Ex Parte Mantovani

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Aug 23, 2006

10206704 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 23, 2006)

The opinion in support of the decision being entered today was not written for
publication and is not binding precedent of the Board.
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________
Ex parte JOSE RICARDO BADDINI MANTOVANI
____________
Appeal No. 2006-1777
Application No. 10/206,704
____________
ON BRIEF
____________
Before KRASS, JERRY SMITH, and BLANKENSHIP, Administrative Patent Judges.
BLANKENSHIP, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1-19, 21, and 22.
We affirm-in-part.
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Application No. 10/206,704
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BACKGROUND
The invention relates to electrical impedance based audio compensation in
electrical devices that are subject to variable acoustic impedance (e.g., wireless
communication devices). Representative claim 1 is reproduced below.
1. A method in an electronics device having an ear-mounted sound
transducer, comprising:
determining a change in an electrical parameter that changes with
changes in an acoustic impedance of the sound transducer;
determining audio signal compensation based upon the change in
the electrical parameter;
dynamically compensating an audio signal sent to the sound transducer
based upon the audio signal compensation.
The examiner relies on the following references:
Johnson 4,973,917 Nov. 27, 1990
Walker 5,068,903 Nov. 26, 1991
Richardson 5,771,297 Jun. 23, 1998
Klippel 5,815,585 Sep. 29, 1998
Nakano 6,154,538 Nov. 28, 2000
Claims 1, 6-9, 11, 21, and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as being
anticipated by Nakano.
Claims 14 and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as being anticipated by
Walker.
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Application No. 10/206,704
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Claims 1, 2, 8-11, 21, and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as being
anticipated by Johnson.
Claims 18 and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Walker.
Claim 16 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Walker and Klippel.
Claims 14 and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Richardson and Walker.
Claims 3-7, 12, and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Johnson and Walker.
Claim 20 has been allowed.
We refer to the Final Rejection (mailed Mar. 24, 2005) and the Examiner’s
Answer (mailed Oct. 7, 2005) for a statement of the examiner’s position and to the Brief
(filed Jun. 29, 2005) and the Reply Brief (filed Nov. 30, 2005) for appellant’s position
with respect to the claims which stand rejected.
OPINION
Nakano
Claims 1, 6-9, 11, 21, and 22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as being
anticipated by Nakano. The rejection deems the “dynamically compensating” step of
claim 1 to read on continuous adjustment of the audio signal to be sent to the speaker,
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Application No. 10/206,704
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“such as in the state of off-hook or on-hook,” referring to column 4, lines 33 through 63
of the reference. According to the examiner, when the user removes the telephone
from the ear, the telephone should be in the off-hook state (“gain is zero”), and in the
on-hook state when the phone is moved to the ear (“gain is non-zero”). (Answer at 3-4.)
Nakano teaches that the apparatus detects, from varying impedance, when the
user has held the earpiece 21 (Fig. 2) to the user’s ear. Col. 3, ll. 46-53. When the
controlling portion 13 (Fig. 1) receives the impedance variation detection signal, the
controlling portion performs the same process as operation of the response button or
start button. Col. 4, ll. 25-29.
We agree with appellant, for the reasons expressed in the briefs, that Nakano
does not meet the requirements of instant claim 1. The rejection fails because when the
telephone of Nakano is in the on-hook state, there is no audio signal to compensate.
Nakano does not describe any form of compensation of the audio signal when the audio
signal is present (i.e., when the telephone is in the off-hook state) that is responsive to
measurements relating to changes in acoustic impedance.
The rejection of the other independent claims (claims 9 and 21) suffers from a
similar deficiency. We thus do not sustain the rejection of claims 1, 6-9, 11, 21, and 22
under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as being anticipated by Nakano.
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Application No. 10/206,704
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Walker
Claims 14 and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as being anticipated by
Walker. (Answer at 5-6.) Appellant contends that Walker lacks an impedance
“mismatch detection circuit.” According to appellant, the current measured in Walker
does not correspond to the mismatch between a reference electrical impedance and an
actual electrical impedance of the sound transducer. (Brief at 12.)
Walker describes an operational amplifier 40 (Fig. 2) that amplifies a difference
signal derived from the output of operational amplifier 30 and the voltage applied to the
loudspeaker system 20. Col. 2, ll. 49-62.
The circuit uses negative current feedback and works as follows. The
current driving the loudspeaker system 20 causes a voltage drop across
the current-sensing resistor 21, which is amplified by the operational
amplifier 30. The gain of the amplifier 30 is chosen so that in operating
conditions in which no mechanical resonances occur in the loudspeaker
system 20, the output voltage of the amplifier 30 is equal in magnitude and
phase to the voltage applied to the loudspeaker system.
Walker col. 3, ll. 5-14.
In our view, Walker’s disclosure provides adequate support for the examiner’s
findings. Operational amplifier 40 has an output corresponding to the mismatch
between a reference electrical impedance (from operational amplifier 30) and an actual
electrical impedance (from loudspeaker system 20) with respect to loudspeaker system
20. We are not persuaded by appellant’s bare assertion that the relevant portions of the
Walker circuit of Figure 2 do not disclose a “mismatch detection circuit” as claimed.
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Appellant also alleges, without convincing elaboration, that Walker’s adder 16
(Fig. 2) cannot be considered a “compensation estimator” and that power amplifier 10
cannot be considered an “audio compensator” within the meaning of claim 14. We find
that the corresponding elements of Walker do all that is required by the language of
claim 14. Moreover, we know from appellant’s specification (e.g., claims 6 and 11) that
audio signal compensation does not require affecting the frequency response of the
system, but may only require a change in gain (e.g., amplification) of the audio signal.
We thus find the examiner has established a prima facie case for anticipation for
instant claim 14. However, we do not sustain the rejection of depending claim 15
because, as appellant argues, the rejection does not assert what elements of Walker
are deemed to correspond to the limitations of claim 15. The 35 U.S.C. § 102 rejection
over Walker is thus sustained with respect to claim 14 and not sustained with respect to
claim 15.
Turning to the rejection of claims 18 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Walker, we agree with appellant to the extent the examiner has not
provided sufficient evidence in support of the proposed modification. Claim 18 requires
that the audio compensator (power amplifier 10; Fig. 2 of Walker) is “a digital filter
having an adjustable frequency response and gain.” While digital filters were known,
the rejection does not provide a teaching or suggestion from the prior art for modifying a
circuit as shown in Walker’s Figure 2 such that the component in place of power
amplifier 10 is, or includes, a digital filter as claimed. We do not sustain the rejection of
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Application No. 10/206,704
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claim 18 over Walker. However, we sustain the rejection of claim 19 because the
examiner finds that any loudspeaker is inherently disposed within a housing, a finding
that seems reasonable on its face. Appellant has not traversed the finding, but appears
to rely (Brief at 14) on the unpersuasive arguments regarding the limitations of claim 14
to distinguish over Walker.
Walker and Klippel
We do not sustain the rejection of claim 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Walker and Klippel. Claim 16 incorporates the limitations of claim 15.
Klippel does not remedy the deficiencies in the rejection applied against base claim 15.
Richardson and Walker
Claims 14 and 17 are, at least nominally, rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Richardson and Walker. The statement of the rejection
(Answer at 8) relates to the requirements of claim 17. Claim 14, however, seems to be
included in the rejection. Perhaps the naming of claim 14 relates to the fact that the
rejection is reasoned in terms of Richardson in view of Walker, which was applied
against base claim 14, rather than in terms of Walker in view of Richardson. In any
event, we summarily sustain the § 103 rejection of claim 14 because, on this record,
Walker taken alone has been demonstrated to meet all the requirements of (i.e.,
anticipate) claim 14.
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Application No. 10/206,704
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With respect to the rejection of claim 17, appellant argues (Brief at 23) that the
examiner “has not specifically indicated how the prior art applies to Claim 17.” The
argument is incorrect; see the examiner’s findings in the Final Rejection and the
Answer. In the Reply Brief (at 10), appellant relies on the untenable position that
Walker fails to disclose a “mismatch detection circuit.” Being not persuaded of error in
the rejection of claim 17, we sustain the § 103 rejection over Richardson and Walker.
Johnson
Johnson describes a current feedback arrangement in an output amplifier
suitable for use in driving loudspeakers for hearing aids (e.g., col. 1, ll. 29-42).
According to Johnson, the loudspeakers have electrical characteristics that depend on
the electrical materials, the mechanical construction of the load device, and the acoustic
surroundings in which the device is placed. The electrical impedance characteristic of
the loudspeaker may reflect resonances arising as a result of the acoustic impedance
faced by the loudspeaker. Col. 3, ll. 7-23.
Appellant notes these and other sections of Johnson upon which the examiner
bases the § 102 rejection of claim 1, and alleges that Johnson fails to disclose or
suggest any of the entirety of claim 1. Appellant does not explain, however, why the
examiner’s findings should be considered erroneous. Appellant’s arguments are correct
to the extent that Johnson does not contain all the words of instant claim 1. For a prior
art reference to anticipate in terms of 35 U.S.C. § 102, every element of the claimed
Appeal No. 2006-1777
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invention must be identically shown in a single reference. However, this is not an
“ipsissimis verbis” test. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832, 15 USPQ2d 1566, 1567 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
Johnson summarizes the current feedback circuitry (Fig. 1C) at column 15, lines
26 through 41. The current feedback compensates for low impedance values of the
loudspeaker that may occur due to the electromechanical and acoustic resonances
associated with the speaker.
We are not persuaded of error in the examiner’s position that Johnson teaches
determining a change in an electrical parameter (i.e., current) that changes with
changes in an acoustic impedance of the sound transducer (i.e, loudspeaker). The
circuitry described by Johnson may fairly be considered to determine audio signal
compensation based upon the change in the electrical parameter via the selected circuit
elements and the selected values of those elements. The real time feedback described
by the reference is a form of dynamic compensation of an audio signal sent to the
sound transducer based upon the audio signal compensation. Johnson falls within the
broad scope of instant claim 1. We sustain the rejection.
We also sustain the rejection of depending claim 2, as a hearing aid receives an
audio voice signal. We sustain the rejection of depending claim 8 because, as noted by
the examiner and supra, Johnson teaches that the electrical parameter of the sound
transducer changes with the acoustical impedance of the sound transducer.
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Application No. 10/206,704
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Appellant in the Brief repeats language from claims 9-11, 21, and 22, and
repeats arguments we have considered in the rejection of claims 1 and 2. We sustain
the rejection of claims 9, 21, and 22 for substantially the same reasons that we have
sustained the rejection of claims 1 and 8. We sustain the rejection of dependent claim
10 for substantially the same reasons that we have sustained the rejection of claims 1,
2, and 8. We sustain the rejection of dependent claim 11 since Johnson meets at least
the “gain” alternative for changing the electrical characteristic of the audio signal sent to
the sound transducer because the negative feedback changes the gain of the audio
signal (e.g., col. 17, ll. 29-37).
Johnson and Walker
We next consider the § 103 rejection of claims 3-7, 12, and 13 as being
unpatentable over Johnson and Walker. Appellant submits that the rejection of claims 3
and 12 is improper because Walker does not measure impedance mismatch. We are
not persuaded that Walker does not measure impedance mismatch, as noted in our
discussion of the § 102 rejection over Walker. We sustain the rejection of claims 3 and
12. Further, we sustain the rejection of claim 7 because Walker teaches measuring
changes in the electrical parameter (e.g., Fig. 2) in accordance with the claim.
With respect to claim 4, the examiner finds that frequency 3 as depicted in Figure
1B of Walker represents where the mismatch between the actual and reference
electrical impedance is the greatest. Since the circuit of Figure 2 would operate over a
Appeal No. 2006-1777
Application No. 10/206,704
1 In comparing the requirements of claim 11 and claim 6, it is apparent that claim 6 should have
been rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102 over Johnson In any event, claim 6 is unpatentable under both
statutory sections. Anticipation is “the epitome of obviousness.” See, e.g., Connell v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548, 220 USPQ 193, 198 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Fracalossi, 681 F.2d 792, 794, 215
USPQ 569, 571 (CCPA 1982); In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1402, 181 USPQ 641, 644 (CCPA 1974).
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range of frequencies inclusive of that at the resonance represented by frequency 3,
Walker teaches determining the change in the electrical parameter at least at a
frequency where the mismatch between the actual and reference electrical impedance
is greatest. (Answer at 10.) Appellant is correct that Figure 1B of Walker shows the
sound pressure of a real speaker as a function of frequency. (Brief at 24.) Appellant’s
remarks do not, however, demonstrate error in the rejection of claim 4. We sustain the
rejection.
Because Johnson teaches compensating the audio signal by changing at least
the gain of the audio signal sent to the sound transducer as required by claim 6, we
sustain the § 103 rejection of the claim.1
We do not, however, sustain the § 103 rejection of claim 5 or 13. We agree with
appellant that the rejection over Johnson and Walker fails to show disclosure or
suggestion of empirical audio signal compensation data as required by the claims.
CONCLUSION
The rejection of claims 1, 6-9, 11, 21, and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as being
anticipated by Nakano is reversed.
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The rejection of claims 14 and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as being anticipated by
Walker is affirmed with respect to claim 14 but reversed with respect to claim 15.
The rejection of claims 1, 2, 8-11, 21, and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as being
anticipated by Johnson is affirmed.
The rejection of claims 18 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Walker is reversed with respect to claim 18 but affirmed with respect to claim 19.
The rejection of claim 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Walker and Klippel is reversed.
The rejection of claims 14 and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Richardson and Walker is affirmed.
The rejection of claims 3-7, 12, and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Johnson and Walker is affirmed with respect to claims 3, 4, 6, 7, and
12 but reversed with respect to claims 5 and 13.
The examiner’s decision is thus affirmed-in-part.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal
may be extended under 37 CFR § 1.136(a). See 37 CFR § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
ERROL A. KRASS )
Administrative Patent Judge )
)
)
)
) BOARD OF PATENT
JERRY SMITH ) APPEALS
Administrative Patent Judge ) AND
) INTERFERENCES
)
)
)
HOWARD B. BLANKENSHIP )
Administrative Patent Judge )
Appeal No. 2006-1777
Application No. 10/206,704
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