Ex Parte MacInnis

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 12, 2016

11488275 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 12, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
111488,275 07/18/2006
121312 7590 02/17/2016
Foley & Lardner LLP/ Broadcom Corporation
3000 K Street N.W
Suite 600
Washington, DC 20007-5109
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Alexander Maclnnis
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
106861-0276 7317
EXAMINER
SHIBRU, HELEN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2484
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/17/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
ipdocketing@foley.com
cmckenna@foley.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ALEXANDER MACINNIS 1
Appeal2014-002503
Application 11/488,275
Technology Center 2400
Before JEFFREYS. SMITH, MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, and
AMBER L. HAGY, Administrative Patent Judges.
HAGY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of claims
13-20, 22-25, 27-31, 33, and 34, which are all of the claims presently
pending.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
Introduction
1 Appellant identifies Broadcom Corporation as the real party in interest.
(App. Br. 2.)
2 Claims 1-12 were canceled in an Amendment filed September 14, 2010.
Claims 21 and 26 were canceled in an Amendment filed May 31, 2011.
Claim 32 was canceled in an Amendment filed November 13, 2012.
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Application 11/488,275
The claims are directed to systems, methods, and apparatus for trick
mode in the playback of a video stream. As described in Appellant's
Specification, "[a] trick mode function includes functions, such as, fast
forward, rewind, reverse play, and displaying pictures in a different order
than the normal playback order." (Spec. i-f 22.)
Exemplary Claim
Claim 13, reproduced below with the disputed limitation italicized, is
exemplary of the claimed subject matter:
13. A system, comprising:
circuitry configured to:
receive a normal video stream;
decompress the normal video stream, thereby resulting in
a reconstructed normal video stream;
generate a compressed trick mode stream from the
reconstructed normal video stream, wherein the compressed trick
mode stream includes fewer pictures than the reconstructed
normal video stream; and
decode the compressed trick mode stream, wherein
pictures of the compressed trick mode stream are selected for
decoding based at least in part on whether the pictures of the
compressed trick mode stream are discardable pictures.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Zdepski
Cavallerano
Rodriguez
US 6,445,738 Bl Sept. 3, 2002
US 2004/0001693 Al Jan. 1, 2004
US 2006/0013568 Al Jan. 19, 2006
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REJECTIONS
Claims 13-16, 20, 22-25, 27-31, and 34 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Zdepski and Rodriguez. (Final
Act. 2-6.)
Claim 17 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Zdepski, Rodriguez, and Ali. (Final Act. 6.)
Claims 18 and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Zdepski, Rodriguez, and Inoue. (Final Act. 7.)
Claim 33 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Zdepski, Rodriguez, and Cavallerano. (Final Act. 7-8.)
ISSUES
(1) Whether the Examiner erred in finding the combination of
Zdepski and Rodriguez teaches or suggests "wherein pictures of the
compressed trick mode stream are selected for decoding based at least in
part on whether the pictures of the compressed trick mode stream are
discardable pictures," as recited in independent claim 13 and
commensurately recited in independent claims 25 and 31.
(2) Whether the Examiner erred in finding the combination of
Zdepski and Rodriguez teaches or suggests "wherein the circuitry is
configured to generate the compressed trick mode stream by compressing
the reconstructed normal video stream using less data dependency than the
normal video stream," as recited in claim 23 and commensurately recited in
claim 28.
(3) Whether the Examiner erred in finding the combination of
Zdepski, Rodriguez, and Cavallerano teaches or suggests "wherein the
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normal video stream and the compressed trick mode stream are encrypted,
and a decryption key for the normal video stream is distinct from a
decryption key for the compressed trick mode stream," as recited in claim
33.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner's rejections in light of Appellant's
arguments the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellant's
conclusions and we adopt as our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth
by the Examiner in the Office Action from which this appeal is taken (Final
Act. 2-9) and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner's
Answer in response to Appellant's Appeal Brief. (Ans. 3-18.) We concur
with the conclusions reached by the Examiner, and we highlight the
following for emphasis. 3
A. Claims 13-16, 20, 22-25, 27-31, and 344
The Examiner finds Zdepski teaches or suggests all limitations of
claim 13 except "wherein pictures of the compressed trick mode stream are
3 Only those arguments made by Appellant have been considered in this
decision. Arguments that Appellant did not make in the brief have not been
considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
4 Appellant collectively argues the rejection of claims 13-16, 20, 22, and 24
with regard to the Examiner's obviousness rejection of claim 13 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a). (App. Br. 5, 9.) Separate patentability is not argued for
claims 14--16, 20, 22, or 24. (Id.) Therefore, based on Appellant's
arguments, we decide the appeal of claims 13-16, 20, 22, and 24 based on
claim 13 alone. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). Other than in our ultimate
decision, claims 14--16, 20, 22, and 24 are not referenced further herein.
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Application 11/488,275
selected for decoding based at least in part on whether the pictures of the
compressed trick mode stream are discardable pictures." (Final Act. 2-3.)
As to that limitation, the Examiner relies on Rodriguez, which the Examiner
finds "teaches for certain speed of trick mode, rather than decoding and
displaying every picture in sequence, the I-picture is only retrieved, decoded
and displayed." (Final Act. 10 (citing Rodriguez i-f 93).) We agree the
Examiner's findings are supported by the cited disclosure.
Appellant argue Rodriguez's disclosure is inapposite because "[t]he
cited portion of Rodriguez describes mechanisms for skipping pictures in a
conventional non-trick mode stream to provide 'faster than normal
playback.' By contrast, claim 13 involves decoding a 'compressed trick
mode stream' that already 'includes fewer pictures than the reconstructed
normal video stream."' (App. Br. 7 (emphases added).)
Appellant's piecemeal focus on alleged deficiencies in the individual
teachings of Rodriguez does not address the entirety of the Examiner's
rejection, which is based on the combination of Zdepski and Rodriguez, and
hence is unpersuasive of error. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA
1981 ). In ignoring the cited combination of references, Appellant does not,
for example, acknowledge that the Examiner relies on Zdepski, not
Rodriguez, for teaching the "compressed trick mode stream" with "fewer
pictures than the reconstructed normal video stream." (Final Act. 3; Ans. 4.)
We agree the Examiner's findings regarding the teachings of Zdepski and
Rodriguez are supported by the cited references. (See Ans. 4 (citing Zdepski
Figs. 2, 5, col. 8, 1. 63----col. 9, 1. 6, col. 11, 11. 34--40; Rodriguez i-f 93).)
Appellant addresses the combination of Zdepski and Rodriguez only
by arguing the Examiner fails to provide "reasoning with rational
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underpinning as to why it would be obvious to modify Zdepski" with the
teaching of Rodriguez. (App. Br. 8.) We disagree the Examiner has
engaged in improper hindsight reconstruction or has erred in combining the
teachings of the cited references. To the contrary, the Examiner has
provided an articulated reason for combining the cited references that
includes a rational underpinning. (See Final Act. 3; Ans. 4, 12-14.)
Appellant has not provided persuasive evidence or line of reasoning
explaining why such rationale is erroneous or why a person of ordinary skill
in the art would not have reached the conclusions reached by the Examiner.
See DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick
Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("[T]he proper question is
whether the ordinary artisan possesses knowledge and skills rendering him
capable of combining the prior art references.").
At most, Appellant argues Rodriguez and Zdepski present "separate
and distinct approaches to trick play," and further assert the Examiner has
provided no reasoning why "one of ordinary skill in the art would combine
these distinct approaches." (App. Br. 9; see also Reply Br. 6-7.) We
disagree. As the Examiner correctly finds, the approaches of Zdepski and
Rodriguez are not mutually exclusive:
Zdepski teaches decoding only ... one of every X frames of the
original, uncompressed normal play bitstream. Rodriguez then
discloses . . . rather than decoding and displaying pictures at
position 1 and at position 4, decoding and displaying only an !-
pictures in order to avoid burden on the processing capabilities
and the burden slows the processing. Rodriguez teaches the
number of pictures displayed per interval decreases which lead
to scan through the video stream faster (the motivation).
(Ans. 13-14 (citation omitted) (citing Zdepski col. 9, 11. 8-13, col. 11, 11. 40-
45; Rodriguez i-f 93).) We further note the artisan is not compelled to blindly
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follow the teaching of one prior art reference over the other without the
exercise of independent judgment. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp.,
733 F.2d 881, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Rather, as the Supreme Court has
explained, the skilled artisan would "be able to fit the teachings of multiple
patents together like pieces of a puzzle" because the skilled artisan is "a
person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton." KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420-21 (2007). Here, Appellant has not demonstrated
that the Examiner's proffered combination would have been "uniquely
challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art." Leapfrog
Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418).
For the foregoing reasons, we are unpersuaded of Examiner error.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of
independent claim 13, and also dependent claims 14--16, 20, 22, or 24,
which Appellant argues collectively with claim 13.
Although Appellant purports to argue claims 25 and 31 separately
(App. Br. 10-17), Appellant merely repeats for each of those claims the
arguments made for claim 13, which we have found unpersuasive as
addressed above. Therefore, we also sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) rejection of independent claims 25 and 31, as well as dependent
claims 27-30 and 34, which Appellant argues collectively with claims 25
and 31. (App. Br. 12, 16.)
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B. Claims 17-19
Appellant does not present separate substantive arguments for the
patentability of dependent claims 17-19, which stand rejected over Zdepski
and Rodriguez in addition to Ali (claim 17) or Inoue (claims 18 and 19). As
to these claims, Appellant contends only the Examiner's additional citation
to Ali or Inoue "fails to cure the deficiencies of Zdepski in view of
Rodriguez discussed above with reference to claim 13." (App. Br. 19.)
Because we do not find the Examiner's findings regarding Zdepski and
Rodriguez to be deficient with regard to claim 13, as explained above, we
also sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claims 17-19.
C. Claims 23 and 28
Claim 23 depends from claim 13 and adds the limitation "wherein the
circuitry is configured to generate the compressed trick mode stream by
compressing the reconstructed normal video stream using less data
dependency than the normal video stream." (App. Br. 17 (emphasis added).)
Claim 28 depends from claim 25 and adds the similar limitation "wherein
the circuitry capable of generating the compressed trick mode stream is
further configured to compress the reconstructed normal video stream using
less inter-picture dependency than in the normal video stream." (Id.
(emphasis added).)
The Examiner finds these limitations are taught or suggested by
Zdepski and/or Rodriguez. (Final Act. 5; Ans. 5---6, 14--16.) With regard to
claim 23, which recites "less data dependency," the Examiner notes the
Specification provides little guidance, and "thus broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with [Appellant's] disclosure must be given to the
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limitation." (Ans. 15.) The Examiner considers the claim term "less data
dependency" as encompassing including fewer pictures. (Ans. 15 (citing
Specification i-f 72).) The Examiner then finds Zdepski discloses using fewer
pictures in the compressed trick mode stream: "if original normal play
bitstream included I frames at a frequency of 1 every X frames, the new
video sequence comprises only one of every X pictures or frames of the
original." (Ans. 15 (citing Zdepski col. 8, 11. 51---62, col. 11, 11. 25-33, col. 7,
11. 3 0-41).) The Examiner also considers "less data dependency" as
encompassing using pictures "that do not depend on other pictures" (Ans.
15), which would thus render claim 23 of similar scope to claim 28 (which
recites "less inter-picture dependency"). The Examiner's findings regarding
the teachings of Zdepski also apply to this interpretation, as excluding
frames (such as B frames in particular) would result in less inter-picture
dependency. The Examiner also cites Rodriguez's teaching of decoding!-
pictures only, noting "it is well known in the art [that] an I-picture does not
depend on any other picture." (Ans. 15-16.)
We agree the Examiner's findings are supported by the cited
disclosures, and are also within the broadest reasonable interpretation of the
claims consistent with the Specification. We, therefore, are not persuaded of
error in the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejections of claims 23 and 28
over Zdepski and Rodriguez, and we sustain those rejections.
D. Claim 33
Claim 33 depends from claim 31 and adds the limitation "wherein the
normal video stream and the compressed trick mode stream are encrypted,
and a decryption key for the normal video stream is distinct from a
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decryption key for the compressed trick mode stream." (App. Br. 20.) The
Examiner finds this limitation is taught or suggested by Cavallerano, in
combination with Zdepski and Rodriguez. (Final Act. 8 (citing Cavallerano
iTiT 4--5, 7-8).)
Appellant's challenge to the Examiner's rejection of claim 33 is an
unpersuasive piecemeal challenge to the Cavallerano reference. In
particular, Appellant argues the Examiner's reliance on Cavallerano is
deficient because, although Cavallerano "discusses 'trick-mode pointers,'
such a stream does not correspond to the claimed 'compressed trick mode
stream."' (App. Br. 21 (emphasis added).) The Examiner notes in response,
however, "Cavallerano's art is applied for only the limitation 'the normal
video stream and the trick mode stream are encrypted, and a decryption key
for the normal video is distinct from a decryption key for the trick mode
stream' which wasn't specifically taught by the combination of Zdepski and
Rodriguez." (Ans. 16-17.)
Continuing in piecemeal fashion, Appellant also argues Cavallerano
does not teach or suggested the limitation of claim 33 because the input to,
and the output from, the "rescrambler 150" shown in Figure 1 of
Cavallerano "does not appear to be a trick mode stream." (Reply Br. 10
(emphasis added).) Appellant's individual challenge to the Cavallerano
reference is not only unpersuasive as a misplaced piecemeal attack, but it is
not well-founded factually. As the Examiner correctly finds,
Cavallerano shows in figure 1 decryptor 115 is different
from descrambler 160, and transport stream decryptor 115 is
used to decrypt the inputted transport stream (i.e. the transport
stream inputted to unit 115 must have been encrypted prior to
entering unit 115, referring to the claimed encrypted normal
video stream).
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(Ans. 17-18 (citing Cavallerano iii! 4--8).) Cavallerano also discloses
"rescrambler 150" is part of the "trick-mode section 110" depicted in Figure
1. As Cavallerano further discloses, the data stream from "rescrambler 150"
is injected with "trick-mode pointers" and that stream is stored, and then
"descrambler 160" descrambles that entire stream, with the "trick-mode
pointers," "using the key used by the rescrambler 150." (Cavallerano if 5.)
As the Examiner finds, and we agree, Cavallerano thus teaches an
"encrypted trick mode transport stream" (Ans. 17 (citing Cavallerano if 8)),
wherein a decryption key for the trick mode stream is distinct from a
decryption key for the normal stream. (Ans. 17-18 (citing Cavallerano
irir 4--8).)
In short, we agree the Examiner's findings are supported by the
teachings of the cited references, and we are not persuaded of error in the
Examiner's finding Cavallerano, combined with Zdepski and Rodriguez,
teaches or suggests the limitation of claim 3 3. We, therefore, sustain the
Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claim 33.
DECISION
For the above reasons, the Examiner's rejection of claims 13-20, 22-
25, 27-31, 33, and 34 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
kis
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