Ex Parte MarcusDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardNov 14, 201713474618 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 14, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/474,618 05/17/2012 Robert Marcus ROTOP002X1 3093 22434 7590 11/16/2017 Weaver Austin Villeneuve & Sampson LLP P.O. BOX 70250 OAKLAND, CA 94612-0250 EXAMINER CHIN-SHUE, ALVIN CONSTANTINE ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3634 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 11/16/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): USPTO@wavsip.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ROBERT MARCUS Appeal 2015-004949 Application 13/474,618 Technology Center 3600 Before JOHN C. KERINS, EDWARD A. BROWN, and ARTHUR M. PESLAK, Administrative Patent Judges. BROWN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Robert Marcus (Appellant)1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 10—16, 18—20, and 22-40.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM-IN-PART. 1 The Appeal Brief identifies the inventor, Robert Marcus, as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 4. 2 Claims 1—9, 17, and 21 are cancelled. Appeal Br. 47-49 (Claims App.). Appeal 2015-004949 Application 13/474,618 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Claims 34 and 40 are independent. Claim 34 is illustrative of the claimed subject matter, and reads: 34. A system comprising: a deployable descent device, the deployable descent device having a first end and a second end; and an aerial vehicle configured to: deliver the deployable descent device to an elevated location at the side of a building, anchor the first end of the deployable descent device to a feature that is on the side of the building at the elevated location or to a feature that is accessible through the side of the building via an opening in the side of the building at the elevated location while the first end of the deployable descent device is supported by the aerial vehicle, and release the first end of the deployable descent device after the first end of the deployable descent device is anchored to the feature that is on the side of the building at the elevated location or to the feature that is accessible through the side of the building via the opening in the side of the building at the elevated location. Appeal Br. 51—52 (Claims App.). REJECTIONS The Final Action includes the following rejections: I. Claims 34 and 40 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Sellards (US 4,256,199, issued Mar. 17, 1981). II. Claims 34 and 40 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Xia (US 2003/0116380 Al, published June 26, 2003). 2 Appeal 2015-004949 Application 13/474,618 III. Claims 10-12, 15, 16, 18-20, 25, 29, 32, 34, 37, and 40 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Goossen (US 8,251,307 B2, issued Aug. 28, 2012) and Sellards. IV. Claim 35 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Sellards and Weinandt (US 1,242,286, issued Oct. 9, 1917). V. Claims 13 and 35 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Goossen, Sellards, and Weinandt. VI. Claims 14 and 36 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Goossen, Sellards, and Andrews (US 3,741,340, issued June 26, 1973). VII. Claim 24 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Goossen, Sellards, and Huff (US 966,447, issued Aug. 9, 1910) or Douglas (US 5,605,205, issued Feb. 25, 1997). VIII. Claims 27 and 28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Goossen, Sellards and Huang (US 2004/0031646 Al, published Feb. 19, 2004). IX. Claims 22, 23, 30, and 31 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Goossen, Sellards, and Protesto (US 2005/0242602 Al, published Nov. 3, 2005). X. Claims 26 and 33 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Goossen, Sellards, and Stewart (US 3,490,547, issued Jan. 20, 1970). 3 Appeal 2015-004949 Application 13/474,618 XI. Claims 38 and 39 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Goossen, Sellards, and Wing Shee (US 2,538,719, issued Jan. 16, 1951).3 ANALYSIS I. Claims 34 and 40 anticipated by Sellards As to claim 34, the Examiner finds that Sellards discloses a deployable descent device 11 (cable 11) and an aerial vehicle (helicopter 15) that is “capable to” meet the “deliver,” “anchor,” and “release” limitations. Final Act. 2—3. Claim 40 is directed to an aerial vehicle and recites substantially the same limitations as those in claim 34 pertaining to the aerial vehicle. Appeal Br. 53 (Claims App.). The Examiner relies on the same findings for claim 40 as those made for claim 34. Final Act. 2—3. Figure 1 of Sellards depicts a building rescue system comprising cable 11 having an upper end attached to a roof of a building. Sellards, col. 2,11. 36—38. Sellards discloses two ways to attach cable 11 to the building. First, cable 11 may be attached to the building by “an anchoring device placed on the roof of the building by a helicopter 15,” and “[ajfter placing the cable anchoring device on the roof, the helicopter can move backwardly to the position shown by the dashed lines 15 and drop the cable 11 to ground level and the free end thereof can be affixed to the wench [sic, winch].” Id. at col. 2,11. 41—44, 48—52 (emphasis added), Fig. 1. Second, “the upper end of the cable 11 may be attached to the building by firing a projectile such as shown 3 Appellant notes that the Final Action refers to this reference as “Weinberg” although the first-named inventor is “G.F. Wing Shee.” Appeal Br. 10; Final Act. 17. For consistency, we refer to this reference as “Wing Shee.” 4 Appeal 2015-004949 Application 13/474,618 in FIG. 2 from the helicopter through a window of the building.” Id. at col. 2,11. 52-55, Fig. 2. Appellant contends that neither of the two options disclosed by Sellards anticipates claim 34. Appeal Br. 13. As to the first option, Appellant contends that Sellards describes the helicopter simply as “placing” an anchoring device on the roof of the building, but does not indicate that the helicopter is “configured to” do anything but place the anchoring device on the roof, where, presumably, humans located on the roof would then need to actually “anchor” the anchoring device in place. Id. Thus, Appellant contends, Sellards’ helicopter is not disclosed as being “configured to” “anchor the first end of the deployable descent device to a feature that is on the side of the building ... or to a feature that is accessible through the side of the building via an opening in the side of the building at the elevated location while the first end of the deployable descent device is supported by the aerial vehicle.” Id. (emphasis added). As to the second option, Appellant acknowledges that the cable is anchored by firing a projectile through a window in the side of a building. Id. at 14. However, Appellant contends, the anchoring mechanism (i.e., the projectile) is fired from the helicopter, and, thus, is no longer supported by the helicopter after being fired. Id. Consequently, Appellant contends, the helicopter does not “anchor the first end of the deployable descent device . . . while the first end of the deployable descent device is supported by the aerial vehicle,” as claimed. Id. (emphasis added). The Examiner responds that Sellards discloses that “the cable may be attached to the building by any suitable means, such as an anchoring device placed on the roof of the building by a helicopter 15.” Ans. 25 (emphasis 5 Appeal 2015-004949 Application 13/474,618 omitted). The Examiner finds that “any suitable means” and “such as an anchoring device” could be the one shown in Figure 2, or a “known window anchoring hook, etc., with such an anchoring device being carried by the . . . aerial device, such is capable/configured to be able to be anchored to the side of a building such as to a window at the side of a building just as Appellant’s J-hook being attached to a side of the building at the window.” Id. at 25—26 (emphasis omitted). The Examiner also states that Sellards describes that “after placing the cable anchoring device” on the roof of the building, or “the capable attachment to a window at the side of the building,” the helicopter moves backwardly to the position shown by dashed lines 15 and drops cable 11 to ground level. Id. at 26 (emphasis omitted). According to the Examiner, it is after anchoring the first end of the deployment device to the building by the helicopter, that the helicopter is moved backwardly to the position shown by dashed lines 15, and, thus, the first end of the descent device is still attached to the aerial vehicle, and is only released from the aerial vehicle when cable 11 is dropped when the aerial vehicle reaches the dashed lines 15. Id. Appellant replies that the Examiner does not explain how such helicopter, having a rotor wash that prevents it from approaching anywhere close enough to the side of the building to facilitate placing a J-hook over a window ledge, would be able to place such a J-hook on the building. Reply Br. 4. Appellant also contends, “[i]f the first end of Sellards’ descent device/cable is anchored to the building, how is it possible for the helicopter to then move into the position indicated by the dashed lines while the helicopter is still attached to the first end?" Id. at Reply Br. 5. Appellant 6 Appeal 2015-004949 Application 13/474,618 also contends that Figure 1 of Sellards “clearly shows that there is no connection between the helicopter and the roof anchor point that is shown underneath the solid-outline helicopter,” and, as such, Figure 1 does not disclose the actual operation of Sellards’ anchoring system. Id. We agree with Appellant that Sellards does not disclose that helicopter 15 is “configured” to meet the “deliver,” “anchor,” and “release” limitations of claim 34. Figure 1 of Sellards does not show an anchoring device anchored to a feature that is on the side of building 12, or accessible through the side of building 12. Sellards does not disclose how the anchoring device is “placed on the roof of the building” by helicopter 15, or how the anchoring device is secured to the upstanding structure on the roof, as shown in Figure 1. Appellant’s contention that humans located on the roof would need to actually “anchor” the anchoring device in place is plausible. In Figure 2 of Sellards, the anchoring device is propelled from the helicopter. We agree with Appellant that it is not apparent how the upper end of cable 11 would be anchored to “a feature that is accessible through the side of the building via an opening in the side of the building” by helicopter 15 while the upper end is supported by helicopter 15, as required by claim 34. See Reply Br. 5. Nor is it clear how helicopter 15 would then “release” the first end of cable after it is anchored to the feature. Thus, we agree with Appellant that the Examiner has not shown with evidence that Sellards meets each of the limitations of claim 34, which the Examiner characterizes as “intended use.” Ans. 27. For these reasons, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 34 and 40 as anticipated by Sellards. 7 Appeal 2015-004949 Application 13/474,618 II. Claims 34 and 40 anticipated by Xia As to claim 34, the Examiner finds that Xia discloses a deployable descent device 12 (wind chute 12) and an aerial vehicle (helicopter 60) that is “capable to” meet the “deliver,” “anchor,” and “release” limitations. Final Act. 3. The Examiner relies on the same findings for claim 40. Id. Figure 2 of Xia shows a helicopter-assisted setup of a wind chute escape system. See Xia 134. As shown, helicopter 60 uses cable 62 to pick up chute entrance 64 and wind chute 12 and lift them to emergency floor level 3 of building 2. See id. 145, Fig. 2. Chute entrance 64 is then “fastened quickly to the emergency floor level [3].” Id. Appellant contends that Xia does not indicate that the helicopter is configured to grab the top of wind chute 12, guide it into place, and then perform the fastening. Appeal Br. 16. Rather, Appellant contends, “[g]iven that the end of the wind chute is dangling at the end of a long cable from the bottom of the helicopter, it is logical to assume that there are humans on the building roof that grab the top of the wind chute, guide it into place, and then perform the fastening.” Id. The Examiner responds that, in Xia, the first end of deployment device 12 is anchored to the side of the building by chute entrance 64, which is brought to the building by aerial vehicle 60, and aerial vehicle 60 is capable/configured to release the first end of deployment device 12 after the first end is anchored by the release of pick up means 62. Ans. 28. Appellant replies that Figure 2 of Xia relates to a descent device that is anchored to the top of the building, not to the side. Reply Br. 6. Appellant’s contentions are persuasive. Xia does not disclose that helicopter 60 is configured to “anchor” the first end of wind chute (at chute 8 Appeal 2015-004949 Application 13/474,618 entrance 64) to any location of building 2. Xia discloses that one function of the chute entrance “is to provide a measure to fasten itself to the emergency floor easily and quickly.” See Xia 36 (emphasis added). Emergency floor level 3 is located on the top of building 2. Accordingly, it appears that chute entrance 64 can fasten itself to emergency floor level 3 located on the top of building 2. Xia does not discloses that helicopter 60 is configured to anchor chute entrance 64, or any other portion of wind chute 12, to a feature located on the side of building 2, or that is accessible through the side of building 2, as required by claim 34. For these reasons, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 34 and 40 as anticipated by Xia. III. Claims 10-12, 15, 16, 18-20, 25, 29, 32, 34, 37, and40 unpatentable over Goossen and Sellards Claims 10-12, 15, 16, 18—20, 25, and 37 depend directly, or indirectly, from claim 34, claim 29 depends from claim 40 and recites the same limitations as claim 10, and claim 32 depends from claim 29. Appeal Br. 47—53 (Claims App.). The Examiner finds that Goossen discloses an aerial vehicle having a framework at a front of the body with at least one mechanical manipulator arm 1 mounted to the body, wherein mechanical manipulator arm 1 is capable of anchoring the first end of a first deployable descent device to a feature on a side of a building at an elevated location. Final Act. 4. The Examiner finds that Sellards discloses a deployable descent device 11 having a first end and a second end. Id. at 4—5. The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to