Ex Parte Mukherjee

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Sep 29, 2008

10180205 (B.P.A.I. Sep. 29, 2008)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte DEBARGHA MUKHERJEE
____________

Appeal 2008-2689
Application 10/180,205
Technology Center 2600
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Decided: September 29, 2008
____________

Before KENNETH W. HAIRSTON, MAHSHID D. SAADAT,
and SCOTT R. BOALICK, Administrative Patent Judges.

SAADAT, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1-12, 14-26, 28-32, and 41. Claims 13, 27, and
33-40 have been canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

Appeal 2008-2689
Application 10/180,205

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s invention relates to data compression used for reducing
the cost of storing video images and the time taken to transmit the video
images (Spec. 1).
Independent claims 1 and 11 are representative and read as follows:
1. A method of compressing a current frame in a video
sequence, the compressed frame to be sent over a transmission
channel, the method comprising:
generating an estimate of the current frame;
adjusting the estimate by a factor α, where 0<α<1, the factor
based on loss characteristics of the transmission channel; and
computing a residual error between the current frame and the
adjusted estimate.

11. A method of compressing a current frame in a video
sequence, the method comprising:
generating an estimate of the current frame;
adjusting the estimate by a factor α, where 0< α <1;
computing a residual error between the current frame and the
adjusted estimate;
organizing each spatial resolution layer into multiple SNR
layers; and encoding the residual error in multiple layers in a scalable
manner.

The Examiner relies on the following prior art references:
Kim US 5,483,286 Jan. 9, 1996
Lim US 5,485,210 Jan. 16, 1996
Naveen US 5,995,151 Nov. 30, 1999
Brüls US 6,122,314 Sep. 19, 2000
Heinzelman US 6,754,277 B1 Jun. 22, 2004
(filed Oct. 6, 1999)

The rejections, as presented by the Examiner, are as follows:
Claims 1-3, 7, 9, 10, 20, 21, 25, and 26 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) as being anticipated by Kim.
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Claims 11, 12, 14-16 and 28-30 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) as being anticipated by Lim.
Claims 4-6 and 32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Kim in view of Brüls.
Claim 8 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Kim in view of Naveen.
Claims 17-19 and 31 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Lim in view of Heinzelman.1
Claims 22-24 and 41 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Lim in view of Brüls.
Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellant and the Examiner,
we refer to the Brief and the Answer for their respective details. Only those
arguments actually made by Appellant have been considered in this decision.
Arguments which Appellant did not make in the Brief have not been
considered and are deemed waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

ISSUES
1. Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), with respect to the appealed claims 1-3, 7,
9, 10, 20, 21, 25, and 26, does Kim anticipate the claimed subject
matter by teaching all of the claimed limitations?
2. Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), with respect to the appealed claims 11, 12,
14-16 and 28-30, does Lim anticipate the claimed subject matter by
teaching all of the claimed limitations?

1 Claim 18 is dependent upon the canceled claim 13, which should be
corrected if prosecution is continued with respect to claim 18.
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3. Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), with respect to the remaining appealed
claims, would the ordinarily skilled artisan have found it obvious to
modify Kim or Lim based on the teachings of Brüls, Naveen, or
Heinzelman to render the claimed invention unpatentable?

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
1. Anticipation
A rejection for anticipation requires that the four corners of a single
prior art document describe every element of the claimed invention, either
expressly or inherently, such that a person of ordinary skill in the art could
practice the invention without undue experimentation. See Atlas Powder
Co. v. IRECO, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Paulsen, 30
F.3d 1475, 1478-79 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
2. Obviousness
The test for obviousness is what the combined teachings of the
references would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art. See In re
Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 987-88 (Fed. Cir. 2006), In re Young, 927 F.2d 588,
591 (Fed. Cir. 1991), and In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). To
reach a conclusion of obviousness under § 103, the Examiner bears the
burden of producing a factual basis supported by a teaching in a prior art
reference or shown to be common knowledge of unquestionable
demonstration. Our reviewing court requires this evidence in order to
establish a prima facie case. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1471-72 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
The Examiner can satisfy this burden by showing some articulated
reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
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obviousness. KSR Int’l. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007) (citing
In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
3. Burdens of Proof and Production
In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103, it is incumbent upon the
Examiner to establish a factual basis to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In re
Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Only if that burden is met,
does the burden of going forward shift to the applicant. In re King, 801 F.2d
1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Wilder, 429 F.2d 447, 450 (CCPA 1970).
Once a prima facie case is established and rebuttal evidence is
submitted, the ultimate question becomes whether, based on the totality of
the record, the examiner carried his burden of proof by preponderance. See
In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1445. If the examiner fails to establish a prima
facie case, the rejection is improper and will be overturned. In re Fine, 837
F.2d at 1074.

