Ex Parte Marchaj

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 21, 2017

13622526 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 21, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/622,526 09/19/2012 Ian T. Marchaj 62237US01;
67097-2042PUS1
5791
54549 7590 09/25/2017
TART SON OASKFY fr OT DS/PR ATT fr WHTTNFY
EXAMINER
400 West Maple Road
Suite 350
KANG, EDWIN G
Birmingham, MI 48009 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3741
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/25/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ptodocket @ cgolaw. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte IAN T. MARCHAJ
Appeal 2015-006228
Application 13/622,526
Technology Center 3700
Before MICHAEL L. HOELTER, JILL D. HILL, and BRENT M.
DOUGAL, Administrative Patent Judges.
HILL, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Ian T. Marchaj (Appellant) appeals under 35U.S.C. § 134 from the
Examiner’s final decision rejecting claims 1—26. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
Appeal 2015-006228
Application 13/622,526
BACKGROUND
Independent claims 1 and 12 are pending. Independent claim 1,
reproduced below, illustrates the claimed subject matter with a disputed term
emphasized.
1. A nacelle assembly comprising:
a thrust reverser moveable between a stowed position and
a deployed position;
a variable area fan nozzle;
a motor to move the variable area fan nozzle;
a drive shaft including a first portion coupled to the
motor and a second portion coupled to the variable area fan
nozzle;
a clutch mechanism that couples the first portion of the
drive shaft and the second portion of the drive shaft, wherein
the first portion of the drive shaft decouples from the second
portion of the drive shaft when the thrust reverser moves from
the stowed position to the deployed position; and
a sensor that detects flight conditions.
REJECTIONS
I. Claims 25 and 26 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, as indefinite. Final Act. 3, Ans. 2.
II. Claims 1—20, 23, and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(e) as anticipated by West (US 2013/0312387 Al, pub. Nov. 28, 2013.
Final Act. 4.
III. Claims 1—9, 12—18, and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) as anticipated by McKay (US 2011/0192135 Al, pub. Aug. 11,
2011). Final Act. 6.
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Application 13/622,526
IV. Claims 10, 11, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over McKay and Midgley (US 4,799,354, iss. Jan.
24, 1989). Final Act. 8.
V. Claims 21 and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over West and Hillel (US 2010/0107600 Al, pub. May 6,
2010). Final Act. 9.
VI. Claims 21 and 22 also stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over McKay and Hillel. Final Act. 10.
VII. Claims 25 and 26 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over West and Trumper (US 7,448,198 B2, iss. Nov. 11, 2008).
Final Act. 11.
VIII. Claims 25 and 26 also stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over McKay and Trumper. Final Act. 12.
ANALYSIS
Rejection I
The Examiner determines that claim 25 lacks antecedent basis for “the
first feature,” “the second feature,” and “the friction material.” Final Act. 3.
Appellant does not explicitly refute this rejection in the Appeal Brief. Claim
10, from which claim 25 depends, provides antecedent basis for both “the
first feature” and “the second feature.” Because we are unable to find
antecedent basis for “the friction material,” we sustain the rejection of claim
25, and claim 26 that depends therefrom.
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Appeal 2015-006228
Application 13/622,526
Rejection II—Anticipation by West—Claims 1—20, 23, and 24
Appellant argues claims 1—10, 12—19, 23, and 24 as a group. Appeal
Br. 3. We select independent claim 1 as representative. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv). Claims 2—10, 12—19, 23, and 24 stand or fall with claim 1.
Regarding independent claim 1, the Examiner finds that West
discloses a nacelle assembly including a thrust reverser and, inter alia, a
clutch (in decoupling drive train 100) that couples a first portion of a drive
shaft and a second portion of the drive shaft when the thrust reverser is in a
stowed portion, “wherein the first portion of the drive shaft decouples from
the second portion of the drive shaft when the thrust reverser moves from the
stowed position to the deployed position,” and sensors 62, 74 that detect
“flight conditions.” Final Act. 4 (citing West Figs. 9 and 12, || 43 and 60).
Appellant argues that West’s “position sensors 62 and translation
sensors 74” detect position rather than flight conditions. Appeal Br. 3.
The Examiner responds that Appellant’s Specification provides no
explicit definition for the term “flight conditions,” and proffers a broadest
reasonable interpretation therefor. Ans. 3. According to the Examiner,
Appellant’s Specification states that its “sensor 86 monitors flight conditions
and supplies this data to a Full Authority Digital Engine Control 88
(FADEC),” and Mathews (US 2013/0054055 Al, pub. Feb. 28, 2013)
discloses that its FADEC receives multiple current input variables of the
current flight condition including throttle lever position. Ans. 3. The
Examiner reasons that position sensors are flight condition sensors, and
contends that the broadest reasonable interpretation of “flight conditions” is
“any parameter associated with the aircraft and its component[s], while in
flight.” Id. at 3—4.
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Application 13/622,526
We are not persuaded that the Examiner’s interpretation of “flight
conditions” is unreasonable. Although Appellant’s Specification discloses a
“particular flight condition” of cruise or fuel-efficient “bucket cruise” at 0.8
Mach and 35,000 feet, this example does not provide an explicit definition
for “flight conditions.” Spec. 142. The Examiner contends that one skilled
in the art would understand that a broadest reasonable interpretation of
“flight conditions” can include position sensor information, and supports
that contention with the citation to Mathews, which provides evidence of the
understanding of one skilled in the art. Appellant does not provide evidence
or reasoning showing that Mathews is inaccurate, and it remains the best
evidence that a position sensor can detect flight conditions.
We sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 as anticipated by
West. Claims 2—10, 12—19, 23, and 24 fall with claim 1.
Dependent Claims 11 and 20
Regarding dependent claims 11 and 20, which recite the clutch in
more detail and including a friction material, the Examiner finds that West’s
clutch (in decoupling drive shaft 100) includes a first feature connected to
the first portion of the drive shaft and a second feature connected to the
second portion of the drive shaft, one of the first and second features
including friction material engaged by the other of the first and second
features when the drive shaft is coupled. Final Act. 5 (citing West | 63).
Appellant argues that the Examiner gives the term “friction material”
an overly broad definition, and that the Examiner’s alleged friction material,
“such as keys, teeth and ribs, might generate frictional forces, but these
items are not ‘friction material.’” Appeal Br. 2—A. Appellant provides a
website link to define “friction material,” and argues that the term “friction
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Application 13/622,526
material” refers to a specific type of material and is known. Id. at 4 (citing
http://blog.hemmings.com/index. php/2013/08/30/tech-101 -how-to-choose-
the-right-brake-frictionmaterial/) (directed to selecting brake friction
material).
The Examiner responds that no explicit definition for “friction
material” was provided in the Specification, and contends that the broadest
reasonable interpretation thereof includes “materials used to generate
frictional forces.” Ans. 4. That Examiner finds that West’s keys, teeth, and
ribs would generate frictional forces and, therefore, meet the claim. Id.
Appellant has the better argument. The Examiner’s interpretation of
“friction material” as including as any material or structure (e.g., a key or
teeth) that generates frictional forces is unreasonably broad, particularly in
light of Appellant’s evidence that one skilled in the art would understand
“friction material” to designate a particular type of supplemental material
suited to specific applications and having specific properties such as wear
resistance, coefficient of friction, thermal stability, and thermal conductivity.
We do not sustain the rejections of claims 11 and 20 as anticipated by
West.
Rejection III—Anticipation by McKay — Claims 1—9, 12—18, and 24
Appellant argues claims 1—9, 12—18, and 24 as a group. Appeal Br. 4.
We select independent claim 1 as representative. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv). Claims 2—9, 12—18, and 24 stand or fall with claim 1.
Like West, McKay discloses position sensors 28, 40 that the Examiner
finds detect flight conditions. Final Act. 6. Appellant again argues that
position sensors do not detect “flight conditions.” Appeal Br. 4. For the
reasons explained above regarding Rejection II, we sustain the rejection of
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claim 1 as anticipated by McKay. Claims 2—9, 12—18, and 24 fall with claim
1.
Rejection IV— Obviousness over McKay and Midgley — Claims 10,
11, 19, and 20
Appellant makes no argument that claims 10, 11, 19, and 20 would be
patentable over McKay and Midgley, if claims 1 and 12 are not patentable
over McKay.1 Appeal Br. 4. We, therefore, sustain the rejection of claims
10, 11, 19, and 20 for the reason discussed above regarding Rejection III.
Rejection V Obviousness over West and Hillel Claims 21 and 22
Appellant relies on the arguments made above regarding Rejection II,
further arguing that, “[i]f West was modified such that the VAFN panel 58
moved based on flight conditions instead of a detected position, this
modification would change how West operates and change a principle of
operation of West,” such that “[tjhere is no reason to make this
modification.” Appeal Br. 4—5. Lacking a defined “principle of operation”
of West, and an explanation of how that principle of operation would
change, we are not persuaded by this argument. We sustain Rejection V.
Rejection VI— Obviousness over McKay and Hillel — Claims 21 and
22
Appellant relies on the arguments made above regarding Rejection III,
further arguing that, “[i]f McKay was modified such that the VAFN cowl 12
moved based on flight conditions instead of a detected position, this
modification would change how McKay operates,” such that “[tjhere is no
1 The Examiner relies on Midgley for disclosing the limitation “friction
material” as recited in claims 11 and 20. Final Act. 9.
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reason to make this modification.” Appeal Br. 5. Lacking an explanation of
how McKay’s operation would change and how such a change would negate
a reason for modifying McKay as proposed by the Examiner, we are not
persuaded by this argument. We sustain Rejection VI.
Rejection VII Obviousness over West and Trumper — Claims 25 and
26
Appellant makes no argument that claims 25 and 26 would be
patentable over West and Trumper if claim 1 is not patentable over West.
We sustain Rejection VII for the reason set forth above regarding Rejection
II.
Rejection VIII Obviousness over McKay and Trumper — Claims 25
and 26
Appellant makes no argument that claims 25 and 26 would be
patentable over McKay and Trumper if claim 1 is not patentable over
McKay. We sustain Rejection VIII for the reason set forth above regarding
Rejection III.
DECISION
We AFFIRM the rejection of claims 25 and 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
second paragraph, as indefinite.
We AFFIRM the rejection of claims 1—10, 12—19, 23, and 24 under
35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by West.
We REVERSE the rejection of claims 11 and 20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(e) as anticipated by West.
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Appeal 2015-006228
Application 13/622,526
We AFFIRM the rejection of claims 1—9, 12—18, and 24 under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by McKay.
We AFFIRM the rejection of claims 10, 11, 19, and 20 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over McKay and Midgley.
We AFFIRM the rejection of claims 21 and 22 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over West and Hillel.
We AFFIRM the rejection of claims 21 and 22 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over McKay and Hillel.
We AFFIRM the rejection of claims 25 and 26 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over West and Trumper.
We AFFIRM the rejection of claims 25 and 26 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over McKay and Trumper.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED
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