Ex Parte Mollon

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Aug 18, 2009

10463731 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 18, 2009)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
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Ex parte ERIC L. MOLLON
____________

Appeal 2009-002948
Application 10/463,731
Technology Center 2600
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Decided: August 18, 2009
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Before KENNETH W. HAIRSTON, JOHN A. JEFFERY
and BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, Administrative Patent Judges.

HAIRSTON, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON REQUEST FOR REHEARING
In a Decision dated June 5, 2009, the Board affirmed the Examiner’s
indefiniteness rejection of claim 9, and affirmed the Examiner’s obviousness
rejections of claims 1 to 9. In the request for rehearing, Appellant has
presented several points believed to have been misapprehended or
overlooked in the decision.
Appeal 2009-002948
Application 10/463,731

2
Appellant’s arguments (Req. Reh’g 2) that “vertical acceleration is not
equivalent to road roughness,” and that “[e]ven assuming it was obvious to
use an acceleration sensor to estimate the actual noise being created in a
suspension, the cited art fails to provide any teaching or motivation to
convert the estimated noise into a roughness value” are without merit since
“Appellant, like Nakao1, uses acceleration sensors to detect vertical
acceleration of the moving vehicle body (Spec. 3 and 4; col. 18, ll. 56 to
60)” (Dec. 5). If road roughness causes the vertical acceleration in the
suspension system in the disclosed and claimed invention, then road
roughness likewise causes vertical acceleration in the suspension system in
the applied references. Stated differently, if the acceleration sensors
disclosed by Appellant are capable of distinguishing between tire/vehicle
body noise and noise created in the suspension system by a rough road, then
we still maintain that the acceleration sensors used in the applied references
will sense motion in the suspension system, and determine a roughness value
from the sensed motion of the suspension system (Req. Reh’g 2 and 3) (Dec.
6 and 7). No evidence or convincing argument that proves otherwise has
been submitted by Appellant in the request for rehearing.
Appellant’s argument (Req. Reh’g 2) that “the decision overlooks the
specific limitations of claim 1 which recites i) sensing motion of a
suspension component, ii) determining a roughness value in response to the
motion, and iii) transforming the roughness value into a volume boost” is
deemed to be untimely inasmuch as neither the brief nor the reply brief

1 Nakao teaches use of acceleration sensors to detect torsional vibration as
well as vertical vibration of the vehicle body (col. 16, ll. 62 to 66).
Appeal 2009-002948
Application 10/463,731

3
argued the specific steps of claim 1. Both the brief and the reply brief
presented arguments directed to the individual shortcomings in the teachings
of each of the applied references as opposed to arguments directed to the
combined teachings of the references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425
(CCPA 1981).
Appellant’s argument (Req. Reh’g 2) that “[o]nly the disclosure of the
present invention teaches that a roughness value being used by the
suspension to control its damping can be used as a desirable parameter in
determining a volume boost for the audio system” is without merit since
“Sugasawa describes an automatic sound level control system that varies the
sound level of audio equipment in a moving motor vehicle based upon a
level of noise generated by the suspension of the vehicle” and detected by
the accelerometers as taught by Nakao (Dec. 5 to 7).
In summary, Appellant’s request for rehearing has been granted to the
extent that our decision has been reconsidered, but such request is denied
with respect to making any modifications to the decision.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

REHEARING
DENIED
KIS

MARK L. MOLLON
36270 DARDANELLA
LIVONIA, MI 48152