provide the system of Goossen with a deployable descent device, as taught by Sellards, because this would have 9 Appeal 2015-004949 Application 13/474,618 provided the predictable result of facilitating evacuation of a building. Id. at 5. Appellant argues that the Examiner provides no explanation as to how Goossen and Sellards are combined to teach all the limitations of independent claims 34 and 40. Appeal Br. 23. However, Appellant does not identify any specific limitation recited in claim 34 or 40 that is not disclosed or suggested by the proposed combination. Accordingly, Appellant’s contention against the rejection of claims 34 and 40 does not apprise us of any error. Appellant challenges the Examiner’s stated rationale for combining the teachings of Goossen and Sellards. Appeal Br. 21. Appellant contends that Sellards’ system already accomplishes the purpose stated by the Examiner without needing to combine Sellards with the teachings of another reference. Id. at 21—22. This contention is not persuasive. The Examiner’s combination of Goossen and Sellards effectively substitutes Sellards’ aerial vehicle with another known aerial vehicle (i.e., Goossen’s UAV) to result in the claimed system. “[W]hen a patent claims a structure already known in the prior art that is altered by the mere substitution of one element for another known in the field, the combination must do more than yield a predictable result.” KSR Inti Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). We are not apprised of any error in the Examiner’s reasoning in regard to claim 34 or 40. Appellant addresses the Examiner’s findings in relation to the subject matter recited in claim 10. Appeal Br. 18—20. These contentions do not 10 Appeal 2015-004949 Application 13/474,618 apprise us of any error in the Examiner’s findings as they relate to claim 34 or 40. In regard to claim 10, Appellant contends that “there is no structure depicted in Figure 1 of Goossen, or described elsewhere in Goossen, that can be reasonably described as a rigid external framework configured to support the first deployable descent device in front of the body during flight of the aerial vehicle,” as recited in claim 10. Appeal Br. 20. The Examiner responds that Goossen does show a “rigid frame work.” Ans. 32. In support, the Examiner provides a definition of “frame work” and an annotated version of Figure 10 of Goossen in which a “rigid framework” is identified. Id. at 32—33. Appellant replies that claim 10 recites a “rigid external framework,” not a “rigid framework.” Reply Br. 7 (emphasis added). Appellant contends that the claimed rigid framework is mounted to, and, thus, external to, the “body” of the aerial vehicle, whereas Goossen’s aerial vehicle has a “body” that appears to be provided by biplane airfoils 6. Reply Br. 7. Appellant contends that these biplane airfoils cannot be “external” to, or “mounted to,” themselves. Id. Thus, Appellant contends, Goossen’s biplane airfoils do not meet the limitation of a “rigid external framework.” Id. Appellant’s contentions are persuasive. Figure 1 of Goossen shows upper biplane airfoils 7 and lower biplane airfoils 6, which are also shown in Figure 10. As far as we can determine, the Examiner’s annotated Figure 10 of Goossen identifies portions of the UAV that correspond to an upper biplane airfoil 7 and a lower biplane airfoil 6 as a “rigid framework.” Ans. 33. As shown more clearly in Figure 10 of Goossen, manipulator arm 1 includes a pivot 18 attached to UAV 3. See Goossen, col. 5,11. 48—50. As 11 Appeal 2015-004949 Application 13/474,618 noted, the Examiner finds that Goossen’s manipulator arm 1 is mounted to the “body.” Assuming this finding is correct, the “rigid framework” in annotated Figure 10 of Goossen appears to correspond to the “body.” We agree with Appellant that it is not apparent how the “rigid framework” is mounted to the “body.” It is also not apparent how upper biplane airfoils 7 or lower biplane airfoils 6 can be considered a “framework.” It is further not apparent how the “rigid framework” identified in annotated Figure 10 is “configured to support the first deployable descent device in front of the body during flight of the aerial vehicle.” In fact, the Examiner makes no finding that Goossen’s “rigid framework” in annotated Figure 10 would support the first deployable descent device in front of the body of the UAV during its flight, as required by claim 10. In the UAV shown in Figure 10, it is manipulator arm 1 that is configured to support a payload. For these reasons, we sustain the rejection of claim 34, but do not sustain the rejection of claim 10, or claims 11, 12, 15, 16, 18—20, 25, and 37 depending therefrom, as unpatentable over Goossen and Sellards. For the same reasons, we sustain the rejection of claim 40, but do not sustain the rejection of claims 29 and 32, as unpatentable over Goossen and Sellards. IV Claim 35 unpatentable over Sellards and Weinandt The Examiner’s application of Weinandt to reject claim 35, which depends from claim 34, does not cure the deficiency in the rejection of claim 34 as anticipated by Sellards (Rejection I). Final Act. 7—8. V. Claims 13 and 35 over Goossen, Sellards, and Weinandt The Examiner’s application of Weinandt to reject claim 13, which depends from claim 11, does not cure the above-discussed deficiency in the rejection of claim 11 (Rejection III). Final Act. 7—8. Accordingly, we do 12 Appeal 2015-004949 Application 13/474,618 not sustain the rejection of claim 13 as unpatentable over Goossen, Sellards, and Weinandt. Claim 35 depends from claim 34. Appellant relies on the contentions made for the rejection of claim 34 over Goossen and Sellards (Rejection III) for patentability of claim 35. See Appeal Br. 28. As those contentions are not persuasive, we sustain the rejection of claim 35 as unpatentable over Goossen, Sellards, and Weinandt. VI. Claims 14 and 36 unpatentable over Goossen, Sellards, and Andrews Claim 14 depends from claim 10, and claim 36 depends from claim 14. The Examiner’s application of Andrews to reject claims 14 and 36 does not cure the deficiency in the rejection of claim 10. Final Act. 9—11. Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 14 and 36 as unpatentable over Goossen, Sellards, and Andrews. VII. Claim 24 unpatentable over Goossen, Sellards, and Huff or Douglas The Examiner’s application of Huff or Douglas to reject claim 24, which depends from claim 10, does not cure the above-discussed deficiency in the rejection of claim 10. Final Act. 11—12. Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 24 as unpatentable over Goossen, Sellards, and Huff or Douglas. VIII. Claims 27 and 28 unpatentable over Goossen, Sellards and Huang Claim 27 depends from claim 10, and claim 28 depends from claim 27. The Examiner’s application of Huang to reject claims 27 and 28 does not cure the deficiency in the rejection of claim 10. Final Act. 12—14. Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 27 and 28 as unpatentable over Goossen, Sellards, and Huang. 13 Appeal 2015-004949 Application 13/474,618 IX. Claims 22, 23, 30, and 31 unpatentable over Goossen, Sellards, and Protesto Claim 22 depends from claim 10, claim 23 depends from claim 22, claim 30 depends from claim 29, which recites the same limitations as claim 10, and claim 31 depends from claim 30. The Examiner’s application of Protesto to reject claims 22, 23, 30, and 31 does not cure the deficiency in the rejection of claims 10 and 29. Final Act. 14—15. Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 22, 23, 30, and 31 as unpatentable over Goossen, Sellards, and Protesto. X. Claims 26 and 33 unpatentable over Goossen, Sellards, and Stewart Claim 26 depends from claim 12, and claim 33 depends from claim 29. The Examiner’s application of Stewart to reject claims 26 and 33 does not cure the deficiency in the rejection of claims 12 and 29. Final Act. 16— 17. Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 26 and 33 as unpatentable over Goossen, Sellards, and Stewart. XI. Claims 38 and 39 unpatentable over Goossen, Sellards, and Wing Shee Claim 38 depends from claim 10 and claim 39 depends from claim 38. The Examiner’s application of Wing Shee to reject claims 38 and 39 does not cure the deficiency in the rejection of claim 10. Final Act. 17—18. Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 38 and 39 as unpatentable over Goossen, Sellards, and Wing Shee. DECISION We reverse the rejection of claims 34 and 40 as anticipated by Sellards. We reverse the rejection of claims 34 and 40 as anticipated by Xia. 14 Appeal 2015-004949 Application 13/474,618 We affirm the rejection of claims 34 and 40, and reverse the rejection of claims 10-12, 15, 16, 18—20, 25, 29, 32, and 37, as unpatentable over Goossen and Sellards. We reverse the rejection of claim 35 as unpatentable over Sellards and Weinandt. We reverse the rejection of claim 13, and affirm the rejection of claim 35, as unpatentable over Goossen, Sellards, and Weinandt. We reverse the rejection of claims 14 and 36 as unpatentable over Goossen, Sellards, and Andrews. We reverse the rejection of claim 24 as unpatentable over Goossen, Sellards, and Huff or Douglas. We reverse the rejection of claims 27 and 28 as unpatentable over Goossen, Sellards and Huang. We reverse the rejection of claims 22, 23, 30, and 31 as unpatentable over Goossen, Sellards, and Protesto. We reverse the rejection of claims 26 and 33 as unpatentable over Goossen, Sellards, and Stewart. We reverse the rejection of claims 38 and 39 as unpatentable over Goossen, Sellards, and Wing Shee. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended according to 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 15 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation