Ex Parte Maeng

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Nov 30, 2011

11438829 (B.P.A.I. Nov. 30, 2011)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/438,829 05/23/2006 Joon Maeng 38715-P005C1 5550
7590 11/30/2011
Kelly K. Kordzik
Winstead Sechrest & Minick P.C.
P.O. Box 50784
Dallas, TX 75201
EXAMINER
TUNG, KEE M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2628
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/30/2011 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
________________

Ex parte JOON MAENG
________________

Appeal 2009-007505
Application 11/438,829
Technology Center 2600
________________

Before SCOTT R. BOALICK, CARL W. WHITEHEAD, JR., and
BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, Administrative Patent Judges.

BAUMEISTER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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SUMMARY
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejections of claims 1-14:
Claims 9-13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for being directed
to non-statutory subject matter.
Claims 1, 3, 4, 6-9, 11, 12, and 14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as obvious over Duruoz (US 6,363,207 B1; issued Mar. 26, 2002)
in view of Iijima (US 5,873,059; issued Feb. 16, 1999).
Claims 2 and 10 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious
over Duruoz in view of Iijima and Bowen (US 6,147,695; issued Nov. 14,
2000).
Claims 5 and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious
over Duruoz in view of Iijima and Klapman (US 6,674,461 B1; Jan. 6,
2004).
We affirm.

THE INVENTION
Appellant describes his invention as follows:
The present invention relates to the play back of
previously recorded audio and video data. More particularly,
the present invention relates to a computer system, method, and
computer readable medium storing instructions executable by
computer system for varying the playback rate of audio data as
corresponding motion video data is displayed. In accordance
with the present invention, the playback rate can be increased
above or decreased below normal playback rates while
maintaining the quality or tone of audio speech.
(Abstract).

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THE § 101 REJECTION
In the Examiner’s Answer (Ans. 2-3), the Examiner newly rejects
claims 9-13 under 35 U.S.C. §101 for being directed towards non-statutory
subject matter. Appellant does not respond to this new rejection (see Reply
Br. 2-14). We therefore summarily sustain this rejection.

THE § 103 REJECTIONS
CLAIMS 1, 4, 9, AND 12
Independent claim 1 is representative of the claims listed above:1
1. A method comprising:
reading first audio data stored in memory;
generating first audio corresponding to the first audio
data, wherein the first audio is generated at a first audio
generation rate;
sequentially displaying first image frames on a monitor
as the first audio is generated, wherein the first image frames
correspond to the first audio data;
reading second audio stored in memory;
generating second audio corresponding to the second
audio data, wherein the second audio is generated at a second
audio generation rate;
sequentially displaying second image frames on a
monitor as the second audio is generated, wherein the second
image frames correspond to the second audio data;

1 In the Supplemental Appeal Brief filed December 3, 2008 (“App. Br.”),
Appellant argues claims 1, 4, 9, and 12, inter alia, together as a single group
(App. Br. 5-9). Appellant additionally argues dependent claims 4 and 12
under a separate heading (App. Br. 9), but the patentability arguments
regarding claims 4 and 12 are solely based upon the patentability of
independent claims 1 and 9 (App. Br. 9). We therefore treat claim 1 as
representative of claims 1, 4, 9, and 12. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).
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wherein the second audio is generated after the first audio
is generated;
wherein the second audio generation rate is distinct from
the first audio generation rate; and
wherein the first audio is generated at a tone substantially
equal to that of the second audio.
Appellant contends that there is no express teaching in Duruoz of
(1) the display of first and second image frames as corresponding first and
second audio data is respectively generated (App. Br. 5-6), (2) second audio
being generated after first audio (App. Br. 6-7), and (3) a different audio
generation rate for the first and second audio (App. Br. 8-9). Appellant also
contends that the Examiner has not provided a reasoned rationale to combine
the teachings of Duruoz and Iijima (App. Br. 14-19). In the Reply Brief,
Appellant notes the Examiner’s position that “Duruoz teaches a fast forward
play back mode which does not mute the audio during the fast forward play
back operation” (Reply Br. 2), but Appellant contends that “[t]he teaching of
not muting the audio does not teach a second audio generation rate that is
distinct from the first audio generation rate” (id. (emphasis omitted)).
The Examiner finds Duruoz discloses the generation and presentation
of image frames alongside corresponding audio (Ans. 13-14 (citing, e.g.,
Duruoz, col. 13, ll. 1-7)). The Examiner also finds that selection of a fast-
forward trick play mode after an initial normal playback mode would result
in second audio being generated after first audio (Ans. 14-15). Similarly, the
fast-forward trick play audio would have a higher generation rate than audio
during a normal playback mode (Ans. 15). The Examiner additionally finds
the rationale for applying Iijima’s known technique of tone equalization to
Duruoz’s audio is preferred by Duruoz (Ans. 6 (citing Duruoz, col. 15, ll. 3-
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6)) and would result in higher sound quality and a better user experience
(Ans. 19-20).
Additional review of Duruoz’s disclosure also reveals discussion of
(1) synchronization of audio with corresponding frames of video (col. 1, ll.
39-42), (2) fast forward audio after normal playback audio (respectively 532
and 524 in Figure 10), and (3) different audio generation rates (slopes of 532
and 524 in Figure 10).
From Appellant’s assertions regarding Duruoz’s demultiplexing and
decoding processes and various clocks (e.g., App. Br. 5-9), we infer
Appellant’s contentions to be implicitly founded upon the premise that claim
1’s steps of generating the first and second audio must somehow include
Duruoz’s demultiplexing and decoding steps. However, we understand the
Examiner’s position to alternatively be that the step of generating the audio
occurs after the signals have already been demultiplexed and decoded.
Restated, the Examiner interprets generating first and second audio as the
audio analog of displaying first and second image frames. Appellant has not
provided any persuasive evidence or argument for why this interpretation is
improper.
Appellant also contends that the “Examiner’s reasoning for modifying
Duruoz with Iijima to include the missing claim limitation of claims 1, 9 and
14 is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of obviousness” (App. Br.
14 (emphasis omitted)). At the outset, Appellant acknowledges the
Examiner provides a rationale for combining the references and that Duruoz,
itself, provides the motivation for doing so:
“because by maintaining a constant pitch between transitioning
playback modes . . . the audio would be significantly clearer to
the user, which is disclosed as being important to Duruoz et al.,
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while not affecting the new rate imposed on the audio in the
second playback mode, resulting in a more enjoyable user
experience.”
(App. Br. 15 (citing Final Rej. 4-5)). Appellant nonetheless maintains that
the Examiner’s reasoning is insufficient (App. Br. 15), the Examiner has not
provided any rational underpinning as to how the Examiner derived him
motivation for modifying Duruoz (App. Br. 15-16), the Examiner is
improperly relying on common knowledge and common sense without
objective evidence (App. Br. 16), and “the Examiner’ [sic] reasoning . . .
does not provide reasons . . . that the skilled artisan,” absent knowledge of
the claimed invention, would solve the problem facing the inventors with the
missing claim limitation (App. Br. 17-19).
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive. The Examiner has set forth
how the prior art teaches the claim elements as well as a motivation, which
was taught by Duruoz. As such, the Examiner has established a prima face
showing of obviousness, shifting to Appellant the burden of rebuttal.
Appellant’s arguments do not rebut this prima facie showing.
For the reasons above, Appellant’s arguments concerning the
teachings of Duruoz and the lack of a reasoned rationale are not persuasive.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of representative claim 1,
as well as claims 4, 9, and 12, which are grouped with claim 1.
CLAIMS 3 AND 11
Appellant argues dependent claims 3 and 11 together as a separate
group (App. Br. 9). We treat claim 3 is representative of this group. It reads
as follows (emphasis added):
3. The method of claim 1 wherein the first and second audio
data are substantially equal in quantity, wherein the first audio
is generated within a first time period, wherein the second audio
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is generated in a second time period, and wherein the first time
period is greater or lesser than the second time period.
Appellant argues that Figure 10 of Duruoz merely “illustrates the
relationship of the time values in the [system time clock] STC 86 and
[virtual system time clock] VSTC 88 over time for different play back
modes” but not the amount of data (App. Br. 9; Reply Br. 3-4).
The Examiner notes that the claim’s recitation of “substantially equal”
is broader than if the claim had alternatively recited exactly equal (Ans. 16).
Based upon the ambiguities in the metes and bounds of the term
“substantially equal,” the Examiner finds that the claim limitation may be
interpreted broadly enough such that Duruoz’s first standard playback period
in Figure 10 has a substantially equal amount of data as the first fast forward
playback period in Figure 10 (id.). We understand the Examiner’s position
to be that because the times associated with the standard playback and fast
forward playback periods are similar, the amount of data generated within
the respective time periods may also be deemed to be sufficiently similar so
as to constitute being “substantially equal.”
Appellant has not offered an explanation or definition of what the
term “substantially equal” means (see App. Br. 3-4; Reply Br. 9). Nor has
Appellant provided any persuasive reasons for why the quantity of data
generated during similar time periods cannot be reasonably interpreted as
being “substantially equal” (App. Br. 3-4; Reply Br. 9). Appellant has
therefore not persuaded us that the Examiner’s interpretation is
unreasonable.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 3 and 11.
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CLAIM 6
Dependent claim 6 reads as follows:
6. The method of claim 1 further comprising:
inputting the first audio generation rate via a graphical
user interface;
generating the first audio at the first audio generation rate
in response to inputting the audio generation rate in third
memory;
inputting the second audio generation rate via the
graphical user interface;
generating the second audio at the second audio
generation rate in response to inputting the second audio
generation rate in memory.
The Examiner finds that “Duruoz et al. teaches that user commands
are processed from a control input device operated by a control system
display, which displays information, menu selections and other information
to the user and which may or may not also function as an input device (col.
5, lines 21-26)” (Ans. 7-8). The Examiner interprets the control system
display, which allows for user input via menu selection, as constituting a
graphical user interface (Ans. 8). The Examiner finds that Duruoz’s
graphical user interface allows for user selection of playback modes (Ans.
16). The Examiner also reasons, “[i]t is inherent that if first and said video
and audio data is processed that said data must have been input into said
system at some point in time” (Ans. 8).
Appellant argues that Duruoz does not teach the language of claim 6
(App. Br. 10-11; Reply Br. 5-6). Specifically, Appellant acknowledges that
Duruoz teaches a central processing unit having the functionality that the
Examiner noted (App. Br. 10). But Appellant nonetheless maintains “[t]his
language does not teach inputting the first [or second] audio generation rate
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via a graphical user interface” (id.). Appellant also contends that this
language does not teach generating either the first or second audio at the
respective rates in response to inputting the rates in third memory (id.). In
short, Appellant’s contentions essentially constitute a conclusory assertion
that Duruoz’s acknowledged teachings do not correspond to the entire
language of claim 6.
As such, Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. The Examiner
has set forth a rationale for the rejection with reasonable clarity (Ans. 8, 16-
17), and Appellant has not articulated any persuasive reasons why the
Examiner’s interpretation is unreasonable. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii)
(2006) (establishing that “[a] statement which merely points out what a
claim recites will not be considered an argument for separate patentability of
the claim”). Furthermore, to the extent Appellant may be deemed to be
arguing that claim 6 fails to set forth generating audio, the reasons for why
such arguments are unpersuasive have already been set forth above in the
analysis of claim 1.
We therefore sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claim 6.
CLAIM 7
Dependent claim 7 reads as follows:
7. The method of claim 1 further comprising:
displaying a graphical user interface on a monitor,
wherein the graphical user interface comprises a first field
configured to receive data;
entering data relating the first audio generation rate into
the first field of the graphical user interface;
entering data relating to the second audio generation rate
into the first field of the graphical user interface.
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In rejecting claim 7, the Examiner incorporates the reasoning set forth
for claim 6 (Ans. 8). For example, the Examiner had found in relation to
claim 6 that Duruoz’s control system display corresponds to the graphical
user interface (id.). In relation to claim 7, the Examiner more specifically
finds the graphical user interface is considered a first field (id.). Appellant
questions how a graphical user interface itself can be considered a first field
(Reply Br. 8).
Reading the rejections of claims 6 and 7 as a whole, we understand
the Examiner’s position to be that Duruoz’s control system display (or
monitor) corresponds to the graphical user interface and that the menu
options, which are disclosed as being available within the control system
display, and by which data can be input (col. 5, ll. 20-25), correspond to
fields of the graphical user interface.
Appellant has not provided any persuasive evidence in the Briefs as to
how the claim term “fields” is to be interpreted. Appellant’s Specification
does not provide an express definition of the term “field” either, but it does
indicate that an electronic button of a graphical user interface constitutes a
field (Spec. 8:3-4). As such, we see no reason that would preclude one of
Duruoz’s disclosed menu options from constituting a field, as recited by
claim 7.
Appellant also presents additional arguments in relation to claim 7
(App. Br. 11-12; Reply Br. 7-8). However, these additional arguments
effectively consist of statements of what Duruoz teaches and unsupported
conclusions that Duruoz does not teach all of the language of claim 7 (App.
Br. 11-12; Reply Br. 7-8). As such, Appellant’s arguments do not
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demonstrate that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 7. We therefore
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 7.
CLAIM 8
Dependent claim 8 recites:
8. The method of claim 1 further comprising receiving a
message via the Internet, wherein the message comprises first
and second compressed audio data, wherein the first and second
audio data results from decompressing the first and second
compressed audio data, respectively.
Appellant argues that Duruoz does not teach first and second
compressed audio data (App. Br. 13).
The Examiner finds that Duruoz discloses, in addition to the elements
set forth in prior sections of the rejection, receiving first and second
compressed audio data and decompressing this data (Ans. 8 (citing Duruoz,
col. 2, ll. 27-30)). The Examiner finds that cited prior art fails to disclose
transmitting the compressed data over the internet, but the Examiner takes
Official Notice that this was a well-known method of transmitting data (id.)
and sets forth a rationale for why one of ordinary skill in the art would have
been motivated to transmit data over the internet (Ans. 8-9).
Appellant acknowledges that Duruoz teaches, inter alia,
decompressing data (App. Br. 13; Reply Br. 9). But Appellant contends the
Examiner has not established a prima facie case of obviousness because
claim 8 does not merely recite decompressing data (Reply Br. 9), and
Duruoz does not teach the entire language of claim 8 (App. Br. 13; Reply Br.
9 (each Brief reciting the language of claim 8 verbatim)).
This argument is not persuasive. Appellant has not alleged what
specific claim language the cited art fails to teach. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2006) (establishing that “[a] statement which merely
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points out what a claim recites will not be considered an argument for
separate patentability of the claim”). We therefore sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 8.
CLAIM 14
Appellant argues that the Examiner never particularly addresses any
of the limitations of claim 14 (App. Br. 13-14; Reply Br. 9-11). This
argument is not persuasive. In rejecting claim 14, the Examiner expressly
states that the rejection incorporates the rationales set forth in the rejection
of claim 1, 6, and 8 (Ans. 9). The Examiner also sets forth a rationale for
why Duruoz teaches other elements and limitations of claim 14 such as a
microprocessor for decompressing data (Ans. 9 (discussing Duruoz’s
application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) 36)) and third memory (Ans.
10 (discussing Duruoz’s cache memory)).
Appellant’s additional argument concerning the Examiner’s rationale
for the combination (App. Br. 14-19) is identical to that discussed above in
the rejection of independent claim 1, and it is unpersuasive for the reasons
set forth previously.
We therefore sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 14.
CLAIMS 2 AND 10
Dependent claim 2 is representative of the group:
2. The method of claim 1 wherein the first and second
image frames are displayed at equal rates.
Appellant contends that Bowen does not teach displaying first and
second image frames at equal rates (App. Br. 20). Appellant also contends
that the Examiner’s reason for combining Bowen with Duruoz and Iijima
lacks a rational underpinning (App. Br. 20-23; Reply Br. 11-12).
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The Examiner finds that Duruoz teaches first and second image
frames (Ans. 10). The Examiner admits that Duruoz does not teach a
constant frame rate, but relies on Bowen to teach dynamically sizing frames
of varying frame rates to achieve a constant frame rate (Ans. 20). The
Examiner concludes it would have been obvious to apply the constant frame
rate achieved by Bowen to the first and second image frames of Duruoz and
Iijima (Ans. 10). The Examiner also finds that the rationale for applying
Bowen’s known constant frame rate technique to the first and second frames
of Duruoz was preferred by Duruoz (id. (citing Duruoz, col. 15, ll. 3-6)) and
would have resulted in a smoother visual presentation (Ans. 11).
For the reasons above, Appellant’s arguments concerning the
teachings of the cited references and the lack of a rationale to combine the
cited references are not persuasive. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of dependent claims 2 and 10.
CLAIMS 5 AND 13
Appellant’s sole argument is that the Examiner has not provided any
rational underpinning for the proposed combination of Klapman, Duruoz,
and Iijima (App. Br. 23-27). We disagree with Appellant’s contention. The
Examiner finds that incorporating Klapman’s interpolation method into the
combination of Duruoz and Iijima would, among other reasons, allow for a
greater number of, and more easily generated views of, a scene (Ans. 23).
We adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner
in the action from which the appeal is taken (see Ans. 11-12) and (2) the
reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in response to
Appellant’s Appeal Brief (see Ans. 22-26). We concur with the conclusions
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reached by the Examiner. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of dependent claims 5 and 13.

DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-14 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2010).

AFFIRMED

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