Ex Parte Mandava

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 28, 2016

12137044 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 28, 2016)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/137,044 06/11/2008 Srikanth Mandava 104.20080025 6749
131406 7590
Gilliam IP PLLC (CA)
7200 N. Mopac
Suite 440
Austin, TX 78731
11/30/2016 EXAMINER
SANDERS, STEPHEN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2434
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/30/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
u spto @ gilliamip .com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SRIKANTH MANDAVA
Appeal 2015-000465
Application 12/137,0441
Technology Center 2400
Before HUNG H. BUI, JOSEPH P. LENTIVECH, and JOHN R. KENNY,
Administrative Patent Judges.
BUI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner’s Final Office Action rejecting claims 1—13 and 17—20, which are
all claims pending on appeal. Claims 14—16 have been cancelled. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.2
1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is CA, Inc. App. Br. 2.
2 Our Decision refers to Appellant’s Appeal Brief filed February 4, 2013
(“App. Br.”); Reply Brief filed May 7, 2013 (“Reply Br.”); Examiner’s
Answer mailed March 7, 2013 (“Ans.”); Final Office Action mailed
September 7, 2012 (“Final Act.”); and original Specification filed June 11,
2008 (“Spec.”).
Appeal 2015-000465
Application 12/137,044
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s invention relates to “content transfer control” and “file
management policies . . . used to limit files that may be stored on or copied
from [a] data storage device.” Spec., Title, 117. According to Appellant, a
file management policy is used to allow files to be read from a data storage
device but prevents those files from being written, or otherwise stored, to
other data storage locations. Id. 118.
Claims 1,11, and 19 are independent. Claim 1 is illustrative of
Appellant’s invention, as reproduced below with disputed limitations in
italics:
1. A computerized method comprising:
receiving, in a device driver, a request to perform a file
management function affecting a location where a first file is
stored;
in the device driver, querying a repository of file
management rules as a function of at least one of a file type of
the first file and a location where the first file is stored and a
destination of where the first file is to be stored and an identity
of the user to retrieve a first set of file management rules;
determining, in the device driver through execution of
instructions on a computer processor, if the destination is an
authorized location where the first file may be stored as a
function of the first set of retrieved file management rules; and
in the device driver, preventing the file management
function upon determining that the destination is not an
authorized location.
See Amendment3 filed June 13, 2012 (emphasis added).
3 The claims presented in the Claims Appendix are predicated upon entry of
an Amendment After Final filed on February 4, 2013, filed concurrently
with the Appeal Brief (“App. Br.”). However, that Amendment was not
entered by the Examiner as indicated in Miscellaneous Communication
issued by the Examiner on June 20, 2013. As such, for purposes of this
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Application 12/137,044
Examiner’s Rejection and References
Claims 1—13 and 17—20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Levien et al. (US 2006/0274154 Al, published Dec.
7, 2006; “Levien”) and Kobata et al. (US 2002/0082997 Al, published June
27,2002). Ans. 4—14.
ANALYSIS
Claims 1, 11, and 19
In support of the obviousness rejection of independent claim 1, and
similarly independent claims 11 and 19, the Examiner finds Levien teaches
Appellant’s claimed “computerized method” including all the steps, except
for the use of “a device driver” to implement the steps recited. Ans. 4—5
(citing Levien H 10, 66-67, 165-166, 195, 222-224, 249-250, 265). The
Examiner then relies on Kobata for teaching the use of a “device driver” in
the context of using “file management rules” to control digital content to
support the conclusion of obviousness. Id. at 4—5 (citing Kobata 186—
187, Fig. 15).
Appellant does not challenge the Examiner’s rationale for combining
Levien and Kobata. Instead, Appellant contends the combination of Levien
and Kobata does not teach or suggest “a device driver that receives [1] ‘a
request to perform a file management function affecting a location where a .
. . file is stored’ and [2] prevents ‘the file management function upon
determining that the destination is not an authorized location, ’ as recited in
Appellant’s claims.” App. Br. 11. According to Appellant, Levien and
appeal, we treat claims 1—13 and 17—20 as presented in the Amendment filed
on June 13, 2012, as claims pending on appeal.
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Application 12/137,044
Kobata “provide solutions that implement file management rules either
through a stand-alone software program or through a module that is
integrated into the managed digital content” but “neither of these solutions
utilize a device driver to implement and enforce file management rules.” Id.
In particular, Appellant argues Levien does not teach or suggest
“augmenting the functionality of a device driver to implement and enforce
file management rules as claimed.” Id. at 12. Appellant acknowledges
Kobata teaches the use of a “device driver” but argues (1) the “device
drivers disclosed in paragraphs [0186]-[0187] of Kobata perform no further
functions than what a device driver typically perform, such as facilitating
communication between and operating system” and (2) “Figure 15 and
paragraphs [0186]-[0187] of Kobata do not disclose or even mention file
management rules.” Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. One cannot show
nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejection is
based on combination of references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA
1981). “[T]he test [of obviousness] is what the combined teachings of the
references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. at
425. Both Levien and Kobata disclose systems and methods for controlling
and managing digital content using different types of rules. For example,
Levien teaches using data storage protocol and identifier record to restrict
access to digital content, shown in Levien’s Figures 31—42. Similarly,
Kobata teaches using file management rules, shown in Figure 8B, to control
access to digital content. See Kobata ^fl[ 102—103, 140—141, Fig. 8B.
Contrary to Appellant’s arguments, Kobata (not Levien) is relied upon for
teaching the use of a “device driver” shown in Figure 8B and, as correctly
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Appeal 2015-000465
Application 12/137,044
recognized by the Examiner, that “device driver” can implement and enforce
the file management rules. Ans. 15—16 (citing Kobata Tflf 95, 102—103, 140-
141). Levien is relied upon for teaching the recited functions of: (1)
“receiving ... a request to perform a file management function affecting a
location where a . . . file is stored” in the form of a query from an authorized
user (or 3rd party) to activate access to digital content as described by
Levien; and (2) “preventing the file management function upon determining
that the destination is not an authorized location” in the form of preventing
transfer of digital content based on a failure to obtain confirmation of an
authorized user as described by Levien. Ans. 4—5 (citing Levien H 210,
249-250).
In the reply, Appellant acknowledges Kobata’s “viewer module 1406”
described in paragraph 187 is part of a “device driver” but argues that: (1)
Kobata’s “viewer module 1406 resides at the destination, not the source, of
a digital asset, and could not ‘prevent (a) file management function
(affecting a location where a first file is stored) upon determining that the
destination is not an authorized location’” as recited in claims 1,11, and 19;
and (2) the terms “viewer module 416” (shown in Kobata’s figure 4) and
“viewer module 1406” (shown in Kobata’s figure 15) are not the same.
Reply Br. 2—3. We remain unpersuaded because Appellant’s claims 1,11,
and 19 do not preclude the “device driver” at either the source or the
destination as long as the recited “file management function” is performed.
Moreover, contrary to Appellant’s argument, the “viewer module 416”
shown in Kobata’s figure 4 and the “viewer module 1406” shown in
Kobata’s figure 15 are examples of a “device driver” that can be “a stand-
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Application 12/137,044
alone software program” or can be an integrated part of the digital content
itself. Kobata H 84, 95, 102-103, 186-187.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant has not demonstrated the
Examiner erred. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of independent claims 1,11, and 19 based on Levien and Kobata.
Claim 2
Claim 2 depends from claim 1, and further comprises “logging the file
management function request including [1] an indication if the file
management function was allowed or prevented and [2] data identifying the
identity of the user.”
Appellant argues Levien only teaches “transferring an inventory data
version from the separate storage facility to an external unit” and does not
teach “logging the file management function request including [1] an
indication if the file management function was allowed or prevented and [2]
data identifying the identity of the user” as recited in claim 2. App. Br. 14—
15 (citing Levien 1248).
We are not persuaded. As correctly recognized by the Examiner, the
logging function of a file management function request is part of the file
management rules as described by Kobata. Ans. 16 (citing Kobata Tflf 102—
103, 140—141, Fig. 8B). Moreover, Appellant’s logging function can also be
interpreted to encompass tracking how/when and by whom the digital
content is manipulated. Id. (citing Kobata 1118).
For these reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
claim 2 based on Levien and Kobata.
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Claims 3 and 13
Claim 3 depends from claim 1, and further comprises “communicating
an alert to another user when a file management function is prevented.”
Similarly, claim 13 recites the same limitation.
Appellant argues Levien teaches “alerting an authorized user before
the data is transferred, whereas Appellant’s claim 3 recites alerting a user at
the same time a file management function is prevented or after the file
management function is prevented” and, as such, Levien does not teach or
suggest “communicating an alert to another user when a file management
function is prevented” as recited in claim 3. App. Br. 15 (citing Levien
11 164, 249-250).
We remain unpersuaded. Specifically, Levien teaches:
employing one or more of the following features for making the
captured data available to an authorized party prior to the
transferring: printout, screen display, viewfinder display,
display monitor, thumbnail display, removable memory, device
memory, audio, tactile, alert, notification, transmittal to other
device, and instructional.
Levien 1164 (emphasis added). As correctly recognized by the Examiner,
such an alert or notification can be generated when a file management
function is executed regardless of whether that file management function is
authorized or prevented. Ans. 17—18. Moreover, Kobata also teaches
tracking of the digital content, including sending “a notification” each time
the digital content is accessed. See Kobata 117.
For these reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
claims 3 and 13 based on Levien and Kobata.
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Claim 4
Claim 4 depends from claim 1, and further recites “wherein the
repository of file management rules is also queried as a function of a type of
content held in the first file.”
Appellant argues Levien teaches “[facilitating future access to a file
by storing the file according to the values of one or more of the file’s
attributes” — that is “different from querying a repository of file
management rules as a function of a type of content held in a file, as recited
in Appellant’s claim 4.” App. Br. 16.
We agree with Appellant. However, Levien also teaches similar
“rules” or “policy guidelines” that define limits regarding the type of digital
content, i.e., “a function of a type of content held in the first file” as recited
in Appellant’s claim 4. Ans. 18; see also Levien 1195.
Accordingly, we also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
claim 4 based on Levien and Kobata.
Claims 7 and 8
Claim 7 depends from claim 1, and further recites “wherein the file
management function includes a ‘save as’ operation performed by a
computer application.” Claim 8 depends from claim 7, and further recites
“the computer application” is “a word processing application.”
Appellant acknowledges Levien teaches the use of a “storage protocol
. . . [for] keeping a saved version of selected data.” App. Br. 17 (citing
Levien H 12, 67). However, Appellant argues that Levien’s keeping a
saved version of selected data is not the same as teaching Appellant’s
claimed “save as” operation within a word processing application. Id.
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We remain unpersuaded. The Examiner finds, and we agree, Levien
teaches a “save as” operation to save a digital content (i.e., captured image)
in the manner recited in Appellant’s claim 7. Ans. 7 (citing Levien 174).
Likewise, the Examiner finds, and we agree, Levien also teaches various
computer processing applications in the manner recited in Appellant’s claim
8. Id. at 8 (citing Levien || 12, 67, Ligs. 42, 52, 63). Similar to Levien,
Kobata also teaches the use of a viewer module to view the digital content
and the viewer module includes “software operable to transform different
formats of decrypted digital content into usable formats, so that an end-user
can manipulate the digital content” such as “Microsoft Word (Doc).”
Kobata 95—96.
Lor these reasons, we also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of claims 7 and 8 based on Levien and Kobata.
Remaining Claims 5, 6, 9—12, and 17—20
With respect to the remaining dependent claims 5, 6, 9—12, and 17—
20, Appellant presents no separate patentability arguments. App. Br. 18.
Lor the same reasons discussed, we also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of claims 5, 6, 9-12, and 17—20.
CONCLUSION
On the record before us, we conclude Appellant has not demonstrated
the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1—13 and 17—20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a).
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Application 12/137,044
DECISION
As such, we AFFIRM the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1—13
and 17—20.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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