Ex Parte MillerDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMay 12, 201511958337 (P.T.A.B. May. 12, 2015) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/958,337 12/17/2007 Kerry Philip Miller ES-1038 (290110.405) 1942 70336 7590 05/12/2015 SEED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW GROUP PLLC 701 FIFTH AVENUE SUITE 5400 SEATTLE, WA 98104 EXAMINER FLYNN, RANDY A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2424 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/12/2015 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte KERRY PHILIP MILLER ____________________ Appeal 2013-003350 Application 11/958,337 Technology Center 2400 ____________________ Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, JON M. JURGOVAN, and JOHN A. HUDALLA, Administrative Patent Judges. JURGOVAN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from Final Rejection of claims 1–31. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm.2 1 The real party in interest is EchoStar Technologies, L.L.C. 2 Our Decision refers to the Appeal Brief filed Aug. 6, 2012 (“App. Br.”), the Examiner’s Answer mailed Oct. 23, 2012 (“Ans.”), the Reply Brief filed Dec. 26, 2012 (“Reply Br.”), and the Specification filed Dec. 17, 2007 (“Spec.”). Appeal 2013-003350 Application 11/958,337 2 STATEMENT OF CASE Overview of Claimed Subject Matter The claims recite recording an “advance period” and “following period” for a program of interest, such as television program. See, e.g., claim 1; Spec. ¶ 14. For example, a televised sports program may have an unscheduled “advance period” covering an athlete’s profile or the history of a sporting event. See Spec. ¶ 20. A “following period” may occur when a sports program runs past its scheduled end time, such as when a game goes into overtime. See Spec. ¶ 21. The start and end times of a sports program may also be shifted for other reasons, such as delays due to inclement weather. See Spec. ¶ 21. The “advance period” and “following period” are referenced by Appellant and the Examiner generically as an “extension period.” See, e.g., Reply Br. 10, Ans. 5. Appellant’s claims are directed to comparing “characteristics” of a current program and previously recorded program for which an “advance period” or “following period” was recorded, in order to determine whether an “advance period” or “following period” should be recorded for the current program. See claim 1. A “characteristic” may be information indicating a program relates to a sporting event, news, movies, etc. See Spec. ¶ 79. Representative Claim 1. A method for recording programs, comprising: identifying a program selected for recording as a program of interest based upon the program selected for recording having at least one characteristic corresponding to at least one characteristic of a previous program for which at least one of an advance period associated with the previous program or a following period associated with the previous program was recorded; recording an advance period associated with the program of interest, the advance period corresponding to a period before a beginning of the program of interest; and Appeal 2013-003350 Application 11/958,337 3 recording a following period associated with the program of interest, the following period corresponding to a period after a conclusion of the program of interest. Prior Art Kuroda US 6,311,011 B1 Oct. 30, 2001 Otana US 2002/0181935 A1 Dec. 5, 2002 Bumgardner US 2003/0206719 A1 Nov. 6, 2003 Ellis US 2006/0222325 A1 Oct. 5, 2006 Dolph US 2007/0286582 A1 Dec. 13, 2007 Tobiishi US 7,369,744 B2 May 6, 2008 Rejections Claims 1–25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on Dolph and Ellis. Ans. 4–14. Claims 26, 28, and 29 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on Dolph, Ellis, and Kuroda. Ans. 14–17. Claim 27 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on Dolph, Ellis, Kuroda, and Tobiishi. Ans. 17–18. Claim 27 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on Dolph, Ellis, Kuroda, and Otana. Ans. 18–19. Claims 30 and 31 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on Dolph, Ellis, Kuroda, and Bumgardner. Ans. 19–21. PRINCIPLES OF LAW The Board gives claims their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into Appeal 2013-003350 Application 11/958,337 4 the claims. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). References combined in an obviousness rejection are viewed not for what the individual references themselves suggest but rather for what the combination of disclosures taken as a whole would suggest to one of ordinary skill in the art. In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971). ANALYSIS We adopt the findings of fact made by the Examiner in the Final Rejection and the Examiner's Answer as our own. We agree with the Examiner's decision to reject claims 1–31 for the reasons given in the Examiner's Answer. We highlight the following for emphasis. “Was Recorded” Argument Regarding claims 1–26 and 28–31, Appellant argues Ellis fails to teach comparison of a characteristic of a current program of interest with a characteristic of a previous program of interest with an advance period or following period that “was recorded” as claimed. App. Br. 10–15; Reply Br. 10–11, 13–14. Specifically, Appellant argues Ellis teaches selecting programs for which record start and stop times are adjusted based on similarity to previously broadcast programs that have had scheduling time changes, not whether they had extension periods previously recorded, as claimed. App. Br. 10–11 citing Ellis Abstract ¶ 81 [sic].3 3 Appellant’s citations appear to be to Ellis, US 2002/0054068 A1, which was not applied by the Examiner, instead of Ellis ’325 as applied by the Examiner in the disputed rejection. See Ans. 22. Because Ellis ’068 and the cited portions thereof were not used in the rejection, they are not relevant evidence and we give them no weight in our analysis. We do, however, Appeal 2013-003350 Application 11/958,337 5 The Examiner finds Ellis teaches the “was recorded” limitation. See Ans. 21–26 citing Ellis ¶¶ 7, 8. Specifically, the Examiner points to paragraphs 7 and 8 of Ellis, which state as follows: [0007] In some embodiments, recording options, such as quality setting, start time or end time, may be modified for the re-recording of the video. In some embodiments, recording options may be modified based on prior recordings to potentially avoid the need to re-record a program. For example, category information (e.g., episode of a series, program title, sports program, etc.) of a video scheduled to be recorded may be compared with the category information of previously re- recorded videos. The recording options of the video scheduled to be recorded may then be modified based on the recording options of the re-recorded videos. [0008] For example, a prior re-recorded program which was a Monday Night Football game was originally recorded with the first four minutes of the broadcast missing. For the scheduled re-recording, the start time was modified to add a five minute buffer to the beginning of the program. The five minute buffer may then be added to all other scheduled recordings of Monday Night Football in an attempt to avoid the original problem of missing the first four minutes of the broadcast. Emphasis added. Ellis thus teaches that a five minute buffer is added to the beginning of a program, as well as to other programs in the same category. In so doing, Ellis compares the characteristic (category) of the current program (one of the later editions of Monday Night Football) with a characteristic (category) of a previously recorded program (the original Monday Night Football program) for which an advance period (five minute buffer) was recorded. address Appellant’s arguments to the extent they are not strictly dependent on these erroneous citations. Appeal 2013-003350 Application 11/958,337 6 Thus, we agree with the Examiner that Ellis teaches the claimed “was recorded” limitation. “May Not Have Been Recorded” Argument Regarding claims 1–16, Appellant argues Ellis’s selection of recording options may not result in recording of advance or following periods of a program as claimed. App. Br. 13–14; Reply Br. 11–13 citing Ellis ¶ 50. Appellant argues Ellis’s conflict checking to determine when to set record start and end times may impede recording of extension periods for a program. App. Br. 13 citing Ellis ¶ 50. Appellant also argues Ellis implements a prioritization scheme, and if a program is selected to have its extension time recorded at lower priority than another conflicting program, the extension may not be recorded at all. Id. Appellant further argues the user’s selection of recording options may override the initial recording options selected and result in no recording of extension periods. Reply Br. 11–12 citing Ellis ¶ 50. We disagree with Appellant’s arguments. The proper focus for obviousness is not whether Appellant can imagine scenarios under Ellis’s teachings for which a program would have no buffer recorded. Instead, the focus is on what Ellis’s teachings as a whole would have taught or suggested to the ordinarily skilled artisan. Such person would interpret Ellis’s teachings concerning buffer recording for a program to be an optional feature that could be useful under some circumstances, notwithstanding that certain other options or alternative embodiments of Ellis may result in a buffer not being recorded. As the Examiner relied upon the former and not the latter in the rejection, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred. Furthermore, Appellant’s claims contain no limitation that the recited comparing of program characteristics must never occur with a program that Appeal 2013-003350 Application 11/958,337 7 did not have a buffer period recorded. To the extent Appellant’s argument depends on such a limitation, Appellant’s argument is not commensurate in scope with the claims as recited. “In Response to the Available Memory Capacity Being Less Than” Argument Appellant argues the references cited in the rejection do not disclose the emphasized limitation of claim 27, which recites: in response to the available memory capacity being less than the second amount of memory capacity and the third amount of memory capacity, recording the advance period associated with the program of interest and the following period associated with the program of interest until the available memory capacity is utilized. App. Br. 15–16, Reply Br. 14–16. Appellant argues claim 27 requires that separate memory capacities are determined for the program to be recorded, for the advance period and for the following period. App. Br. 16, Reply Br. 14–16. According to Appellant, Tobiishi describes that “recording is finished when the capacity of the recording device is full or a preset recording time has elapsed” without regard to any determined memory capacity for recording an advance period or following period of the program. App. Br. 16. The Examiner explains he relied on Dolph to teach determination of the amount of memory required for the advanced period (pre-content) and following period (post-content) (Ans. 27 citing Dolph ¶ 5). The Examiner cites Kuroda for teaching determining the amount of memory capacity for recording a program of interest (Ans. 27 citing Kuroda Fig. 3, S104), and determining an available memory capacity of the memory device in excess of the first amount of memory capacity for storing the program of interest Appeal 2013-003350 Application 11/958,337 8 (Ans. 27–28 citing Kuroda Fig. 3, S107). The Examiner cites Tobiishi for teaching recording until memory capacity is full, i.e., determining a capacity of the recording device is less than what is needed for the entire program, and that pieces of the program will only be recorded until the determined capacity is utilized in full (Ans. 28 citing Tobiishi col. 13, ll. 56–62). The Examiner concludes Tobiishi teaches the disputed limitation of claim 27. We agree with the Examiner claim 27 would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art considering as a whole the teachings of Dolph, Ellis, Kuroda, and Tobiishi for the reasons set forth by the Examiner. Appellant did not address the Examiner’s rejection of claim 27 based on Dolph, Ellis, Kuroda, and Otana in the Appeal Brief (see Ans. 18–19). However, Appellant did address this rejection for the first time in the Reply Brief (See Reply Br. 14–16). Unless good cause is shown, the Board is not required to address arguments in a Reply Brief that could have been presented in the Appeal Brief. Ex parte Borden, 93 USPQ2d, 1473, 1474 (BPAI 2010) (informative). As no good cause has been shown, we do not consider the new arguments made in the Reply Brief and affirm the rejection of claim 27. Remaining Claims As no separate arguments are presented for the remaining claims, we affirm their rejection for the reasons set forth with respect to their independent claims. DECISION For the above reasons, the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–31 is affirmed. Appeal 2013-003350 Application 11/958,337 9 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED kis Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation