Ex Parte MomitaDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardApr 1, 201913207203 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 1, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 13/207,203 08/10/2011 Paul M. Momita 27189 7590 04/03/2019 PROCOPIO, CORY, HARGREAVES & SAVITCH LLP 525 B STREET SUITE 2200 SAN DIEGO, CA 92101 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. l 1778 l -002UT1 5471 EXAMINER LULTSCHIK, WILLIAM G ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3626 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 04/03/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketing@procopio.com PTONotifications@procopio.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Exparte PAUL M. MOMITA1 Appeal2018-000503 Application 13/207 ,203 Technology Center 3600 Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, JAMES R. HUGHES, and JESSICA C. KAISER, Administrative Patent Judges. HUGHES, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 7, 9--18, 22, 24--27, and29--31. Claims 1---6, 8, 19--21, 23, and 28 have been canceled. Non-Final Act. 1-2. 2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We affirm. 1 Medlmpact Healthcare Systems, Inc. ("Appellant") is the Applicant as provided in 37 C.F.R. § 1.46 and is identified as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2. 2 We refer to Appellant's Specification ("Spec.") filed Aug. 10, 2011; Appeal Brief ("Appeal Br.") filed July 5, 2017; and Reply Brief ("Reply Br.") filed Oct. 17, 2017. We also refer to the Examiner's Non-Final Office Action ("Non-Final Act.") mailed Jan. 4, 2017; and Answer ("Ans.") mailed Aug. 18, 2017. Appeal2018-000503 Application 13/207,203 Appellant's Invention The invention "relates generally to prescription drug benefits programs and more specifically relates to an improved claims adjudication system for adjudicating consumer purchases that are covered by such programs" (Spec. ,r 2). See Spec. ,r,r 20-22; Abstract. Representative Claim Independent claim 7, reproduced below, further illustrates the invention: 7. A method for improved processing of claims by a pharmacy benefits management system, the method comprising executing machine-readable instructions, on at least one hardware processor, to: receive a claim adjudication request from an originating system over at least one network, wherein the claim adjudication request comprises a current claim identifying a healthcare plan and a member of said healthcare plan; determine whether adjudicating the current claim would result in a denial of the current claim or an allowance of the current claim at an initial tier; if it is determined that adjudicating the current claim would result in a prospective denial of the current claim, retrieve historical claim data from a non-transitory computer-readable medium, search the historical claim data to determine whether a prior claim, matching the current claim, was allowed, when it is determined that a prior claim, matching the current claim, was allowed, override the prospective denial of the current claim, and, when it is not determined that a prior claim, matching the current claim, was allowed, do not override the prospective denial of the current claim; if it is determined that adjudicating the current claim would result in an allowance of the current claim at an initial tier within a current formulary, 2 Appeal2018-000503 Application 13/207,203 search the historical claim data to determine whether a prior claim, matching the current claim, was allowed at a prior tier within a prior formulary that is different than the current formulary, and, when it is determined that a prior claim, matching the current claim, was allowed at a prior tier, access a tier mapping to determine whether or not the prior tier within the prior formulary is an improvement over the initial tier within the current formulary, wherein the tier mapping maps a plurality of tiers in the prior formulary to a plurality of tiers in the current formulary, when it is determined that the prior tier is an improvement over the initial tier, adjudicate the allowance of the current claim based on the prior tier, and, when it is determined that the prior tier is not an improvement over the initial tier, adjudicate the allowance of the current claim at the initial tier; and transmit a result of the adjudication to the originating system over the at least one network. Rejection on Appeal The Examiner rejects claims 7, 9--18, 22, 24--27, and 29--31 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. ISSUE Based upon our review of the record, Appellant's contentions, and the Examiner's findings and conclusions, the issue before us follows: Did the Examiner err in finding Appellant's claims were directed to patent-ineligible subject matter, without significantly more, under 35 U.S.C. § 101? 3 Appeal2018-000503 Application 13/207,203 ANALYSIS The Examiner rejects claims 7, 9--18, 22, 24--27, and 29--31 as a group based on claim 7 (see Non-Final Act. 2---6) and concludes claim 7 is directed to patent-ineligible subject because claim 7 is "directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more." Non-Final Act 2 (emphasis omitted); see Non- Final Act. 3-6; Ans. 2-10. Specifically, the Examiner reiterates the language of claim 7 and concludes the reiterated limitations of claim 7 "correspond to concepts identified as abstract ideas by the courts." Non- Final Act. 4. The Examiner explains that the claim is directed to "an idea of itself," specifically "comparing new and stored information and using rules to identify options" similar to the claims in SmartGene (SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 555 F. App'x 950 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Non- Final Act. 4. The Examiner further explains that in claim 7 "new information in the form of a claim adjudication request is compared to stored historical claim data and rules are used to determine whether to override a prospective denial or whether to adjudicate an allowance based on a prior formulary tier or at an initial current formulary tier." Non-Final Act. 4. Additionally, the Examiner explains that claim 7 does "not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to more than the abstract idea because the additional elements ... amount to no more than" "well- understood, routine and conventional activities" and require "no more than a generic computer performing generic computer functions that are well- understood, routine and conventional activities previously known to the industry" Non-Final Act. 5. 4 Appeal2018-000503 Application 13/207,203 Appellant contends the Examiner erred in rejecting the claims as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. See Appeal Br. 5-8; Reply Br. 2-5. Specifically, Appellant contends claim 7 (and the other pending claims) is not similar to the claims in SmartGene, and SmartGene is inapposite to the instant claims. See Appeal Br. 5-6; Reply Br. 2-3. Appellant contends the instant claims, instead, are similar to the claims in McRO (McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016)) and are, therefore, patent-eligible. See Appeal Br. 6-8; Reply Br. 3-5. Appellant also contends the claims are not similar to the claims in Electric Power Group (Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F .3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)), and Electric Power Group is inapposite to the instant claims. See Reply Br. 3. Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a patent may be obtained for "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof." The Supreme Court has "long held that this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable." Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bankint'l, 573 U.S. 208,216 (2014) (quotingAss'nfor Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)). The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 77-80 (2012), "for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts." Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. Assuming that a claim nominally falls within one of the statutory categories of machine, manufacture, process, or composition of matter, the 5 Appeal2018-000503 Application 13/207,203 first step in the analysis is to "determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts" (id.), e.g., to an abstract idea. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 ("On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk."); see also Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) ("Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners' application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk."). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible include, but are not limited to, certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219--20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594--95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as "molding rubber products" (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981 )); "tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores" (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267---68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that "[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 ("We view respondents' claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula."). The Supreme Court continued by qualifying its findings, indicating that a claim "seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract ... is not accorded 6 Appeal2018-000503 Application 13/207,203 the protection of our patent laws, ... and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment." Id. (citing Benson and Flook) (citation omitted); see, e.g., id. at 187 ("It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection."). If the claims are not directed to an abstract idea, the inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework where the elements of the claims are considered "individually and 'as an ordered combination' to determine whether the additional elements 'transform the nature of the claim' into a patent-eligible application." Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78-79). This second step is described as "a search for an 'inventive concept'-i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ' ... significantly more than ... the [ineligible concept] itself."' Id. at 217-18 ( alteration in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73). "A claim that recites an abstract idea must include 'additional features' to ensure 'that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea]."' Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 ( quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). "[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[ s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention." Id. The Court acknowledged in Mayo that "all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas." Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71. We, therefore, look to whether the claims focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the 7 Appeal2018-000503 Application 13/207,203 abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery. See Enfzsh, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of § 101. USPTO's 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (hereinafter "2019 Revised Guidance"). Under that guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: ( 1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (hereinafter "Step 2A, prong 1 "); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.0S(a}-(c), (e}-(h)) (hereinafter "Step 2A, prong 2"). Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not "well-understood, routine, conventional" in the field (see MPEP § 106.0S(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. 3 See 2019 Revised Guidance. Eligibility Analysis-Revised Guidance Steps 1 and 2A, Prong 1 Turning to the first step of the eligibility analysis, "the first step in the Alice inquiry ... asks whether the focus of the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities ... or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an 'abstract idea' for which computers are invoked merely 3 Items (3) and (4) are collectively referred to as "Step 2B" hereinafter and in the 2019 Revised Guidance. 8 Appeal2018-000503 Application 13/207,203 as a tool." Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1335-36. "The abstract idea exception prevents patenting a result where 'it matters not by what process or machinery the result is accomplished."' McRO, 837 F.3d at 1312 (quoting O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853)). The Examiner determines independent claim 7 recites an abstract idea (see Ans. 3-5), which is "an idea of itself' (Non-Final Act. 4) similar to Alice. See Non-Final Act. 2---6; Ans. 2-10. Here, in rejecting the claims (in particular claim 7) under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Examiner analyzed the claims using the Mayol Alice two-step framework, consistent with the guidance set forth in the USPTO's "2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility," 79 Fed. Reg. 74618 (Dec. 16, 2014), in effect at the time the rejection was made, i.e., on January 4, 2017. In view of the 2019 Revised Guidance, we clarify and expand the Examiner's reasoning as follows. We begin our analysis by broadly but reasonably construing Appellant's claim 7. Claim 7 recites a method for processing insurance (pharmacy) claims by executing instructions utilizing a processor to perform the delineated claim processing steps (see Spec. ,r,r 2, 25). These claim processing steps include: (1) receiving a request ("a claim adjudication request") including current claim information ("a current claim"), which identifies a healthcare plan (e.g., a plan identification number) and member information (e.g., a member's name) from an originating system over a network (see Spec. ,r,r 27, 28, 31 ); (2) determining whether the current claim would be denied or an allowed within an initial (formulary) tier (see Spec. ,r,r 4, 9, 29); (3) if the current claim would result in a prospective denial (be denied), retrieve historical claim data (from a computer-readable media), search the historical claim data, determine whether a (prior) claim that 9 Appeal2018-000503 Application 13/207,203 matches the current claim was previously allowed and, if so, override the prospective denial ( of the current claim), otherwise do not override the prospective denial of the current claim (see Spec. ,r,r 7, 29, 32, 42, 45); (4) if the current claim would result in an allowance (be allowed) at an initial tier within a current formulary (see step 2 (supra)) search the historical claim data (see step 3 (supra)) and determine whether a previous claim, matching the current claim, was allowed at a tier within a previous formulary different than the current formulary (see Spec. ,r,r 8, 21, 36, 42); (5) when a matching and allowed prior claim is identified (in Step 4 ), accessing a tier map and determining whether the tier within the previous formulary is an improvement over the initial tier within the current formulary, when an improvement is determined/identified over the initial tier processing the current claim ("adjudicat[ing] the allowance" (i.e., allowing) of the current claim) at the tier within the previous formulary, otherwise, allowing/processing the current claim at the initial tier (see Spec. ,r,r 9, 21, 3 6, 3 7, 41, 46); and ( 6) transmitting the processed current claim ("a result of the adjudication") to the originating system over the network (see Spec. In summary, claim 7 recites a computer implemented insurance (pharmacy) claim processing method for determining whether to allow or deny a claim, overriding claim denials, and overriding higher cost claim approvals using certain criteria/rules, including the steps of: ( 1) receiving information or data (the "claim adjudication request"); (2) determining to allow or deny a claim (making an initial determination (to allow or deny a claim)) (based on unspecified rules and criteria); (3) in the event of a denial, retrieving (historical claim) data (from computer-readable media), analyzing 10 Appeal2018-000503 Application 13/207,203 (searching) the data, determining a match (between historical claim data and a current claim) and that the claim was previously allowed, overriding the denial (that is changing the result (denial), i.e., allowing the claim), or (if no matching, allowed claim is found) not overriding the denial; ( 4) in the event of an allowance of the claim (at an initial tier within a current formulary), analyzing (searching) the data, determining a match (between a previous claim and the current claim) and that the claim was allowed at a different tier (prior tier within a prior formulary different than the current formulary); (5) when a matching and allowed claim is identified, accessing stored data ( a data structure) (specifically, a tier map), determining a tier improvement (cost improvement) (based on unspecified rules and criteria), and processing the claim at the improved tier, or (if no improvement is found) processing the claim at the initial tier; and ( 6) transmitting information ( the processed claim). Hereinafter, we refer to this method as the "claim processing method." Claim 7 also includes additional elements-a hardware processor, an originating system (pharmacy), a network, and a computer-readable medium. These additional elements consist of structural elements that, while necessary to perform the functionality of the claim processing method, do not limit how the functionality is actually performed. For example, the claim processing method recites a "hardware processor" "executing machine-readable instructions," to perform the delineated claim processing ( claim 7). The claim does not recite how the processor performs any of the claim processing functionality. Further, Appellant's Specification explains that the claims processing system (pharmacy benefits management system) "can be a conventional personal computer, computer server, personal digital 11 Appeal2018-000503 Application 13/207,203 assistant, smart phone, tablet computer, or any other processor enabled device that is capable of wired or wireless data communication." Spec. ,r 65. We find that claim 7 recites a method (process) which is a statutory category of invention (subject matter) (USPTO's Step 1). Utilizing our interpretation of claim 7 (supra), we analyze whether the claim is directed to an abstract idea (USPTO's Step 2A). Here, Appellant's claims generally, and independent claim 7 in particular ( as summarized, supra), recite a process for automating insurance (pharmacy) claim processing. This is consistent with how Appellant describes the claimed invention. See Appeal Br. 6 ("the present claims automate a claim adjudication process"); see also Appeal Br. 2 ("[ c ]laim 7 is directed to a method for improved processing of claims by a pharmacy benefits management system"). Hereinafter, we refer to this method as the "claim processing method." The summarized limitations (supra) of the claim processing method recite a process for automating insurance (pharmacy) claim processing in that the enumerated limitations recite operations that ordinarily take place during pharmacy claim processing. For example, receiving information (a "claim adjudication request") and making an initial determination to allow or deny a claim, as recited in limitations (1) and (2), are activities inherent in processing insurance claims. See Spec. ,r,r 4--5. Also, reviewing an initial claim determination and overriding a claim denial, as recited in limitation (3), or reviewing an initial claim determination and making a determination to process the claim at a lower cost (a different, improved tier), as recited in limitations (4) and (5), are ordinary pharmacy claim processing operations. As explained in Appellant's Specification, revisions to pharmacy formularies and utilization rules are common. See Spec. ,r 5. Avoiding 12 Appeal2018-000503 Application 13/207,203 claim denials and processing similar claims at the same (lower) cost prevents consumer frustration. See id. Appellant's claim 7 recites a judicial exception (US PTO' s Step 2A, Prong 1; see 2019 Revised Guidance). Specifically, claim 7 recites a claim processing method, discussed supra, that is a method of organizing human activity, in particular, a fundamental economic practice. Insurance claim processing involves determining whether a claim would be allowed or denied and if allowed, under what conditions ( e.g., what tier), which is an economic act conditioning payment on certain conditions being met. Thus, like the rules-based task generation in Accenture and calculating a bill based on insurance information in Salwan, the concept of processing insurance claims in Appellant's claim 7 is a fundamental economic practice.. See Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1342--45 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (claims directed to "generating tasks to be performed in an insurance organization" (id. at 1342 (quotations omitted)) were found to embody an abstract idea of "generating tasks [based on] rules ... to be completed upon the occurrence of an event" (id. at 1344 ( quotations omitted))); see also In re Salwan, 681 Fed. Appx. 938, 941 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Claims directed to "billing insurance companies and organizing patient health information" including recited limitations of "storing, communicating, transferring, and reporting patient health information in a network" and "using billing software to calculate a patient's bill based on ... insurance information" were found to be directed to an abstract idea; specifically, "the automation of a method of organizing human activity with respect to medical information" ( quotations omitted) and such concepts are "fundamental economic and conventional business 13 Appeal2018-000503 Application 13/207,203 practices."). See also, Smariflash LLC v. Apple Inc., 680 Fed. Appx. 977, 982 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Claims directed to "conditioning and controlling access to data based on payment," i.e., approving or denying a request and retrieving information based on particular criteria (see id. at 980) is a "fundamental economic practice."). Further, in Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1313-14 (Fed. Cir. 2016) the Federal Circuit found claims related to filtering email content-which recited receiving content information (identifiers), matching the content information to other content information, and outputting a result-were directed to an abstract concept because "[the] relevant characteristics [ of the mail] could be kept in a person's head" (id. at 1314) and characterizing e-mail based on known information is a fundamental economic practice similar to the abstract concept in Alice. Accordingly, we conclude Appellant's claim 7 recites a fundamental economic practice, which is one of the certain methods of organizing human activity in the 2019 Revised Guidance, and thus an abstract idea. Eligibility Analysis-Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong 2 Appellant's claim 7 also recites additional elements beyond the abstract claim processing method (the judicial exception) (supra). These elements include, as previously discussed (supra): the hardware processor, originating system (pharmacy), network, and computer-readable medium. We evaluate these additional elements to determine whether the additional elements integrate the abstract claim processing method (the judicial exception) into a practical application of the exception (USPTO's Step 2A, Prong 2; see 2019 Revised Guidance). Appellant contends (supra) that "the present claims automate a claim adjudication process, specifically, 14 Appeal2018-000503 Application 13/207,203 determining when to override denials and improve the tier at which a claim is adjudicated" (Appeal Br. 6) and "focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant art (i.e., claim adjudication)" (Appeal Br. 7) similar to the claims in McRO. See Appeal Br. 6-8; Reply Br. 3-5. In other words, Appellant contends the claims recite meaningful limitations that sufficiently limit the practical application of the alleged abstract idea. We disagree. Appellant's additional elements (or the combination of the additional elements) do not apply or use the claim processing method (the judicial exception) in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221-24 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78- 85). Rather, Appellant's claims recite computers (the hardware processor, network, and computer readable media ( computer memory) and various other computers-the originating system) and data structures (tier maps or mappings stored in computer readable media) that are utilized as tools to perform the claim processing method (the abstract idea). Utilizing a computer as a tool to perform the abstract idea does not impose a meaningful limit on the abstract idea. See MPEP § 2106.05([); see also Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 ("if [the] recitation of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to implement an abstract idea on a computer that addition cannot impart patent eligibility" ( quotations and internal citations omitted)). Appellant's claims can be distinguished from patent-eligible claims such as those in McRO, Enfish, Bascom (Bascom Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)) and DDR Holdings (DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014)) that are directed to "a specific means or method that improves the relevant 15 Appeal2018-000503 Application 13/207,203 technology" (McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314), or "a specific improvement to the way computers operate" (Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1336), solving a technology- based problem (BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1349--52), or a method "rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer [technology]" (DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257). Contrary to Appellant's arguments, claim 7 is not a technological improvement or an improvement in a technology. Appellant's claim 7 does not "improve the functioning of the computer itself' or "any other technology or technical field." Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. Nor, does it provide a technological solution to a technological problem. See DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257. See MPEP § 2106.05(a). Rather, Appellant's claims and, in particular, the above-identified additional elements are similar to the claims in Alice (see Alice, 573 U.S. at 225-26) and Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1333-34 (Fed. Cir. 2015) in that the instant claims implement a fundamental economic practice utilizing a general purpose computer. In summary, "the focus of the claims is not on such an improvement in computers as tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas that use computers as tools." Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 13 54 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the claims are directed to an abstract idea. Step 2B Analysis-"Inventive Concept" Having concluded Appellant's claims are directed to an abstract idea under the 2019 Revised Guidance Step 2A analysis, we next address whether the claims add significantly more to the alleged abstract idea. As directed by our reviewing court, we search for an "'inventive concept' 16 Appeal2018-000503 Application 13/207,203 sufficient to 'transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application."' McRO, 837 F.3d at 1312 ( quoting Alice, 573 U.S. at 217). The implementation of the abstract idea involved must be "more than performance of 'well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activities previously known to the industry."' Content Extraction and Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass 'n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347--48 (Fed Cir. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Alice, 573 U.S. at 225). The "inventive concept" "must be significantly more than the abstract idea itself, and cannot simply be an instruction to implement or apply the abstract idea on a computer." Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1349 (citation omitted). Here, the Examiner determined that Appellant's claims do not add significantly more. The Examiner reiterated the limitations of claim 7 and explained that Appellant's recited processor and network perform "well- understood, routine and conventional functions" of "transmitting data, storing data, and executing program instructions." Non-Final Act. 5. Additionally, the Examiner explained how Appellant's Specification described the processor, network, and memory as generic computer components performing generic computer functions. See Non-Final Act. 5- 6 (citing Spec. ,r,r 26, 65, 66, 68-71, 75, 77). Appellant does not address whether the claims add significantly more to the alleged abstract idea. See Appeal Br. 4--8; Reply Br. 2-5. Appellant fails to persuade us of error in the Examiner's rejection with respect to the second Alice step. We agree with the Examiner that Appellant's claim 7 ( and the other pending claims) does not evince an "inventive concept" that is significantly more than the abstract idea itself. In particular, Appellant fails to explain how the additional elements (above) 17 Appeal2018-000503 Application 13/207,203 add specific limitations beyond the judicial exception discussed above that are not well-understood, routine, conventional in the field. As previously discussed, claim 7 ( and the other pending claims) merely recites additional non-abstract elements ( above }-specifically the hardware processor, originating system, network, and computer-readable media, and utilizing conventional computers and conventional computer processes (including the tier maps ( data structures stored in the computer- readable media)) to receive, search, and analyze information, and to transmit results. As explained by the Examiner, Appellant's Specification describes the computer systems as conventional (generic) computers. See, e.g., Spec. ,r,r 26, 65 (the "system 550 can be a conventional personal computer ... or any other processor enabled device (emphasis added)), 66, 68-71, 75, 77. Accordingly, Appellant's Specification itself describes the additional elements as being well-understood, routine, and conventional. Such conventional computer processes operating on conventional computer hardware "do not alone transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent- eligible subject matter." FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1256). For at least the reasons above, we are not persuaded of Examiner error in the rejection of claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Thus, we sustain the Examiner's rejection under§ 101 of independent claim 7, independent claim 13, and dependent claims 9--12, 14--18, 22, 24--27, and 29-31, which were not separately argued with specificity. CONCLUSION Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 7, 9--18, 22, 24--27, and 29--31 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 18 Appeal2018-000503 Application 13/207,203 DECISION We affirm the Examiner's rejection of claims 7, 9-18, 22, 24--27, and 29-31. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.50(f). AFFIRMED 19 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation