Ex Parte Mahler et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 24, 2016

11755035 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 24, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
111755,035 0513012007 Joachim Mahler
57579 7590 06/28/2016
MURPHY, BILAK & HOMILLER/INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES
1255 Crescent Green
Suite 200
CARY, NC 27518
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
1012-0650 I 2005P54870 8460
us
EXAMINER
NADAV,ORI
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2811
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/28/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
official@mbhiplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JOACHIM MAHLER, STEP AN LANDAU, EDUARD KNAUER,
KHALIL HOSSEINI, and MANFRED MENGEL 1
Appeal2015-001753
Application 11/755,035
Technology Center 2800
Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, DANIEL N. FISHMAN, and
JAMES W. DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judges.
FISHMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of claims
1-21, 33, 35, and 36.2 Claims 22-32 and 34 have been cancelled. We have
jurisdiction over the remaining pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We affirm.
1 Appellants identify INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES AG as the real party in
interest. Appeal Brief 2.
2 In this Decision, we refer to Appellants' Appeal Brief ("App. Br.," filed
August 19, 2014); the Reply Brief ("Reply Br.," filed November 3, 2014);
the Final Office Action ("Final Act.," mailed March 28, 2014); the
Examiner's Answer ("Ans.," mailed on September 4, 2014); and the original
Specification ("Spec.," filed August 8, 2007).
Appeal 2015-001753
Application 11/755,035
THE INVENTION
Appellants' invention is directed to producing a semiconductor device
comprising a semiconductor chip stack and a plastic housing. Abstract.
Independent claim 1, reproduced below, is representative:
1. A semiconductor device, comprising:
a device carrier;
an adhesive layer;
a first plastic housing composition;
a chip stack including a first semiconductor chip fixed by
its rear side on the device carrier and at least one second
semiconductor chip adhesively bonded by its rear side to a top
side of the first semiconductor chip by the adhesive layer;
and a second plastic composition arranged between the
first plastic housing composition and the chip stack such that
the second plastic composition adjoins the adhesive layer and
extends from the top side of the first semiconductor chip to the
rear of the second semiconductor chip;
wherein the second plastic composition has a sufficient
thermal stability to physically decouple the first semiconductor
chip from the second semiconductor chip under thermal
expansion of the first plastic housing composition.
THE REJECTION3
Claims 1-21and33, and 35-36 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kim (US 7,145,253 Bl; Dec. 5, 2006).
Ans. 2-7.
3 In the Final Office Action, the Examiner issued a rejection of all pending
claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) and a rejection of all pending claims under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kim or Nakaoka. Final Act. 2-9.
In the Examiner's Answer, the Examiner withdraws the rejection under
§ 112 and the rejection under§ 103 over Nakaoka (Ans. 2) and re-states the
rejection of all pending claims under§ 103 over Kim (Ans. 2-7).
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Application 11/755,035
ISSUE
Only those arguments actually made by Appellants have been
considered in this Decision. Arguments that Appellants did not make in the
Briefs have not been considered and are waived. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
Based on Appellants' arguments in the Appeal Brief (App. Br. 11-
17), the issue presented is: Has the Examiner erred by finding Kim teaches
or suggests a second plastic composition having "sufficient thermal stability
to physically decouple the first semiconductor chip from the second
semiconductor chip under thermal expansion of the first plastic housing
composition," as recited in independent claim 1 (hereinafter the "disputed
limitation")?
ANALYSIS
We are not persuaded by Appellants' contentions of Examiner error
(App. Br. 11-17). We adopt as our own the findings and reasons set forth
by the Examiner in the Answer (Ans. 2-15). However, we highlight and
address specific arguments and findings for emphasis as follows.
Appellants contend Kim's insulating gel 250 does not teach a second
plastic composition that meets the disputed limitation. App. Br. 11-21. In
particular, Appellants argue Kim's insulating gel 250 "is not resistant to
thermal expansion of a corresponding plastic housing composition." Id. at
16. Further, Appellants argue Kim's insulating gel 250 is soft, not rigid, and
transmits external pressure to sensing chip 230. Id. at 15-16 (citing Kim
col. 3, 11. 62---65). See also Reply Br. 4. Thus, Appellants contend Kim's
insulating gel 250 does not have sufficient thermal stability to physically
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Application 11/755,035
decouple the semiconductor chip 220 from semiconductor chip 230 under a
thermal expansion of molding housing composition 420. App. Br. 16.
Appellants' arguments do not persuade us of Examiner error. When
construing claim terminology during prosecution before the Office, claims
are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the
specification, reading claim language in light of the specification as it would
be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of Sci.
Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). At the outset, we find no
specific definition in Appellants' Specification that distinguishes the
material of the recited "second plastic composition" from the material of
Kim's insulating gel 250. Appellants provide permissive examples of a
second plastic composition in the Specification stating "plastics from the
polymer classes ... are preferably user!' and "[ m ]odified silane polymers
and silicones and also copolymers ... can also be contained." App. Br. 12-
13 (quoting Spec. p. 14, 11. 1-5) (emphases added). Thus, we are
unpersuaded that a broad but reasonable interpretation of the recited second
plastic composition excludes the material of Kim's gel 250.
Further, Appellants cite no explicit or implicit support from the
Specification for a construction of "physically decoupling ... " that requires
no transfer of pressure from the thermal expansion of the first plastic
housing composition to the second semiconductor chip. App. Br. 12. At
some degree of pressure any material will transfer some (or all) pressure to
the protected chip stack, and Appellants' Specification provides no guidance
as to a permissible range of pressure to be withstood by the second plastic
composition. Thus, we conclude the broadest reasonable interpretation of
"physically decouple" requires only a reduction in the transfer of pressure
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Application 11/755,035
onto the second semiconductor chip from the first plastic housing
composition. This interpretation is consistent with Appellants' argument
that "claim 1 limits the possible materials of the second plastic housing
composition to those materials that resist thermal expansion of the first
plastic housing composition." App. Br. 12. Materials may resist thermal
expansion to varying degrees that, in tum, reduce the transfer of pressure
between the housing and the chip stack.
Further, Appellants fail to cite evidence or reasoning that Kim's gel
transfers all pressure to chip 230 from mold 420's thermal expansion.
App. Br. 15. Specifically, we find that Kim's insulating gel 250 has at least
some resistance to mold 420's thermal expansion and at least changes
(reduces) the stress transmitted by mold 420 to chip 230 (i.e., the insulating
gel 250 resists thermal expansion to some degree). Contrary to Appellants
contention, Kim teaches that the insulating gel 250 transfers external
pressure, but Kim does not teach that all pressure from the second mold 420
is transferred to chip 230. Kim col. 3, 11. 60-65. Accordingly, the Examiner
broadly but reasonably construes a second plastic composition as
encompassing and, therefore, taught or suggested by Kim's insulating gel
250. Ans. 2-3 (citing Kim Figures 5E and 6).
Appellants further argue the Examiner "incorrectly alleges that Kim's
mold structure 420 corresponds to the claimed first plastic housing
composition." App. Br. 17. In particular, Appellants assert "[t]hose of
ordinary skill will appreciate that the mold structure 420 described by Kim is
formed from a metal or other material that can withstand the higher
temperatures associated with this molding process." App. Br. 17.
Appellants further argue Kim "makes clear that the 'mold' and 'encapsulant'
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Application 11/755,035
are different features of the apparatus, and are not interchangeable." Reply
Br. 6-7 (citing Figure 5E and col. 7, 11. 4--15).
It is well settled that mere attorney arguments and conclusory
statements, which are unsupported by factual evidence, are entitled to little
probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re
De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Attorney argument is not
evidence. In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974). Nor can such
argument take the place of evidence lacking in the record. Meitzner v.
Mindick, 549 F.2d 775, 782 (CCPA 1977). At the outset, we note
Appellants provide only unsupported assertions but fail to identify
persuasive evidence that Kim's mold structure 420 would withstand higher
temperatures associated with Kim's molding process. Therefore,
Appellants' contention does not persuade us of error in the Examiner's
rejection.
Further, we are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments because the
Examiner relies on Kim's teaching of an encapsulant 640 for the suggestion
that the molding housing (mold 420) composition can be comprised of
plastic. Ans. 14--15 (citing Kim col. 8, 11. 10-13). The Examiner finds, and
we agree, Kim's disclosure of mold 420, together with disclosure of
encapsulant 640 as a possible material for mold 420, teaches or suggests the
claimed "first plastic housing composition." Ans. 14--15
For the reasons discussed supra, we sustain the Examiner's rejection
of independent claim 1. For similar reasons, we sustain the Examiner's
rejection of dependent claims 2-21, 33, 35, and 36, which are not argued
separately.
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DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's decision to reject claims 1-21, 33, 35, and
36.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this
appeal may be extended under 3 7 C.F .R. § 1.13 6( a )(1 )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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