Ex Parte Meckauskas et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 29, 2017

11468904 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 29, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/468,904 08/31/2006 Rimantas T. Meckauskas RTN-700PUS 5704
(05E137-US-NP)
33164 7590
RAYTHEON COMPANY
C/O DALY, CROWLEY, MOFFORD & DURKEE, LLP
354A TURNPIKE STREET
SUITE 301A
CANTON, MA 02021
EXAMINER
GOODCHILD, WILLIAM J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2433
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/03/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@dc-m.com
amk@dc-m.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte RIMANTAS T. MECKAUSKAS and
GREGORY E. CERBUS
Appeal 2015-002349
Application 11/468,904
Technology Center 2400
Before JAMES R. HUGHES, JAMES W. DEJMEK, and
MONICA S. ULLAGADDI, Administrative Patent Judges.
ULLAGADDI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a final rejection of
claims 1—11, 13—19, and 21—23. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
According to Appellants, the claims are directed to converting a
Meteorological Aerodrome Report (METAR) formatted message to a Joint
Variable Message Format (JVMF). Abstract. Claim 1, reproduced below
with a key disputed limitation italicized, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
Appeal 2015-002349
Application 11/468,904
1. A computer-implemented method comprising:
receiving, by a computer, a Meteorological Aerodrome
Report (METAR) formatted message, the METAR formatted
message having a plurality of METAR data fields for the storage
of weather related information;
converting, by the computer, the METAR formatted
message to a JVMF formatted message, the Joint Variable
Message Format (JVMF) formatted message having a plurality
of JVMF data fields;
placing, by the computer, latitude and longitude
coordinates in a corresponding latitude and longitude JVMF data
fields respectively, the latitude and longitude coordinates being
derived from a particular METAR data field including an
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) station
identifier;
placing, by the computer, the ICAO station identifier in a
comment field of the JVMF formatted message;
determining, by the computer, that a first particular
METAR data field does not include a corresponding JVMF data
field of the same type and in response storing the first particular
METAR data field in the comment field of the JVMF formatted
message; and
determining, by the computer, that a second particular
METAR data field is temporarily unavailable and in response
placing an illegal value in a corresponding JVMF data field.
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
REFERENCES
appeal is:
Murphy et al.
Dver et al.
US 6,298,307 B1 Oct. 2, 2001
US 2002/0035504 Al Mar. 21,2002
US 2003/0229603 Al Dec. 11, 2003
US 2004/0055005 Al Mar. 18, 2004
US 2007/0180487 Al Aug. 2, 2007
US 2008/0316021 Al Dec. 25, 2008
Childress et al.
Creswell et al.
Nagamatsu
Manz et al.
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Application 11/468,904
REJECTIONS
Claims 1—5 and 23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Murphy, Manz, Childress, Dver, and Creswell.
Claims 6, 13, 14, 21, and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Murphy, Manz, and Creswell.
Claims 7, 10, 11, 15, 16, and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Murphy, Manz, and Creswell as applied to claims
6 and 13 above, and further in view of Dver.
Claim 8 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Murphy, Manz, and Creswell as applied to claim 6 above, and further
in view of Nagamatsu.
Claims 9, 17, and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Murphy, Manz, Creswell as applied to claims 6 and 13
above, and further in view of Childress.
ISSUE
Whether the Examiner erred in finding Creswell teaches or suggests
the “illegal value” as recited in independent claims 1, 6, and 13.
ANALYSIS
Appellants do not contest the rejections of claims 7—11 and 15—19,
other than to assert that these claims are patentable. App. Br. 10. As such,
we summarily sustain the rejections of these claims.
The Examiner cited Murphy for its teaching of converting weather
data from a METAR format and Manz for its teaching of converting the
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Application 11/468,904
weather data to a JVMF format. Final Act. 6—8. The Examiner cited
Childress for its teaching of converting waypoints from a name to a
latitude/longitude pair. Id. at 8. The Examiner cited Dver for its teaching of
mapping fields lacking a logically mapped target into a comments or notes
field and Creswell for teaching that a null value can be entered into a field.
Id. at 9; see id. at 10. More particularly, the Examiner concludes that
It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art
at the time the invention was made to include updating a field
that did not have a value to put into it with a value outside of the
ordinary value for that field in order to ensure that the user had a
value in the field that was not going to be mistaken for a valid
value.
Id. at 10.
Appellants dispute the Examiner’s findings and conclusions with
respect to Creswell. First, Appellants argue “that one of ordinary skill in art
does not associate a null value with being an illegal value- there is no
suggestion in Creswell that the default null value is ‘illegal.’” App. Br. 6
(emphasis omitted). Second, Appellants argue that “the Examiner has
impermissibly . . . explicitly combine[d] Applicant’s exemplary embodiment
of a range, i.e., an altimeter, with the null value of Creswell[.]” Id. at 7
(emphasis omitted). Third, Appellants argue that “when inserting a default
value, it cannot be known a priori whether the default value is illegal.” Id. at
6 (emphasis omitted). Appellants argue that “an evaluation must be
performed to determine if a value is in fact illegal. . . [t]hat is, the legal
values for the field must be known and considered before an ‘illegal value’
can be placed in the field.” Id. at 7 (emphasis omitted). Finally, Appellants
point to a Wikipedia.com article which Appellants assert “explains that
‘[t]he null character (also null terminator), abbreviated NUL, is a control
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Application 11/468,904
character with the value zero” that “is present in many character sets.” Id. at
9 (emphasis omitted). We address each of Appellants’ arguments in turn.
With respect to Appellants’ first and second arguments, the Examiner
finds that
[A]n illegal value is outside the range of the normal values for
that field, inserting a null value would be outside the range of
any of the alpha numeric values as a null value can be a blank
field or random characters (which would be outside a specific set
of alpha numeric values defined for a field). Creswell is not used
to show the specific word “illegal value”, but rather to show the
concept that a value outside a defined range of values can be
placed into a field when no other value is currently available, as
is shown in Appellant’s specification for at least one
embodiment.
Ans. 5 (emphases added). We understand the Examiner’s stated position to
merely reference Appellants’ Specification for an understanding of the term
“illegal value,” not to form the basis of a rejection. See id. We further
concur in the Examiner’s finding that the null value taught by Creswell
would have been understood by the ordinarily skilled artisan to be an “illegal
value” for fields that require, for example, alphanumeric input.
With respect to Appellants’ third argument, the Examiner responds
that the claims do not recite evaluating or otherwise considering a value to
determine whether it is “illegal.” Ans. 8. We agree and further concur with
the Examiner’s finding that it would have been obvious to the ordinarily
skilled artisan that “the null value can take various forms (depending on the
design specification and the programmer), such as blank or random
characters, which can be used to be an illegal value for a field that is
expecting a certain range of values.” Id.
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With respect to Appellants’ fourth argument, we note that the
referenced Wikipedia article was not properly made part of the record, nor
was the URL of the referenced article set forth in its entirety in the Appeal
Brief, nor is it clear that the article is contemporaneous with the filing date
of the present application. Microsoft’s Computer Dictionary, 5th Edition
(2002), p. 370 defines a null value as follows:
A character code with a null value; literally, a character meaning
“nothing.” Although it is real in the sense of being recognizable,
occupying space internally in the computer, and being sent or
received as a character, a NUL character displays nothing, takes
no space on the screen or on paper, and causes no specific action
when sent to a printer. In ASCII, NUL is represented by the
character code 0.
Irrespective of which definition is applied, even if a null value is represented
in ASCII by the character code 0, its value is still “nothing,” which we agree
would have been understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to be outside
of a range of, for example, alphanumeric characters.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding that
Creswell, in combination with the other applied references, teaches or
suggests the “illegal value” recited in independent claims 1, 6, and 13. We
are also not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting dependent claims 2—5,
7—11, 14—19, and 21—23, which were not separately argued. Therefore, we
sustain the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejections of claims 1—11, 13—19, and 21—23.
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DECISION
The rejection of claims 1—5 and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Murphy, Manz, Childress, Dver, and Creswell is affirmed.
The rejection of claims 6, 13, 14, 21, and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Murphy, Manz, and Creswell is affirmed.
The rejection of claims 7, 10, 11, 15, 16, and 19 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Murphy, Manz, Creswell, and Dver is
summarily affirmed.
The rejection of claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Murphy, Manz, Creswell, and Nagamatsu is summarily
affirmed.
The rejection of claim 9, 17, and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Murphy, Manz, Creswell, and Childress is summarily
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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