Ex Parte Mahooti et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardFeb 3, 201713192107 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 3, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/192,107 07/27/2011 Kevin Mahooti 81413253US01 5385 65913 7590 Intellectual Property and Licensing NXPB.V. 411 East Plumeria Drive, MS41 SAN JOSE, CA 95134 EXAMINER TAN, RICHARD ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2842 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/07/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ip. department .u s @ nxp. com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte KEVIN MAHOOTI and MANKET GANDHI Appeal 2015-006556 Application 13/192,107 Technology Center 2800 Before GEORGE C. BEST, JULIA HEANEY, and JENNIFER R. GUPTA, Administrative Patent Judges. BEST, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Claims 1-20 are pending in Application 13/192,107. In the Final Action, the Examiner rejected claims 1, 2, 4-8, and 20 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious, objected to claims 3, 18, and 19,1, and 1 The Examiner objected to these claims, indicating that they would be allowable “if rewritten [(a)] to overcome the rejection(s) under 34 U.S.C. 112, 2nd paragraph, set forth in this Office action and [(b)] to include all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims.” Final Act. 10. The Final Action, however, does not include a rejection under § 112,12. We, therefore, assume that Appellants’ July 10, 2014 Amendment overcame the § 112,12 rejection set forth in the May 22, 2015 Office Action and that Appeal 2015-006556 Application 13/192,107 allowed claims 9-17. Final Act. (November 6, 2014). Appellants* 2 seek reversal of these rejections pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM. BACKGROUND The ’107 Application describes embodiments that enable fast start-up, ultra-low power bias generators for fast wake-up oscillators and other applications. Spec. 13. In particular, these embodiments comprise a bias generator circuit, a master startup circuit for applying current to a first node in the bias generator circuit, a second startup circuit for applying current to one or more additional nodes in the bias generator circuit, and a power switch for controlling supply of power to the bias generator circuit, master startup circuit, and second startup circuit. Id. 1 5. Claim 1 is representative of the ’107 Application’s claims and is reproduced from the Claims Appendix to the Appeal Brief below: 1. A bias generator comprising: a bias generator circuit; a master startup circuit that is configured to apply a first startup current to a first node in the bias generator circuit; a second startup circuit that is configured to apply a second startup current to additional nodes in the bias generator circuit; and the reference to § 112 in the Final Action is an inadvertent error on the part of the Examiner. Thus, the sole remaining objection to claims 3, 18, and 19 is that they depend from a rejected base claim and would be allowable if rewritten in independent claim. 2 NXP B.V. is identified as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 1. 2 Appeal 2015-006556 Application 13/192,107 a power switch that is configured to receive power from a power supply and provide power to the bias generator circuit, wherein the master startup circuit is configured to receive a first timing control signal, the second startup circuit is configured to receive a second timing control signal, and the second timing control signal is a delayed version of the first timing control signal. Appeal Br. 10 (some paragraphing and indentation added). REJECTION On appeal, the Examiner maintains the following rejection: 1. Claims 1, 2, 4—8, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Wong,3 Ogawa,4 and Manning.5 Final Act. 4. DISCUSSION Appellants present specific arguments for reversal of the rejection with respect to independent claims 1 and 8. See Appeal Br. 4—7. Claims 2, 4—7, and 20 depend directly or indirectly from claim 1. Appellants assert that these claims are allowable due to their dependencies from an allowable base claim. Id. at 8. Accordingly, claims 2, 4—7, and 20 will stand or fall with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2013). Appellants argue that the rejection of claims 1 and 8 should be reversed because the Examiner has not established a prima facie case of obviousness. Appeal Br. 4. In particular, Appellants argue that (1) the 3 US 7,602,234 B2, issued October 13, 2009. 4 US 5,825,237, issued October 20, 1998. 5 US 6,002,617, issued December 14, 1999. 3 Appeal 2015-006556 Application 13/192,107 Examiner has failed to provide sufficient reasoning to support the obviousness rejection, id.', (2) the Examiner erred by finding that the combination of Wong, Ogawa, and Manning describes or suggests the use of a second timing control signal that is a delayed version of the first timing control signal, id. at 5-7; and (3) the Examiner’s proposed combination of prior art references would render Wong’s apparatus unsatisfactory for its intended purpose, id. For the following reasons, we find Appellants’ arguments to be unpersuasive of reversible error. First, Appellants begin by arguing that “[t]he Office Action failed to provide articulated reasoning to support its obviousness rejections. Hence, as described below, the Office Action has failed to present a prima facie case of obviousness for any of the rejected claims.” Id. at 4 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006). We have reviewed the Final Office Action, the Advisory Action of January 29, 2015, and the Examiner’s Answer. These documents present the reasoning underlying the rejection of claims 1 and 8 in sufficient detail that Appellants had notice of the basis for the rejection. See, e.g., Final Act. 2—3, 4—9. Appellants’ disagreement with the Examiner’s reasoning is insufficient to establish that the Office Action failed to provide the necessary reasoning. Here, the Examiner met the burden of providing a detailed explanation of the basis for the rejection. Appellants, therefore, must demonstrate reversible error in the Examiner’s reasoning if they are to prevail in this appeal. Second, Appellants argue that the Examiner erred by finding that the asserted prior art combination describes or suggests the use of a second timing control signal that is a delayed version of the first timing control signal. Appeal Br. 5—7. We are not persuaded by this argument. 4 Appeal 2015-006556 Application 13/192,107 The Examiner found that the combination of Wong and Ogawa describes or suggests each limitation recited in claim 1 except for the requirement that the second timing control signal is a delayed version of the first timing control signal. Final Act. 4—5. The Examiner also found that Wong’s Figure 5 and the associated portions of Wong’s Specification describe a master startup circuit—transistor NST—and a second startup circuit—transistor PST. Id. at 4. The Examiner also found that transistor P ST receives a timing control signal that is a delayed version of the timing control signal received by transistor NST. Id. at 4—5. In particular, transistor NST receives a first timing control signal Vstrt. Id. at 4. Transistor PST receives timing control signal Vstrt after it passes through inverter INV2. Id. at 4—5. Wong does not expressly describe inverter INV2 as delaying Vstrt in addition to inverting it. Id. at 5. The Examiner cites Manning as describing the passage of a signal through two cascading inverters as delaying the signal. Id.', Answer 5. Based upon Manning, the Examiner reasons that a single inverter must also produce a slight delay in signal arrival. Answer 5. Thus, passage of Vstrt through inverter INV2 means that transistor PST receives an inverted and delayed version of Vstrt. Appellants argue that “while a pair of cascaded inverters could be defined as a delay circuit, a single inverter would not perform that function. A single inverter inverts a signal, which is not the same as delaying an unchanged signal.” Appeal Br. 6; see also Reply Br. 2^4. Based upon this assertion, Appellants argue that a person having ordinary skill in the art would not have any reason to replace the single inverter with a delay circuit “because an inverter and a delay circuit have entirely different functions.” Appeal Br. 6. 5 Appeal 2015-006556 Application 13/192,107 Appellants’ arguments are not persuasive because they are based upon a misinterpretation of the Examiner’s rejection. The rejection is not premised upon replacing Wong’s single inverter with Manning’s pair of cascaded inverters. Instead, Manning is cited as evidence that the process of passing a signal through an inverter introduces delay. Appellants have not convinced us that the Examiner’s factual determinations in this regard constitute reversible error. Third, Appellants argue that the Examiner’s proposed combination of references would render Wong unsuitable for its intended use. Appeal Br. 5—7 (citing In re Gordon, 733 F.2d 900 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). In particular, Appellants argue that Wong’s circuit cannot tolerate a delay in the arrival of Vstrt at transistor PST because Wong’s pair of start circuits “are part of a CMOS bias generator having mirrored p-type and n-type halves. The intended purpose of Wong involves complementary operation, wherein the ‘characteristics of ioutp and ioutn are substantially identical.’” Appeal Br. 5 (quoting Wong col. 5,11. 8—9). Appellants’ argument is not persuasive for at least two reasons. First, as the Examiner points out, “substantially identical” is not “identical.” Answer 4—5. Since the Examiner did not propose modifying Wong’s circuitry to introduce a delay, the introduction of the delay caused by INV2 must have an insubstantial effect on the functioning of Wong’s circuitry. Second, in context Wong’s statement that the “characteristics of ioutp and ioutn are substantially identical” appears in connection with a discussion of the fluctuation of the current as a function of temperature. See Wong col. 5, 1. 5—col. 6,1. 18. Appellants do not direct us to any portion of Wong that addresses questions concerning the relative timing in the functioning of the P-Mirror Start Circuit and N-Mirror Start Circuit portions of Wong. 6 Appeal 2015-006556 Application 13/192,107 CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the rejection of claims 1, 2, 4—8, and 20 of the ’107 Application. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). AFFIRMED 7 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation