Ex Parte Luo et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardNov 16, 201713408266 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 16, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/408,266 02/29/2012 Yun Luo 081276-9505-US00 6805 34044 7590 02/02/2018 MICHAEL BEST & FRIEDRICH LLP (Bosch) 100 EAST WISCONSIN AVENUE MILWAUKEE, WI 53202 EXAMINER MARC-COLEMAN, MARTHE Y ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3661 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/02/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): mkeipdocket@michaelbest.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte YUN LUO and DIETER HOETZER Appeal 2016-001505 Application 13/408,2661 Technology Center 3600 Before JEAN R. HOMERE, HUNG H. BUI, and DAVID J. CUTITTAII, Administrative Patent Judges. BUI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL We vacate the Decision mailed on November 20, 2017, in favor of this substitute decision because the original Decision inadvertently failed to address the Non-Final Action dated April 10, 2015 issued after the Final Action dated August 7, 2014 rejecting claims 1—15, all of which are pending on appeal. App. Br. 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE,2 and enter a new ground of rejection in accordance with 37 C.F.R. §41.50(b). 1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Robert Bosch LLC. App. Br. 2. 2 Our Decision refers to Appellants’ Appeal Brief filed July 1, 2015 (“App. Br.”); Reply Brief filed November 20, 2015 (“Reply Br.”); Examiner’s Answer mailed September 21, 2015 (“Ans.”); Non-Final Action mailed April 10, 2015 (“Non-Final Act.”); Final Office Action mailed August 7, Appeal 2016-001505 Application 13/408,266 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants’ invention relates to “a system for assisting a driver in aligning a trailer hitch of a vehicle with a trailer coupling of a trailer.” Spec. 13; Abstract. Claim 1—which is the only independent claim—is illustrative of the claimed subject matter, as reproduced below with disputed limitations in italics: 1. A hitch alignment system for aligning a vehicle and a trailer, the system comprising: a camera system that generates image data and has a field of view at a hitch of the vehicle; and a controller that [1] analyzes the image data, [2] detects a first target in the image data, the first target being affixed to a trailer coupling of the trailer, [3] determines a location of the trailer coupling relative to the hitch based on the image data, [4] determines a path of travel of the vehicle, and [5] detects when an object is located in the determined path of travel of the vehicle based at least in part on data from a radar system, an ultrasonic system, or both, wherein the determined path of travel of the vehicle is from a current position to a second position, and wherein the second position is located a distance between the hitch and the trailer coupling that is less than or equal to a predetermined threshold. App. Br. 11 (Claims App’x.) (bracketing added). 2014 (“Final Act.”); and original Specification filed February 29, 2012 (“Spec.”). 2 Appeal 2016-001505 Application 13/408,266 Examiner’s Rejections and References (1) Claims 1, 3—7 and 12—14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being unpatentable over Freese V et al. (US 2010/0096203 Al; published Apr. 22, 2010; “Freese”). Non-Final Act. 5—8. (2) Claim 2 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Freese and Gillen, Jr. (US 6,357,126 Bl; issued Mar. 19, 2002. Non-Final Act. 8—9. (3) Claims 8, 9, and 11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Freese and Okuda et al. (US 2009/0236825 Al; published Sept. 24, 2009; “Okuda”). Non-Final Act. 10-11. (4) Claim 10 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Freese, Okuda, and further in view of Schofield et al. (US 2012/0062744 Al; Mar. 15, 2012; “Schofield”). Non-Final Act. 11. (4) Claim 15 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Freese and Wu et al. (US 2009/0292468 Al; published Nov. 26, 2009; “Wu”). Non-Final Act. 12. ANALYSIS In support of the anticipation rejection of independent claim 1, the Examiner finds Freese teaches Appellants’ claimed “hitch alignment system [shown in Figure 1] for aligning a vehicle [12] and a trailer [14]” equipped with ah the limitations, except for “detecting] when an object is located in the determined path of travel of the vehicle.” Non-Final Act. 6—7 (citing Freese 1112, 13, 16-18). 3 Appeal 2016-001505 Application 13/408,266 Freese’s Figure 1 is reproduced below with additional markings for illustration. Freese’s Figure 1 shows a hitch alignment system 10 for aligning a vehicle 12 and a trailer 14. As shown in Freese’s Figure 1, the hitch alignment system 10 includes a vehicle coupling (known as “hitch” or “hitch ball”) 20 mounted at the rear of a towing vehicle 12 and a trailer coupling (known as a “trailer hitch”) 22 at a towed trailer 14, attached to the vehicle coupling (“hitch”) 20 of the vehicle 12, via attachment device 108 and line 106, shown in Figure 2. The hitch alignment system 10 also includes a camera system 52 that generates image data and has a field of view at the vehicle coupling (“hitch”) 20 of the vehicle 12 and the trailer coupling (“trailer hitch”) 22 of the trailer 14; and a controller 62 that analyzes the image data (see Freese 117), detects a first target 54 fixed to the trailer coupling (“trailer hitch”) 22 of the trailer 14 in 4 Appeal 2016-001505 Application 13/408,266 the image data (see Freese Tflf 12, 13, 17, 18), determines a location of the trailer coupling (“trailer hitch”) 22 relative to the vehicle coupling (“hitch”) 20 based on the image data (see Freese 118), and determines a path of travel of the vehicle 12 (see Freese 118). Freese also teaches the use of an “object pre-impact sensor 60 . . . located at the rear 18 of the towing vehicle 12, for example on a rear bumper 64,. . . detect[s] the presence of objects behind the towing vehicle” and such an “object pre-impact sensor 60 may take various forms, such as a radar or sonic emitter and detector,” to emit “a signal to detect objects behind the towing vehicle 12.” Freese 116. The Examiner also finds Freese teaches wherein the determined path of travel of the vehicle [12] is from a current position of the vehicle [12] to a second position of the vehicle [12], [and] wherein the second position is located a distance between the hitch [20] and the trailer coupling [22] that is less than or equal to a predetermined threshold. Non-Final Act. 4 (citing Freese 118). Appellants acknowledge Freese’s pre-impact sensor 60, located at the rear of a towing vehicle 12 shown in Figure 1, is used to determine whether an object is located behind the vehicle 12 within the field of view of the sensor 60. App. Br. 6. However, Appellants argue: (1) Freese’s “pre-impact sensor is not cognizant of the path of the towing vehicle” and “is only able [to] detect the presence of an object that is located in the path between the towing vehicle and the towed vehicle when the field of view of the object pre-impact sensor is aligned with the path’ ''', (2) the fact that Freese’s “pre-impact sensor might detect an object that is located in the path between the towing vehicle and the towed vehicle, does not implicitly or inherently teach that the sensor, or more broadly the system, discerns or 5 Appeal 2016-001505 Application 13/408,266 knows whether the detected object is located in a particular path of travel”; and (3) as such, Freese does not disclose “detecting whether an object is located ‘in the determined path of travel of the vehicle,’ as recited by claim 1.” App. Br. 7—8. In addition, Appellants emphasize that [detecting when an object is located in a determined path of travel requires making an active differentiation between an object that is located in the determined path of travel and an object that is not located in the determined path of travel. Freese V’s system merely detects objects that may or may not be in the determined path of travel of the towing vehicle. Freese V does not teach making an active determination of whether a detected object is located in a determined path of travel or outside of the determined path of travel. Reply Br. 2 (emphasis added). The Examiner responds that (1) Freese’s object pre-impact sensor 60 (i.e., a radar, sonic emitter and detector) located at rear 18 of towing vehicle 12 is operable to detect the presence of objects behind towing vehicle 12; and (2) such a detection would include “an object [] located in the determined path of travel of the vehicle” as recited in claim 12. Final Act. 10, 12 (citing Freese Tflf 16—7). At the outset, we note that claim 1 is broader than the embodiment shown in Figures 3^4 and described in Appellants’ Specification. For example, claim 1 simply requires the controller to “determine[] a path of travel of the vehicle” and “detect[] when an object is located in the determined path of travel of the vehicle.” 6 Appeal 2016-001505 Application 13/408,266 We also agree with the Examiner’s finding that Freese’s controller is used to “determine^ a path of travel of the vehicle” 12 and “detect[] when an object [is behind the towing vehicle 12 in order to prevent an undesirable impact.]” Freese ^fl[ 16, 18. We further acknowledge that when an object is detected behind the towing vehicle 12, such a detection is within the field of view of Freese’s object pre-impact sensor 60. However, an object within the field of view of a towing vehicle is not necessarily within the path of travel of the vehicle, or is inclusive of any object located in the determined path of travel of the vehicle 12, as recited in Appellants’ claim 1. As such, we do not agree with the Examiner that Freese discloses the disputed limitation: “detecting] when an object is located in the determined path of travel” as recited in Appellants’ claim 1. We find, however, one of ordinary skill in the art, looking at Freese, would have been able to ascertain whether the disclosed object is within the path of travel of a towing vehicle. We also conclude that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify the teachings of Freese V to detect when an object is within the path of travel because Freese already detects the path of travel and because such a modification would enhance safety by avoiding unnecessary collision using an existing sensor and path determination. Based on this record, we do not sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of independent claim 1 and its dependent claims 3—7 and 12—14, and likewise, the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of dependent claims 2, 8—11, and 15. 7 Appeal 2016-001505 Application 13/408,266 NEW GROUND OF REJECTION New §103 Rejection of Claim 1 based on Freese under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) Pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), however, we reject independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Freese for the reasons discussed above, i.e., one of ordinary skill in the art, looking at Freese, would be able to ascertain whether the disclosed object is within the path of travel of a towing vehicle in the manner recited in Appellants’ claim 1. We also conclude that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify the teachings of Freese V to detect when an object is within the path of travel because Freese already detects the path of travel and because such a modification would enhance safety by avoiding unnecessary collision using an existing sensor and path determination. With respect to remaining dependent claims 2—15, we leave it to the Examiner to evaluate whether they are independently patentable over Freese and other prior art references, including Gillen, Okuda, Schofield, and Wu. DECISION As such, we REVESE the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1—15. Pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), however, we reject independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Freese. Rule 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) states that “[a] new ground of rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.” Further, § 41.50(b) also provides that Appellants, WITHIN TWO MONTHS 8 Appeal 2016-001505 Application 13/408,266 FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new grounds of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the prosecution will be remanded to the examiner. . . . (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. . . . No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). REVERSED 37 C.F.R, $ 41.50(b) 9 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation