Ex Parte Moulckers

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 17, 2016

11103888 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 17, 2016)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/103,888 04/12/2005 Ingrid M. Moulckers AUS920040719US1 9019
48916 7590 08/17/2016
Greg Goshorn, P.C.
9600 Escarpment Blvd.
Suite 745-9
AUSTIN, TX 78749
EXAMINER
LOUIE, JUE WANG
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2193
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/17/2016 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte INGRID M. MOULCKERS
____________

Appeal 2015-002572
Application 11/103,888
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, JAMES R. HUGHES, and
JAMES W. DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judges.

JEFFERY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 8 and 21–36. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b). We affirm.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s invention defines, categorizes, and manages reusable
components for solving business problems. In one aspect, a deployment
package is generated based on, among other things, a practice manifest
derived from a previously generated practice manifest. See generally
Abstract; Spec. ¶¶ 28–33; Figs. 2–3. Claim 8 is illustrative:
8. A method, comprising:
defining a plurality of reusable components;
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defining categories based upon types of business problems,
associated with a business solution, solved by the plurality of reusable
components, wherein each reusable component corresponds to one or
more of the categories;
generating a derived practice manifest, from a previously
generated practice manifest corresponding to a different business
solution, stored on a physical memory, the derived practice manifest
describing a subset of the components and the corresponding
categories assigned to each of the subset, wherein each component of
the subset represents a portion of the business solution and
collectively the subset represents functionality necessary to address
the entire business solution;
modifying the derived practice manifest based upon the
categories;
producing a package descriptor and a custom build assets list
based upon the derived practice manifest;
generating a deployment package based upon the package
descriptor and the custom build assets list; and
storing the deployment package on the memory for delivery to
a computing system.

THE REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejected claims 8, 23, 24, 26, 28–30, 32, 35, and 36
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Carlson (US 7,149,734 B2;
Dec. 12, 2006), Jhanwar (US 7,562,346; July 14, 2009), and McGinnes (US
2005/0289524 A1; Dec. 29, 2005). Ans. 3–7.1
The Examiner rejected claims 21, 22, 27, 33, and 34 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Carlson, Jhanwar, McGinnes, and Miller (US
6,175,948 B1; Jan. 16, 2001). Ans. 8–9.

1 Throughout this opinion, we refer to (1) the Appeal Brief filed August 17,
2014 (“App. Br.”); (2) the Examiner’s Answer mailed November 4, 2014
(“Ans.”); and (3) the Reply Brief filed January 2, 2015 (“Reply Br.”).
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The Examiner rejected claims 25 and 31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Carlson, Jhanwar, McGinnes, and Gianluigi Caldiera &
Victor R. Basili, Identifying and Qualifying Reusable Software Components,
24 IEEE COMPUTER 61–70 (1991) (“Caldiera”). Ans. 9–10.

THE REJECTION OVER CARLSON, JHANWAR, AND MCGINNES
Regarding independent claim 8, the Examiner finds that Carlson
defines reusable components and categories based on types of business
problems, and modifies a project based on the categories. Ans. 3–4. The
Examiner acknowledges that Carlson does not (1) generate a derived
practice manifest from a previously generated practice manifest; (2) produce
a package descriptor and custom build access list based on the derived
manifest; (3) generate a deployment package based on the descriptor and
assets list; and (4) store the deployment package as claimed, but cites
Jhanwar for principally teaching these features. The Examiner
acknowledges that although Jhanwar generates a practice manifest, it is not
derived from one that is previously generated. See Ans. 4–5. Nevertheless,
the Examiner cites McGinnes for teaching this manifest derivation, namely
by developing a new application definition by using an existing one
containing similar business concepts. Ans. 5.
Appellant argues that McGinnes works with application definitions
and business concepts which are not analogous to the recited manifest. App.
Br. 8–10; Reply Br. 2–4. According to Appellant, the Examiner’s position
that McGinnes’ business concepts are “components” runs counter to the
Specification’s description of components as hardware and software. App.
Br. 8–9.
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ISSUE
Under § 103, has the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 8 by finding
that Carlson, Jhanwar, and McGinnes collectively would have taught or
suggested generating a derived practice manifest from a previously
generated practice manifest corresponding to a different business solution?

ANALYSIS
We begin by noting that the Examiner’s reliance on Carlson and
Jhanwar for teaching various limitations of claim 8 is undisputed, as is the
cited references’ combinability. As such, the Examiner’s finding that
Jhanwar, among other things, generates a practice manifest describing a
subset of components and corresponding assigned categories (Ans. 4–5) is
uncontested.
What is contested is the Examiner’s reliance on McGinnes for
generating a derived practice manifest from a previously generated practice
manifest and, in particular, whether McGinnes teaches or suggests a
manifest. We, therefore, begin by construing that term.
Paragraph 33 of Appellant’s Specification defines the term “manifest”
as a high-level list of components that the proposed business solution
requires. Accord Ans. 10; App. Br. 10 (quoting this definition). Moreover,
business “components” include, but are not limited to: (1) hardware; (2)
executable logic for performing specific functions; (3) user manuals; (4)
procedural manuals; and (5) other documentation corresponding to particular
hardware or software. Spec. ¶ 7. For example, component types can include
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(1) “off-the-shelf” software or hardware products, and (2) custom products
developed for other projects and stored in a component library. Id.
Given this broad and open-ended description, we see no error in the
Examiner’s mapping McGinnes’ application definitions to the recited
manifest, for these definitions are effectively a list of components, namely
business concepts, that the proposed business solution requires. Ans. 10–11
(citing McGinnes ¶¶ 27, 77, 299, 417). As McGinnes explains in paragraph
298, an application definition can be a grouping of business concepts which
at least suggests a list of those concepts. That McGinnes explicitly states
that business concepts are structured components used to provide application
functionality in paragraph 105 as the Examiner indicates (Ans. 11) only
further bolsters the Examiner’s position that McGinnes’ application
definitions are “manifests” listing required concept-based components.
Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (App. Br. 8–10; Reply Br. 2–4)
are unavailing and not commensurate with the scope of the claim. First, the
Examiner’s reliance on Jhanwar’s generating a practice manifest (Ans. 4–5)
is undisputed as noted above. But leaving these uncontested findings aside,
Appellant’s contention that the Examiner incorrectly equates manifests and
components as synonymous (Reply Br. 2–3) is inapposite, for the Examiner
does not equate those terms. Rather, as noted above, the Examiner equates
the recited manifest to McGinnes’ application definition that lists
components, namely business concepts. See Ans. 10–12. Under the
Examiner’s mapping, then, McGinnes’ “manifest” is not a component, but
rather lists concept-based components and, therefore, reasonably comports
with Appellant’s definition of “manifest” in paragraph 33 of the
Specification.
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Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 8, and claims 23, 24, 26, 28–30, 32, 35, and 36 not argued separately
with particularity.

THE OTHER OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS
We also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of claims 21,
22, 25, 27, 31, 33, and 34. Ans. 8–10. Appellant reiterates similar
arguments made in connection with claim 8 and alleges that the additional
cited references fail to cure those purported deficiencies. App. Br. 12–13.
We are not persuaded by these arguments for the reasons previously
discussed.

CONCLUSION
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 8 and 21–36 under § 103.

DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 8 and 21–36 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED