Ex Parte Lyons

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jul 18, 2011

11109184 (B.P.A.I. Jul. 18, 2011)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte SCOTT LYONS
____________

Appeal 2010-008700
Application 11/109,184
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before HUBERT C. LORIN, ANTON W. FETTING, and BIBHU R.
MOHANTY, Administrative Patent Judges.

LORIN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appeal 2010-008700
Application 11/109,184

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Scott Lyons (Appellant) seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of
the final rejection of claims 1-28 and 30. We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b) (2002).

SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM.1

THE INVENTION
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on
appeal.
Claim 1. A system for accessing a venue on one or more days
comprising:
a computer having access to the website of a remote server for
purchasing online an electronic ticket to a venue or the like
electronically from the website of the remote server;
a first printer associated with either the computer or with the
remote server for printing out a hard copy electronic ticket having a
random bar code on said electronic ticket assigned by the server;
a scanner at the venue for scanning the electronic ticket when
presented at the venue and decoding the information recorded on the
bar code on the electronic ticket; and
a second printer associated with the scanner at the venue for
printing out a replacement hard ticket replacing said electronic ticket

1Our decision will make reference to the Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Br.,”
filed Nov. 19, 2009) and the Examiner’s Answer (“Answer,” mailed Dec.
24, 2009).
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and invalidating said electronic ticket such that fraudulent duplicates
of said first electronic ticket cannot be used to obtain a replacement
ticket based on said first electronic ticket.
THE REJECTIONS
The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of
unpatentability:
Frank
Jackson
Davies
Nakfoor
Collins
US 2002/0023955 A1
US 2003/0213843 A1
US 6,588,664 B2
US 2003/0093387 A1
US 2004/0054623 A1
Feb. 28, 2002
Nov. 20, 2003
Jul. 8, 2003
May 15, 2003
Mar. 18, 2004
The Examiner has taken Official Notice that “it is old and well known
in the art at the time of the invention to locate a computer at a hotel.”
Answer 11 (discussing claim 11). [Official Notice 1]
The Examiner has taken Official Notice that “it is old and well known
in the art at the time of the invention to locate a computer at a travel
agency.” Answer 11 (discussing claim 12). [Official Notice 2]
The Examiner has taken Official Notice that “it is old and well known
in the art at the time of the invention that tickets are used to access
opera houses, concerts, or stage presentations.” Answer 11
(discussing claims 16-18). [Official Notice 3]
The Examiner has taken Official Notice that “it is old and well known
in the art at the time of the invention that hard tickets are used for
multiple days at a venue.” Answer 12 (discussing claims 19 and 23).
[Official Notice 4]
The Examiner has taken Official Notice that “it is old and well known
in the art at the time of the invention that tickets may be used for
entrance to attractions at an event.” Answer 12 (discussing claims 20
and 28). [Official Notice 5]
The following rejections are before us for review:
1. Claims 1-3, 7-10, 13-15, 21, 22, 25, 27, and 29 are rejected under 35
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U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Frank, Jackson, and
Davies.
2. Claims 4 and 24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Frank, Jackson, Davies, and Nakfoor.
3. Claims 5, 6, 26, and 30 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Frank, Jackson, Davies, and Collins.
4. Claims 11, 12, 16-20, 23, and 28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a)
as being unpatentable over Frank, Jackson, Davies, and Official
Notice.

ISSUE
The issue is whether it would have been obvious over the cited prior
art combination to one of ordinary skill in the art to provide for a system
comprising “ [(a)] a second printer associated with the scanner at the venue
for printing out a replacement hard ticket replacing said electronic ticket
and[(b)] invalidating said electronic ticket such that fraudulent duplicates of
said first electronic ticket cannot be used to obtain a replacement ticket
based on said first electronic ticket” (claim 1).

FINDINGS OF FACT
We rely on the Examiner’s factual findings stated in the Answer (Ans.
3-5). Additional findings of fact may appear in the Analysis below.

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ANALYSIS
The rejection of claims 1-3, 7-10, 13-15, 21, 22, 25, 27, and 29 under 35
U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Frank, Jackson, and Davies.
The Appellant argued claims 1-3, 7-10, 13-15, 21, 22, 25, 27, and 29
as a group (Br. 6-7). We select claim 1 as the representative claim for this
group, and the remaining claims 2, 3, 7-10, 13-15, 21, 22, 25, 27, and 29
stand or fall with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2007).
The Examiner found that Frank discloses all the elements of the
claimed system but for the limitations “ [(a)] a second printer associated
with the scanner at the venue for printing out a replacement hard ticket
replacing said electronic ticket and[(b)] invalidating said electronic ticket
such that fraudulent duplicates of said first electronic ticket cannot be used
to obtain a replacement ticket based on said first electronic ticket” (claim 1).
Answer 3-4. Jackson is relied upon as showing the subject matter of claim
limitation (a) and Davies is relied upon as showing the subject matter of
limitation (b). Answer 4-5. According to the Examiner, one of ordinary
skill in the art would have been led to combine these disclosures and reach
the claimed system. Answer 4-5.
The Examiner’s characterization of the differences between the
claimed invention and what the prior art discloses does not appear to be in
dispute.
Nor do we see a dispute over the Examiner’s characterization of the
scope and content of the prior art. There is a discussion on page 6 of the
Brief disputing the relevance of Jackson in showing limitation (a). But the
Examiner relied on Davies, not Jackson, as showing this limitation. As for
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Davies, the Appellant argues that “ Davies only teaches invalidation once
the hard ticket is scanned at the venue” (Br. 7) rather than “invalidation of
the electronic ticket when the hard ticket is printed” (Br. 7) as claimed. But
the Examiner did not state that Davies discloses “invalidation of the
electronic ticket when the hard ticket is printed.” The Examiner clearly
explained that Davies discloses “invalidating a ticket after it is scanned [col
6, lines 30-39]” (Answer 4) (which has not been disputed) and that this
disclosure in combination with that of Frank and Jackson leads one to the
limitation at issue. Arguing the merits of Davies alone misses the
Examiner’s position which is based on the combination of the prior art
references as a whole. Cf. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) and
In re Young, 403 F.2d 754, 757-58 (CCPA 1968).
The only dispute appears to be over the apparent reasoning for
combining the prior art disclosures in reaching the claimed system. But
there is no dispute that the prior art discloses all the elements of the claimed
combination. “The combination of familiar elements according to known
methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable
results.” KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007).
In that regard, the Examiner very clearly explained why she believed
one of ordinary skill in the art would have been led to combine the elements
of the prior art to reach the claimed system. We find no error in the
Examiner’s logic underpinning the legal conclusion of obviousness. In
rebuttal, the Appellant questions only why one of ordinary skill would be led
to prevent fraudulent activity by issuing a second ticket while invalidating a
prior issued ticket. Br. 6-7. But Davies discloses invalidating a token before
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a replacement token is issued. See Col. 6, ll. 43-44. Common sense tells us
that this is necessary to prevent the fraudulent use of the prior token. In our
view a prima facie case of obviousness has been established.
Also, there is insufficient evidence on the record of unpredictable
results arising from the combination as claimed. Nor is there any evidence
of secondary consideration of nonobviousness.
For the foregoing reasons, the rejection is sustained.

The rejection of claims 4 and 24 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Frank, Jackson, Davies, and Nakfoor.
The Appellant has not provided a persuasive argument showing error
in the rejection. The argument rests on the assertion that Nakfoor fails to
teach what is claimed. Br. 7. However, in keeping with the Examiner’s
position (see Answer 8-9), “[t]he question in a §103 case is what the
references would collectively suggest to one of ordinary skill in the art. In re
Simon, 461 F.2d 1387, 174 USPQ 114 (CCPA 1972).” In re Ehrreich, 590
F.2d 902, 909 (CCPA 1979). (Emphasis original.)
For the reasons given in affirming the rejection of independent claims
1 and 21, we affirm this rejection of dependent claims 4 and 24.

The rejection of claims 5, 6, 26, and 30 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Frank, Jackson, Davies, and Collins.
As with the rejection of claims 4 and 24, the Appellant has not
provided a persuasive argument showing error in the rejection. Similarly,
the argument rests on the assertion that Collins fails to teach what is
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claimed. Br. 8.
For the reasons given in affirming the rejection of claims 4 and 24, we
affirm this rejection of dependent claims 5, 6, 26, and 30.

The rejection of claims 11, 12, 16-20, 23, and 28 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as
being unpatentable over Frank, Jackson, Davies, and Official Notice(s) 1-5.
As with the rejection of claims 4 and 24, the Appellant has not
provided a persuasive argument showing error in the rejection. The
argument rests on the assertion that Official Notice(s) 1-5 fail to teach what
is claimed. Br. 8.
For the reasons given in affirming the rejection of claims 4 and 24, we
affirm this rejection of dependent claims 11, 12, 16-20, 23, and 28.

DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-28 and 30 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2009).

AFFIRMED

MP