Ex Parte Melichar

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Sep 11, 2012

11455297 (B.P.A.I. Sep. 11, 2012)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/455,297 06/16/2006 Robert J. Melichar 2671-000014 7997
27572 7590 09/11/2012
HARNESS, DICKEY & PIERCE, P.L.C.
P.O. BOX 828
BLOOMFIELD HILLS, MI 48303
EXAMINER
RAMADAN, RAMY O
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2859
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/11/2012 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
________________

Ex parte ROBERT J. MELICHAR
________________

Appeal 2009-011438
Application 11/455,297
Technology Center 2800
________________

Before JOSEPH F. RUGGIERO, BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, and
GLENN J. PERRY, Administrative Patent Judges.

BAUMEISTER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appeal 2009-011438
Application 11/455,297

2
SUMMARY
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1-24:
Claims 1, 2, 6, 7, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, and 21 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Plett (US 2005/0110498 A1; published
May 26, 2005).
Claims 3, 5, 8, 14, 17, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as obvious over Plett in view of Arai (US 2007/0052423 A1; published Mar.
8, 2007).1
Claims 4 and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious
over Plett in view of Arai and Kikuchi (US 2004/0178798 A1; published
Sep. 16, 2004).
Claims 9, 11, 20, and 22-24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as obvious over Plett in view of Arai and Verbrugge (US 2004/0162683 A1;
published Aug. 19, 2004).
We affirm-in-part.

1 The Arai publication does not qualify as prior art under § 102(a) or (b)
because this reference was published after Appellant’s filing date. Nor does
it qualify under § 102(e) because the corresponding international application,
PCT/JP04/15400, was published in Japanese. However, this issue was not
raised by Appellant (see App. Br. 5-10; Reply Br. 2-5). Accordingly, this
issue is deemed waived. See Ex Parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI
2010) (citing In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445) (explaining that the BPAI
reviews the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by
Appellants, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon).
Moreover, the published international application, WO/2005/050234, does
qualify as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) based on its publication date,
June 5, 2005. As such, we understand the Examiner to be intending to base
the rejection on the published international application and to be using Arai
as an English translation of that patent document.
Appeal 2009-011438
Application 11/455,297

3
STATEMENT OF CASE
Appellant describes the present invention as follows:
A battery control module for use with a battery includes a
voltage measuring module that measures battery voltage and a
current measuring module that measures battery current. A
power limit module communicates with the current and voltage
measuring modules and once every time period estimates a
battery current limit that corresponds with a future time period.
The battery current limit is based on a predetermined voltage
limit of the battery and a battery current and a battery voltage
that correspond with a time period that precedes the future time
period.
(Abstract).
Independent claims 1 and 12 are illustrative:
1. A battery control module for use with a battery,
comprising:
a voltage measuring module that measures battery
voltage;
a current measuring module that measures battery
current; and
a power limit module that communicates with the current
and voltage measuring modules and that once every time period
estimates a battery current limit that corresponds with a future
time period, wherein the battery current limit is based on a
predetermined voltage limit of the battery and a battery current
and a battery voltage that correspond with a time period that
precedes the future time period.

12. A method for controlling current draw from a battery
comprising:
measuring a battery voltage;
measuring a battery current; and
periodically estimating a battery current limit that
corresponds with a future time period and represents a
Appeal 2009-011438
Application 11/455,297

4
maximum allowable battery current through the battery,
wherein the battery current limit is based on the measured
battery current, the measured battery voltage, and a
predetermined voltage limit of the battery.

CLAIMS 1-5
Contentions
The Examiner finds Plett teaches “a power limit module” that
performs the calculations as recited in claim 1. In particular, the Examiner
interprets Plett’s open-circuit voltage (OCV) at state of charge zk at time t as
corresponding to the claimed “battery voltage” (Ans. 9 (citing Plett, ¶ 0007))
and Plett’s battery maximum discharge current, ,
, , as corresponding to
the claimed estimated “battery current limit” (Ans. 3 (citing Plett, ¶ ¶ 0064-
0074)). The Examiner finds Plett discloses “determining a battery open-
circuit voltage (OCV(zk(t))) that corresponds to a present state of charge
(zk (t)), in the present period, that precedes a next period of (Δt) seconds
and estimating a maximum charge current for the next period of (Δt)
seconds based on the battery open-circuit voltage (OCV(zk(t)))” (Ans. 10;
emphasis in original (citing Plett, ¶ ¶ 0070-0072)). As such, the Examiner
concludes Plett anticipates claim 1.
Appellant asserts Plett fails to teach the “power limit module” of
claim 1. In particular, Appellant argues, inter alia, “the voltages of Plett are
either selected for the same time period as the estimate of the maximum
discharge current or for a subsequent time period - not an earlier time period,
as in claim 1” (Reply Br. 5). In support of this argument, Appellant asserts
“Plett uses . . . eq[uation] [(]8[)] . . . to solve for maximum current (ik(t))”
Appeal 2009-011438
Application 11/455,297

5
using OCV as a function of state of charge at time t (Reply Br. 4). Appellant
concludes,
Therefore, ,
, corresponds to the maximum discharge
current of cell k at time t, the present time period. Therefore,
any OCV voltage selections provide OCVs for the present
time period t or a future time period t+Δt, but not at time
period previous to the time period of ,
, . Therefore, if
Plett is solving for a maximum discharge current of a future
time period, Plett is using OCVs that correspond to a period
after the future time period, not before the future time period, as
in claim 1.
(Id.) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, Appellant argues the Examiner
has erred in rejecting claim 1 and dependent claims 2-5.
Issue
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 1-5 because Plett’s open
circuit voltage, OCV(zk(t)), and maximum discharge current, ,
, do not
correspond to the claimed “battery current limit” and “a battery voltage” as
shown in the Examiner’s rejection?
Analysis
We agree with Appellant that the Examiner has erred. The Examiner
has not shown that Plett’s open circuit voltage (OCV) corresponds “with a
time period that precedes the future time period” in which the claimed
battery current is estimated.
We agree with the reasons presented by Appellant (Reply Br. 4) that
show Plett’s OCV(zk(t)) is not determined for an earlier time period than the
maximum discharge current. We disagree with the Examiner’s
characterization of Plett’s time periods (Ans. 10, 11).
Appeal 2009-011438
Application 11/455,297

6
Plett discloses “a method for finding the maximum discharge power
for a user-defined time horizon Δt, i.e. how much power may be drawn from
the battery continuously for use for the next Δt time period” (¶ 0039). The
Examiner relies upon an embodiment where Plett teaches a method of
calculation based on voltage limits using Taylor series expansion (¶¶ 0064-
0077). In these calculations, Plett solves for the maximum absolute value of
the current of a cell k at time t (¶ 0068). Plett uses the open circuit voltage,
OCV(zk(t)), in the Taylor series expansion calculations (¶ ¶ 0070-0072).
Regarding the corresponding time period, Plett explains that the prior art
does not find “the constant value of current that is available for the next Δt
seconds” (¶ 0065).
The Examiner’s findings are ambiguous, and the plausible
interpretations of these findings fail to show Plett anticipates claim 1. The
Examiner states that Plett estimates “a maximum charge for the next period
of (Δt) seconds” relative to the OCV (Ans. 10; emphasis added/emphasis in
original). If “the next period” refers to the period beginning at time t+Δt,
the Examiner’s statement is not consistent with Plett’s disclosure.
Specifically, as shown by Appellant (Reply Br. 4), the OCV(zk(t)) is not used
to compute the maximum discharge current for next time period that
includes time t+Δt.
Alternatively, if “the next period” refers to the time horizon for the
corresponding estimated current limit (Plett, ¶ 0039), the Examiner’s
mapping of Plett’s values to the claimed “battery current” and “battery
voltage” fails to meet the other requirements of the claim. Specifically, the
claim requires an estimate that uses a battery voltage from a preceding time
Appeal 2009-011438
Application 11/455,297

7
period, but Plett’s OCV value does not correspond to an earlier time horizon
than current limit it is used to estimate.
Accordingly, we agree with Appellant that the Examiner has failed to
show that claim 1 is anticipated by Plett.
Regarding the remaining rejection of dependent claims 3-5, the
additionally cited references, Arai and Kikuchi, do not cure the deficiency of
the rejection explained above.

CLAIMS 6-24
Contentions
Appellant argues “[c]laims 6, 12, 15 and 23 are allowable for at least
similar reasons as claim 1” (App. Br. 8; Reply Br. 5).
The Examiner finds that Appellant’s arguments do not apply to
independent claims 6, 12, 15, and 23 because these claims do not require
that “[the] current limit is based on a battery voltage that corresponds
with a time period that precedes the future time period” (Ans. 11, 12;
emphasis in original).
Analysis
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive because they are not
commensurate in scope with independent claims 6, 12, 15, and 23. In
particular, these claims do not recite the same battery current limit
estimation function found in claim 1.
With respect to claim 1, Appellant argues “Plett does not at least
show, teach or suggest a power limit module that once every time period
estimates a battery current limit that corresponds with a future time period”
(App. Br. 6; emphasis in original); however, independent claims 6, 12, 15,
Appeal 2009-011438
Application 11/455,297

8
and 23 do not implicitly or explicitly require this feature. In particular,
claim 6 does not contain any limitations directed to a “time period.” In
contrast to estimating “once every time period,” claims 12 and 15 broadly
recite “periodically estimating a battery current limit” (emphasis added), and
claim 23 likewise contains a similar limitation. Additionally, Appellant’s
arguments directed to claim 1 are further removed from independent claims
6, 12, 15, and 23 because, unlike claim 1, these other independent claims do
not recite that “a battery voltage that corresponds with a time period that
precedes the future time period.”
Accordingly, Appellant has not demonstrated the Examiner’s
anticipation rejection of claims 6, 12, 15, and 23 contains error. Likewise,
dependent claims 7-11, 13, 14, 16-22, and 24 do not add additional
limitations that make Appellant’s arguments directed to claim 1 relevant.
Accordingly, we will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 6-24.

DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-5 is reversed.
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 6-24 is affirmed.

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

rwk