Ex Parte Martins

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 19, 2016

12632935 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 19, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
12/632,935 12/08/2009 Carlos E. Martins
42624 7590 09/19/2016
DAVIDSON BERQUIST JACKSON & GOWDEY LLP
8300 Greensboro Dr, Suite 500
McLean, VA 22102
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
2540-1202 4787
EXAMINER
BAUER, SCOTT ALLEN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2836
MAILDATE DELIVERY MODE
09/19/2016 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte CARLOS E. MAR TINS 1
Appeal2015-001351
Application 12/632,935
Technology Center 2800
Before MARK NAGUMO, WESLEY B. DERRICK, and
CHRISTOPHER L. OGDEN, Administrative Patent Judges.
DERRICK, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the
Examiner's maintained rejection of claims 1-13. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6.
We AFFIRM.
BACKGROUND
Appellant's claimed invention relates to a "power distribution unit
that switches off power outlets in the event of an overcurrent condition by
using circuitry that measures how long input current has exceeded a
1 Appellant identifies A vocent Corporation as the real party in interest.
Appeal Br. 1.
Appeal2015-001351
Application 12/632,935
threshold and sending a reset signal to the power outlets when input current
has exceeded the threshold for a predetermined time duration." Spec.
Abstract. Independent claims 1 and 9 are directed to power distribution
units. Independent claim 6 is directed to a method using a power
distribution unit.
Independent claims 1 and 9 are illustrative:
1. A power distribution unit comprising:
a plurality of switched power outlets adapted to provide
power to external devices wherein the switched power outlets
are adapted to be controlled by a control signal to open power
to the external devices at the switched power outlets;
a sensor that measures the magnitude of the current of
power being drawn by the power distribution unit;
a comparator that determines if the magnitude of the
current exceeds a predetermined threshold;
time qualification circuitry that determines if the
magnitude of the current exceeds the predetermined threshold
for a predetermined time duration;
a control bus communicating with the plurality of
switched power outlets to provide to selected ones of the
plurality of switched power outlets to open power to the
corresponding external devices at the selected switched power
outlets; and
control circuitry that sends a control signal to said
switched power outlets to command selected ones of the
switched power outlets to open power to the corresponding
external devices when the magnitude of the current exceeds a
predetermined threshold for a predetermined time duration.
9. A power distribution unit comprising:
a plurality of switched power outlets adapted to provide
power to external devices wherein the switched power outlets
are adapted to be controlled by a control signal to open power
to the external devices at the switched power outlets;
2
Appeal2015-001351
Application 12/632,935
sensor circuitry that measures the magnitude of the
current of power being drawn by each of said plurality of
switched power outlets;
comparator circuitry that determines for each of said
plurality of switched power outlets if the magnitude of the
current exceeds a predetermined threshold;
time qualification circuitry that determines for each of
said plurality of switched power outlets if the magnitude of the
current exceeds the predetermined threshold for a
predetermined time duration;
a control bus communicating with the plurality of
switched power outlets to provide to selected ones of the
plurality of switched power outlets the control signal to open
power to the corresponding external devices at the selected
switched power outlets; and
control circuitry that sends a control signal to the selected
ones of said plurality of switched power outlets if the
magnitude of the current of the switched power outlet exceeds a
predetermined threshold for a predetermined time duration.
Appeal Br. (Claims Appendix) 13, 15.
THE REJECTIONS
The claims stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as follows:
I. Claims 1-3 over Sullivan2 in view of Covi; 3
II. Claims 4-8 over Sullivan in view of Covi and Smith;4
III. Claims 9-11 over Shaya5 in view of Covi; and
IV. Claims 12 and 13 over Shaya in view of Covi and Smith.
2 Sullivan, II et al., US 4,324,987, issued April 13, 1982.
3 Covi et al., US 2002/0118500 Al, published August 29, 2002.
4 Smith et al., US 2004/0059903 Al, published March 25, 2004.
5 Shaya et al., US 2006/0238938 Al, published October 26, 2006.
3
Appeal2015-001351
Application 12/632,935
DISCUSSION 6
Upon consideration of the record, we do not find Appellant's
arguments persuasive of reversible error in the Examiner's decision rejecting
the claims. We add the following.
Appellant relies on argument grounded on the meaning of "power
distribution unit"-recited in the preamble of each independent claim, i.e.,
claims 1, 6, and 9-for all claims and proffers further argument as to
independent claim 9 rejected over Shaya in view of Covi.
Appellant's argument as to all claims is that the Examiner erred in
giving the term "power distribution unit" an overly broad meaning. See
generally Appeal Br.; Reply Br. In particular, Appellant argues that "none
of the cited references disclose a 'power distribution unit' as recited, for
example, in claim l ." Appeal Br. 6. Addressing Sullivan and Covi that the
Examiner relied on in rejecting claim 1, Appellant contends that neither
"include[s] the words 'power distribution unit' or 'PDU"' (Appeal Br. 6-7),
that Sullivan merely "describes a residential energy management system for
power for an entire residence" (Appeal Br. 6-7, citing Sullivan col. 1, 11. 19-
25, col. 2, 11. 62-63), and that Covi merely describes a solid state circuit
breaker in which outlets are not controlled, but "instead the whole load is
shut down" (Appeal Br. 7, citing Covi Fig. 3, ,-i,-i 11, 20).
Appellant contends that "power distribution unit" is a "known term of
art" and that the Specification, particularly the second sentence of the second
paragraph, clearly indicates its meaning. Appeal Br. 8-9 (citing Spec. 2-5,
6 We refer to the Final Office Action mailed May 22, 2013, the Appeal Brief
filed June 18, 2014, the Examiner's Answer mailed September 3, 2014, and
the Reply Brief filed November 3, 2014.
4
Appeal2015-001351
Application 12/632,935
Fig. 6 ). Appellant further contends that the relevant art, the context in which
the meaning of the term "power distribution unit" must be drawn, is that
relating to the "typical use" of "powering a plurality of back racked servers."
Appeal Br. 8-9 (quoting Spec. ii 2); see also Reply Br. 1--4.
We begin our analysis by determining the meaning of the claims,
giving terms the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the
Specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.
See, e.g., In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 1259-60 (Fed. Cir.
2010); In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054-55 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re
ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("[A]s
applicants may amend claims to narrow their scope, a broad construction
during prosecution creates no unfairness to the applicant or patentee.").
Looking to the Specification, we discern no particular definition, but
rather an explanation that "[p ]ower distribution units provide a way to
distribute power from a single input source to a plurality of power outlets"
and that "[a] typical use ... is powering a plurality of back racked servers
through a single connection to a building's wiring system." Spec. ii 2.
Further disclosure, including that in paragraphs 2-5 and Figure 6, fails to
provide any definition to limit the meaning more narrowly than "[units] to
distribute power from a single input source to a plurality of power outlets."
As the recited use of "powering a plurality of back racked servers" is merely
"[a] typical use of a power distribution unit" (Spec. ii 2), it is insufficient to
limit the meaning of "power distribution unit" to those powering, or capable
of powering, a plurality of servers. See, e.g., Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV
Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("[A] particular
5
Appeal2015-001351
Application 12/632,935
embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read into a
claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment.").
As to "power distribution unit" being a known term of art, the issue is
both whether it is a known term of art and what meaning, if any, it takes in
the claim. Having carefully considered the Specification, including
paragraphs 2-5 and Figure 6, we find nothing that expressly limits the
"power distribution unit" to a unit supplying power to servers or to any other
particular type of device. Nor does Appellant direct us to any such
language, only arguing that the recited "typical use" indicates "that the
known term of art is being referred to." Appeal Br. 8-9 (citing Spec. iJ 2);
see also Reply Br. 1-4. The Examiner, however, has explained that usage of
the phrase "power distribution unit" is not so limited where it is, for
example, used to describe a unit distributing power to various outlets in a
home. Final Act. 10 (citing Domigan,7 col. 7, 11. 47-50); see also Ans. 6.8
The Examiner further explains that while "the term 'power distribution unit'
is used in the server environment as a rack mounted device that supplies
power to a rack of servers," the term is not limited to that meaning. Final
Act. 10; see also Ans. 6.
In effect, the phrase "power distribution unit" has a narrower "known
term of art" meaning in the context of a server environment and a broader
7 US 5,675,194 (cited by way of example).
8 Appellant addresses the Examiner's citation to Domigan in the Reply
Brief, noting that it "does not change the ordinary and customary meaning of
a term of art to those of ordinary skill in the relevant art." Reply Br. 4.
Appellant's argument is, however, untimely as the Examiner relied on
Domigan for this position no later than the Final Office Action and
Appellant has not shown good cause why the argument was not raised in the
Appeal Brief. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 41.4l(b)(2) (2012).
6
Appeal2015-001351
Application 12/632,935
meaning outside of that context that encompasses the narrower. The
question then is whether one of ordinary skill in the art would interpret the
claims to be limited to a server environment, which we answer in the
negative on this record. Cf In re Self, 671F.2d1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982) (It
is well established that limitations not appearing in the claims cannot be
relied upon for patentability.). It follows that the proper interpretation of the
phrase "power distribution unit" is, as stated in the Specification, and wholly
consistent with the Specification, a unit that "distribute[ s] power from a
single source to a plurality of power outlets." Spec. iJ 2.
Turning to Appellant's arguments that neither Sullivan nor Covi
discloses a "power distribution unit" (Appeal Br. 6-7, 9-10), we find them
without merit given the proper interpretation of the phrase "power
distribution unit" for the reasons set forth by the Examiner (Final Act. 2--4,
9-11; Ans. 3-6).
Appellant's argument as to claim 9 rejected over Shaya in view of
Covi is that neither reference teaches or suggests sending a control signal to
selected outlets based on exceeding time duration. Appeal Br. 10-11. The
argument focuses on the absence of individual switch power outlets in Covi
where it directs the artisan to shut down an entire system when over-current
conditions are met. Appeal Br. 11. Appellant contends the Examiner's
"inference[] ... [that] 'one would use the timer qualification for each
circuit. .. ' (emphasis added)" is not actually disclosed or suggested in either
reference. Reply Br. 4.
We find Appellant's argument unpersuasive of reversible error
because it fails to address squarely the relied on teachings and reasoning as
set forth by the Examiner (Final Act. 7-8; Ans. 6-7) in which Covi is relied
7
Appeal2015-001351
Application 12/632,935
on for teaching the use of a control signal when the magnitude of current
exceeds a predetermined threshold for a predetermined time duration (Final
Act. 8; Ans. 7) and Shaya for its teaching of, inter alia, monitoring and
controlling current of switched power outlets individually (Final Act. 7; Ans.
7). As explained by the Examiner, Appellant's argument fails to address
"what one of ordinary skill would have learned from the combination of the
two references." Ans. 7. The argument is not, therefore, persuasive of error.
See KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (an obviousness
analysis "need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject
matter of the challenged claim, for [an examiner] can take account of the
inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
employ."); In re Preda, 401F.2d825, 826 (CCPA 1968) ("[I]t is proper to
take into account not only specific teachings of the reference but also the
inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be expected to draw
therefrom."); see also In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) ("The
test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may
be bodily incorporated into the structure of a primary reference .... Rather,
the test is what the combined teachings of those references would have
suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.").
On this record, we are unpersuaded of reversible error in the
Examiner's decision. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner's rejection of
claims 1-13.
8
Appeal2015-001351
Application 12/632,935
CONCLUSION
The Examiner's rejections of claims 1-13 are AFFIRMED.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 3 7 C.F .R. § 1.13 6( a )(1 ).
AFFIRMED
9