Ex Parte Monroe

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jul 31, 2008

09982061 (B.P.A.I. Jul. 31, 2008)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________________

Ex parte ERIC M. MONROE
____________________

Appeal 2008-0683
Application 09/982,061
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Decided: July 31, 2008
____________________

Before JAMES D. THOMAS, JAY P. LUCAS and
THU A. DANG, Administrative Patent Judges.

DANG, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

I. STATEMENT OF CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a final rejection of
claims 1-22. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

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A. INVENTION
According to Appellant, the invention relates to systematically
translating field temperature conditions associated with particular
packages/products into accelerated life testing requirements based on a pre-
determined set of design use inputs, consumer behavior patterns, and
environmental field conditions (Spec. 1, ll.7-10).

B. ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIM
Claim 1 is exemplary and is reproduced below:
1. A computer-implemented method, tangibly embodied on a
computer readable storage medium, which when executed will quantify the
reliability test requirements of a package/chip device over a product lifetime
comprising:

modeling a plurality of different types of ambient and power-driven
temperature cycle fluctuations the package/device is expected to undergo
over the product lifetime; and

determining the accelerated life test requirements that represent each
of the plurality of different types of temperature cycle fluctuations.

C. REJECTIONS
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:

Mencinger, Nicholas P., “A Mechanism-Based Methodology for
Processor Package Reliability Assessments,” Intel Technology Journal Q3,
2000, pp. 1-8.
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Doty, Hatt, “Application Specific Semiconductor Device
Qualification Methodology,” HDP User Group International, Inc., February
1998.

ReliaSoft’s Alta 1.0, “On site Training Guide,” 1999.

Dellin, Ted, “Semiconductor Device Reliability Failure Models,”
Sematech International 2000, pp. 1-27.

Claims 1-5 and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the
teachings of Mencinger and Doty;
Claims 6-12, 14, and 17-22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
over the teachings of Mencinger, Doty, and ReliaSoft; and
Claims 13 and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the
teachings of Mencinger, Doty, ReliaSoft, and Dellin.

We affirm.

II. ISSUES
The issues are whether Appellant has shown that the Examiner erred
in finding that
A. Claims 1-5 and 16 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over
the teachings of Mencinger and Doty.
B. Claims 6-12, 14, and 17-22 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) over the teachings of Mencinger, Doty, and ReliaSoft.
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C. Claims 13 and 15 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over
the teachings of Mencinger, Doty, ReliaSoft, and Dellin.

III. FINDINGS OF FACT
The following Findings of Fact (FF) are shown by a preponderance of
the evidence.
Appellant’s Invention
1. In Appellant’s invention, the accelerated life model includes equations
known in the art such as the Coffin-Manson model, which iteratively derives
point estimates of the number of accelerated test cycles required to
approximate the temperature profile of the product (Spec. 5, ll. 8-17).
2. In a modified model, the number of accelerated reliability cycles
required to accurately model the temperature profile of the package/chip
device is equivalent to a sum of 1) the number of accelerated test cycles
required to separately model temperature fluctuations due to storage cycles,
2) the number of accelerated test cycles required to separately model
temperature fluctuations due to shipping cycles; and 3) the number of
accelerated test cycles required to separately model power cycle fluctuations
including on/idle, application use (Spec. 10, ll. 14-27).

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Mencinger
3. Mencinger discloses a mechanism-based methodology for processor
package reliability assessment which requires that every failure mechanism
be modeled against life with the appropriate physical model (pg. 2, col. 1, ll.
5-7).
4. Environments are linked to appropriate accelerated tests. Equivalent
use condition and lifetime models are used with acceleration models to
define the accelerated stress durations for each failure mechanism
discovered during development, the use condition including “short duration
extreme ambient temperature exposures during shipping and transport,” “fast
processor On/off power cycles,” “operating air temperature range,”
“maximum sustained storage temperature,” and “minimum sustained storage
temperature” (pg. 4, col. 1; Table 2).
5. In an example, the failure mechanisms are related through a power
law relationship (Coffin-Manson) to an end-user environment (pg. 4, col. 2).
Doty
6. In Doty, the use environment determines tests, conditions and
durations (Slide 2). The method includes 1) defining user environments, 2)
developing list of accelerated tests/conditions, 3) relating acceleration
factors to appropriate tests, 4) quantifying the temperature fluctuation from
the environment, and 5) calculating conditions for each standard application
(slide 4).
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7. The use environment in the four phases is established, including the
first storage/transportation phase, the assembly phase, the second
storage/transportation phase, and the operational life phase, wherein a list of
different types of ambient/non-ambient temperature fluctuations is
developed (slide 3).

IV. PRINCIPLES OF LAW
“Section 103 forbids issuance of a patent when ‘the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains.’” KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727,
1734 (2007).
The Supreme Court emphasized “the need for caution in granting a
patent based on the combination of elements found in the prior art,” and
discussed circumstances in which a patent might be determined to be
obvious. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1739 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 12 (1966)). The Court reaffirmed principles based on its precedent
that “[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is
likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” Id.
The operative question in this “functional approach” is thus “whether the
improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according
to their established functions.” Id. at 1740.
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“Under the correct analysis, any need or problem known in the field
and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements
in the manner claimed.” Id. at 1742. The Court noted that “[c]ommon sense
teaches . . . that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary
purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the
teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.” KSR, 127 S.
Ct. at 1742. “A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary
creativity, not an automaton.” Id.
One cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually
where the rejections are based on combinations of references. In re Merck
& Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
In the absence of separate arguments with respect to claims subject to
the same rejection, those claims stand or fall with the claim for which an
argument was made. See In re Young, 927 F.2d 588, 590 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
See also 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii)(2004).

V. ANALYSIS
Claims 1-5
Appellant does not provide separate arguments with respect to the
rejection of claims 1-5. Therefore, we select independent claim 1 as being
representative of the cited claims. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).
Appellant argues that “Mencinger does not disclose, or even suggest,
determining accelerated life test requirements that represent each of a
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plurality of different types of temperature cycle fluctuations a
package/device is expected to undergo over the product lifetime, as recited
by claim 1” (App. Br. 5). Appellant adds that “Doty simply refers to an
application-specific semiconductor qualification methodology in which
certain stress conditions are provided that refer to temperature cycle
fluctuations for only one application phase, namely, the operation life
phase, but not in each of the four application phases (App. Br. 6).
We disagree. We generally agree with the Examiner’s finding that
Mencinger and Doty disclose the claimed elements on appeal beginning at
page 4 of the Answer and the Examiner’s corresponding responsive
arguments at page 18 of the Answer.
Mencinger discloses modeling failure mechanism against life with the
appropriate physical model, wherein the failure mechanisms are related
through the Coffin-Manson relationship to an end-user environment linked
to appropriate accelerated tests (FF 3-5). In Mencinger, equivalent use
condition and lifetime models are used with acceleration models to define
the accelerated stress durations for each failure mechanism discovered
during development, the use condition including “short duration extreme
ambient temperature exposures during shipping and transport,” “fast
processor On/off power cycles,” “operating air temperature range,”
“maximum sustained storage temperature,” and “minimum sustained storage
temperature” (FF 4). We agree with the Examiner that “Mencinger teaches
determining accelerated life test requirements” and “[t]herefore teaching
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each of different types of temperature cycle fluctuations” (Ans. 18). In fact,
Appellant’s invention sets forth that the different types of fluctuations the
product undergoes include the temperature fluctuations due to storage, the
temperature fluctuations due to shipping cycle, and power cycle fluctuations
including on/idle, application use (FF 2).
Doty discloses establishing use environment to determine tests,
conditions and durations in the four phases over the product’s lifetime,
which includes defining user environments, developing list of accelerated
tests/conditions, relating acceleration factors to appropriate tests, and
quantifying the temperature fluctuation from the environment (FF 6-7). We
agree with the Examiner’s finding that “Doty also like Mencinger teaches
each of a plurality of different types of temperature cycle fluctuations a
package/device is expected to undergo over a product lifetime” (Ans. 19),
and that the accelerated tests/conditions are determined accordingly.
Though Appellant appears to be arguing that Mencinger alone “does
not disclose, or even suggest, determining accelerated life test requirements
that represent each of a plurality of different types of temperature cycle
fluctuations a package/device is expected to undergo over the product
lifetime” (App. Br. 5), the Examiner has rejected the claims based on the
combination of Mencinger and Doty, and nonobviousness cannot be shown
by attacking the references individually. According to the Examiner’s
findings as discussed above, in both Doty and Mencinger, different types of
fluctuations the product is expected to undergo over the product’s lifetime
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are determined, and the accelerated tests/conditions are then determined
accordingly. We agree with the Examiner that combined teachings of
Mencinger and Doty of using the Coffin-Manson model in relation with use
condition to define the accelerated stress durations for each failure
mechanism over the four phases of the product’s lifetime to be “determining
the accelerated life test requirements that represent each of the plurality of
different types of temperature cycles fluctuations” a package/device is
expected to undergo over the product lifetime as recited in claim 1. In fact,
Appellant admits using the well-known Coffin-Manson model as the
accelerated life model to iteratively derive point estimates of the number of
accelerated test cycles required to approximate the temperature profile of the
product (FF 1).
Though Appellant argues that the stress conditions in Doty “refer to
temperature cycle fluctuations for only one application phase, namely, the
operation life phase, but not in each of the four application phases” (App.
Br. 6), the Examiner found that Doty does consider temperature or power
cycle fluctuations of other non-operational phases (Ans. 19-21). In the
Reply Brief, Appellant provides no argument to dispute that the Examiner
has correctly shown where this claimed element appears in the prior art.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues that “the Answer cites to and
relies upon unrelated portions of both Mencinger and Doty as evidence of
the different types of temperature cycle fluctuations these references
allegedly disclose—but none of the cited portions of Mencinger and Doty
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discuss the alleged different types of temperature cycle fluctuations in the
context of determining accelerated life test requirement” (Reply Br. 3).
Again, Appellant appears to be arguing that individually Mencinger and
Doty do not disclose the claimed invention when the Examiner has rejected
the claims based on the combination of Mencinger and Doty.
As discussed above, both Mencinger and Doty are directed to
determining accelerated test requirements in view of fluctuations a product
undergoes over the product’s lifetime. We agree with the Examiner’s
finding that the combination of Mencinger’s teachings with Doty’s teachings
results in the claimed invention of using temperature or power cycle
fluctuations for determining accelerated life test requirements in operational
and non-operations phases over the product’s lifetime.
Appellant further argues that the combination of teachings of
Mencinger with those of Doty is improper because “the proper evidence of
obviousness must show why there is a suggestion to combine the references”
(App. Br. 8).
The Examiner’s finding of motivation to combine beginning at page 5
of the Answer and the Examiner’s corresponding responsive arguments at
page 22 of the Answer comply with the requirements of the above-noted
case law. We agree with the Examiner’s finding that “Doty and Mencinger
are solving the same nature of the problem as would be easily recognized by
a person skilled in the art” (Ans. 22).
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Appellant has provided no evidence that incorporating Doty’s testing
over four application phases in a product’s lifetime to Mencinger’s testing
over a product’s lifetime was “uniquely challenging or difficult for one of
ordinary skill in the art,” Leapfrog, 485 F.3d 1153, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007),
nor has Appellant presented evidence that this incorporation yielded more
than expected results. Rather, Appellant’s invention is simply an
arrangement of the known teaching of testing in four phases in a testing
system. Thus, it is our view that a person of ordinary skill would have been
able to fit such teachings of Mencinger and Doty together like pieces of a
puzzle since a person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity,
not an automaton. See KSR at 1742.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellant has not shown that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, and claims 2-5, falling with claim 1,
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

Claim 16
As to claim 16 which Appellant admits “recites features essentially
analogous to claim 4,” Appellant provides the same argument as to claim 4
and adds the argument that “claim 16 further recites quantifying frequencies
and magnitudes of temperature fluctuations based in part of the shipping
route taken by the product” which differs from the teachings of Doty
because “the seasonal temperature variations referred to by Doty involve an
overall trending of the temperature data occurring over a long period of time,
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rather than an immediate impact as would be expected by the product taking
a different route” (App. Br. 9).
We find no deficiencies regarding Mencinger and Doty, as discussed
above regarding claims 1-5. Claim 4 has not been separately argued.
Furthermore, the Examiner found that the combination of Mencinger and
Doty discloses such shipping route limitation, and that Mencinger,
particularly, shows “short duration extreme ambient temperature exposures
during shipping and transportation” (Ans. 25).
In the Reply Brief, Appellant provides no argument to dispute that the
Examiner has correctly shown where this claimed element appears in both
Doty and Mencinger, and nonobviousness cannot be shown by attacking
Doty individually. Therefore, we conclude that Appellant has not shown
that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over
Gibbon.

Claims 6-12, 14 and 17-22
As to claims 6-12, 14 and 17-22, Appellant provides the same
argument as claims 1, 4 and 16, and add the argument that “ReliaSoft does
not cure the critical deficiencies of the Mencinger and Doty references” and
that “there exists no express motivation in any of the references to combine
them” (App. Br. 10).
The Examiner’s finding of motivation to combine beginning at page
10 of the Answer and the Examiner’s corresponding responsive arguments
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beginning at page 28 of the Answer comply with the requirements of the
above-noted case law.
We find no deficiencies regarding Mencinger and Doty, as discussed
above regarding claim 1, 4, and 16. We agree with the Examiner’s finding
that the references “are solving the same nature of the problem as would be
easily recognized by a person skilled in the art” (Ans. 29) since a person of
ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton. See
KSR at 1742.
Therefore, we conclude that Appellant has not shown that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claims 6-12, 14 and 17-22 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) over Mencinger, Doty, and ReliaSoft.

Claims 13 and 15
As to claims 13 and 15, Appellant provides the same argument as
claims 1 and 9 from which they depend, and adds the argument that taking
the teaching of a Coffin Manson model as described in Dellin and use with
the teachings of Mencinger, Doty, and ReliaSoft “is mere hindsight” (App.
Br. 10).
The Examiner’s finding of motivation to combine beginning at page
15 of the Answer and the Examiner’s corresponding responsive arguments at
page 30 of the Answer comply with the requirements of the above-noted
case law.
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We find no deficiencies regarding Mencinger, Doty, and ReliaSoft as
discussed above. Claim 9 has not been separately argued. Furthermore, we
agree with the Examiner’s finding that Mencinger, Doty, and Reliasoft are
“analogous art” to Dellin (Ans. 30), since Mencinger also discloses the use
of the Coffin-Manson model (FF 5). We thus agree with the Examiner that
the “nature of problem to be solved is common to both Dellin and
Mencinger” (Ans. 30). It is our view that a person of ordinary skill would
have been able to combine such analogous teachings to solve the common
problem without mere hindsight.
Therefore, we conclude that Appellant has not shown that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claims 13 and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over
Mencinger, Doty, ReliaSoft, and Dellin.

CONCLUSION OF LAW
(1) Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in finding that
claims 1-5 and 16 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the
teachings of Mencinger and Doty.
(2) Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in finding that
claims 6-12, 14, and 17-22 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over
the teachings of Mencinger, Doty, and ReliaSoft.
(3) Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in finding that
claims 13 and 15 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the
teachings of Mencinger, Doty, ReliaSoft, and Dellin.
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(4) Claims 1-22 are not patentable.

DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).

AFFIRMED

pgc

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