3) by which (other) network users may access selected
folders, files, or applications. As shown, for example, in Figure 3, the
mobile device user can grant to network user “new_empl” the right to access
folder “Samples” (Fig. 2), upon entry of the password “123456.” The
mobile device user can also grant to network user “ABC_empl” the right to
access sub-folder “Project 2,” in folder “Client ABC,” upon entry of the
password “access.” See Bradfield ¶¶ [0029] - [0030].
Appellant argues, however, that the network user is presented with a
view that lists both secured and unsecured folders (i.e., folders for which
security is not set, but also those for which security is set).
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The Bradfield reference, to the contrary, seems to be quite clear.
After mobile device 140 [Fig. 1] determines which of the
required sharing criteria the network user meets, in other words
which resources the network user has access to, the mobile
device forwards a list of accessible folders, files and
applications to the network user’s device for display (step 620)
[Fig. 6]. It follows that the folders, files and applications for
which the network user fails to provide matching sharing
criteria are not displayed. The network user then requests
access to one of the displayed folders, files or applications (step
625).

Bradfield ¶ [0050] (emphasis added).
While it seems that the above-quoted portion of Bradfield should be
sufficient answer to Appellant’s argument, Appellant refers to another
portion of the reference as support for the contrary position. In Appellant’s
view, paragraph [0047] of Bradfield establishes that the network user is, at
least initially, presented with a view of both secured and unsecured folders.
Bradfield at paragraph [0047] says that when a network user requests
access to a directory, file, or application stored in memory 144 of mobile
device 140, the response is to display to the network user “a listing of all
directories accessible to the network user.” The network user then “drills
down” through the directories until the user finds the folders, files, or
applications that are sought.
Bradfield at paragraphs [0028] and [0055] specifies the relationships
between directories, folders, and sub-folders. As shown in Figure 2, root
directory (or folder) “F:” contains sub-directories “Client ABC,” “Client
XYZ,” and “Samples.” “Client ABC,” in turn, contains the sub-directory (or
sub-folder) “Project 1,” containing the file “Proposal.doc.”
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In view of Bradfield’s description of directories and folders, the
reference at paragraph [0047] is consistent with the clear statement at
paragraph [0050] that folders, files, and applications for which the network
user fails to qualify for access are not displayed to the network user. If we
assume, for example, that a network user has the right to access root
directory “F:” but does not have the right to access the folder “Samples”
contained in that root directory, the network user would first be presented
with a display of directories (including “F:”) that are accessible to the user.
However, the user would not be presented with an expanded (tree) view of
the directory (including the sub-directory “Samples”), as depicted in Figure
2. If the network user does not have rights to access the folder “Samples,”
the folder is not displayed to the user (see Bradfield ¶ [0050]).2
We therefore consider Bradfield to provide more than adequate
support for the Examiner’s finding that the reference discloses providing a
display to the network user that includes folders for which the user has the
right to access but not the folders for which the user lacks such right. We
are not persuaded of error in the rejection of claim 1.

Claim 7
Appellant argues that claim 7 requires that “only” when the secret
number inputted by the user matches the secret number stored in the storage
in advance, the security setting releasing means conducts operation thereof.
The “storage” refers to the first line of claim 7, wherein the user stores a

2 A “folder” as described by Bradfield, and consistent with the artisan’s
understanding, may be designated a “parent folder” or a “sub-folder,”
depending on its relationship to other folders. See, e.g., Bradfield ¶¶ [0028],
[0038].
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secret number for the security setting and releasing in “a storage” in
advance.
The Examiner reads claim 7 as “inherent” to the password access to
folders described at paragraph [0068], lines 1 through 4, of Bradfield. The
referenced portion of Bradfield describes the user of mobile device 140
making changes to access rights of network users with respect to particular
folders.
Even with the Examiner’s amplification at page 20 of the Answer, it is
unclear to what “password” in Bradfield the rejection may refer. If the
password (or “secret number”) in the rejection refers to the password set by
the mobile device user (e.g., Fig. 3, element 315b) such that a network user
may later use the password to access resources (e.g., folders) in shared
memory, that “password” entered by the mobile device user is not matched
to a password stored in advance. That is, the reference does not disclose that
the mobile device user must first enter the password (provided for network
user access) before modifying any of the access parameters (e.g., the
password) for that network user.
If, on the other hand, the “password” in the rejection refers to a
“password” entered by the mobile device user to gain access to the
application for setting usage rights with respect to the shared memory, the
rejection does not point out where Bradfield describes entry of such
password. Moreover, the owner of the mobile device would not necessarily
need a password for accessing the applications on the device, since the
device is not described as being physically accessible by anyone other than
the mobile device user.
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We are thus persuaded by Appellant to the extent that the rejection
fails to set forth a prima facie case of anticipation for claim 7 over Bradfield.

Conclusion
In view of the foregoing, we sustain the rejection of claims 1-6 and 8-
37. We do not sustain the rejection of claim 7.

DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-37 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
being anticipated by Bradfield is affirmed with respect to claims 1-6 and 8-
37 but reversed with respect to claim 7.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

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