Ex Parte MccoyDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardNov 7, 201712556753 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 7, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/556,753 09/10/2009 RICHARD A. MCCOY PAT-US20090402-US-NP 3182 173 7590 11/09/2017 WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION - MD 3601 2000 NORTH M63 BENTON HARBOR, MI 49022 EXAMINER GRANT, MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3715 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 11/09/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): whirlpool_patents_co@whirlpool.com mike_lafrenz @ whirlpool .com deborah_tomaszewski@whirlpool.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte RICHARD A. McCOY Appeal 2016-002434 Application 12/556,753 Technology Center 3700 Before MICHAEL L. HOELTER, MICHELLE R. OSINSKI, and PAUL J. KORNICZKY, Administrative Patent Judges. OSINSKI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Richard A. McCoy (Appellant)1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—3, 13, and 15—33.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Whirlpool Corporation. Appeal Br. 2. 2 Claims 4—12 and 14 are withdrawn. Final Act. 1. Appeal 2016-002434 Application 12/556,753 THE CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Claim 1, the sole independent claim, is reproduced below and is representative of the claimed subject matter on appeal. 1. A meal planning system that facilitates planning at least one meal by a user, the system comprising: memory in a non-transitory computer readable medium having appliance user domain data created by the user and related to an appliance, other appliance user domain data related to another user who may participate in the at least one meal, and control system domain data created by a developer for the appliance, the control system data comprising a cycle outcome model instance and a sequence model instance for a cycle in a cycle structure for the appliance related to preparing the at least one meal, wherein at least one instance of appliance user domain data is bound to at least one instance of control system domain data, including at least one cycle outcome model instance or at least one sequence model instance, or at least one instance of other appliance user domain data, and a communication path connected to the memory and connectable to a data sender, wherein a query for information about: at least a portion of one of the appliance user domain data or the other appliance user domain data from the data sender to the memory7 over the communication path will return at least a portion of the at least one instance of control system domain data to effect the planning and preparing of the at least one meal. EVIDENCE The Examiner relied on the following evidence in rejecting the claims on appeal: Slotznick US 5,983,200 Nov. 9, 1999 Abrams et al. (“Abrams”) US 6,587,739 B1 July 1, 2003 Larsen More Crockpot Mar. 12,2007 Information Becoming a Slow Cooking Pro! 2 Appeal 2016-002434 Application 12/556,753 THE REJECTIONS I. Claims 1—3, 13, 32, and 33 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2—3. II. Claims 1—3, 13, and 15—33 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant regards as the invention. Id. at 4. III. Claims 1—3, 13, 32, and 33 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Slotznick. Id. at 5—9. IV. Claims 15—18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Slotznick and Abrams. Id. at 9—11. V. Claims 19-31 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Slotznick, Abrams, and Larsen. Id. at 11—14. OPINION Rejection I Appellant argues claims 1—3, 13, 32, and 33 as a group. Appeal Br. 3—7; Reply Br. 2—8. We select claim 1 as the representative claim, and claims 2, 3, 13, 32, and 33 stand or fall therewith. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). The Supreme Court has set forth “a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Inti, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71—73 (2012)). Under that framework, it must be “determine[d] whether the claims at issue 3 Appeal 2016-002434 Application 12/556,753 are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts”—i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea. Id. If so, “the elements of each claim [must be considered] both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78). The Supreme Court has described the second part of the analysis as “a search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72—73) (alteration in original). Part one The Examiner determines that claim 1 is “directed to the abstract idea of a method of organizing human activity.” Final Act. 2. More particularly, the Examiner determines that claim 1 is “directed to planning an activity (e.g.[,] cooking) based upon the availability of appliances and ingredients.” Id. at 3. The Examiner compares claim 1 to the claims in DietGoal Innovations LLC v. Bravo Media LLC, 599 Fed. Appx. 956 (Fed. Cir. 2015) where the Federal Circuit held “a patent ineligible because claims were directed to ‘selecting meals for the day, according to one’s particular dietary goals and food preferences.’” Ans. 3. Appellant asserts that the Examiner did not adequately explain how all of the claims are “directed to” an abstract idea in that the Examiner failed to show how the “claimed concept... is similar to at least one concept that the courts have identified as an abstract idea.” Appeal Br. 3. We disagree. The Examiner has analogized the subject matter of claim 1 to the customized 4 Appeal 2016-002434 Application 12/556,753 meal-planning using a food database of DietGoal. Ans. 3. Meal planning, more generally, constitutes the organization and comparison of information to develop a guideline for eating. This is similar to the concept of comparing new and stored information and using rules to identify options, that was found to be abstract by the Federal Circuit in SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 555 Fed. App’x. 950 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In SmartGene, the Federal Circuit concluded that claims reciting methods and systems of selecting a therapeutic treatment regimen for a patient with a known disease were directed to an abstract idea because the claims did “no more than call on a ‘computing device’ with basic functionality for comparing stored and input data rules, to do what doctors do routinely.” Id. at 954. Similar reasoning applies here. The claimed system uses various computer components to do what an individual might otherwise do without the benefit of a computer—that is, store information regarding recipes, guest preferences, required cooking appliances, and steps regarding food preparation (e.g., order and cooking times); associate certain information together; and retrieve associated information to help plan and prepare meals depending on desired criteria. Appellant also argues that the Examiner did “not adequately explain[] how the claims tie up the alleged judicial exception,” and thus, the “Examiner erroneously failed to use the ‘streamlined analysis’ of Part I.B.3 of the [2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility (hereinafter Interim Guidance)].” Appeal Br. 3; see also id. at 5—6 (Appellant asserting that “the Examiner never explains how the system of claim 1 ties up the ‘abstract’ meal planning activity he asserts”). We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. We first note that the Interim Guidance 5 Appeal 2016-002434 Application 12/556,753 does not carry the force of law, Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002), as we must ensure we follow binding precedent in evaluating whether the Examiner erred in rejecting the claims as lacking patent-eligibility. Thus, even if the Examiner’s analysis is not consistent with the Interim Guidance, that inconsistency is not of itself dispositive of Examiner error. An Examiner’s failure to follow the Director’s guidance is appealable only to the extent that the Examiner has failed to follow the statutes or case law. To the extent the Director’s guidance goes beyond the case law and is more restrictive on the Examiner than the case law, the failure of the Examiner to follow those added restrictions is a matter for petition to the Director. Appellant does not identify any controlling case law that requires an Examiner to utilize the streamlined analysis. Moreover, Appellant mischaracterizes the purpose of Part I.B.3 of the Interim Guidance as placing a requirement on the Examiner. Rather, it is available to the Examiner as a discretionary analysis. Part I.B.3 is explicit that “if there is doubt as to whether the applicant is effectively seeking coverage for a judicial exception itself, the full analysis should be conducted.” Interim Guidance, 79 Fed. Reg. 74618, 74625 (Dec. 16, 2014). Because the use of the streamlined analysis is at the Examiner’s discretion, the Examiner choosing to perform a full analysis is not an error. Additionally, although the Supreme Court has described “the concern that drives this exclusionary principle [i.e., the exclusion of abstract ideas from patent eligible subject matter] as one of preemption,” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354, characterizing preemption as a driving concern for patent eligibility is not the same as characterizing preemption as the dispositive test for patent 6 Appeal 2016-002434 Application 12/556,753 eligibility. Instead, “[t]he Supreme Court has made clear that the principle of preemption is the basis for the judicial exceptions to patentability” and “[f]or this reason, questions on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354). Although “preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Id. The Federal Circuit concluded that “[wjhere a patent's claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo framework, . . . preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot.” Id.; see also id. (holding that “[i]n this case, Sequenom's attempt to limit the breadth of the claims by showing alternative uses of cffDNA outside of the scope of the claims does not change the conclusion that the claims are directed to patent ineligible subject matter”). Given this direction from our reviewing court, we decline to apply a preemption standard in our analysis, and instead apply the steps set forth by the Supreme Court in Alice and Mayo. Appellant also argues that “the claims are clearly directed to a system with a very specific data structure,” not “a method.” Appeal Br. 6. The Federal Circuit has made clear that the basic character of a process claim drawn to an abstract idea is not changed by claiming only its performance by a machine or apparatus, or by claiming the process embodied in program instructions on a computer-readable medium. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375—76 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing In reAbele, 684 F.2d 902 (CCPA 1982)). Accordingly, even if claim 1 is directed to a system having a memory with a particular data structure, we determine that it involves a process for taking data and arranging data into the recited data 7 Appeal 2016-002434 Application 12/556,753 structure. The claims are directed to an abstract data structure constituting logical relationships between data, and, therefore, directed to an abstract idea. See In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that a claim directed to a data structure did not constitute patentable subject matter because it was nothing more than a way of describing the manipulation of ideas). Appellant argues that the Examiner has not “established] how the claims as a whole embody the abstract idea.” Reply Br. 6. With respect to computer-enabled claimed subject matter, it can be helpful to determine whether “the claims at issue . . . can readily be understood as simply adding conventional computer components to well-known business practices” or are “directed to an improvement in the functioning of a computer.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In Enfish, the court recognized that “[s] oft ware can make non-abstract improvements to computer technology just as hardware improvements can” and found it “relevant to ask whether the claims are directed to an improvement to computer functionality versus being directed to an abstract idea.” Id. at 1335. Appellant has not persuaded us that claim 1 purports to improve the functioning of the computer itself, or effect an improvement in a technical field. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (focusing on whether the claim is “an improvement to [the] computer functionality itself, not on economic or other tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity”). Here, rather than improving computer functionality by solving a technical problem, we view the claimed data analysis, association, organization, and manipulation to facilitate planning and preparing a meal as 8 Appeal 2016-002434 Application 12/556,753 a solution to an organizational/efficiency problem. That is, the solution may be assisted using a computer to perform the data analysis, association, organization, and manipulation processes, but is not a solution rooted in computer technology to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks. Appellant has not persuaded us otherwise. Cf. DDR Holdings, LLCv. Hotels.com., L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (the court determined the claims to be directed to patent-eligible subject matter because they “specify how interactions with the Internet are manipulated to yield a desired result—a result that overrides the routine and conventional sequence of events ordinarily triggered by the click of a hyperlink”); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (the court concluded that the claim, when considered as a whole, was directed to a technological improvement over existing, manual 3-D animation techniques and used limited rules in a process specifically designed to achieve an improved technological result in conventional industry practice). Part two The second step of the analysis considers whether the claims recite an element, or combination of elements, that is enough to ensure that the claims are directed to significantly more than an abstract idea. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. Under the second step, the Examiner determines that [t]he additional element(s) or combination of elements in the claims other than the abstract idea per se amounts to no more than: (i) mere instructions to implement the idea on a computer, and/or (ii) recitation of generic computer structure that serves to perform generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the pertinent industry. 9 Appeal 2016-002434 Application 12/556,753 Final Act. 2. The Examiner asserts that “[f]or example, the computer is merely relied upon to store data regarding the availability of appliances and ingredients and to return a meal plan based upon that data.” Id. at 3. The Examiner determines that “[vjiewed as a whole, these additional claim element(s) do not provide meaningful limitation(s) to transform the abstract idea into a patent eligible application of the abstract idea such that the claim(s) amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself.” Id. at 2. Appellant argues that the Examiner’s analysis relies on an improper broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim terms that is not consistent with the Specification because the Examiner does not limit the claim terms to “elements of computer programming.” Appeal Br. 5 (citing Spec. 69- 70); see also id. at 4 (“The Examiner apparently construes ‘appliance user domain data’ to include recipes in a recipe box, ‘control system domain data’ to include the kind of appliances in a kitchen, and ‘other appliance user domain data’ to include how many guests are coming for a meal.’”); see also id. at 5 (“One of ordinary skill would know that instantiation (e.g.[,] creating instances of data) is a specific realization of an object in object-oriented computer programming .... One of ordinary skill would know that binding is ‘computerese’ for linking data elements to achieve a function.”). We are not persuaded of Examiner error. We do not view the Examiner as failing to recognize the claim as relating to computer programming and/or being directed to a system having a memory with a particular data structure. Rather, we view the Examiner as determining that the computer-related aspects of claim 1 do not add significantly more to the abstract idea, as outlined above, sufficient to transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application in accordance with the two part 10 Appeal 2016-002434 Application 12/556,753 MayolAlice test. See Ans. 5—6 (“The Supreme Court in Alice, however, contrary to Appellant’s suggested approach, considered whether the idea embodied in the computer programming that was claimed was abstract and found it was (step 1). Then the Supreme Court considered whether the computerized aspects of the claim were not generic, well-known, and conventional and thereby could add ‘substantially more’ to the abstract idea (step 2), and found they did not. The facts of the instant Application are the same as those of Alice in that the applicant in both have claimed computer programming embodied in generic hardware and software embodiments and, thereby, have not claimed patentable subject matter.”). More particularly, the Examiner finds that the computer elements described and claimed (e.g., memory in a non-transitory computer readable medium, a communication path connected to the memory and connectable to a data sender) were “generic, well-known, and conventional.” Ans. 3. See also Adv. Act. 2 (“[Sjtoring data and creating various data structures to represent real-world objects and relationships are generic, well-known and conventional computer functions that do not add significantly more to the claimed abstract idea and therefore do not render patentable subject matter.”). Appellant argues that the claim requires “three sets of data,” that the “control system domain data [comprise] a cycle outcome model instance and a sequence model instance for a cycle in a cycle structure for the appliance,” that “an instance of the appliance user domain data is bound to an instance of the control system domain data, including a cycle outcome model instance or a sequence model instance, or an instance of other appliance user domain data,” and that “a query for information about a portion of the 11 Appeal 2016-002434 Application 12/556,753 appliance user domain data or the other appliance user domain data will return a portion of the instance of control system domain data.” Reply Br. 4—5. In our view, Appellant’s argument simply reiterates elements of its claim, but provides no explanation, supported by persuasive evidence and/or reasoning, as to how the Examiner erred in finding that these claimed elements are generic, well-known, and conventional computer elements. In the absence of any contrary evidence or reasoning, we do not find error with the Examiner’s finding that the computer elements described and claimed function in a conventional manner to manipulate and organize information (e.g., data). See, e.g., Adv. Act. 2. In sum, Appellant has not persuaded us that the computer elements set forth in the claim ‘“transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359— 60 (holding patent-ineligible claims in which “each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions”) (internal quotation marks, citation omitted); see also DDR, 773 F.3d at 1256 (“[AJfter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible”) (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358)). For the foregoing reasons, we find nothing in claim 1 to be sufficiently transformative to render claim 1 patent eligible. We sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 1, and claims 2, 3, 13, 32, and 33 which fall therewith, under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. 12 Appeal 2016-002434 Application 12/556,753 Rejection II Appellant does not present any substantive arguments contesting the Examiner's rejection of claims 1—3, 13, and 15—33 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite. See, e.g., Appeal Br. 3—8 (presenting arguments only as to the § 101 rejection and the obviousness rejections). Consequently, Appellant has waived any argument of error, and we summarily sustain the rejection of claims 1—3, 13, and 15—33 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite. See, e.g., In re Berger, 279 F.3d 975, 984—85 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the Board did not err in sustaining a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, when the applicant failed to contest the rejection on appeal); Hyatt v. Dudas, 551 F.3d 1307, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining that summary affirmance without consideration of the substantive merits is appropriate where an appellant fails to contest a ground of rejection). Rejection III The Examiner finds that Slotznick teaches a meal planning system comprising memory in a non-transitory computer readable medium having appliance user domain data created by the user and related to an appliance (e.g., “various recipes”), other appliance user domain data related to another user who may participate in the at least one meal (e.g., recipes “created according to ‘the number of family members (and planned-for guests). . .’”), and control system domain data developed by a developer for the appliance (e.g., “data regarding various appliances and pots and pans that the user has”). Final Act. 5 (citing Slotznick, 7:1—40). The Examiner also relates “an ‘order in which to cook items[”’] to the claimed “cycle outcome model instance” of the control system domain data 13 Appeal 2016-002434 Application 12/556,753 and ‘“how long to cook each item’” to the claimed “sequence model instance” of the control system domain data. Id. at 6. As to at least one instance of appliance user domain data being bound to at least one instance of control system domain data (or at least one instance of other appliance user domain data), the Examiner finds that “Slotznick teaches that these two datum [e.g., the recipes and available appliances] are ‘bound’ at a minimum to the extent that they are able to be combined in order to result in the critical path” [to ensure that all the food is done at the appropriate times].” Id. (emphasis omitted). As to the claimed communication path connected to the memory and connectable to a data sender, wherein a query for information about at least a portion of one of the appliance user domain data or the other appliance user domain data from the data sender to the memory over the communication path will return at least a portion of the at least one instance of control system domain data to effect the planning and preparing of the at least one meal the Examiner finds that Slotznick teaches “inputting into the device a query that includes at least a portion o[f] a recipe” (e.g., “a fish entree and pasta side dish”) and “the device then returning the critical cooking path that specifies, inter alia, what appliances to use to cook the food.” Id. at 7. According, to the Examiner. Slotznick discloses using “data describing recipes” and “data concerning which pots and pans someone has on hand” in order to generate “additional data . . . that outlines the order in which to ec each item and how long to cook each item.” Ans. 9. To the extent that the cited embodiment “may fail to specifically teach the device having a memory and a communication path connected to the memory and connectable to a data sender, [the Examiner finds that] in its 14 Appeal 2016-002434 Application 12/556,753 first embodiment Slotzmek teaches such a device,” Final Act, 7 (citing Slotznick, Figs. 1, 2) (emphasis omitted). The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to employ the device of the cited embodiment “using the computerized device otherwise taught by the first embodiment of Slotznick, in order to result in a solid state and reliable computing system.” Id. at 7-8. The Examiner also finds that “[fjhe computer programming aspect of what is claimed is rudimentary.” Ans, 9. Appellant acknowledges that Slotznick has “a number of input devices” and “a number of output devices,” but argues that Slotznick fails to disclose “how the input data is handled, associated, related, and manipulated to accomplish or aid the listed activities [e.g., preparing a critical path method].” Appeal Br. 7. That is, Appellant argues that none of the claimed “data structure” is disclosed in Slotznick. Id. Appellant maintains that Slotzmek fails to “disclose how the device operates” and “[t]he Examiner offers no articulated rationale of how one of ordinary skill would arrive at a memory in a non-transitory computer readable medium” meeting the claim language. Reply Br. 8-9. In our view, Appellant has not identified with sufficient particularity a defect in the Examiner's specific findings and conclusions as to how the claimed data structure (e.g., memory having appliance user domain data, other appliance user domain data, and control system domain data; the control system data comprising a cycle outcome model instance and a sequence model instance; binding of one instance of appl iance user domain data to one instance of control system domain data; a commun ication path, wherein a query for information about appliance user domain data returns control system domain data to effect the planning and preparing of a meal) is 15 Appeal 2016-002434 Application 12/556,753 achieved in Slotzniek (see Final Act. 5—7; Ans. 9) so as to persuade us of error by the Examiner. Appellant also argues that it is unreasonable for the Examiner to interpret “control system domain data” so as to extend to “which appliances or pots and pans to use.” Appeal Br. 7. Appellant asserts that “control system domain data” is “information related to the control and operation of an appliance.” Id, Because, according to Appellant, which applianee(s) to use “is not an instance of control system domain data,” Appellant further armies that Slotzniek fails to disclose binding between at least one instance of appl iance user domain data and at least one instance of control system domain data. The Examiner responds that Appellant did not limit the definition of “control system domain data” in its Specification and the limitation is not a term of art. Ans. 10. Thus, according to the Examiner, a broadest reasonable interpretation of “control system domain data” includes “information (“domain data’) concerning what pots and pans (“control system[sj’) an individual had on hand.” Id, We determine the scope of claims in patent applications giving claims “their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification” and “in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Am. Acad. ofSci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). It is the Appellant’s burden to precisely define the invention, not the PTO’s. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1056 (Fed. Cir 1997); see also In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“Although an inventor is indeed free to define the specific terms used to describe his or her invention, this must be done with reasonable clarity, 16 Appeal 2016-002434 Application 12/556,753 deliberateness, and precision.”). Appellant always has the opportunity to amend the claims during prosecution, and broad interpretation by the Examiner reduces the possibility that the claim, once issued, will be interpreted more broadly than is justified. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404—05 (CCPA 1969). In this case, we are not persuaded that Appellant provided an explicit definition of “control system domain data” in their Specification. Moreover, we are not persuaded that the Specification precludes an interpretation of the term “control system domain data” that encompasses which appliances (e.g., pots and pans) to use. In particular, paragraph 70 of the Specification uses open-ended, inclusive language when describing “control system domain data” in that it “includes information related to the control and operation of an appliance” or “includes such things as cycle structures.” Spec. 170 (emphasis added). Such open-ended, inclusive language does not prohibit the Examiner’s interpretation that “control system domain data” encompasses which appliances to use for a particular recipe. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find that the Examiner erred in concluding that the subject matter of independent claim 1 is unpatentable over Slotznick. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 1, and claims 2, 3, 13, 32, and 33, which depend therefrom and for which Appellant provides no separate argument or reasoning. See Appeal Br. 8. Rejection IV and V Claims 15—31 depend from claim 1. Appellant’s arguments in support of the patentability of claims 15—31 solely relate to the perceived deficiencies in Slotznick in connection with the rejection of independent claim 1. See Appeal Br. 8. Because we have found no deficiencies in the 17 Appeal 2016-002434 Application 12/556,753 Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1 based on Slotznick, we determine that the Examiner did not err in concluding that claims 15—18 would have been obvious over Slotznick and Abrams and that claims 19—31 would have been obvious over Slotznick, Abrams, and Larsen. Accordingly, we sustain the rejections, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), of claims 15—18 as unpatentable over Slotznick and Abrams and claims 19-31 as unpatentable over Slotznick, Abrams, and Larsen. DECISION The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1—3, 13, 32, and 33 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is affirmed. The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1—3, 13, and 15—33 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant regards as the invention is summarily affirmed. The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1—3, 13, 32, and 33 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Slotznick is affirmed. The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 15—18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Slotznick and Abrams is affirmed. The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 19—31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Slotznick, Abrams, and Larsen is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 18 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation