Ex Parte Man et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardSep 26, 201713113750 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 26, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/113,750 05/23/2011 Kwai Hing Man SVL920070099US2/IBMP034-C 1216 63056 7590 09/28/2017 MOLLBORN PATENTS, INC. 2840 COLBY DRIVE BOULDER, CO 80305 EXAMINER FILIPCZYK, MARCIN R ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2158 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/28/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): MOLLBORN@MOLLBORN.COM eofficeaction @ appcoll.com admin @ mollborn .com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte KWAI HING MAN and WAI KEI SO Appeal 2017-0029971 Application 13/113,750 Technology Center 2100 Before JAMES R. HUGHES, CATHERINE SHIANG, and NORMAN H. BEAMER, Administrative Patent Judges. HUGHES, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1—15, which constitute all the claims pending in this application. Final Act. 1,2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is International Business Machines Corp. App. Br. 1. 2 We refer to Appellants’ Specification (“Spec.”) filed May 23, 2011 (claiming benefit of US 11/842,314, filed Aug. 21, 2007); Appeal Brief (“App. Br.”) filed Apr. 20, 2016; and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”) filed Dec. 14, 2016. We also refer to the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”) mailed Oct. 26, 2016, and Final Office Action (Final Rejection) (“Final Act.”) mailed Nov. 25,2015. Appeal 2017-002997 Application 13/113,750 Appellants ’ Invention The invention generally concerns content management systems, computer program products, and methods for providing a dynamic access control list in a content management system, including a storage device operable to store digital objects, where some digital objects are grouped into item types, a server that stores a single dynamic access control list for each item type, where the dynamic access control list further includes a list of subjects associated with operations that the subjects have permission to perform on digital objects of a particular item type and a set of dynamic evolution conditions, where the dynamic evolution conditions specify trigger events for automatically evolving the dynamic access control list to a new state in which each subject is associated with a second set of operations that the subject has permission to perform on the digital objects of the particular item type. Spec. 2, 5—7; Abstract. Representative Claim Independent claim 1, reproduced below with key disputed limitations emphasized, further illustrates the invention: 1. A computer-implemented content management system, comprising: a storage device operable to store a plurality of digital objects, wherein at least some of the digital objects are grouped into item types and each item type includes at least two digital objects; a server storing a single dynamic access control list for each item type, the dynamic access control list including'. a list of one or more subjects, each subject being associated with a first set of operations that the subject has permission to perform on digital objects of a particular item type; and 2 Appeal 2017-002997 Application 13/113,750 a set of dynamic evolution conditions, the dynamic evolution conditions specifying trigger events for automatically evolving the dynamic access control list to a new state in which each subject is associated with a second set of operations that the subject has permission to perform on the digital objects of the particular item type. Rejections on Appeal 1. The Examiner rejects claims 2—5, 7—10, and 12—15 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant regards as the invention. 2. The Examiner rejects claims 1—15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Carpenter et al. (US 2008/0127354 Al, published May 29, 2008 (filed Nov. 28, 2006)) (“Carpenter”) and Adams et al. (US 2002/0124053 Al, published June Sept. 5, 2002) (“Adams”). ISSUES Based upon our review of the record, Appellants’ contentions, and the Examiner’s findings and conclusions, the issues before us follow: 1. Did the Examiner err in claims 2—5, 7—10, and 12—15 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite? 2. Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of Carpenter and Adams collectively would have taught or suggested: a storage device operable to store a plurality of digital objects, wherein at least some of the digital objects are grouped into item types and each item type includes at least two digital objects; a server storing a single dynamic access control list for each item type, the dynamic access control list including: 3 Appeal 2017-002997 Application 13/113,750 a list of one or more subjects, each subject being associated with a first set of operations that the subject has permission to perform on digital objects of a particular item type; and a set of dynamic evolution conditions, the dynamic evolution conditions specifying trigger events for automatically evolving the dynamic access control list to a new state in which each subject is associated with a second set of operations that the subject has permission to perform on the digital objects of the particular item type within the meaning of Appellants’ claim 1 and the commensurate limitations of claims 6 and 11? ANALYSIS The 35 U.S.C. § 112 Rejection of Claims 2—5, 7—10, and 12—15 Appellants contend “that it is clear to a person of ordinary skill in the art that the ‘objects’ in the dependent claims unambiguously refer to the ‘digital objects’ of the independent claims,” but further state that “Appellant is willing to amend the dependent claims to recite ‘digital objects,’ should this be helpful in getting the case in condition for allowance.” App. Br. 9. We find, however, Appellants have failed to provide any substantive support for their contention. Further, Appellants agree to amend claims 2—5, 7—10, and 12—15 to resolve the antecedency issue. App. Br. 9. Accordingly, Appellants do not persuade us of error in the Examiner’s indefmiteness rejection, and we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2—5, 7—10, and 12-15. 4 Appeal 2017-002997 Application 13/113,750 The 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejection of Claims 1—15 Appellants argue independent claims 1, 6, and 11 together. App. Br. 10-12. Appellants provide nominal separate arguments with respect to dependent claims 2—5, 7—10, and 12—15, but do not separately argue the dependent claims particularity and merely reiterate the contentions made with respect to the independent claims. See App. Br. 12—14. Accordingly, we select independent claim 1 as representative of Appellants’ arguments and grouping with respect to claims 1—15. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). The Examiner rejects claim 1 as being obvious in view of Carpenter and Adams. See Final Act. 3—5; Ans. 2—8. We adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 3—5), and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer (Ans. 2—8) in response to Appellants’ Appeal Brief. We concur with the findings and conclusions reached by the Examiner, and we address specific findings, conclusions, and arguments for emphasis as follows. Appellants contend that Carpenter and Adams do not teach or suggest the disputed features of representative claim 1. See App. Br. 10-12; Reply Br. 2-4. Specifically, Appellants contend: (1) Carpenter and Adams do not teach a single dynamic access control list (DACL) for each item type, where each type includes multiple objects (see App. Br. 10—11; Reply Br. 2—4); (2) Carpenter and Adams do not teach a list of one or more subjects associated permissions (accesses) that the subject has for performing a set of operations on of a particular item type of digital objects (see App. Br. 11); and (3) Carpenter and Adams do not teach a set of dynamic evolution conditions specifying trigger events that automatically evolve the dynamic access 5 Appeal 2017-002997 Application 13/113,750 control list such that each subject is associated with a second set of operations the subject has permission to perform on the digital objects of the particular item type (see App. Br. 11—12; Reply Br. 2—3). With respect to Appellants’ first contention of error, Appellants contend “Carpenter only refers to single objects and not to item types” (App. Br. 10; see Reply Br. 3—4) and “Carpenter’s access control list is [not] a ‘dynamic access control list’” (Reply Br. 2). We disagree. As explained by the Examiner (see Final Act. 3—5; Ans. 2—6), Carpenter describes securable software objects (SSOs) secured by access control lists (ACLs), where the SSOs include files, folders, and other objects (see Carpenter 111) — here the use of plurals at least suggests multiple objects (e.g., files, printers, stations, active directory objects, job objects, etc.) included in an SSO. Accordingly, we interpret Appellants’ “item type” to read on Carpenter’s SSO. Carpenter also describes a Dynamic Access Control List (DACL) that controls access to an object (SSO) (see Carpenter 116). Further, Adams describes access levels (access control) determined by, among other elements, the resources or type of files to be accessed (see Adams 117). In the Reply Brief, Appellants argue Carpenter’s list is static, not dynamic, and conflate the features of the recited DACL and the evolution conditions (see Reply Br. 2—\ and discussion, infra) the limitation at issue recites storing a DACL for each type. Carpenter describes this feature (supra). There is no requirement in the instant limitation for automatically changing the access control list itself (or access of various entities) as Appellants seem to argue (see Reply Br. 2). Even so, Carpenter’s DACL is dynamic (as conceded by Appellants — see Reply Br. 2) in that Carpenter describes changing access based on conditions — “this 6 Appeal 2017-002997 Application 13/113,750 co-worker may have different access privileges to the lab resource before/during/after his manager’s vacation” (Reply Br. 2). See Ans. 4—5 (citing Carpenter 149). Therefore, we agree with the Examiner and find a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the combination of Carpenter and Adams would have taught or at least suggested “storing a single dynamic access control list for each item type” where “each item type includes at least two digital objects” (claim 1). With respect to Appellants’ second contention of error, Appellants concede that Carpenter and Adams describe “an ACL with one or more subjects, and associated operations” (App. Br. 11), but reiterate the arguments made with respect to their first contention of error — that the operations in Carpenter’s DACL are not performed (by the subject(s) according to the permissions) on the “digital objects of a particular item type” (id.). Carpenter at least suggests a dynamic access control list for each item type (supra). Similarly, Adams describes an ACL for a type of file (supra). Therefore, we agree with the Examiner and find a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the combination of Carpenter and Adams would have taught or at least suggested “the dynamic access control list including” “a list of one or more subjects, each subject being associated with a first set of operations that the subject has permission to perform on digital objects of a particular item type” (claim 1). With respect to Appellants’ third contention of error, Appellants contend Carpenter and Adams do not teach a DACL including “a set of dynamic evolution conditions” (App. Br. 11) and that Carpenter’s and Adams’ access control lists “do not evolve, but remain static” (App. Br. 12). See Reply Br. 2-4. We disagree. 7 Appeal 2017-002997 Application 13/113,750 As explained by the Examiner (see Final Act. 3—5; Ans. 4—5, 7—8), Carpenter describes dynamic evolution conditions. Carpenter describes access conditions (CONs) “based on dynamic system state information 59 or dynamic user state information 62 that is evaluated by referencing dynamically updatable system resources 58 at the time of requested access” (Carpenter 116). For example Carpenter describes access changing when permissions expire (access being revoked). See Carpenter || 49-50. A subject has access to certain operations when permissions are granted (a first set of operations) and access to different operations when permissions expire (a second set of operations). See id. Therefore, Carpenter at least suggests “dynamic evolution conditions” that specify “trigger events for automatically evolving the dynamic access control list to a new state” where a “subject is associated with a second set of operations.” Appellants concede that “the end result may be the same in both cases, that is, that a user obtains a different access level to an object,” but the “mechanisms for achieving this are completely different” (App. Br. 12). In other words Appellants agree that Carpenter describes a DACE with conditions that dynamically change the operations a subject may perform — that the functionality (result) in Carpenter and the recited limitation of claim 1 is the same. Appellants do not define “dynamic evolution conditions” or recite the process by which they “dynamic evolution conditions” “automatically evolv[e]” the DACE. Appellants attempt to distinguish their DACL from Carpenter’s DACL based on undisclosed and unclaimed processes (methods) to produce information (data) that is utilized to effect operation permissions. See Reply Br. 2-4. Such results, however, do not distinguish the disputed limitations from the cited prior art — the disputed 8 Appeal 2017-002997 Application 13/113,750 limitations are functionally indistinguishable, as conceded by Appellants. Appellants’ disputed claim limitation does not inform the mechanics of how the “evolution” is accomplished; rather, the “dynamic evolution conditions” merely describe conditions that result in changes to operations that may be performed. Carpenter describes a DACL with conditions that result in the same changes to operations that may be performed. In view of these findings, we agree with the Examiner that a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the combination of Carpenter and Adams would have taught or at least suggested “the dynamic access control list including” “a set of dynamic evolution conditions . . . specifying trigger events for automatically evolving the dynamic access control list to a new state in which each subject is associated with a second set of operations that the subject has permission to perform on the digital objects of the particular item type” (claim 1). Thus, Appellants do not persuade us of error in the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of representative independent claim 1. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of representative claim 1, independent claims 6 and 11, and dependent claims 2—5, 7—10, and 12—15, not separately argued with particularity {supra). CONCLUSIONS Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 2—5, 7—10, and 12—15 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 9 Appeal 2017-002997 Application 13/113,750 DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1—15. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 10 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation