Ex Parte Miyazaki et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 11, 2017

12445242 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 11, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/445,242 04/10/2009 Akiko Miyazaki 70404.387/ok 5735
54072 7590 10/13/2017
SHARP KABUSHIKI KAISHA
C/O KEATING & BENNETT, LLP
1800 Alexander Bell Drive
SUITE 200
Reston, VA 20191
EXAMINER
PIZIALI, JEFFREY J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2625
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/13/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
JKEATING@KBIPLAW.COM
u spto @ kbiplaw. com
epreston @ kbiplaw. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte AKIKO MIYAZAKI, KAZUNARI TOMIZAWA,
KOZO NAKAMURA, and SHUN UEKI
Appeal 2016-002597
Application 12/445,2421
Technology Center 2600
Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., HUNG H. BUI, and
ADAM PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judges.
BUI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner’s Non-Final Office Action rejecting claims 28—38 and 49—51.
Claims 1—27 have been cancelled. Claims 39-48, 52, and 53 have been
withdrawn from consideration. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.2
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Sharp Kabushiki
Kaisha. App. Br. 2.
2 Our Decision refers to Appellants’ Appeal Brief filed June 26, 2015 (“App.
Br.”); Reply Brief filed January 4, 2016 (“Reply Br.”); Examiner’s Answer
mailed November 4, 2015 (“Ans.”); Non-Final Office Action mailed January
30, 2015 (“Non-Final Act.”); and original Specification filed April 10, 2009
(“Spec.”).
Appeal 2016-002597
Application 12/445,242
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ invention relates to “a display device for conducting a
display operation in multiple primary colors” so as to “increase the vertical
resolution of a multi-primary-color display panel.” Spec. ^ 1,7.
Claim 28, which is the sole independent claim, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter, as reproduced below with disputed limitations in
italics:
28. A display device comprising:
a multi-primary-color display panel including multiple
display subpixels that are arranged in columns and rows,
wherein in a series of L columns of subpixels of the multiple
display subpixels, where L is a natural number that is equal to
or greater than two, multiple sets of subpixels in the series of L
columns of subpixels are provided in first and second different
combinations and are arranged alternately, each of the multiple
sets of subpixels in the series of L columns of subpixels
including L subpixels that are arranged in a direction that is
parallel with the rows of the multiple display subpixels; and
a signal converter arranged and programmed to convert
a video signal, having values that represent colors of pixels in a
matrix pattern, into a multi-primary-color signal provided to
drive the multiple display subpixels in the multi-primary-color
display panel;
wherein the signal converter is arranged and
programmed to drive the multi-primary-color display panel
with the multi-primary-color signal based on a value of the
video signal representing a color of at least one of the pixels in
the matrix pattern in a pth row of the matrix pattern,
where p is any whole number,
to generate, based on at least one of a look up table and
a predetermined equation, values of the multi-primary-color
signal that control luminances of subpixels of the multiple
display sub pixels positioned on (s-l)th and sth rows of the rows
of the multiple display subpixels,
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Application 12/445,242
where s is any whole number, and also based on a value
of the video signal representing a color of at least one of the
pixels in the matrix pattern in a (p+l)th row of the matrix
pattern to generate, based on at least one of the look up table
and the predetermined equation, values of the multi-primary-
color signal that control luminances of subpixels of the multiple
display subpixels positioned on the sth row and a (s+l)th row of
the rows of the multiple display subpixels.
App. Br. 22 (Claims App’x) (emphasis added).
Examiner’s Rejections and References
(1) Claims 28—38 and 49-51 stand rejected under 35U.S.C. § 112,
first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement. Non-
Final Act. 5—16.
(2) Claims 28—38 and 49-51 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
second paragraph, as being indefinite. Non-Final Act. 16—30.
(3) Claims 28—38 and 49-51 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ben-David et al. (US 2004/0174389 Al;
published Sept. 9, 2004; “Ben-David”) and Yamamoto et al. (US
2007/0230813 Al; published Oct. 4, 2007). Non-Final Act. 31^42.
ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 112, 1st Paragraph: Claims 28—38 and 49—51
Independent claim 28 recites, inter alia, “a signal converter.” The
Specification describes an example sequence of steps taken by the signal
converter to drive the multi-primary color display device. Spec, [0099]—
[0113]. The Specification also describes that the “respective elements that
are included in the signal converter 300 of the display device 100 [recited in
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Appellants’ claim 28] . . . could be implemented as hardware components
but could also be implemented by software programs either partially or even
entirely [executed by a computer].” Spec. 1248.
The Examiner finds claims 28—38 and 49—51 fail to comply with the
enablement requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph because (1)
“the Specification does not provide an algorithm(s) by which any of the
above claimed functions are performed” and, as such, (2) “the Specification
does not contain an enabling disclosure of structure, material, or acts
corresponding to the above functions.” Non-Final Act. 6—11.
Appellants present several arguments against the Examiner’s
enablement rejection, including:
(1) the term “signal converter” as recited in Appellants ’
claims is not a generic placeholder (i.e. nonce) word, and does
not invoke “means-plus-fimction” claiming in accordance with
35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph;
(2) Appellants’ claimed “signal converter” does not use
“mean for” language and connotes “in general a structure which
is understood in the relevant prior art and defined in dictionaries
as having a well-known meaning in the electrical arts connotative
of structure”;
(3) “the term ‘signal converter’ has long been an art-
recognized term connoting clear structure in the LCD field as
evidenced by the numerous U.S. patents (see, for example, U.S.
Patent Nos: 7,808,462; 8,144,106; 7,348,959; 6,271,821, etc.)
containing claims reciting ‘signal converter’ or ‘converter’”; and
(4) “there is no requirement in U.S. patent law that an
originally filed disclosure must contain ‘algorithm(s) for
deriving’ features recited in Appellant’s claims” and “even if
U.S. patent law required that an originally filed disclosure must
contain ‘algorithm(s) for deriving’ features recited in Appellant’s
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Application 12/445,242
claims,” “Appellant’s specification does contain such
algorithms. For example, paragraphs [0099]—[0113] of
Appellant’s substitute specification describe in great detail an
example of a sequence of steps taken in driving a multi-primary-
color display device in accordance with a preferred embodiment
of Appellant’s invention.”
App. Br. 7-14.
We disagree with the Examiner. At the outset, we note there is a
distinction between the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph and
second paragraph. Contrary to the Examiner’s assertion, 35 U.S.C. § 112,
sixth paragraph is invoked to interpret a claim when there is a “means-plus-
function” limitation recited therein in order to determine whether that claim
is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, and not for lack of
“enablement” under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. For example, should
the terms of the claim be limited entirely to the structure disclosed in the
Specification, then the Specification necessarily enables the claims (although
the claim scope may not be clear or definite).
Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph, the “means-phis-function”
limitation must be “construed to cover the corresponding structure, material,
or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” Personalized
Media Comm ’ns, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm ’n, 161 F.3d 696, 703 (Fed. Cir.
1998). If the “means-plus-fimction” limitation recited in the claim does not
have an adequate supporting disclosure, then the claim fails to particularly
point out and distinctly claim the invention as required under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, second paragraph. See In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1195
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[I]f one employs means-plus-fimction language in a
claim, one must set forth in the specification an adequate disclosure showing
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what is meant.... If an applicant fails to set forth an adequate disclosure,
the applicant has in effect failed to particularly point out and distinctly claim
the invention as required by the second paragraph of section 112.”)
In the context of software, the disclosed structure is a general purpose
computer programmed to perform a disclosed algorithm. WMS Gaming, Inc.
v. Inti Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“In a means-
plus-function claim in which the disclosed structure is a computer, or
microprocessor, programmed to carry out an algorithm, the disclosed
structure is not the general purpose computer, but rather the special purpose
computer programmed to perform the disclosed algorithm.”). A general
purpose computer alone is insufficient if the Specification fails to disclose an
algorithm for performing the claimed function. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v.
VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Generic terms such as “mechanism,” “element,” “device,” and other
nonce words used in a claim can also be considered as a substitute for the
“means-plus-fimction” limitation and, as such, may invoke the application of
35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph because these generic terms or nonce
words “typically do not connote sufficiently definite structure.” Williamson
v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
For example, in Ex Parte Lakkala (Appeal 2011-001526 (PTAB
March 13, 2013)), we concluded that the term “processor” is used as merely
a substitute for the “means-plus-fimction” limitation and thus invokes the
application of § 112, sixth paragraph. In addition, we also concluded
because the Specification fails to disclose an algorithm for performing the
functions recited in the “processor” limitation, the claim fails to describe
sufficient corresponding structure as required for a limitation interpreted
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under 35U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph, and, as such, is indefinite under 35
U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.
The correct analysis of claims 28—38 and 49-51 under 35 U.S.C.
§112, second paragraph should have involved two questions: (1) whether
the term “signal converter” recited in claims 28—38 and 49—51 is used as a
substitute for the “means-plus-fimction” limitation and, as such, invokes the
application of 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph; and (2) once the term
“signal converter” is treated as a “means-plus-fimction” limitation, whether
Appellants’ Specification discloses sufficient corresponding structure, i.e.,
an algorithm for performing the functions recited in the “processor”
limitation. See Ex parte Rodriguez, 92 USPQ2d 1395 (BPAI 2009)
(precedential); Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (en banc). In other words, Appellants’ Specification must sufficiently
disclose an algorithm to transform the general purpose computer or
processor to a special purpose processor programmed to perform the
disclosed algorithm. Aristocrat Techs. Australia PtyLtd. v. Int’l Game
Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008). An algorithm is defined, for
example, as “a finite sequence of steps for solving a logical or mathematical
problem or performing a task.” Microsoft Computer Dictionary 23 (5th ed.
2002). An applicant may express the algorithm in any understandable terms
including as a mathematical formula, in prose, in a flow chart, or “in any
other manner that provides sufficient structure.” Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV
Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
An indefmiteness rejection under § 112, second paragraph, is
appropriate if the Specification discloses no corresponding algorithm
associated with a computer or processor. Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1337—38.
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However, mere reference to a general purpose computer or processor with
appropriate programming without providing an explanation of the
appropriate programming, or to “software” without providing detail about
the means to accomplish the software function, is not an adequate disclosure.
Id. at 1334; Finisar, 523 F.3d at 1340-41. Likewise, simply reciting the
claimed function in the Specification, while saying nothing about how the
computer or processor ensures that those functions are performed, is not a
sufficient disclosure for an algorithm which, by definition, must contain a
sequence of steps. Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn, Inc., 574 F.3d 1371,
1384 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
In this case, however, the Examiner’s rejection is not based on § 112,
second paragraph. Instead, the Examiner’s rejection is based on § 112, first
paragraph for lack of enablement. See, e.g., Ans. 47. Whether a claim
meets the enablement requirements under 35 U.S.C. §112, first paragraph, is
an issue of law. Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1985). To comply
with the enablement requirements of 35 U.S.C. §112, first paragraph, a
specification must adequately teach how to make and how to use a claimed
invention throughout its scope, without undue experimentation. Plant
Genetic Systems N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
The key word here is “undue,” not experimentation. In re Wands, 858
F.2d 731,737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In determining whether undue
experimentation would have been required to make and use an invention, the
following factors are considered:
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of
direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of
working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state
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of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the
predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of
the claims.
Wands, 858 F.2d at 737. However, not all of these factors need be reviewed
to determine enablement. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d
1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the Wands factors “are illustrative,
not mandatory. What is relevant depends on the facts.”). A patent
specification need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the
art. Spectra Physics Inc. v. Coherent Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1534 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
The correct “enablement” analysis is whether Appellants’
Specification adequately teaches how to make and how to use a claimed
invention (i.e., the signal converter) throughout its scope, without undue
experimentation, and not whether the Specification provides “an
algorithm(s) by which any of the above claimed functions are performed.”
Regardless, we find “Appellant’s specification does contain such algorithms.
For example, paragraphs [0099]—[0113] of Appellant’s substitute
specification describe in great detail an example of a sequence of steps taken
in driving a multi-primary-color display device in accordance with a
preferred embodiment of Appellant’s invention,” as Appellants argue.3 App.
Br. 12.
3 Because Appellants’ Specification also teaches such algorithms, we need
not address the question of whether the term “signal converter” recited in
claim 28 invokes § 112, sixth paragraph. We note, however, that the term
“signal converter” (i.e., the absence of the term means) presumptively
connotes sufficient definite structure to those skilled in the art to avoid
invoking § 112, sixth paragraph in several similar cases. See, e.g., Linear
Tech. Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp., 379 F.3d 1311, 1320—21 (Fed. Cir.
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Because the Examiner misapplies the enablement requirements of 35
U.S.C. §112, first paragraph, and the application of Wands factors, we do
not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 28 and its dependent claims
29-38 and 49—51 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to
comply with the enablement requirement.
35 U.S.C. § 112, 2ndparagraph: Claims 28—38 and49—51
With respect to claim 28, the Examiner finds various terms unclear
and indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, including, for
example: (1) “first and second different combinations”, (2) “value” and
“values”, (3) “color”, (4) at least one of the pixels”, (5) at least one of a look
up table and a predetermined equation”, (6) “luminances”, (7) “subpixels of
the multiple display pixels”, and (8) “a (s-l)th row” or “a (s-l)th plurality of
rows.” Non-Final Act. 13—29.
With respect to dependent claims 29—38 and 49—51, the Examiner
questions proper antecedent basis for several terms, including: (1) “the
values”, “color”, “colors”, and “the pixels” recited in claim 29; (2) “the first
different combination” and “the second different combination” recited in
claim 30; (3) “the first” and “second different combinations” recited in
claims 32—34; (4) “the columns” and “the matrix pattern” recited in claim
34; (5) “the (s-1 )th row” and “the series” recited in claim 35; (6) “the value”
recited in claim 36; (7) “the first different combination” and “the second
2004) (holding that term “circuit” itself in claim term “‘circuit’ for
‘monitoring a signal from the output terminal to generate a first feedback
signal’” connotes structure); Personalized Media Commc’ns, 161 F.3d at
703—704 (holding that claim term “digital detector” recited sufficient
structure to avoid § 112,16).
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different combination” recited in claims 37, 38, and 51; (8) “the colors”, “the
pth row”, and “the (p+l)th rows” recited in claim 49. Id. at 13—29.
In addition, the Examiner also alleges that Appellants’ claims are
indefinite because the Specification “does not provide any algorithm(s) for
deriving the above signal converter functions.” Id. at 14, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24,
26, 27, and 29.
We do not agree with the Examiner. Whether a claim is indefinite is
an issue of law. Credle v. Bond, 25 F.3d 1566, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The
second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that a patent’s claims, viewed
in light of the Specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled in
the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty. In
contrast, “a claim is indefinite when it contains words or phrases whose
meaning is unclear.” Ex parte McAward, Appeal 2015-006416, 2017 WL
3669566, at *5 (PTAB Aug. 25, 2017) (precedential) (quoting In re
Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
As explained by Appellants, “claims 28—38 and 49-51 properly
follow the convention of using an indefinite article, such as, for example, ‘a’
or ‘an’, when first introducing a feature and then using a definite article,
such as, for example, ‘the’ or ‘said’, when referring to the feature in a later
portion of the claim or in a dependent claim in accordance with MPEP
§ 2173.05(e).” App. Br. 14—16. We find a skilled artisan would understand
the meaning of these terms in the context of the claims and Appellants’
Specification. There is no basis for the Examiner to question the meaning of
these terms recited in claims 28—38 and 49—51.
Regarding the alleged lack of an “algorithm”, an indefmiteness
rejection under § 112, second paragraph, is appropriate if the Specification
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discloses no corresponding algorithm associated with a computer or
processor. Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1337—38. However, an algorithm can be
described in prose, as identified in paragraphs [0099]—[0113] of Appellants’
Specification and as discussed above with respect to the enablement
rejection.
For these reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 28—38 and 49-51 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a): Claims 28—38 and49—51
With respect to independent claim 28, the Examiner finds Ben-Davis
teaches a display device, shown in Figure 2B, equipped with all the
limitations, including:
(1) “a multi-primary-color display panel including
multiple display subpixels that are arranged in columns and rows
... ,
(2) “a signal converter arranged and programmed to
convert a video signal, having values that represent colors of
pixels in a matrix pattern, into a multi-primary-color signal
provided to drive the multiple display subpixels in the multi-
primary-color display panel;” and
(3) “wherein the signal converter is arranged and
programmed to . . . generate, based on at least one of a look up
table and a predetermined equation, [1] values of the multi-
primary-color signal that control luminances of subpixels of the
multiple display sub pixels positioned on (s-l)th and sth rows of
the rows of the multiple display subpixels, ... [2] values of the
multi-primary-color signal that control luminances of subpixels
of the multiple display subpixels positioned on the sth row and a
(s+l)th row of the rows of the multiple display subpixels.”
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Non-Final Act. 31—32 (citing Ben-Davis Tfl[57—100, Fig. 2B) (bracketing
added).
To the extent Ben-Davis is deficient (without any particular reason),
the Examiner refers to Yamamoto for teaching the same display device
including similar limitations to support the conclusion of obviousness, i.e.,
“to combine Yamamoto’s error diffusion processing techniques with Ben-
Davis’s display device, so as to enhance display quality). Id. at 33—34
(citing Yamamoto 20-53, Fig. 1).
Appellants argue the Examiner fails to consider features recited in
Appellants’ claims and “has instead just made broad unsupported allegations
that Ben-David et al. and Yamamoto et al. somehow, somewhere teach the
features recited in Appellant’s [sic] claims.” App. Br. 16. Because “[t]he
Examiner’s above failure to specifically identify which features of Ben-
David et al. and Yamamoto et al. are alleged by the Examiner to disclose
each element of Appellant’s [sic] presently claimed invention renders the
Office Action ‘arbitrary and capricious’, and therefore invalid, under the
Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706).” Id. at 17.
We agree with Appellants. Obviousness is the question of law, based
upon factual inquiries set forth in the Graham case: (1) the scope and
content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the prior art and the
claims at issue; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and (4)
objective evidence of non-obviousness, if any. Graham v. John Deere Co.,
383 U.S. 1, 17—18 (1966). The Examiner bears the initial burden of
presenting a prima facie case of obviousness. In re Huai-Hung Kao, 639
F.3d 1057, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2011). A prima facie case is established when
the party with the burden of proof points to evidence that is sufficient, if
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uncontroverted, to entitle it to prevail as a matter of law. See Saab Cars
USA, Inc. v. United States, 434 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
In this case, that burden has not been met in a manner enabling proper
review. The Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 28—38 and 49—51
lacks the requisite specificity needed for the establishment of a prima facie
case of obviousness. For example, the Examiner has cited multiple
paragraphs of Ben-Davis and Yamamoto for various elements, but has not
provided any explanation as to (1) how these multiple, distinct teachings of
Ben-Davis and Yamamoto correspond to each of Appellants’ claimed
elements, (2) what are “the differences between the prior art and the claims
at issue” or (3) how the teachings of Ben-Davis and Yamamoto may be
combined to describe Appellants’ claimed invention (See Non-Final Act.
31—42). Likewise, the Examiner has not sufficiently articulated reasoning as
to why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine
the references. “[Rejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by
mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated
reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cited with
approval in KSRInt'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).
As further explained by Appellants, neither Ben-David nor Yamamoto
teaches Appellants’ claimed “signal converter [] arranged and programmed
to . . . generate, based on at least one of a look up table and a predetermined
equation, [1] values of the multi-primary-color signal that control
luminances of subpixels of the multiple display sub pixels positioned on (s-
l)th and sth rows of the rows of the multiple display subpixels,... [2] values
of the multi-primary-color signal that control luminances of subpixels of the
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multiple display subpixels positioned on the sth row and a (s+l)th row of the
rows of the multiple display subpixels” as recited in claim 28. App. Br. 18—
19.
Based on the record before us, we cannot sustain the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection of claims 28—38 and 49—51 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
based on Ben-Davis and Yamamoto.
CONCLUSION
On the record before us, we conclude Appellants have demonstrated
the Examiner erred in rejecting: (1) claims 28—38 and 49—51 under 35
U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement
requirement; (2) claims 28—38 and 49—51 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, as being indefinite; and (3) claims 28—38 and 49-51 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ben-David and Yamamoto.
DECISION
As such, we REVERSE the Examiner’s rejection of claims 8—38 and
49—51 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph and second paragraph, and
under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
REVERSED
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