Ex Parte McCowin

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 28, 2017

14045792 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 28, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/045,792 10/03/2013 Peter D. McCowin 07-1110-US-DIV 4838
63759 7590 03/02/2017
DTTKFW YFF
EXAMINER
YEE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. AFTERGUT, JEFFRY H
P.O. BOX 802333
DALLAS, TX 75380 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1746
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/02/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ptonotifs @yeeiplaw.com
mgamez @ yeeiplaw. com
patentadmin @ boeing. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte PETER D. MCCOWIN
Appeal 2016-001257
Application 14/045,792
Technology Center 1700
Before GEORGE C. BEST, DONNA M. PRAISS, and
ELIZABETH M. ROESEL, Administrative Patent Judges.
PRAISS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL1
1 In this decision, we refer to the Specification filed Oct. 3, 2013 (“Spec.”),
the Final Office Action appealed from mailed Mar. 27, 2015 (“Final Act.”),
the Appeal Brief filed May 21, 2015 (“App. Br.”), the Examiner’s Answer
mailed Aug. 28, 2015 (“Ans.”), and the Reply Brief filed Oct. 28, 2015
(“Reply Br.”).
Appeal 2016-001257
Application 14/045,792
STATEMENT OF CASE
Appellant2 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 21-23 and 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Johnson3 in view of either one of Shupe4 or Benson.5
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
The subject matter on appeal relates to “automated fiber placement
[AFP] systems.” Spec. ^ 1. “AFP machines may be used in the aircraft
industry, for example to fabricate structural shapes and skin assemblies by
wrapping relatively narrow strips of composite, slit tape or ‘tows’,
collimated into a wider band, around a manufacturing tool.” Id. ^ 2. Claims
21 and 23 are illustrative (disputed limitations italicized and bracketed
matter added):
21. A fiber tape placement apparatus for placing fiber
tape on a substrate, comprising:
a plurality of tape supply devices each holding a supply of
fiber tape, wherein at least one tape strip from the plurality of
tape supply devices has a start staggered relative to other tape
strips from the plurality of tape supply devices;
a device for compacting the tape on the substrate;
a plurality of threading mechanisms respectively
associated with the tape supply devices and each operable for
initiating tape feed from one of the tape supply devices to the
compaction device such that each tape strip individually fed to
2 The real party in interest is identified as The Boeing Company. Br. 2.
3 Johnson et al., US 5,698,066, iss. Dec. 16, 1997 (“Johnson”).
4 Shupe et al., US 5,290,389, iss. Mar. 1, 1994 (“Shupe”).
5 Benson et al., US 5,045,147, iss. Sept. 3, 1991 (“Benson”).
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Application 14/045,792
the substrate and placed on the substrate is contiguous with
another of the tape strips; and,
a cutting device including a single cutting blade for
cutting, with a single cut, the ends of all of the tapes fed to the
compaction device substantially simultaneously.
23. The fiber tape placement apparatus of claim 21,
wherein:
the tapes are arranged side-by-side as the tapes are fed to
the compaction device, and
the cutting blade is position [ed] to cut the ends of the tapes
while the tapes are in side-by-side relationship.
App. Br. 18 (Claims Appendix).
Appellant does not separately argue the patentability of claims 22 and
25. In accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv), claims 22 and 25 will
stand or fall together with independent claim 21. See App. Br. 16 (“Claims
22 and 25 stand or fall with claim 21.”).
OPINION
Claim 21
Regarding claim 21, the Examiner finds that Johnson teaches a device
for compacting tape on a substrate which includes a plurality of devices for
holding a supply of fiber tapes or tows (Johnson Fig. 1, item 2), a
compaction roller {id. at Fig. 1, item 4), and a cutting mechanism (id. at Fig.
1, item 17) to cut the tapes that are brought together into a single band and
severed substantially simultaneously with a single cut. Ans. 2. The
Examiner also finds that Johnson does not teach “separate threading
mechanisms for each of the tows or tapes at a cut/add/restart assembly
disposed between the tape supplies and the compaction device.” Id. at 3.