ANALYSIS
1. 35 U.S.C. § 102 Rejection over Kim
With respect to independent claims 1 and 20, the Examiner reads the
claimed limitation of “adjusting the estimate by a factor α” on adjusting by
DF Scaling Factor Generator 30 of Kim (shown in Figure 2) and relies on
the disclosure in column 8, line 53 through column 9, line 20 of Kim to
show the range of values for the scaling factor (Ans. 3). Appellant contends
that Kim does not describe the manner and characteristics of the
transmission to the screen as recited in those claims (Br. 8). In particular,
Appellant argues that Kim’s scaling factor μ1 is centered about 1, which
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means it can be less than 1 or greater than 1, whereas the claims require that
α be less than 1 and greater than zero (Br. 8-9). Appellant asserts that the
portion relied on by the Examiner discloses that “the scale factor μ1 is 0.5<
μ1<1 or 1< μ1<2” which is different from the claim requirement of 0<α<1
which makes reconstruction more dependent on prediction and less
dependent on the residual error (Br. 9).
We find that although Kim changes the value of the DF scaling factor
μ to be centered around 1 (col. 4, ll. 48-52), the scale factor may also have a
value between 0.5 and 1 (col. 9, ll. 1-3). Therefore, contrary to Appellant’s
assertion that this range is different from the claimed range of less than 1
and greater than zero, a scaling factor between 0.5 and 1 clearly falls within
the claimed range.
Appellant further contends that Kim neither discloses a scale factor
that is based on loss characteristics of the transmission channel (Br. 9), nor
identifies the output buffer 10e as a part of the transmission channel (id.).
The Examiner responds by pointing to the teachings of Kim in column 4,
lines 48-53 and in column 7, lines 15-19 to show that the buffer 10e is a part
of the encoding circuit, which, in turn, compresses and transmits video
signals through a transmit channel (Ans. 11). We agree with the
Examiner’s findings in the cited portions of Kim and further find that a scale
factor is used to restore the video signal when data is subject to a loss due to
a channel error or channel change (Abstract). In that regard, contrary to
Appellant’s argument regarding the absence of a transmission channel or
whether the scaling factor is applied based on a loss characteristics of the
transmission channel (Br. 10), the Examiner’s findings demonstrate that the
encoding circuit of Kim is the transmission channel whose loss due to the
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output buffer and encoding circuit is used for adjusting the frame estimate
(col. 4, ll. 31-63). Kim indeed shows the buffer 10e as a component of the
encoding circuit 10 which uses the scale factor DSF(μ) for compression and
transmission (col. 7, ll. 15-19) based on loss characteristics of the
transmission channel (Abstract).
Appellant presents no separate argument for claims 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 21,
25, and 26 and argues their patentability based on the same arguments made
supra with respect to claims 1 and 20. We also note that Appellant merely
recites the limitation of claim 9 and alleges that the Examiner does not cite
any portion of Kim that discloses adjusting the scaling factor according to
the transmission reliability (Br. 11). However, we find that the Examiner
has satisfied the initial burden of setting forth a prima facie case by relying
on Kim’s teachings related to the state of the output buffer within the
transmission channel as the channel reliability (Ans. 4). In view of the
above discussions, since all of the claimed limitations are shown to be
present in the disclosure of Kim, the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
rejection of independent claims 1 and 20, as well as dependent claims 2, 3,
7, 9, 10, 21, 25, and 26 which are not separately argued by Appellant (App.
Br. 11), is sustained.
2. 35 U.S.C. § 103 Rejection over Kim and Brüls
With respect to independent claim 32, Appellant relies on the same
arguments made with respect to Kim and the differences between the claims
and Kim’s disclosure and further argues that nothing in Brüls discloses those
differences (Br. 11). For the reasons discussed above, the 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) rejection of claims 4-6 and 32 over Kim in view of Brüls is
sustained.
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3. 35 U.S.C. § 102 Rejection over Lim
Regarding claim 11, Appellant provides details of data arrangement
within each SNR layer and asserts that Lim’s discussion of processing
quantized coefficients in column 8 does not teach the claimed step of
organizing each spatial resolution layer into multiple SNR layers (Br. 12).
The Examiner argues that Figures 1 and 3C and the accompanying text of
Lim disclose that each spatial resolution layer (Q, I, or Y) is organized into
multiple SNR layers (Ans. 13).
After a review of Lim, we agree with the Examiner. Lim teaches that
each layer Q, I, and Y is organized into multiple SNR layers as they are sub-
sampled in subband coder 110 to generate a frame 201 (Figure 3C) having
subbands 202, 203, and 204, while the lowest subband is further subdivided
into subbands 206, 207, and 208 and further continued for four levels (col. 7,
ll. 24-37). Lim further provides the weighted residual for each of Q, I, and
Y layers to quantizer 112 where the layers are further statistically coded and
transmitted across the channel (col. 7, ll. 60-62).
Appellant further presents arguments in support of patentability of
claim 14 by asserting that Lim does not disclose the claimed vector
quantization which is described in Appellant’s Specification to deal with the
grouping of coefficients, not their quantization (Br. 13). The Examiner
argues that vector quantization is performed by motion compensator 108 by
receiving a frame of motion vectors M from motion estimator 104 (Ans. 14).
Given the broad meaning of “vector quantization,” we find the Examiner’s
position to be reasonable, whereas Appellant’s arguments are focused on
how the Specification distinguishes vector quantization dealing with
grouping of coefficients over quantization of coefficients.
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In view of the analysis above, we find that Appellant has not rebutted
the Examiner’s prima facie case of anticipation of claim 11. Since Appellant
has not shown any error in the Examiner’s position, we, therefore, sustain
the 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) rejection of claims 11 and 14, as well as claims 12,
15, 16, and 28-30 argued together with claim 11 as one group (Br. 12-13),
over Lim.
4. 35 U.S.C. § 103 Rejection over Lim and Brüls
With respect to independent claim 41, Appellant relies on the
arguments made with respect to Lim and further argues that nothing in Brüls
discloses those differences (Br. 13). For the reasons discussed above, the
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claims 22-24 and 41 over Lim in view of
Brüls is sustained.
5. 35 U.S.C. § 103 Rejection over Lim and Heinzelman
With respect to claim 17, Appellant contends that Heinzelman does
not teach or suggest unequally protecting critical and non-critical
information within each spatial resolution layer, as recited in claim 17 (Br.
14). The Examiner argues that Heinzelman teaches error protection for
critical information, such as “HEADER” or “MOTION MV” and for non-
critical information, such as “TEXTURE (DCT COEFFICEINTS” in Figure
3 (Ans. 14). We disagree with Appellant that such characterization of the
claimed unequal protection is unreasonable and in error. In that regard, we
also find that Appellant’s statement regarding varying protection via the
error code, rather than by placement in a bit stream (Br. 14), relates to
features that are not recited.
Under the facts we have here and the arguments presented by the
Examiner and Appellant, as described above, we have concluded that
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Appellant has not shown any error in the Examiner’s position for finding
claim 17, as well as claims 18, 19, and 31 which are not argued separately,
unpatentable for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Lim and
Heinzelman.
6. 35 U.S.C. § 103 Rejection over Kim and Naveen
With respect to claim 8, Appellant does not present any argument and
apparently intends to group claim 8 as falling with its base claim 1 (Br. 11).
For the reasons discussed above with respect to Kim, the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
rejection of claim 8 over Kim in view of Naveen is also sustained.

CONCLUSION
On the record before us, Appellant has failed to show that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-12, 14-26, 28-32, and 41. In view of
our analysis above, we sustain the rejection of claims 1-3, 7, 9-12, 14-16, 20,
21, 25, 26, and 28-30 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and of claims 4-6, 8, 17-19,
22-24, 31, 32, and 41 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

ORDER
The decision of the Examiner rejecting claims 1-12, 14-26, 28-32, and
41 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED

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