Ex Parte Morgan et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 14, 2013

11092419 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 14, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte DANIEL J. MORGAN and ROGER S. CARVER
____________

Appeal 2010-010517
Application 11/092,419
Technology Center 2600
____________

Before JAMESON LEE, HOWARD B. BLANKENSHIP and
MIRIAM L. QUINN, Administrative Patent Judges.

QUINN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) (2002) from a final
rejection of claims 1-3, 5, 7-9, 13-19, and 21-27. Claims 4, 6, 10-12, 20, and
28-30 have been withdrawn from consideration. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM and enter NEW GROUNDS OF REJECTION UNDER
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ Invention
According to Appellants, the invention relates to display systems that
use a spatial light modulation device. (Spec. [0001].)

Representative Claim
Independent claims 1 and 13 are representative and read as follows:
1. A display system comprising:
a plurality of light sources;
a spatial light modulator located to receive light
from at least one of the plurality of light sources, the
spatial light modulator including a plurality of
independently controllable elements that can be
controlled to direct received light in one of a first
direction for display and a second direction for non-
display;
a light sensor located to receive light directed in
the second direction from elements of the spatial light
modulator and issue a rightness signal indicative of the
intensity of the received light; and
a processing device for detecting a color balance
ratio based at least in part of the brightness signal
issued by the light sensor.

13. A display system comprising:
a plurality of light sources;
a spatial light modulator located to receive light
from at least one of the plurality of light sources, the
spatial light modulator including a plurality of
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independently controllable elements that can be
controlled to direct received light in one of a first
direction for display and a second direction for non-
display;
a light sensor for receiving light directed from
elements of the spatial light modulator and outputting a
brightness signal based on the intensity of the received
light; and
a processing device for controlling the spatial
light modulator to modulate the light received from at
least one of the light sources so that the brightness
signal output from the light sensor is within a specified
range of values.

References
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Marshall US 5,774,196 Jun. 30, 1998
Takeda US 7,165,845 B2 Jan. 23, 2007

Rejection
Claims 1-3, 5, 7-9, 13-19, and 21-27 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Takeda in view of Marshall.
(Ans. 3-8.)
ISSUES
Based on Appellants’ arguments, the dispositive issues on appeal are
directed to the Examiner’s rejection of all the claims as being obvious over
the combination of Takeda and Marshall, and in particular the issues turn on:
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(1) Whether Marshall discloses “detecting a color balance ratio,” as
recited in claims 1 and 18 (App. Br. 7-11);
(2) Whether the Examiner’s combination of Takeda and Marshall is
improper in light of the meaning of the claim limitation “color
balance ratio” (App. Br. 11-12);
(3) Whether the combination of Takeda and Marshall teaches or
suggests adjustment of “an output of at least one of the plurality
of light sources,” as recited in claims 8 and 22 (App. Br. 13-14);
and
(4) Whether the combination of Takeda and Marshall teaches or
suggests “controlling the spatial light modulator to modulate the
light” so that the brightness signal “is within a specified range of
values,” as recited in claims 13 and 23 (App. Br. 14-17).

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’
contentions that the Examiner has erred. Further, we have reviewed the
Examiner’s response to Appellants’ arguments.
Claims 1-3, 5, 7-9, 18, 19-21
We have considered all the arguments Appellants raise regarding this
group of claims. Primarily, Appellants contend that the Examiner failed to
meet the duty of presenting a prima facie obviousness rejection, because
Marshall’s detection of the amount of red and blue light does not teach
“detecting a color balance ratio,” and because the Examiner “misinterprets”
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the meaning of “color balance ratio,” rendering the combination of Takeda
and Marshall improper. (App. Br. 8-12.) We do not agree with Appellants’
conclusions.
The first argument deals with the interpretation of the term “color
balance ratio.” During examination, claims are given the broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification. In re Amer.
Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations
omitted). The Examiner determined that the meaning of “color balance
ratio” is “broadly considered as the ratio of the brightness/lumens signal of
one color and the brightness/lumens signal of another color . . . .” (Ans. 8-
9.) In support of this position, the Examiner notes that the Specification
describes the color balance ratio by referring to the ratio of lumens
corresponding to each light source, i.e. LR/LG/LB. (Spec. 20.) Appellants
take issue with the Examiner’s interpretation and provide an alternative
interpretation – that “color balance ratio” is not just any ratio, but instead is a
“white point” of the display system. (App. Br. 10.) That “white point,”
according to Appellants, is a term well known in the display art, which, in
the context of the Specification, refers to the combined brightness of the
three colors (red, green, and blue) that results in the display of the color
white. (See App. Br. 10; Spec. [008].) In other words, Appellants view the
term “color balance ratio” as being defined by the specific relationship
between the three colors that yields “the color balance or white point.”
(Reply 2.)
We have considered both positions, and we agree with the Examiner’s
interpretation. Independent claims 1 and 18 recite “detecting a color balance
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ratio.” The claim language itself does not present any indication that the
“color balance ratio” is a specific ratio of colors that yields the “white
point.” To confirm that fact we look to the Specification, which describes
detecting the color intensity of each of the red, green, and blue LEDs (Spec.
[0010]) because the “white point” shifts as the operational time of the LED
display system increases. (See e.g., Spec. 3.) That is, the ratio of intensity
of the three colors varies over time, thus deviating from the desired ratio that
yields the “white point.” Thus, while the purpose of detecting the color
balance ratio may be to eventually ensure that the display system has the
desired “white point” setting, we do not agree with Appellants that the
detected “color balance ratio,” as recited in claims 1 and 13, has to mean that
“white point” setting. Therefore, we conclude that the claimed detected
color balance ratio does not necessarily correspond to “the white point,” as
Appellants argue. We also conclude that the Examiner did not err in
construing the claim limitation and in finding that Marshall’s detection of
the relative amounts of red and blue light (Ans. 9) meets this limitation.
As to the second argument, we determine that the combination of
Takeda and Marshall is proper. First, we agree with the Examiner’s finding
that Marshall discloses light sensors that measure the intensity of each color.
(Ans. 3-4 (citing Marshall, fig. 1, item 50; col. 4, ll. 48-62).) Appellants’
argument – that Marshall does not teach measuring the absolute intensity of
the colors, or the relative intensity of all three colors (Reply 2) – contradicts
the express teaching of Marshall, and is not persuasive.
Further, we conclude that Appellants’ arguments focus on whether the
Marshall embodiment can be combined with the Takeda system. (See App.
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Br. 11-12; Reply 3-4.) “The test for obviousness is not whether the features
of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the
primary reference . . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of
the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” In
re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (citations omitted).
Here, the Examiner does not propose that the features of Marshall,
such as the use of the sensor wheel and detecting the location of the spoke in
the color wheel, be physically incorporated into the display system of
Takeda. Instead, the Examiner concludes that the combined teachings of the
references would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art the
Appellants’ invention. The Appellants’ argument overlooks “the relevant
combined teachings of the . . . references.” In re Andersen, 391 F.2d 953,
958 (CCPA 1968) (dismissing the argument that a combination would result
in an inoperative structure).
To be sure, the Examiner rejects the claim based on the use of
Marshall’s sensors (50) in Takeda’s display system. (Ans. 9.) And we find
that Takeda expressly discloses optimizing the luminous flux of each of the
color rays projected onto the tilt-mirror device (30) to obtain “white light.”
(See Takeda, col. 3, ll. 23-32; col. 4, ll. 35-42; col. 12, l. 56 – col. 13, l. 14.)
Takeda further discloses a driving control unit (40), which the Examiner
finds is a processing device, but Takeda does not describe it as detecting a
“color balance ratio.” (Ans. 3.) We conclude, however, based on the
teachings of Takeda and Marshall, that it would have been obvious for a
person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to incorporate
in Takeda’s display system the use of color sensors disclosed in Marshall,
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one for each of the three colors disclosed in Takeda, to sense the “magnitude
of the specific light being sensed” (Marshall, col. 4, ll. 56-57) during the off
position (see Takeda, fig. 3; Marshall, col. 5, l. 66 – col. 6, l. 2, fig. 2
(illuminating the SLM after a predetermined period of time)). We further
conclude that it would have been obvious to modify Takeda’s driving
control unit (40) to receive the output of each of the sensors in order to
detect the ratio of the magnitudes of each of the colors (as taught by
Marshall with respect to the relative intensities of the red and blue light rays)
and optimize the luminous flux for white light, as taught in Takeda (Takeda,
col. 3, ll. 23-32; col. 4, ll.35-42; col. 12, l. 56 – col. 13, l. 14). A person of
ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Takeda and
Marshall this way to achieve an automated timing adjustment (purpose of
the output of Marshall’s sensors) of Takeda’s timing signals (Takeda, fig.5).
Therefore, we conclude that the teachings of Takeda and Marshall
support: (1) the Examiner’s determination that it would have been obvious to
combine the teachings from Takeda and Marshall and (2) the Examiner’s
rejection of independent claims 1 and 18.
Because in sustaining the rejection of claims 1 and 18, we make
findings in addition to those set forth by the Examiner, we designate this as a
new grounds of rejection using our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).
Claims 2, 3, 5, and 7-9 depend from claim 1 and are argued as being
patentable based on the patentability of claim 1. (App. Br. 12.) Claims 19
and 21 depend from claim 18 and are argued as being patentable based on
the patentability of claim 18. (Id.) As such, the rejections of those
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dependent claims are also sustained for the reasons set forth above with
respect to claims 1 and 18.
Claims 8 and 22
Appellants challenge the Examiner’s rejection of claims 8 and 22
because Marshall allegedly fails to disclose any adjustment of the light
source, and because Takeda in view of Marshall does not solve this
deficiency. (App. Br. 13-14.) First, we note that the Examiner’s rejection
points to, not Marshall, but Takeda, as disclosing a driving control unit (40)
for “adjusting the output of a plurality of light sources,” as recited in claims
8 and 22. (Ans. 6 (citing Takeda, col. 9, l.61  col. 10, l. 15).) And Takeda
confirms the Examiner’s conclusion; it discloses that the amount of
luminous flux output by each light source is adjusted by increasing or
decreasing the turning-on period of each light source. (See Takeda, col. 3, ll.
24-32.) Thus, we agree with the Examiner that Takeda, in view of Marshall,
teaches the limitations recited in claims 8 and 22. Relying on the statement
of the rejection provided supra with respect to claims 1 and 18 and the
findings in Takeda concerning the adjustment of light source output as stated
herein, we sustain the rejection of claims 8 and 22 as being obvious over
Takeda and Marshall. Because in sustaining the rejection of claims 8 and
22, we rely on findings in addition to those set forth in the Examiner’s
rejection, we designate this as a new grounds of rejection using our authority
under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).
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Claims 13, 14-17, 23, and 24-27
The disputed claim limitation concerns the control of the spatial light
modulator to “modulate the light” so that the brightness signal “is within a
specified range of values.” The Examiner points to Marshall’s processing
device (30-34) for controlling the spatial light modulator as claimed. (Ans.
6-7.) The Examiner reasons that “the controller [in Marshall] continues to
receive the intensity of red and blue lights (or the claimed brightness signal)
and to control the [spatial light modulator or] SLM to modulate the
correspondingly colored light and to create a light image so that the red and
blue brightness signals have identical magnitudes (or values) or are within a
specified range.” (Ans. 6-7.) Appellants disagree with the Examiner’s
finding because the micro-mirrors in Marshalls SLM do not affect the output
of the two sensors, as the number of mirrors in the “off” position is always
equal. (App. Br. 15-16.)
We are persuaded by Appellants’ argument that Marshall does not
disclose modulating the SLM as stated by the Examiner, but find,
nevertheless, that Takeda in view of Marshall teaches the claimed limitations
of claim 13. We find that:
(1) Takeda discloses a driving control unit 40 that controls the tilt-
mirror device 30 via gradation-expressing signals for each of the color rays:
red, green, and blue. (Takeda, col. 13, ll. 37-55.)
(2) These gradation-expressing signals control the duration
(gradation-expressing periods) necessary for achieving the optical power
(gradation) of the light ray by the SLM (tilt-mirror device 30). (Takeda, col.
13, ll.56-61.)
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(3) The gradation-expressing periods substantially agree with the
turning-on periods of the light sources, so that the tilt-mirror device 30
modulates the mirror elements 31 accordingly. (Takeda, col. 13, ll. 15-36;
col. 14, ll.29-41.) That is, Takeda discloses a driving control unit 40 that
controls the modulation of the tilt-mirror device 30 in accordance with
timing signals that are indicative of the desired optical power and luminous
flux amounts of the light source.
We conclude, based on these findings, that it would have been
obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to
incorporate in Takeda’s display system the use of color sensor disclosed in
Marshall, one for each of the three colors disclosed in Takeda, to sense the
“magnitude of the specific light being sensed” (Marshall, col. 4, ll. 56-57)
during the off position (see Takeda, fig. 3; Marshall, col. 5, l. 66 – col. 6, l.
2, fig. 2 (illuminating the SLM after a predetermined period of time)). We
further conclude that it would have been obvious to modify Takeda’s driving
control unit (40) to receive the output of each of the sensors in order to
detect the ratio of the magnitudes of each of the colors (as taught by
Marshall with respect to the relative intensities of the red and blue rays) and
optimize the luminous flux for white light, as taught in Takeda (Takeda, col.
3, ll. 23-32; col. 4, ll. 35-42; col. 12, l. 56 – col. 13, l. 14). Furthermore, we
conclude that it would have been obvious to modify Takeda’s driving
control unit (40) to automatically adjust the gradation-expressing periods for
obtaining white light according to the desired magnitude of luminous flux
(Takeda, col. 13, ll.3-13; fig 5) and to modulate the light accordingly via the
tilt-mirror device 30. A person of ordinary skill in the art would have been
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motivated to combine Takeda and Marshall this way to achieve an
automated timing adjustment (purpose of the output of Marshall’s sensors)
of Takeda’s timing signals (Takeda, fig.5). Because in sustaining the
rejection of claims 13 and 23, we make findings in addition to those set forth
by the Examiner, we designate this as a new grounds of rejection using our
authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).
Claims 14-17 depend from claim 13 and are argued as being
patentable based on the patentability of claim 13. (App. Br. 16.) Claims 24-
27 depend from claim 23 and are argued as being patentable based on the
patentability of claim 23. (Id. at 17.) As such, the rejections of those
dependent claims are also sustained for the reasons set forth above with
respect to claims 13 and 23.

DECISION
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1-3, 5, 7-9, 13-19, and 21-27
as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Takeda in view of
Marshall is affirmed. We designate our affirmance as a new ground of
rejection using our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).

This decision contains new grounds of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(b) (2010). 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) provides “[a] new ground of
rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial
review.”
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) also provides that Appellants, WITHIN TWO
MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of
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the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to
avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims:
(1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate
amendment of the claims so rejected or new evidence relating
to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter
reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the proceeding
will be remanded to the examiner. . . .
(2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be
reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same record. . . .
No time for taking any action connected with this appeal may be
extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv)
(2011).

AFFIRMED; 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)

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