The Examiner further finds that “[s]uch a mechanism disposed between the
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Application 14/045,792
tape supplies and the compaction device to individually sever, add and
restart individual tapes would have enabled one to vary the bandwidth of the
tape 2 supplied at the compaction roller in Johnson by allowing one to drop
and add tapes at the ends of the tape band to vary the width of the same.” Id.
In addition, the Examiner finds that Shupe and Benson evidence that “it was
known at the time the invention was made to provide a cut/add (threading
mechanism) mechanism for each tape fed to the compaction roller from the
tape supplies in order to enable one to be able to vary the band width of the
tape.” Id. at 3. The Examiner also finds that the threading mechanisms of
Shupe and Benson provide “the means to add the tows or tapes to the
compaction roller upstream of the cutter in Johnson” to “vary the band width
during application without severing the entire band and feeding a different
width tape through the head.” Id. at 3-4 (citing Shupe 1:14^10; Benson 1:5-
29, 1:66-2:4). Regarding the combination of references, the Examiner finds
that because Shupe and Benson “allowed for the tapes to be individually
restarted and fed to the compaction roller[,] one skilled in the art would have
understood that the machines therein were capable of a staggered start
wherein tapes (or tows) were added in sequence to increase the width of the
tape band being applied at the compaction roller.” Id. at 5.
Appellant acknowledges that the terms “tows” and “tapes” are used
interchangeably in the art. App. Br. 8, 15. Appellant contends that the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 21 is in error because it “did not properly
assess the differences among the prior art considered as a whole and the
claimed invention.” Id. at 8. Appellant argues that “it is not reasonable to
attempt to combine the techniques of Johnson with those of Shupe and
Benson because they represent completely different tape application
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Application 14/045,792
techniques: pluralities of tows versus a single band and individual cutting of
ones of a plurality of tows versus a single cut of a single tow.” Id. at 10-11.
According to Appellant, “it does not make sense to both cut individually
pluralities of tows immediately prior to application and also to cut a single
band immediately prior to application.” Id. at 11. Appellant also argues
(1) “it is impossible for Johnson to apply tape strips individually and
contiguously onto the substrate as claimed[,]” (2) “Shupe and Benson cannot
disclose this feature because the tapes applie[d] are not contiguous with
another of the tape strips[,]” and (3) “the Examiner cannot reasonably
interpret the term ‘contiguous’ as meaning the same thing that is shown in
Shupe and Benson.” Id. at 11-12.6 Appellant further contends that
“[bjecause the tapes have a staggered start,” the structure of the claimed
device “accomplishes a goal that the cited combination as a whole cannot
accomplish.” Id. at 12-13. Finally, Appellant contends that “the principle
of operation of Johnson would be changed from the application of a melded
band to that of a plurality of tows” if Johnson were combined with Shupe or
Benson. Id. at 13.
The Examiner responds that claim 21 does not exclude either (1) “the
use of a ribbonizing device which formed the individual tapes into a melded
band” as disclosed by Johnson (Ans. 7) nor (2) “incorporation of individual
cutting means within the system” as disclosed by Shupe {id. at 8). The
6 On page 15 of the Appeal Brief, Appellant asserts that the term
“‘contiguous’ . . . has a tighter meaning than ‘side by side’” but does not
provide claim constructions for either term. See App. Br. 15. If prosecution
continues, the Examiner should consider whether dependent claim 23, which
recites “side-by-side” for the tape arrangement, further limits claim 21,
which recites “contiguous”, in compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112, 4.
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Application 14/045,792
Examiner also responds that because all of the tapes fed to Johnson’s
compaction device are severed with a single blade that cuts a single cut,
Johnson necessarily severs all of the tapes with a single cut and it is “merely
semantics” whether they are called individual tapes or a single melded tape
band. Id. at 6-7. The Examiner further responds that “the add means
described [in Shupe] would have been viewed as an alternative form of add
means in a tape or tow placement system which afforded one with the ability
to vary the band width of the melded band being applied to the surface in
order to avoid overlaps and gaps in the placement of the tapes upon the
surface.” Id. at 9. The Examiner also finds that “Johnson et al taught a
means to rethread the tows after the tows of the melded band have been
severed” and that one skilled in the art would have viewed the add means of
Shupe to be an alternative add means. Id. (citing Johnson 2:16-19).
Regarding the assertion that the tows are not contiguous in the prior
art references, the Examiner finds that “‘contiguous’ is defined as ‘sharing a
common border or being in actual contact’ and clearly a melded band or
tows or tapes [as disclosed in Johnson] would have the individual tows or
tapes in contact with each other so that the final product was a single band of
melded tapes.” Id. at 15. Shupe and Benson, on the other hand, are not
applied “for the compaction application of the tapes but rather for the
specific form of add mechanism one would have provided in Johnson.” Id.
The Examiner finds “inclusion of the add means for Benson et al or Shupe et
al [to vary the band width applied by the device] would have provided one
with a device which was capable of feeding the tapes in the staggered
arrangement one at a time to increase the band width.” Id. at 16.
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In the Reply Brief, Appellant asserts that the claim language “all of
the tapes” requires that a plurality of tows or tapes be cut, however,
“Johnson cuts one tow or tape.” Reply Br. 2-3. Appellant also argues that
“if multiple cutters are added at the tape adding section of Johnson to vary
the width of the tape, the result must and necessarily be the creation of
scrap” which Appellant asserts is contrary to Johnson and also an
unnecessary improvement because “Johnson already can vary tape width by
turning the comb 36.” Id. at 4; id. at 7 (“Johnson already controls band
width by means turning the comb 14, so there is no need to waste material
by cutting it at the compaction roller to produce a different width.”); id. at 10
(arguing modifying Johnson’s add means results in undesirable scrap); id. at
14, 15-16 (arguing that adding cutters to Johnson would add scrap).
Appellant also contends that the claims “plainly and on their face” exclude
the use of additional cutting means. Id. at 6.
Regarding Johnson’s disclosure of an “add means upstream from said
cutting means for holding said cut tape band and adding on demand to
permit the application of tape band to the mandrel where desired” (Johnson
2:16-19), Appellant contends “the sole purpose ... is to re-thread the
solitary band once it has been severed by the downstream cutting device.”
Reply Br. 8. Appellant further argues that modification of Johnson’s feeding
or adding arrangement would not vary tape or tow width “if the same width
of tape is now being laid down, just in different cut sections next to each
other.” Id. at 12.
Appellant also argues that the “staggered tape strip start requires that
the tape supply devices be differently] positioned; otherwise, the tapes
could not be staggered as claimed.” Id. at 13. Finally, Appellant contends
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Application 14/045,792
that “[b]y process of elimination, the claims must exclude melding the tapes
to form a single band” because “any hypothetical melding would have to
take place after the tape has left the claimed device and is already on the
substrate.” Id. at 15.
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive because Appellant’s
distinction between a plurality of tapes “contiguous” with each other as
required by claim 21 and Johnson’s tows formed into a band is conclusory
and not supported by the record. The Examiner’s construction of the term
“contiguous” as “sharing a common border or being in actual contact” is
reasonable, undisputed, and consistent with the Specification. Spec. 42,
43, Figs. 10, 11, 12, 14, 16. Likewise, the Examiner’s finding that the terms
tows and tapes are used interchangeably is also undisputed and further
supported by the Specification, which explicitly defines “‘composite fiber
tape’, ‘fiber tape,’ ‘tape’ and ‘tape strips’ [as] intended to include a wide
range of tapes, ‘tows’ and rovings, including those having standard widths
such as, without limitation, three inches or six inches, and those having
nonstandard widths such as one-eighth inch or one-quarter inch (‘tows’).”
Id. 33.
Consequently, the Examiner’s finding that the claims do not exclude
forming the tapes into a melded band (Ans. 7) is consistent with the claim
constructions of “contiguous” and “tape” and further supported by (1)
Figures 10 and 12 of the Specification which show all of the tapes 36 as an
entire band 106 and (2) paragraph 42 of the Specification which describes
“simultaneously” and “substantially simultaneously” cutting all of the tapes
as “severing] all of the tapes 36 in the band 106 at substantially the same
point at the end of a course” or “a cutter . . . could be drawn transversely
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Application 14/045,792
across the band 106 in a single stroke to sequentially cut the tapes 36 in a
band 106 at the end of the course.” Therefore, Appellant’s position that
cutting a band of tows, as disclosed by Johnson, is not a disclosure of cutting
all of the individual tapes (or tows) in a single cut substantially
simultaneously as required by claim 21 is not supported by the record.
Moreover, Appellant does not dispute that Johnson discloses
tapes/tows that are contiguous with each other on the substrate as found by
the Examiner (Ans. 14). Rather, Appellant contends that (1) Johnson cannot
“apply tape strips individually and contiguously onto the substrate as
claimed” and (2) Shupe and Benson do not disclose contiguous tape strips
based on a comparison of the cited prior art to Figure 12 of the Specification.
App. Br. 12. Figure 12 of the Specification is shown below.
112—
START
POINT
■~r\ DIRECTION
OF TRAVEL
FIG. 12
Figure 12 of the Specification “is a plan view of one tape band illustrating
the sequential, timed starting points of individual tape strips ending at a
common cutting point.” Spec. ^ 24.
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Application 14/045,792
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive because they do not pertain
to the rejection as made by the Examiner. The Examiner relies on Shupe
and Benson, not Johnson, for teaching the “plurality of threading
mechanisms” such that “each tape strip [is] individually fed” as required by
claim 21. Ans. 3, 15. Similarly, the Examiner relies upon Johnson, not
Shupe and Benson, for teaching a contiguous arrangement on the substrate at
the compaction roller. Id. at 2, 15. In addition, Appellant does not
adequately explain why the threading mechanisms of Shupe and Benson do
not apply the tapes contiguous with each other. DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181
F.3d 865, 866-67 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“A brief must make all arguments
accessible to the judges, rather than ask them to play archeologist with the
record.”).
We also are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the
teachings of Johnson and Shupe cannot be combined because they represent
different tape application techniques and because the combination would
change the principle of operation of Johnson. Appellant acknowledges that
both Johnson and Shupe disclose devices for delivering tows for application
onto an object on a mandrel. App. Br. 8-9. Indeed, Figure 1 of Johnson and
Figure 1 of Shupe are nearly identical in depicting their respective filament
delivery systems and mandrel around which the filament is applied.
Johnson, Fig. 1; Shupe, Fig. 1. Discussing the question of obviousness of
claimed subject matter involving a combination of known elements, KSR
Inti. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 explains:
When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design
incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it,
either in the same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary
skill can implement a predictable variation, §103 likely bars its
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Application 14/045,792
patentability. For the same reason, if a technique has been used
to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art
would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the
same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual
application is beyond his or her skill. Sakraida [v. AG Pro, Inc.,
425 U.S. 273 (1976)] and Anderson’s-Black Rock[, Inc. v.
Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)] are illustrative—a
court must ask whether the improvement is more than the
predictable use of prior art elements according to their
established functions.
KSR, 550 U.S. 398 at 417. If the claimed subject matter cannot be fairly
characterized as involving the simple substitution of one known element for
another or the mere application of a known technique to a piece of prior art
ready for the improvement, a holding of obviousness can be based on a
showing that “there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements
in the fashion claimed.” Id. at 418. Such a showing requires,
“some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to
support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” ... [H]owever, the
analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the
specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can
take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would employ.
KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir.
2006)).
If the Examiner’s burden is met, the burden then shifts to the
Appellant to overcome the prima facie case with argument and/or evidence.
Obviousness is then determined on the basis of the evidence as a whole and
the relative persuasiveness of the arguments. See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d
1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
The Examiner’s reason for combining the threading means of Shupe
and Benson with the device of Johnson is to “enable[] one to vary the
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Application 14/045,792
bandwidth of the tape 2 supplied at the compaction roller in Johnson by
allowing one to drop and add tapes at the ends of the tape band to vary the
width of the same” and to “enable [] one to better control the band width of
the tape applied in Johnson.” Ans. 3—4. The Examiner finds that the
threading means of Shupe and Benson “would have been viewed as a more
sophisticated means for threading the tows or tapes in Johnson.” Id. at 4.
Regarding Appellant’s argument that the combination would change
Johnson’s principle of operation, the Examiner points out that the argument
incorrectly presumes “that substitution of the threading means (which
included the individual cut/add assemblies) of Shupe et al or Benson et al
would require the removal of the single cutter in Johnson et al.” Id. at 16.
Thus the Examiner provided a reason for combining the cited references that
is supported by the evidence and the burden shifted to Appellant.
In the Appeal Brief, Appellant does not dispute that Shupe and
Benson’s threading mechanisms would have been viewed as more
sophisticated than that of Johnson. Nor does Appellant dispute that Shupe
and Benson’s threading mechanisms would have provided better control of
the bandwidth. Appellant’s only argument in the Appeal Brief that the
combination “does not make sense or is illogical” is “because they represent
completely different tape application techniques: pluralities of tows versus a
single band and individual cutting of ones of a plurality of tows versus a
single cut of a single tow.” App. Br. 10-11. This argument is not
persuasive because, as discussed above, Appellant acknowledges that the
cited references all relate to applying tows to a substrate on a mandrel, and
Appellant’s own Specification acknowledges that a band comprises a
plurality of tows. Spec. ^ 42, Figs. 10, 12. In the Reply Brief, Appellant
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Application 14/045,792
argues for the first time that the Examiner’s reason for combining Johnson
with Shupe or Benson “is pointless” because “Johnson already controls the
width of the band 2 by turning the upstream comb 36.” Reply Br. 8.
Appellant also argues in the Reply Brief that “[tjhere is no reason to add a
cutter [from Shupe or Benson’s threading mechanism] to vary band width,
especially because doing so is worse than pointless.” Id. According to
Appellant, the combination “would vary the band width, but it would also
produce scrap—directly and explicitly contrary to the intent of Johnson.” Id.
(citing Johnson 3:23-31).
Appellant has not explained what “good cause” there might be to
consider these newly raised arguments concerning the Examiner’s reason for
combining the references to vary the bandwidth of the tape. See Ex parte
Borden, 93 USPQ2d 1473 (BPAI 2010) (informative) (“concluding] that
the regulations set out in 37 C.F.R. § 41, Practice Before the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences, do not require the Board to consider such
belated arguments”). Even considering Appellant’s belated argument, we
are not persuaded of reversible error by the Examiner because the benefit of
varying width by modifying Johnson with the threading mechanisms of
Shupe or Benson is not disputed. Even if scrap were to be produced by also
modifying the adding means 16 in Johnson to include a cutter to vary band
width as argued by Appellant, “simultaneous advantages and disadvantages
. . . [do] not necessarily obviate motivation to combine.” Medichem, S.A. v.
Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
We also are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument in the Reply Brief
that “staggered tape strip start requires that the tape supply devices be
differently] positioned” (Reply Br. 13) because Appellant has not shown
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adequately that the threading mechanism of Shupe or Benson, by which each
tape strip is individually fed, is not capable of controlling the tape strips such
that a start staggered relative to other tape strips is produced as required by
claim 21. Claim 21 does not require that the tape supply devices be
differently positioned as argued by Appellant, by rather, that the tape strips
be staggered relative to other tape strips. Moreover, the Specification refutes
Appellant’s contention that the start-staggered tape strips is effectuated by
the tape supply devices’ position rather than the control of the tape strips.
Spec. ^ 40 (“Since the tape threading mechanisms 90 can be independently
actuated by actuators 86, the starting point of each tape 36 can be
independently controlled so that these starting points may be staggered in
any desired pattern.”).
Finally, Appellant’s argument that “hypothetical melding would have
to take place after the tape has left the claimed device and is already on the
substrate” in order to be within the scope of the claims (Reply Br. 15) is not
supported by the evidence. As discussed earlier, the requirement of claim 21
that the cutting device cuts “the ends of all of the tapes fed to the compaction
device substantially simultaneously” does not preclude a band of tapes being
cut.
In the absence of any error in the Examiner’s findings, we do not find
the Appellant’s arguments sufficient to justify a reversal of the Examiner’s
rejection. In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining that
even if the examiner had failed to make a prima facie case, the Board would
not have erred in framing the issue as one of reversible error because it has
long been the Board’s practice to require an appellant to identify the alleged
error in the examiner’s rejections).
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In sum, Appellant has not persuaded us of reversible error in the
Examiner’s finding that claim 21 would have been obvious over Johnson in
view of either Shupe or Benson.
Claim 23
Regarding claim 23, the Examiner finds that “the tapes in the
references are fed side by side to the compaction roller and the blade in
Johnson is disposed to sever these side by side tapes.” Ans. 5-6.
Appellant’s argument is that the combination does not disclose “the
cutting blade is positioned] to cut the ends of the tapes while the tapes are in
side-by-side relationship” as recited in claim 23 because “the asserted tape in
Johnson is not a plurality of contiguous tows placed side-by-side, but rather
is a melded whole.” App. Br. 16. According to Appellant, “[t]o meet this
feature the cutter in Johnson would have to be positioned back where the
tows are separated, which would make no sense.” Id.
The Examiner responds that Appellant’s distinction over the
references pertains to “the material worked upon and not any structure of the
device.” Ans. 17. The Examiner further responds that the tows in Johnson
“are in contact with each other and in contiguous relation relative to each
other (i.e. in contact with one another) in order for the tows to be melded.”
Id. The Examiner also finds that “the device of Johnson et al is clearly
capable of cutting the plurality of tapes in side by side and contiguous
deposition as the melded tape band is in this condition” and “the claims do
not exclude melding the tapes which are already in side by side contact
together to form a single band.” Id. at 17-18.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that a side-by-side
arrangement of tapes precludes a melded band and that claim 23 precludes a
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device that cuts a melded tape band for the reasons discussed above in
connection with claim 21, namely, the tapes or tows in a melded band of
tapes or tows as disclosed by Johnson are necessarily in contiguous
relationship with each other, which means sharing a common border or
being in actual contact. Although “side-by-side” may not require that the
tapes share a common border as does the term “contiguous,” such an
arrangement where the tapes share a common border would necessarily be
“side-by-side” and therefore encompassed by a band of tows or tapes that
are contiguous. Stated another way, nothing in the record suggests that tapes
in a contiguous relationship are not also in a side-by-side relationship. Our
construction of the term “side-by-side” to encompass a “contiguous”
arrangement is consistent with ^ 38 of the Specification which uses the term
“side-by-side” to describe the relationship of the tapes maintained by slotted
guides 80 in tape alignment and rethread modules 58.
In sum, Appellant has not persuaded us of a reversible error in the
Examiner’s finding that claim 23 would have been obvious over Johnson in
view of Shupe or Benson.
CONCLUSION
We sustain the Examiner’s rejections.
ORDER
The Examiner’s decision is affirmed.
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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1).
AFFIRMED
17