Ex Parte McNeill et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 29, 2018

13966909 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 29, 2018)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/966,909 08/14/2013 Matthew C. McNeill RTHT2020.007 5239
26629 7590 01/31/2018
ZIOLKOWSKI PATENT SOLUTIONS GROUP, SC (ZPS)
136 S WISCONSIN ST
PORT WASHINGTON, WI53074
EXAMINER
JIANG, YONG HANG
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2689
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/31/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
info @ zpspatents. com
sml @ zpspatents .com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MATTHEW C. McNEILL, KYLE E. NELSON, and
RICHARD A. HORTON
Appeal 2017-008416
Application 13/966,909
Technology Center 2600
Before ERIC B. CHEN, KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.
CHEN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appeal 2017-008416
Application 13/966,909
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final rejection of
claims 1 and 3—26. Claim 2 has been cancelled. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm-in-part.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ invention relates to remotely controlling a loading dock.
(Abstract.)
Claims 1, 23, and 26 are exemplary, with disputed limitations in
italics:
1. A distribution center authorization apparatus for use
in a distribution center having at least one dock for exchanging
materials with a respective trailer comprising:
a remote control configured to receive an authorization
input and generate an associated activation signal, wherein the
authorization input is at least one of a mobile equipment
authorization and a user identification input;
at least one dock component located at the dock and
configured to actuate in response to the associated activation
signal; and
a central hub separate from the remote control and
programmed to monitor and track the progress of the remote
control through a workflow protocol.
23. A method restricting control of at least one dock
component to a particular user via a remote controller
comprising:
logging in to the remote controller using an authorization
input;
generating an actuation signal from the remote controller
based on the authorization input, with the actuation signal that
is generated being tailored responsive to the authorization input;
and
2
Appeal 2017-008416
Application 13/966,909
actuating the at least one dock component of a specific
dock station in response to the activation signal from the remote
controller.
26. The method of claim 23 further comprising
inhibiting the activation signal when the remote controller is not
located in an activation zone.
Claims 1, 4, 6, and 11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Burgess (US 6,031,465; Feb. 29, 2000) and Reynard (US
6,975,226 B2; Dec. 13, 2005).
Claims 23 and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Burgess, Reynard, and Das (US 6,493,688 Bl; Dec. 10,
2002).
Claims 3 and 8 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Burgess, Reynard, and Rohrberg (US 6,661,350 Bl;
Dec. 9, 2003).
Claim 5 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Burgess, Reynard, and Tan (US 7,506,363 B2; Mar. 17, 2009).
Claim 25 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as unpatentable over
Burgess, Reynard, Das, and Tan.
Claim 7 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Burgess Reynard, and Matsui (US 7,139,562 B2; Nov. 21, 2006).
Claims 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, and 21 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Burgess, Reynard, and Kemink
(US 6,563,430 B2; May 13, 2003).
Claim 26 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Burgess, Reynard, Das, and Kemink (US 6,563,430 Bl; May 13, 2003).
3
Appeal 2017-008416
Application 13/966,909
Claim 14 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Burgess, Reynard, Kemink, and Rohrberg.
Claim 16 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Burgess, Reynard, Kemink, and Tan.
Claim 19 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Burgess, Reynard, Kemink, and Matsui (US 7,139,562 B2; Nov. 21,
2006).
Claim 22 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Burgess, Reynard, Kemink, and Lee (US 2004/0068424 Al; Apr. 8,
2004).
§103 Rejection—Burgess and Reynard
We are persuaded by Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 7—9; see also
Reply Br. 2—A) that the combination of Burgess and Reynard would not have
rendered obvious independent claim 1, which includes the limitation “a
central hub separate from the remote control and programmed to monitor
and track the progress of the remote control through a workflow protocol.”
The Examiner found that the remote-control transmitter of Burgess
corresponds to the limitation “remote control configured to receive an
authorization input and generate an associated activation signal.” (Final
Act. 5—6.) The Examiner further found that the control panel of Reynard
corresponds to the limitation “central hub separate from the remote control
and programmed to monitor and track the progress of the remote control
through a workflow protocol.” {Id. at 6.) We do not agree with the
Examiner’s findings.
4
Appeal 2017-008416
Application 13/966,909
Claim 1 recites “a central hub . . . programmed to monitor and track
the progress of the remote control through a workflow protocol” (emphasis
added). One relevant plain and ordinary meaning of “protocol” is “a
detailed plan of a . .. procedure.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary 939 (10th ed. 1999). This definition of “protocol” is consistent
with Appellants’ Specification, which states that “docking station
component manufacturers have developed docking station protocols that
dictate that the components of a given docking station remain in a given
state until a trailer has been positioned at the docking station and verified as
present and ready to be serviced” (1 5 (emphasis added)) and Appellants’
Figure 8, which illustrates “flow chart illustrating the steps for mandating an
approved workflow protocol for operation of the docking station” (| 22).
Accordingly, under the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with
Appellants’ Specification, we interpret “protocol” as a detailed plan of a
procedure, for example, a detailed plan of docking station procedure.
Reynard relates to control panels for loading dock equipment, in
particular, “a simplified and unified control panel for operating loading dock
equipment.” (Col. 1,11. 7—10.) Figure 5 of Reynard illustrates a front view
of a combination control (col. 5,11. 47-49), including control panel 70b
having selector switches 71 and 78, push buttons 72, 73 and 74, and three
indicator lights 75, 76, 77 (col. 7,11. 2—5). Reynard explains that control
panel 70b further includes “[a]n array of six operating symbols 81—86
indicating the operational functions of each button and elector switch 79
with has three positions Off, Automatic and Manual.” (Col. 7,11. 5—8.)
Reynard further explains that an operator presses button 72 “to cause the
vehicle restraint to engage the truck or trailer” (col. 7,11. 19-20), “to open
5
Appeal 2017-008416
Application 13/966,909
the door 18” (col. 7,1. 26), “to place the leveler on the truck or trailer”
(col. 7,11. 31—32), “to raise the leveler, fold the lip 15 and then releases the
button to lower the leveler 10 to the stored position” (col. 7,11. 38-40), and
“to close the door 18” (col. 7,1. 44). Reynard further explains “[t]he
operator presses the button 73 to cause the vehicle restraint 20 to release the
truck or trailer.” (Col. 7,11. 49-50.)
Although, the Examiner cited to control panel 70b of Reynard, as
illustrated in Figure 5, the Examiner has not identified sufficient evidence to
support a finding that Reynard teaches the limitation “central hub . . .
programmed to monitor and track the progress of the remote control through
a workflow protocol.” In particular, control panel 70b of Reynard permits
an operator to press buttons 72 and 73 to control various functions, rather
than such control panel 70b being “programmed to monitor and track ... a
workflow protocol,” as recited in claim 1, which is interpreted as monitoring
and tracking a detailed plan of a procedure related to workflow. Moreover,
the Examiner’s application of Burgess does not cure the above noted
deficiencies of Reynard.
Accordingly, we are persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that
[wjhile Reynard discloses a control panel 70b with operation
controls/buttons 72, 73, 74 to operate docking equipment and
indicator lights 75, 76, 77 that indicate to the operator which
piece of docking equipment is currently in effect, there is simply
no disclosure of control panel 70b functioning to monitor a
separate remote control and track the progress thereof though a
workflow protocol
(App. Br. 8—9) and “instead control panel 70b is used only for the direct
control/actuation of dock components and to indicate the current status of
such dock components” {id. at 9).
6
Appeal 2017-008416
Application 13/966,909
Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of independent claim 1
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Claims 4, 6, and 11 depend from independent
claim 1. We do not sustain the rejection of claims 4, 6, and 11 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) for the same reasons discussed with respect to independent
claim 1.
§103 Rejection—Burgess, Reynard, and Rohrberg
Claims 3 and 8 depend from independent claims 1 and 12. Rohrberg
was cited by the Examiner for teaching the additional features of claims 3
and 8. (Final Act. 8—9.) However, the Examiner’s application of Rohrberg
does not cure the above noted deficiencies of Burgess and Reynard.
§103 Rejection—Burgess, Reynard, and Tan
Claim 5 depends from independent claim 1. Tan was cited by the
Examiner for teaching the additional features of claim 5. (Final Act. 9.)
However, the Examiner’s application of Tan does not cure the above noted
deficiencies of Burgess and Reynard.
§103 Rejection—Burgess, Reynard, andMatsui
Claim 7 depend from independent claim 1. Matsui was cited by the
Examiner for teaching the additional features of claim 7. (Final Act. 10.)
However, the Examiner’s application of Matsui does not cure the above
noted deficiencies of Burgess and Reynard.
7
Appeal 2017-008416
Application 13/966,909
§103 Rejection—Burgess, Reynard, and Kemink
Claims 9 and 10
Claims 9 and 10 depend from independent claim 1. Kemink was cited
by the Examiner for teaching the additional features of claims 9 and 10.
(Final Act. 11.) However, the Examiner’s application of Kemink does not
cure the above noted deficiencies of Burgess and Reynard.
Claims 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, and 21
Independent claim 12 recites limitations similar to those discussed
with respect to independent claim 1, and claims 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, and 21
depend from claim 12. We do not sustain the rejection of claims 12, 13, 15,
17, 18, 20, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Burgess,
Reynard, and Kemink for the same reasons discussed with respect to
rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Burgess
and Reynard.
§103 Rejection—Burgess, Reynard, Kemink, and Rohrberg
Claim 14 depends from independent claim 12. Rohrberg was cited by
the Examiner for teaching the additional features of claim 14. (Final
Act. 15.) However, the Examiner’s application of Rohrberg does not cure
the above noted deficiencies of Burgess, Reynard, and Kemink.
§103 Rejection—Burgess, Reynard, Kemink, and Tan
Claim 16 depends from independent claim 12. Tan was cited by the
Examiner for teaching the additional features of claim 12. (Final Act. 15—
8
Appeal 2017-008416
Application 13/966,909
16. ) However, the Examiner’s application of Tan does not cure the above
noted deficiencies of Burgess, Reynard, and Kemink.
§103 Rejection—Burgess, Reynard, Kemink, andMatsui
Claim 19 depends from independent claim 12. Matsui was cited by
the Examiner for teaching the additional features of claim 12. (Final
Act. 16.) However, the Examiner’s application of Matsui does not cure the
above noted deficiencies of Burgess, Reynard, and Kemink.
§103 Rejection—Burgess, Reynard, Kemink, and Lee
Claim 22 depends from independent claim 12. Lee was cited by the
Examiner for teaching the additional features of claim 12. (Final Act. 16—
17. ) However, the Examiner’s application of Lee does not cure the above
noted deficiencies of Burgess, Reynard, and Kemink.
§103 Rejection—Burgess, Reynard, and Das
We are unpersuaded by Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 12—13; see
also Reply Br. 6—7) that the combination of Burgess, Reynard, and Das
would not have rendered obvious independent claim 23, which includes the
limitation “generating an actuation signal from the remote controller based
on the authorization input, with the actuation signal that is generated being
tailored responsive to the authorization input.”
The Examiner found that the zap control module of Das, which
controls preselected channels based upon user profile, corresponds to the
limitation “generating an actuation signal from the remote controller based
on the authorization input, with the actuation signal that is generated being
9
Appeal 2017-008416
Application 13/966,909
tailored responsive to the authorization input.” (Final Act. 7.) We agree
with the Examiner’s findings.
Das relates to an apparatus for receiving a multitude of programs, in
particular, a “user profile [that] influences the behavior of various
components, such as the zap function and the electronic program guide.”
(Abstract.) Das explains that “[t]he selected user profile influences the
behavior of the zap control module 9 and the EPG [electronic program
guide] module 10” such that “[t]he zap control module 9 defines a zap-circle
of channels, which normally contains all receivable channels ordered in
accordance with their preset number.” (Col. 5,11. 4—8.) Because Burgess
explains that the zap control module controls specific channels based upon
the user profile, Burgess teaches the limitation “generating an actuation
signal from the remote controller based on the authorization input, with the
actuation signal that is generated being tailored responsive to the
authorization input.”
Appellants argue that “full access to the remote control [of Burgess] is
granted once the authorization input has been entered, and the actuation
signal itself is not tailored based on the authorization input” and “Reynard
fails to provide any teaching of generating an actuation signal from a remote
controller based on an authorization input.” (App. Br. 12.) However, the
Examiner cited to Das, rather than Burgess or Reynard, for teaching the
limitation “generating an actuation signal from the remote controller based
on the authorization input, with the actuation signal that is generated being
tailored responsive to the authorization input.” (Final Act. 7.)
Appellants further argue that “there is no disclosure in Das that
actuation signals generated by the remote control are tailored responsive to
10
Appeal 2017-008416
Application 13/966,909
the user log-in” but “[ijnstead, commands from the remote control are only
generic channel up/down signals that are processed by the zap control
module in the TV to skip only to designated channels in the circle of
channels specific to that user.” (App. Br. 12—13; see also Reply Br. 6—7.)
However, the limitation “generating an actuation signal from the remote
controller based on the authorization input, with the actuation signal that is
generated being tailored responsive to the authorization input” is broad
enough to encompass the zap control module of Das, which controls specific
channels based upon the user profile.
Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of
Burgess, Reynard, and Das would have rendered obvious independent
claim 23, which includes the limitation “comprising inhibiting the activation
signal when the remote controller is not located in an activation zone.”
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 23 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Claim 24 depends from claim 23, and Appellants have
not presented any additional substantive arguments with respect to this
claim. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 24 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a), for the same reasons discussed with respect to independent
claim 23.
§103 Rejection—Burgess, Reynard, Das, and Tan
Although Appellants nominally argue the rejection of dependent
claim 25 separately (App. Br. 13), the arguments presented do not point out
with particularity or explain why the limitations of this dependent claim are
separately patentable. Instead, Appellants merely argue that “the
combination of Burgess, Reynard and Das fails to teach or suggest that
11
Appeal 2017-008416
Application 13/966,909
which is called for in claim 23” and “requests reversal of the rejection of
claim 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), along with the rejection of all claims
depending therefrom.” (Id.) We are not persuaded by these arguments for
the reasons discussed with respect to claim 23, from which claim 25
depends. Accordingly, we sustain this rejection.
§103 Rejection—Burgess, Reynard, Das, and Kemink
We are unpersuaded by Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 20-22; see
also Reply Br. 10—11) that the combination of Burgess, Reynard, Das, and
Kemink would not have rendered obvious independent claim 26, which
includes the limitation “comprising inhibiting the activation signal when the
remote controller is not located in an activation zone.”
The Examiner found that the control device of Kemink, which is
functionality based on the location, corresponds to the limitation “inhibiting
the activation signal when the remote controller is not located in an
activation zone.” (Final Act. 14.) We agree with the Examiner’s findings.
Kemink relates to data communications, in particular, “the field of
handheld and mobile control devices.” (Col. 1,11. 5—7.) Figure 2 of Kemink
illustrates a context sensitive control system (col. 3,11. 16—17), such that
“control device 100a is a portable device that is carried by a user” and “[a]s
the user enters the house 300, the location sensor 130 in the control device
100a detects an emission from an emitter 301 that is mounted in the entry
area 310” (col. 3,11. 19—23). Moreover, Kemink explains that “until the
control device 100a is located in the entry 310, the user interface 110 of the
control device 100a is not encumbered by the list of lights or the floorplan
diagram.” (Col. 3,11. 57—60.) Because, Kemink explains that control device
12
Appeal 2017-008416
Application 13/966,909
100a is not presented with a light of light or floorplan diagram until control
device 100a is detected in the entry area 310, Kemink teaches the limitation
“inhibiting the activation signal when the remote controller is not located in
an activation zone.”
Appellants argue that “Kemink fails to teach a mobile remote control
that only generates an activation signal when the mobile remote control
determines that the mobile remote control is located in an activation zone.”
(App. Br. 21—22.) In particular, Appellants argue that
Kemink provides specific examples of “global or group options
may be presented to a user in the entry (exit) area 310, such as an
option to turn off all appliances,” and “[f]or example, if the
television appliance 210b in the bedroom 340 is turned on when
the user is at the entry 310, the control device 100a may present
the user the option to turn the television 210b off before exiting
the house 300.”
{Id. at 21.) However, the Examiner cited to the embodiment Kemink, in
which control device 100a is not presented with a list of lights or floorplan
diagram until control device 100a is detected in the entry area 310. (Final
Act. 14.)
Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of
Burgess, Reynard, Das, and Kemink would have rendered obvious
dependent claim 26, which includes the limitation “comprising inhibiting the
activation signal when the remote controller is not located in an activation
zone.”
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of dependent claim 26 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a).
13
Appeal 2017-008416
Application 13/966,909
DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 2, and 3—22 is reversed.
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 23—26 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
14