Ex Parte Miller et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 31, 2018

13227401 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 31, 2018)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/227,401 09/07/2011 J. Scott Miller D08074US01 5405
21921 7590 01/31/2018
DOV ROSFNFFT D
EXAMINER
5507 COLLEGE AVE ITSKOVICH, MIKHAIL
SUITE 2
OAKLAND, CA 94618 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2483
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/31/2018 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte J. SCOTT MILLER, RICHARD W. WEBB, and KEVIN J. STEC
Appeal 2017-003077
Application 13/227,401
Technology Center 2400
Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, DAVID J. CUTITTAII, and
MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges.
STRAUSS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appeal 2017-003077
Application 13/227,401
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Non-Final
Rejection of claims 1—26. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm-in-part, designating as new grounds the portions of our
decision affirming the rejection of claims 1—15 and 17—26.
THE INVENTION
The claims are directed to extended dynamic range and extended
dimensionality image signal conversion and/or delivery via legacy video
interfaces. Spec., Title. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
1. A processing-apparatus-implemented method comprising:
(a) accepting in the processing apparatus video signal data
having an input frame rate and generated by a video signal
source, the video signal data comprising image signal data that
represents color components of picture elements of an image that
is part of the video signal;
(b) converting by the processing apparatus, in the case that the
color components are not in a device independent color space,
the image signal data that represents the color components to
quantities in a device independent color space;
(c) converting by the processing apparatus of the quantities in the
device independent color space to visual dynamic range (VDR)
image signal data of which each picture element (pixel):
has at least 30 bits and at most 36 bits,
can represent the simultaneously human-visible dynamic
range of luminance of at least 5 orders of magnitude
covering at least the range of 10'2 cd/m2 to 103 cd/m2,
1 The real party of interest is Dolby Laboratories Licensing Corporation, the
assignee. App. Br. 1.
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can represent all human-perceivable colors, and
is represented by three variables denoted LD, u', and v',
wherein, for LD in the range [0,1],
Ld = a(log2Y) + p
with Y denoting the luminance in cd/m2 in the CIE-1931
XYZ color space corresponding to the quantities in the
device independent color space, a denoting a scale
parameter, and ft denoting a bias parameter, and
with a' and v' denoting the chrominance quantities in the
CIE-1976 luminance-chrominance color space
corresponding to the quantities in the device independent
color space;
the converting including converting by the processing
apparatus of each of the LD, u', and v' quantities of a pixel
to a digital LD, quantity, a digital u ' quantity, and a digital
v' quantity, respectively, to form the VDR image signal
data of the pixel, the digital LD quantity having a first
number of bits, denoted n and being at least 10, and each
of the digital u' and v' quantities each having a second
number of bits, denoted m and being at least 10, such that
there are 2n possible digital LD values, 2m possible digital
u' values, 2m possible digital v' values, and at least 30 bits
per pixel; and
(d) outputting digital video signal data at an output frame rate
equal to or greater than the input frame rate, the outputted digital
video signal data comprising the VDR image signal data.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Reitmeier et al. US 6,118,820
US 2009/0128620 Al
Sept. 12, 2000
May 21,2009Lipton et al.
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Gregory Ward Larson, The LogLuv Encoding for Full Gamut, High
Dynamic Range Image, Journal of Graphics Tools, Association for
Computing Machinery, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 15—31 (1998).2
REJECTIONS
The Examiner made the following rejections:
Claims 1—5, 7, 9-12, and 23—26 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) as being anticipated by Applicants’ Admitted Prior Art (“AAPA”)
or under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over AAPA and
Reitmeier. Non-Final Act. 16—25.
Claim 6 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over AAPA and Reitmeier. Non-Final Act. 27—28.
Claims 8 and 13—22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over AAPA (or alternatively AAPA in view of Reitmeier) and
Lipton. Non-Final Act. 28—33.
ANALYSIS
The Examiner rejects all claims over AAPA which, according to the
Examiner, includes all subject matter discussed in or referenced by the
Specification as describing technology that is background to the invention
including subject matter discussed in the referenced Larson publication. The
Examiner explains:
A statement by an applicant in the specification or made during
prosecution identifying the work of another as “prior art” is an
2 The “Larson” publication is cited and briefly discussed in the Specification
at paragraph 4. We note the copy of the Larson publication supplied with
the Information Disclosure Statement filed December 7, 2011 appears to be
a reprint which, with the exception of pagination, is identical to the original
publication as it appeared in the Journal of Graphics Tool as cited.
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admission which can be relied upon for both anticipation and
obviousness determinations, regardless of whether the admitted
prior art would otherwise quality as prior art under the statutory
categories of 35 U.S.C. 102.
Non-Final Act. 14 (citing RiverwoodInt 7 Corp. v. R.A. Jones & Co., 324
F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices Inc.,
848 F.2d 1560, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see also MPEP § 2129. According to
the Examiner “AAPA includes statements in Applicant’s Specification and
the publication admitted in Specification, Paragraph 4: Gregory W. Larson,
‘the LogLuv encoding for full-gamut, high dynamic range images’, Journal
of Graphics Tools, col. 3, No. 1, pp 15-31, 1998 (‘Larson’). Larson is also
available as prior art under section 102(b).” Non-Final Act. 16.
Appellants argue
AAPA includes Appellant’ specification and any admissions and
characterization made by Appellant about Larson, but not
portions of Larson which Appellant did not incorporate or
comment on. Hence this rejection is not over a single prior art
reference, but rather over the combination of AAPA and Larson,
and therefore should be under §103, not §102.
App. Br. 8.
Although we agree with the Examiner that AAPA may be relied upon
as anticipating a claim, there is no anticipation here. In particular, we
disagree with the Examiner’s approach that once a feature is found to be part
of the admitted prior art, all such features may be combined to anticipate a
claim. Instead, we look to whether all the claimed features are part of a
unified embodiment in the admitted prior art, whether expressly or
inherently. See Microsoft Corp. v. Biscotti, Inc., 878 F.3d 1052, 1069 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (“a prior art reference must provide every element of the claimed
invention arranged as in the claim in order to anticipate”); Net MoneyIN, Inc.
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v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“differences between
the prior art reference and a claimed invention, however slight, invoke the
question of obviousness, not anticipation”). The Examiner fails to cite to
any authority holding otherwise, e.g., that the objective analysis for
determining obviousness as stated in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1
(1966) is not required because Appellants admit the individual elements are
within the prior art.
As generally argued by Appellants (App. Br. 8), the hallmark of
anticipation is prior invention, so in order to anticipate under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102, a prior art reference must not only disclose all elements of the claim
within the four comers of the document (whether expressly or inherently),
but must also disclose those elements “arranged as in the claim.” Connell v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Here the
Examiner combines Larson’s disclosure of 32-bit LogLuv Pixel Encoding
with additional disclosure contained in the Background section of the
Specification to meet the claim limitations without demonstrating that all
features are disclosed as a single embodiment arranged as in the claim.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102.
We further conclude the Examiner’s statement of the rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is inadequate. Although the Examiner finds “Larson is
also available as prior art under section 102(b)” (Non-Final Act. 16), the
disclosures of Larson (even beyond the specific matter discussed in
Appellants’ Specification) are applied as part of a unified teaching according
to AAPA rather than as a distinct publication or teaching separate from
AAPA. For the reasons discussed below, although we agree with the
substance of the rejection concluding the combined disclosures of Larson,
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AAPA, and Reitmeier teach or suggest the subject matter of the relevant
claims, the statement of the rejection fails to enumerate Larson as a separate
reference. Accordingly, although we sustain the rejection under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a), we do so over the combination of Larson, AAPA, and Reitmeier
(and further including Lipton for claims 8, 13—15, and 17—22) and designate
our rejections as being based on new grounds to afford Appellants a full
opportunity to respond.
Claim 1
Each pixel element has at least 30 bits and at most 36 bits
The Examiner finds AAPA’s use of 16 bits for luminance information
and 16 bits for chrominance, totaling 32 bits per pixel, teaches or suggests
the disputed limitation. Non-Final Act. 18 (citing Spec. Tflf 3—4). According
to the Examiner, “[ujnder the broadest interpretation consistent with the
instant specification and one of ordinary skill in the art, at least 10 bits are
devoted to luminance (LD) and at least 10 bits are devoted to each
chrominance component (u and v).” Id. (emphasis omitted). The Examiner
further finds AAPA teaches 32-bit floating point values per color as used in
RGB encoding. Id. According to the Examiner,
AAPA teaches that color values can be between 8 and 16 bits in
Larson, Section 2.1 and Equations 1 and 2, and further that color
values can be scaled up to 32 bits in the Specification, Paragraph
3. Therefore, the number of storage pixels [is] not critical to
enabling claimed HDOR quantization of pixel values, and a
person of skill in the art would not expect the method steps to be
different for using larger or smaller ranges of color values.
Therefore, at the time of invention, it would have been obvious
to one of ordinary skill in the art to select other values such as
10, 11, and 12 which are between 8 and 32 bits taught in AAPA,
in order to distribute data over an allocated bit amount.
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Non-Final Act. 19.
Appellants contend the Examiner improperly alleges “that AAPA
teaches that color values can be in a range of 8 and 16 bits (and also in a
range from 8 bits to 32 bits) and that this is anticipated because the prior art
teaches use of bit depths in this range.” App. Br. 11. Appellants argue “[i]t
is clear that there is no teachings of a range bit values ranging from 8 to 32
bits, only of Larson’s specific 32-bit (16+6+8) format, and AAPA’s 72- to
96-bit (24+24+24 & 32+32+32) bit formats.” App. Br. 12. The Examiner
responds, finding Larson further discloses 30 and 33 bit representations in
addition to the 32-bit representation. Ans. 17.
Appellants’ contention of error is unpersuasive of reversible Examiner
error. “[T]he disclosure in the prior art of any value within a claimed range
is an anticipation of the claimed range.” In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 267
(CCPA 1976); see also Titanium Metals Corp. of America v. Banner, 778
F.2d 775, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citing In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 682
(CCPA 1962)). Larson teaches 24, 30, 32, 33, 72 and 96-bit pixel elements.
Larson §§ 1,2. Reitmeier discloses “video information having 10-bit pixel
intensity and pixel color depth” (Ans. 23; Reitmeier col. 1,11. 46-48) for a
30-bit pixel (App. Br. 19.) Thus, the claimed pixel range of 30 to 36-bits is
anticipated and thereby also rendered obvious by the prior art’s disclosure of
30, 32, and 33-bits.
At least 10 bits for each of LD, uand v'
The Examiner finds Larson discloses 8-bits for each of u' and v'.
Non-Final Act. 18 (citing Larson § 2.1). The Examiner further finds “AAPA
teaches ‘32-bit floating point per color coordinate encoding’ which provides
for a 24 bit integer portion per color” thereby teaching at least a 10-bit
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chrominance quantity. Non-Final Act. 18 (citing Spec, 3 4). As
discussed above, the Examiner also considers the number of bits used to
represent chrominance information not to be a critical parameter given the
values of 10, 11, and 12 disclosed by AAPA. Non-Final Act. 19.
Appellants argue (i) Larson discloses 8 bits for each chrominance
coordinate, not the claimed “at least 10” and (ii) Larson’s disclosures of
specific values for chrominance bits (8 and 32) are in connection with
particular coding formats and, contrary to the Examiner’s finding, do not
define a range (i.e., 8 through 32). App. Br. 11—12. Appellants further argue
there is no motivation to increase the number of chrominance bits used by
Larson from 8 to at least 10 because “Larson explicitly states that the 32-bits
(16+8+8) arrangement captures the full human-perceivable gamut of
intensities and full human-perceivable gamut of colors.” App. Br. 12—13.
We agree with Appellants that the Examiner has failed to provide
persuasive evidence or technical reasoning explaining why 8-bit
chrominance quantities disclosed using LogLuv encoding and 24 and 32 bits
per color using RGB encoding teaches a continuous range of values.
However, the disputed limitation does not require a range, only that each of
the Ld, u ', and v' be represented by at least 10 bits. Using 24 or 32 bits for
each chrominance value therefore teaches using at least 10 bits. The
Examiner also finds Larson discloses 30 and 33 bit pixel representations,
respectively using 10 and 11 bits to represent red, green, and blue (RGB)
color values. Ans. 17. For example, Larson discloses:
Some formats, used in the digital film industry, extend the
dynamic range slightly using a logarithmic RGB space. Pixar
has been using a 33-bit/pixel log format for years, which covers
3.5 orders of magnitude with 0.4% accuracy. Cineon has a 30-
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bit/pixel log format, but it only covers about 2 orders of
magnitude, depending on the type of film being scanned.
Larson 15—16. Thus, Larson’s description of Cineon would have been
understood to allocate 10 bits per color and Pixar 11 bits per color, both
thereby teaching the disputed at least 10 bits. Larson also discloses 24-bit
encoding using a 10-bit log luminance portion. Larson 17. Reitmeier
further teaches at least 10 bits per luminance and chrominance value,
disclosing “video information having 10-bit pixel intensity and pixel color
depth.” Non-Final Act. 20, 28; Reitmeier col. 1,11. 47—48. We further agree
with the Examiner that “at the time of invention, it would have been obvious
to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify AAPA3 to select a color depth
value of 10 ... as taught in Reitmeier, in order to preserve the dynamic
range of film at a desired bit depth.”4 Non-Final Act. 28 (citing Reitmeier,
col. 1,11. 59—63). Therefore the combination of Larson, AAPA, and
Reitmeier teaches or suggests the disputed limitation.
We further find the selection of the number of bits m allocated to
encoding color information u ' and v' is an obvious design choice primarily
dictated by the number of colors to be represented. Similar reasoning and
conclusions apply to the number of bits n allocated to represent luminance
information LD. A mere design choice, which does not need to be shown
explicitly in the prior art, is generally a minor and obvious choice that solves
no stated problem. Cf. In re Kuhle, 526 F.2d 553, 555 (CCPA 1975) (“Use
3 We adopt and apply the same reasoning for modifying Larson according to
either AAPA or Reitmeier, i.e., in order to preserve the dynamic range of
film at a desired bit depth.
4 We do not decide whether Reitmeier also teaches 11 and 12-bit color
information as asserted by the Examiner.
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of such a means of electrical connection in lieu of those used in the
references solves no stated problem and would be an obvious matter
of design choice within the skill [in] the art.”); see also In re Gal, 980 F.2d
717, 719—20 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding a determination of an “obvious design
choice” was precluded where “the different structures of [the two prior art
references] achieve different purposes”). Thus, design changes that do not
“result in a difference in function or give unexpected results” are “no more
than obvious variations consistent with the principles known in th[e] art” of
the patent at issue are obvious design choices. In re Rice, 341 F.2d 309, 314
(CCPA 1965)). See also In re Chu, 66 F.3d 292, 298-99 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(determining “design choice” is appropriate where “the applicant failed to
set forth any reasons why the differences between the claimed invention and
the prior art would result in a different function or give unexpected results”).
Appellants’ Specification discloses “to cover the complete
simultaneously visible color range and the complete visible gamut of colors
with [a just noticeable difference (JND)] of approximately Vi or less, it is
sufficient to have n [luminance bits] of at least 10 bits, and m [color bits] of
at least 11 bits.” Spec, 194. However, despite disclosing these specific
values, Appellants further disclose “[t]he VDR format allows arbitrary
selection of bit depth for luminance [LD] and chroma [n ’ and v].” Spec.
196. Although Appellants argue the use of 10, 11, or 12 bits to represent
each of Ad, u ', and v' and between 30 and 36 bits per pixel provides the
capability “to represent any of the complete color range and any luminance
in a range of at least 5 orders of magnitude in intensity as recited by claim
1 (App. Br. 8—9, 11, 13), Appellants provide insufficient evidence that the
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argued capability is due to the claimed number of bits or that other numbers
of bits would not provide the same result or would provide a lesser result.
Furthermore, we find insufficient evidence that selection of an
appropriate or optimum number of luminance or chrominance bits satisfying
the recitation that a visual dynamic range (VDR) image using 30 to 36-bit
pixels “can represent the simultaneously human-visible dynamic range of
luminance of at least 5 orders of magnitude covering at least the range of
10'2 cd/m2 to 103 cd/m2, [and] can represent all human-perceivable colors”
(see App. Br. 11) is other than routine engineering practice within the skill of
the ordinary artisan. “[W]here the general conditions of a claim are
disclosed in the prior art, it is not inventive to discover the optimum or
workable ranges by routine experimentation.” In reAller, 220 F.2d 454, 456
(CCPA 1955). Therefore, in the absence of sufficient evidence to the
contrary, we conclude the number of bits used to represent luminance and
chrominance values is a design choice dictated by engineering design
criteria and principles known to those skilled in the art at the time of the
invention.
Video as an input
The Specification discloses that “High Dynamic Range (HDR) images
and videos have become more commonplace” (Spec. 13) and “legacy
interfaces include High Definition Multimedia Interface (HDMI), Digital
Visual Interface (DVI), Serial Digital Interface (SDI), and ‘Display-Port’
associated interfaces” (Spec. 113), which the Examiner finds constitute
AAPA that teaches or suggests the disputed step of accepting, in the
processing apparatus, video signal data having an input frame rate and
generated by a video signal source as recited by claim 1. Non-Final Act. 16.
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Appellants contend Larson fails to teach inputting a video signal. App. Br.
13. The Examiner determines Appellants’ “characterization of Larson does
not contradict a rejection made over AAPA in Specification, Paragraph 3.”
Non-Final Act. 5. The Examiner further notes Appellants’ contention does
not address Reitmeier’s configuration depicted in Figures 1 and 5 (Ans. 28),
including Video Encoder 15 receiving baseband video signal S3 and
producing “MPEG-like” compressed video elementary stream signal S5 (see
Reitmeier col. 3,11. 59-63 (describing Fig. 1)).
Appellants’ argument fails to address the Examiner’s findings
concerning AAPA and Reitmeier and, accordingly, is not persuasive of
reversible Examiner error. We further note Larson’s discussion of the
appropriateness of using perceptual encoding for “output[ting] to a specific
device with known characteristics such as NTSC or PAL video” (Larson 29)
suggests using, as appropriate, perceptual encoding for some forms of video
and, therefore, accepting such a video signal for processing and outputting
the processed video signal. Because Larson’s system is directed to digital
images one skilled in the art would have understood images constituting a
video signal would also be digital, thus suggesting inputting and outputting a
digital video signal with the constituent images being subjected to Larson’s
image processing.
Outputting a digital video signal
The Examiner finds Larson’s discussion of outputting NTSC or PAL
video to a device teaches the disputed limitation of outputting digital video
signal data at an output frame rate equal to or greater than the input frame
rate, the outputted digital video signal data comprising the VDR image
signal data. Non-Final Act. 19. The Examiner further finds Reitmeier’s
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information streams SI, S3, S4, and S5; function criteria source 520; and
decoder 550 also teach digital video processing. Non-Final Act. 19-20.
Appellants argue Larson’s reference to analog output formats NTSC and
PAL is contrary to the Examiner’s finding that Larson teaches outputting a
digital video signal. App. Br. 14. The Examiner, however, determines
“nothing in claim 1 specifies the output of digital video to exclude analog
interfaces or preclude conversion to legacy analog devices compatible with
NTSC or PAL as described in Larson, Section 6.” Ans. 29. The Examiner
further notes Appellants fail to address AAPA’s disclosure of “legacy digital
interfaces HDMI, DVI, SDI, and Display Port cited in AAPA, Specification,
Paragraphs 2 and 13.” Id.
Appellants’ argument is unpersuasive for the reasons discussed above.
In particular, AAPA discusses image processing in terms of legacy media
interfaces including various digital video formats. Spec. H 2, 13. Larson
also discusses the appropriateness of using perceptual encoding for video.
Larson 29. Reitmeier’s Figures 1 and 5 depict Video Encoder 15 receiving
baseband video signal S3 and producing “MPEG-like” compressed video
elementary stream signal S5 (i.e., a digital video signal). Reitmeier col. 3,11.
59—63 (describing Figure 1). Thus, we are not persuaded the prior art fails
to teach or suggest outputting a digital video signal as argued.
Appellants further contend the 11 years between the publication of the
Larson article (1998) and the priority date of the present application (2009 or
2010) is evidence of non-obviousness of providing a digital video output
signal as required by the disputed limitation. App. Br. 15.
Digital video has been an extremely active field since before the
1990s, so that the time between public knowledge of Larson and
the priority date of the subject application is long [such that]
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there has been a long need to provide very high quality output to
display monitors via known legacy digital video interfaces. For
this additional reason, [the disputed limitation] is not anticipated
and is not obvious over the cited art.
App. Br. 15.
Appellants’ argument concerning a “long need” for the invention is
not persuasive because such argument is neither applicable to the issue of
anticipation nor supported by sufficient evidence to be relevant to the issue
of obviousness. Appellants fail to provide objective evidence that the art
recognized the problem for a long period of time (i.e., a long -felt need, see
In re Gershon, 372 F.2d 535, 539 (CCPA 1967)), the long-felt need was not
satisfied prior to Appellants’ invention (see Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg. Co.,
864 F.2d 757, 768 (Fed. Cir. 1988)), or that the invention satisfied the long-
felt need (see In re Cavanagh, 436 F.2d 491 (CCPA 1971)).
Appellants further argue
Reitmeier is unrelated to the steps of Appellant's claim that
include converting each pixel to Appellant’s VDR format.
Rather, regions of pixels in an image are grouped together, e.g.,
in a region, according to how the values of color coordinates are
distributed within the group, e.g., according to the minimum and
maximum values of color coordinates of pixels within the group.
In Appellant’s claim each pixel is handled the same, so that
processing occurs pixel by pixel, so can occur in parallel, or
serially, or in any other way. This cannot happen in Reitmeier.
App. Br. 20. This argument is unpersuasive because Appellants have neither
identified a corresponding limitation of claim 1 that requires each pixel be
handled the same so that processing occurs pixel by pixel as argued nor
explained why any grouping of pixels performed by Reitmeier would result
in the combination of Larson, AAPA, and Reitmeier failing to teach or
suggest the identified limitation.
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For the reasons discussed above, Appellants’ contentions that the
combination of Larson, AAPA, and Reitmeier fails to teach or suggest the
disputed limitation of claim 1 are unpersuasive. Instead, for the reasons set
forth in the Non-Final Action, the Examiner’s Answer, and above, the
combination of Larson, AAPA, and Reitmeier teaches or suggests all of the
limitations of claim 1.
In summary, AAPA and Reitmeier teach or suggest accepting in a
processing apparatus video signal data having an input frame rate and
generated by a video source (see Non-Final Act 16 and explanation above),
and outputting digital video signal data at an output frame rate equal to or
greater than the input frame rate {see Non-Final Act. 19 and explanation
above). It would have been obvious to modify Larson’s LogLuv image
processing system to accept and process a series of images in the form of a
digital video signal to expand use of the technique from analog formats such
as NTSC and PAL described by Larson to further include digital video such
as legacy video formats of AAPA. Furthermore, it would have been obvious
to use digital u' and v' quantities each having at least 10 bits in place of
Larson’s 8-bit quantities to provide enhanced color resolution and because
selection of an appropriate number of bits is an obvious design choice for the
reasons discussed above. Furthermore, it would have been obvious to
modify the combination of Larson and AAPA according to Reitmeier as
applied by and for the reasons set forth by the Examiner. Non-Final Act. 21.
Accordingly, claim 1 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Larson, AAPA, and Reitmeier.
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Because our reasoning differs from that set forth by the Examiner in
the Non-Final Action, we designate the rejection as being based on new
grounds pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).
Claims 4 and 5
Claim 4 requires each of the digital u ' and v' quantities representing
chrominance have at least 11 bits, and claim 5 expands that minimum
number of 11 bits to include the digital LD quantity representing luminance
such that there are at least 33 bits per pixel (i.e., “11, 11, 11”). Appellants’
contention of error in connection with these claims (App. Br. 15—16) is
essentially the same as presented in connection with claim 1 and is
unpersuasive for similar reasons to those discussed above. In particular, we
find Farson’s description of the Pixar’s use of a 33-bit/pixel log format
(Farson 15) teaches or suggests the disputed limitations of claims 4 and 5.
Claim 9
Appellants’ contention of error in connection with dependent claim 9
is based on arguments addressed and found unpersuasive in connection with
claim 1, i.e., “the Examiner has failed to show that Farson teaches ‘video
signal data accepted in the processing apparatus’” and Farson’s disclosure of
outputting NTSC and PAF analog forms of video fails to teach outputted-
video digital signal data. App. Br. 16. Appellants’ contention that “there is
no transporting the mapped outputted digital video signal data over the
legacy digital video interface in Farson or AAPA” (id) is unpersuasive as a
naked assertion of error without adequate supporting explanation. Merely
citing a claim limitation and asserting it is not present falls short of
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identifying an error in the Examiner’s rejection as required on appeal. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv); In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(“[I]t has long been the Board’s practice to require an applicant to identify
the alleged error in the examiner’s rejections.”); In reLovin, 652 F.3d 1349,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[T]he Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to
require more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation
of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements
were not found in the prior art.”).
Claim 10
Appellants’ argument (App. Br. 17) is insufficient as no more than a
naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the prior
art, similar to the discussion of claim 9 above.
Claim 23
Appellants rely on arguments presented in connection with claim 1 in
connection with the rejection of claim 23. App. Br. 25. Having found those
arguments unpersuasive in connection with the rejection of claim 1 for the
reasons discussed above, we similarly reject claim 23 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Farson, AAPA, and Reitmeier as set
forth above in connection with claim 1 and as further set forth by the
Examiner at page 25 of the Non-Final Action.
Claim 24
Claim 24 requires the processing logic, memory, and input port of
claim 23 be included in an integrated circuit (IC) device. The Examiner
finds Farson’s processor is an integrated circuit. Non-Final Act. 25.
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Appellants argue “[tjhere is no factual evidence that Larson’s processor
includes Appellant’s elements and is in an ASIC.” App. Br. 17. The
Examiner determines that Appellant’s contention is unsupported by
objective evidence and that the recited elements are fundamental
components of a processor. Ans. 30.
Appellants’ argument is not commensurate in scope with claim 24
and, therefore, is unpersuasive of error. Claim 24 requires only an integrated
circuit device, not an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC).
Moreover, Appellants only argue that Larson’s processor “likely” would not
include the recited elements at the time of Larson’s “1998 publication date,”
not that it would not be obvious to include them at the time of Appellants’
invention. App. Br. 17. furthermore, Appellants fail to explain why the
Examiner’s finding is erroneous other than asserting it is based on
insufficient evidence without further explanation. See 37 C.E.R.
§ 41,37(c)(l)(iv). We find unpersuasive Appellants’ argument that the
Examiner’s finding is based on insufficient evidence. For example, Larson
discloses using “a 180 MHz processor” for their algorithm. Larson § 5.1.
One definition of a microprocessor is as follows:
A central processing unit (CPU) on a single chip. A modem
microprocessor can have several million transistors in an
integrated-circuit package that can easily fit into the palm of
one’s had. Microprocessors are at the heart of all personal
computers. When memory and power are added to a
microprocessor, all the pieces, excluding peripherals, required
for a computer are present. The most popular lines of
microprocessors today are the 680x0 family from Motorola,
which power the Apple Macintosh line, and the 80x86 family
from Intel, which is at the core of all IBM PC-compatible
computers. See also 65021, 658169, 6800, 68000, 68020, 68030,
68040, 80286, 80386DX, 808, 8086.
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The Microsoft Press Computer Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 2002, Microsoft
Press, page 338—39. ISBN 0-7356-1495-4. Thus, it is unclear why
Appellants believe Larson’s “processor” would not be an “integrated circuit”
or “likely” would not include processing logic, memory, and an input port.
Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 24 for the reasons discussed
above.
Claim 26
The Examiner finds Larson’s processor is an application specific
integrated circuit (ASIC). Non-Final Act. 25. Appellants contend “[tjhere is
no factual evidence that Larson’s processor is an ASIC,” as required by
claim 26. App. Br. 18. The Examiner responds that “an application specific
integrated circuit is just a marketing term for an integrated circuit.” Ans. 31.
Although we do not agree with the Examiner’s “marketing term”
finding, we agree with the Examiner’s conclusion that claim 26 is obvious.
In particular, one skilled in the art would have understood ASIC to be an
“[ajcronym for application-specific integrated circuit.” The Microsoft Press
Computer Dictionary, page 37. Appellants fail to explain why it would not
have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art that Larson’s
disclosed processor could instead have been implemented in an ASIC.
Furthermore, we consider implementing a processor as an ASIC to be mere
design choice dictated by conventional engineering and manufacturing
practices at the time of the invention, with predictable tradeoffs in
performance and cost. Because our reasoning differs from that set forth by
the Examiner (Ans. 31), we designate the rejection as being based on new
grounds pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).
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Claim 6
The Examiner finds AAPA does not explicitly teach the combinations
of bit lengths attributed to luminance and chrominance quantities as recited
in the alternative by claim 6, i.e., numbers of bits used to represent
luminance quantity Ld (n) and chrominance quantities u' and v' (nv, mv)5 of
(10, 11, 11) or (11, 12, 12), or (12, 12, 12), respectively. Non-Final Act. 27—
28. However, the Examiner again finds AAPA teaches color values
represented by between 8 and 16 bits and up to 32 bits, concluding “the
number of storage pixels [is] not critical to enabling quantization of pixel
values, and a person of skill in the art would not expect the method steps to
be different for using larger or smaller ranges of color values.” Non-Final
Act. 28. The Examiner further concludes it would have been obvious to
select other values such as 10, 11, and 12. Id. The Examiner further relies
on Reitmeier’s disclosure that “pixel intensity and pixel color depth of a
digital image is encoded as a binary integer between 0 and 2A(n-l)” for
teaching color depth values (m) of 10, 11, or 12. Id. (citing Reitmeier col. 1,
11. 43-50).
Appellants contend the Examiner’s characterization of the deficiency
of AAPA is inconsistent with the position taken in connection with the
rejection of claims 1, 4, and 5. App. Br. 21. Appellants again argue Larson
and AAPA fail to teach a range of bits and, accordingly, fail to teach or
suggest the limitations of claim 6. App. Br. 21—22.
5 Although, in the disclosed embodiments, the number of bits allocated to
representing chrominance quantities u' and v' (represented by the non-
subscripted variable m) are equal, for purposes of our notation, we separately
designate the respective quantities as nv and nv.
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We agree with Appellants that the prior art does not teach a range of
bits for the reasons discussed above. We disagree the Examiner’s findings
are inconsistent with findings in connection with claims 1, 4, and 5.
However, neither of these determinations is relevant to the present rejection.
Because claim 6 recites the three combinations of n and m values in
the alternative, a teaching of any one of the combinations renders the claim
obvious. As discussed above, Larson’s description of the Cineon system
discloses the use of 10-bits per channel, Pixar’s format uses 11-bits per
channel, and Larson’s 24-bit encoding discloses using a 10-bit log
luminance portion. Larson 15, 17. Larson further teaches encoding using a
total of 32-bits. Larson 15 et seq.
We disagree with the Examiner’s finding that AAPA teaches a range
of values. However, we agree with the Examiner’s reasoning for combining
the disclosed total number of bits and number of bits allocated to represent
luminance and chrominance quantities, i.e., “at the time of invention, it
would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to select other
values such as 10 [and] 11 . . . bits taught in [Larson], in order to distribute
data over an allocated bit amount,” (Non-Pinal Act. 28) thereby teaching or
suggesting the claimed limitation of “each pixel of the VDR image signal
data includes 32 bits, with n=10 and m=H” (Ans. 32 (emphasis added)).
furthermore, in the absence of persuasive evidence to the contrary, the
total number of bits and the allocation of bits among luminance and
chrominance quantities is an obvious design choice being a mere
arrangement of known elements (i.e., the number of bits) in a LogLuv
configuration with predictable results based on known configurations
including, for example, (16, 8, 8) and (10, 7, 7) representing Larson’s
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LogLuv quantities (n[iD],m[U,],7n[V,]) and (10, 10, 10) and (11,11,11) bits
for each of the respective luminance values for colors red, green, and blue as
respectively used by Cineon’s and Pixar’s RGB encoding formats as also
disclosed by Larson. Thus, the combination of Larson, AAPA, and
Reitmeier discloses 10 luminance bits and discloses 11 bits for each of two
chrominance quantities thereby teaching or suggesting at least the first of the
three claimed combinations.
Claims 8 and 13—17
Appellants do not argue these claims separately with particularity.
App. Br. 22. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 8 and 13—17
for the reasons set forth in connection with the claims from which each
depends.
Claim 16
Claim 16 recites:
The method as recited in claim 13, wherein the encoding step
further comprises the step of increasing the frame rate of the
video signal data accepted in the processing apparatus, and
wherein the interleaving step preserves a degree of spatial detail
that is associated with the original video signal within the
stereoscopically merged image frame.
The Examiner finds Lipton’s stereoscopic video providing left and
right 1920 x 1080 pixel images teaches the claimed limitations. Non-Final
Act. 31. Appellants contend the portion of Lipton cited by the Examiner
fails to teach increasing the input frame rate. App. Br. 23. We agree.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 16.
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Claims 18, 19, and 20
Appellants do not present separate arguments for patentability of
claims 18—20. App. Br. 23. Accordingly, claims 18—20 are rejected on the
same basis as claim 1 and for the reasons discussed above.
Claims 21 and 22
Appellants’ contentions of error in connection with claims 21 and 22
amount to no more than naked assertions the subject matter of these claims
is not taught or suggested by the applied prior art. App. Br. 23—24. As
discussed above, a statement which merely points out what a claim recites
will not be considered an argument for separate patentability of the claim.
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(vii); see also In reLovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (“[W]e hold that the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to
require more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation
of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements
were not found in the prior art.”).
DECISION
We reverse the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1—5, 7, 9-12, and
23-26 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
We reverse the Examiner’s decision to reject claim 16 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a).
We affirm the rejection of claims 1—7, 9-12, and 23—26 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) over Larson, AAPA, and Reitmeier.
We affirm the rejection of claims 8, 13—15, and 17—22 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) over Larson, AAPA, Reitmeier and Lipton.
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For the reasons discussed above, we designate our affirmances of the
rejection of claims 1—15 and 17—26 as new grounds of rejection pursuant to
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).
This decision contains new grounds of rejection pursuant to
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) provides “[a] new ground of
rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial
review.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) also provides that Appellants, WITHIN TWO
MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of
the following two options with respect to the new grounds of rejection to
avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims:
(1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate
amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating to
the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered
by the examiner, in which event the prosecution will be
remanded to the examiner. . . .
(2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be
reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. . . .
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART; 37 C.F.R, $ 41.50(b)
25