Ex Parte Montemayor et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 8, 2017

13475576 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 8, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/475,576 05/18/2012 Eduardo Montemayor 58778.8.2 4596
22859 7590 09/12/2017
FREDRIKSON & BYRON, P.A.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GROUP
200 SOUTH SIXTH STREET, SUITE 4000
MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55402
EXAMINER
HUYNH, AN SON PHI
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2426
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/12/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
IP@FREDLAW.COM
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte EDUARDO MONTEMAYOR,
KIRK WAGNER DAVIS, and JESSICA CATHER
Appeal 2015-005748
Application 13/475,576
Technology Center 2400
Before JUSTIN BUSCH, JAMES W. DEJMEK, and ALEX S. YAP,
Administrative Patent Judges.
BUSCH, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
rejection of claims 1—7, 9-18, and 20—23. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
Appeal 2015-005748
Application 13/475,576
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claims 1,14, and 22 are independent claims. The claims relate
generally to generating video presentations and, more specifically, to
generating dynamic data-driven video presentations by assembling video
assets. Spec. 12. Claim 1 is reproduced below:
1. A method comprising:
receiving, with processing circuitry, a request from
a user device through a computer network for a dynamic
data-driven video presentation, the request comprising
video identification information and user device
information;
determining, with the processing circuitry, the video
identification information from the request;
determining, with the processing circuitry, the user
device information from the request;
generating, with the processing circuitry, video
configuration information based on the video
identification information and the user device information,
the video configuration information comprising
instructions for assembling a plurality of video assets to
create the dynamic data-driven video presentation; and
sending, with the processing circuitry, the video
configuration information to the user device through the
computer network to enable the user device to assemble
the plurality of video assets to create the dynamic data-
driven video presentation with the user device based on
the video configuration information.
REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 5—7, 9-11, 14—18, and 20-23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable in view of Lee (US 2010/0325652 Al; Dec. 23,
2010) and Sull (US 2007/0033533 Al; Feb. 8, 2007). Final Act. 3-14.
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Claims 2-4 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable in
view of Lee, Sull, and Brooks (US 7,114,174 Bl; Sept. 26, 2016). Final
Act. 15—16.
Claims 2—\ stand (alternatively) rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable in view of Lee, Sull, and Drukman (US 2009/0228868 Al;
Sept. 10,2009). Final Act. 17-18.
Claims 12 and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable in view of Lee, Sull, and Bovenschulte (US 2007/0136753 Al;
June 14,2007). Final Act. 19-20.
OPINION
Appellants argue the Examiner’s construction of “dynamic data-
driven video presentation” (“DDVP”) and is unreasonably broad and
inconsistent with Appellants’Specification. App. Br. 13—21. Appellants
also contend the combination of Lee and Sull fails to disclose a DDVP and
“sending . . . the video configuration information ... to enable the user
device to assemble the plurality of video assets to create the dynamic data-
driven video presentation,” as recited in independent claim 1 and
commensurately recited in independent claim 14. Id. at 21—27. Similarly,
Appellants argue the combination of Lee and Sull fails to disclose
“receiving, with the user device, video configuration information,” as recited
in independent claim 22. Id. at 27. We first address Appellants’ argument
regarding claim construction, then we discuss Appellants’ assertions that
certain limitations are not taught or suggested by Lee and Sull.
Construction of “Dynamic Data-Driven Video Presentation”
During examination of a patent application, pending claims are given
their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification. In
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re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404—05 (CCPA 1969); In re Am. Acad. ofSci.
Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
[T]he PTO applies to the verbiage of the proposed claims the
broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage
as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art,
taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of
definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written
description contained in the applicant’s specification.
In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). To read a claim in light
of the specification, one must interpret limitations explicitly recited in the
claim, without reading limitations from the specification into the claim, to
thereby narrow the scope of the claim by implicitly adding disclosed
limitations that are not recited in the claim. Prater, 415 F.2d at 1404—05.
Where no explicit definition for a term is given in the specification,
the term should be given its ordinary meaning and broadest reasonable
interpretation. E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1368
(Fed. Cir. 2003). An applicant, however, is entitled to be his or her own
lexicographer and may rebut the presumption that claim terms are to be
given their ordinary and customary meaning by clearly setting forth a
definition of the term that is different from its ordinary and customary
meaning(s). See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
The Examiner finds Appellants’ proposed construction of DDVP
attempts to import limitations from the Specification into the claims. Final
Act. 2; Ans. 21—22 (citing Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP)
§2111.01 (I)). The Examiner finds the broadest reasonable interpretation of
a DDVP in light of the Specification is “any change of video presentation”
or “continuous change or progress of video presentation.” Final Act. 2;
Ans. 21—22.
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Appellants, on the other hand, contend the broadest reasonable
interpretation of a DDVP, in light of the Specification, is “a video created
after being requested by a user, the video created from currently available
data received from one or more databases.” App. Br. 15. Appellants assert
their proposed construction does not read limitations from the Specification
into the claims, but merely uses the Specification to interpret an explicitly
recited limitation, namely the DDVP. Id. at 14—19; Reply Br. 3^4. In
particular, Appellants argue the Specification defines the term “dynamic
data-driven video presentation,” and additionally explains the meaning of
“data-driven” and “dynamic.” App. Br. 15—17 (quoting || 30, 55—56);
Reply Br. 3^4 (quoting || 30, 55—56).
The Examiner is correct that claims should be construed in light of the
Specification without importing limitations therefrom. As discussed above,
Prater cautions us to use the Specification only as a guide and not to import
limitations not explicitly recited into the claims. 414 F.2d at 1395; see also
SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(warning that the written description cannot “be used to rewrite, the chosen
claim language [and] understanding the claim language may be aided by the
explanations contained in the written description, [but] it is important not to
import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim” (citations
omitted)).
However, the Examiner fails to consider the written description’s
explicit definitions:
Multiple terms are used herein to describe various aspects of the
embodiments. A selection of definitions for certain terms used
herein is provided below. The terms should be understood in
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light of the definitions, unless further modified in the
descriptions of the embodiments that follow.
Dynamic Data-Drive Video — A video presentation that is
dynamically rendered with currently available data requested
from a product/service database, in some cases with zero or
minimal time delay. Subsequent renderings of a dynamic data-
driven video presentation automatically change and/or update to
reflect the current state of the data in the database as the data may
be periodically changed or updated.
Spec. 1129-30.
Because Appellants have acted as their own lexicographer, we agree
with Appellants that the Examiner’s construction of DDVP as a “changing
video presentation” or “continuous change or progress of video
presentation” is inconsistent with the Specification. Ans. 21—22.
Nevertheless, Appellants’ proposed construction includes aspects to which
the written description does not limit the term DDVP. In particular,
Appellants’ proposed construction includes a restriction that the video be
“created after being requested by a user,” but the written description does
not define what triggers creation of the DDVP. Accordingly, we construe a
DDVP as “a video presentation that is dynamically rendered with currently
available data requested from a product/service database,” as defined in the
Specification.
Obviousness Rejection in View of Lee and Sull
The Dynamic Data-Driven Video Presentation
Appellants also argue the Examiner fails to demonstrate that the
combination of Lee and Sull teaches or suggests a DDVP. App. Br. 21—23.
Specifically, Appellants contend the claims recite that the DDVP “is created
by the user device assembling the plurality of video assets, which Lee also
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does not disclose.” Id. at 22 (emphasis omitted). Appellants acknowledge
that Lee formats a video program before transmitting the video, but assert
that “Lee is directed to or more related to the processing of a ‘hard file’ type
of video,” and Lee does not send video configuration information that allows
the user device to create the DDVP. Id. at 22 (quoting Appellants’ Response
to Non-Final Office Action, filed Nov. 11, 2013, 10-11). Thus, Appellants
argue Lee does not disclose a DDVP because “Lee is solely directed to
formatting a video program and then transmitting the formatted video
program in full to a user terminal.” Id.
The Examiner, however, finds that the combination of Lee and Sull
teaches the DDVP, which “comprise[s] data from database[s] that are used
to generate video presentation^] such as user selection of different
bookmark, segments to generate different video presentation . .. using data
such as video segment. . . from database/memory/storage device.” Ans. 22
(citing Lee H 43^19, 57; Sull H 58-69, 192-199).
Even given the definition provided by Appellants’ Specification, we
are not persuaded the combination of Lee and Sull fails to at least suggest a
DDVP. Appellants acknowledge that Lee discloses generating a video,
formatting the video based on the user device requesting the video, and
transmitting the processed video for playback at the user device. App.
Br. 22; see also Lee 139 (“the user sends a request signal for the specific
program, the system controller 201 receives the request signal. . . extracts
the terminal characteristic information from the received signal. . . then
converts the video format” in accordance with the terminals’ characteristic
information). Lee also describes various potential video input sources that
may be selected, including a PVR or “internal and external storage media.”
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Lee 146. Thus, Lee teaches every element of a DDVP because Lee
discloses a system that: (1) receives a user request for a video that may be
stored on storage media; (2) selects the requested video from the storage
media; (3) formats the storage media according to the user terminal
characteristics; and (4) transmits the formatted video to the user terminal.
Namely, Lee’s video is both dynamic because it is formatted based on the
user request, and data-driven because the video is retrieved from a storage
device (at least suggesting a database).
Furthermore, Sull discloses “Detection of Individual Program
Segments from a Composite Video Files,” in which a user may “record
multiple programs into a single video stream in a sequential order,” and the
system calculates the start and end frames of each video, allowing the user to
create a single video using “the exact start and end positions of each
program.” Sull Tflf 329-331. Sull also discloses using the bookmarks to
search a “multimedia database for multimedia contents relevant to the
selected content,” such as when “the user might want to find multimedia
contents similar to the content information of the saved bookmark.” Id.
1193. Accordingly, Sull teaches or suggests creating a DDVP because the
user is able to select various video files and create a composite video using
content available in multimedia databases at the time of the search.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding the
combination of Lee and Sull teaches or suggests a DDVP, as recited in the
claims.
Sending and Receiving Video Configuration Information
Appellants also argue Sull does not disclose sending or receiving
video configuration information, as recited in independent claims 14 and 22.
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App. Br. 23—27. In particular, Appellants contend “[t]o supposedly account
for the limitations missing from Lee, the Examiner argued that Sull discloses
sending video configuration information to a user device,” but Sull does not
“teach generating this claimed video configuration information.” Id. at 24—
26.
The Examiner finds Lee teaches or suggests “sending [and receiving]
video configuration information,” and Sull teaches or suggests the video
configuration comprises “instructions for assembling a plurality of video
assets to create the dynamic data-driven video presentation.” Final Act. 4—5,
9, 13—14; Ans. 23—24. The Examiner then provides a reason a person
having ordinary skill in the art would have combined Lee and Sull, finding
that the combination of Lee and Sull teaches sending and receiving video
configuration information comprising instructions for creating the DDVP.
Final Act. 4—6, 9, 13—14; Ans. 23—24.
Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references
individually where, as here, the ground of unpatentability is based upon the
teachings of a combination of references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426
(CCPA 1981). Rather, the test for obviousness is whether the combination
of references, taken as a whole, would have suggested the patentee's
invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art. In re Merck & Co.,
Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Thus, to the extent Appellants
argue Sull, alone, fails to teach or suggest the sending step, that argument is
not persuasive because the rejection is based on the combination of Lee and
Sull.
To the extent Appellants argue Sull does not teach or suggest video
configuration information “comprising instructions for assembling a
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plurality of video assets to create the dynamic data-driven video
presentation,” we are similarly unpersuaded. Sull discloses multi-media
bookmarks, which the user device may use to identify portions of videos to
play. Sull 57, 192—199. Furthermore, as discussed above, Sull discloses
“Detection of Individual Program Segments from a Composite Video Files,”
in which a user may “record multiple programs into a single video stream in
a sequential order,” and the system calculates the start and end frames of
each video, allowing the user to create a single video using “the exact start
and end positions of each program.” Id. H 329-331. Thus, Sull at least
suggests the ability to transmit information allowing the user to assemble a
plurality of videos to create a dynamic video presentation.
For the reasons discussed above, Appellants have not persuaded us the
Examiner erred in rejecting independent claims 1, 14, and 22, and we sustain
the rejection of claims 1, 14, and 22 as obvious in view of the combined
teachings of Lee and Sull.
Dependent Claims
Appellants do not substantively argue the rejection of claims 5—7,
9-11, 15—18, 20, 21, and 23, which ultimately depend from either claim 1 or
14. Thus, for similar reasons, we also sustain the rejection of claims 5—7,
9—11, 15—18, 20, 21, and 23 as obvious in view of the combined teachings of
Lee and Sull. The rejections of claims 2-4, 12, and 13 further rely on the
teachings of Brooks (claims 2-4), Drukman (alternate rejection of claims
2-4), and Bovenschulte (claims 12 and 13). Appellants argue the
patentability of claims 2-4, 12, and 13 only based on their ultimate
dependency from claim 1. Thus, for similar reasons, we sustain the
rejections of claims 2-4 as obvious in view of the combined teachings of
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Lee, Sull, and either Brooks or Drukman, and the rejection of claims 12 and
13 as obvious in view of the combined teachings of Lee, Sull, and
Bovenschulte.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1—7, 9—18, and
20-23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED
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