Ex Parte Lorenzen et al

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 26, 2019

14086827 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 26, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/086,827 11/21/2013
7663 7590 06/27/2019
STETINA BRUNDA GARRED & BRUCKER
75 ENTERPRISE, SUITE 250
ALISO VIEJO, CA 92656
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
David T. Lorenzen
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
NICKT-OOlC 3159
EXAMINER
KAZEMINEZHAD, FARZAD
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2657
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/27/2019 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DAVID T. LORENZEN and NICHOLAS J. WITCHEY 1
Appeal 2018-008268
Application 14/086,827
Technology Center 2600
Before ERIC S. FRAHM, LINZY T. McCARTNEY, and
MICHAEL T. CYGAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
FRAHM, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner's final rejection of claims 1-21.2 We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
1 Appellants identify Vanav Holdings as the real party in interest (App. Br.
4).
2 Pending independent claim 22 is an exact duplicate of independent claim 1,
as admitted by Appellants at pages 7 and 10 of the Appeal Brief (see e.g.,
App. Br. 7 (stating that duplicate claim 22 was presented due to a clerical
error of not removing the final "wherein" clause)). Although Appellants
"assumed that claim 22 is rejected for the same reasons as claim l" (App.
Br. 7), this is not the case. According to the (i) both the cover sheet (box 7)
and the body of the Final Rejection (see Final Act. 4, 6, 8); (ii) Advisory
Appeal 2018-008268
Application 14/086,827
We reverse.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants' invention relates generally to the field of "linguistics and
speech processing" (Spec. ,-J 1 ), and specifically to a "METHODS OF
OFFERING GUIDANCE ON COMMON LANGUAGE USAGE" (Title).
More particularly, Appellants' disclosed and claimed invention pertains to
"[a] computing system for improving accuracy or reducing errors of a
document checker by conforming a document to common usage of a
language" ( claim 1 ). The disclosed and claimed invention helps "guide an
individual on the usage of a common language" (Spec. ,-J 11) using a
"guidance filter" (see Spec. ,-J 20 defining guidance filters; see also Spec. ,-J,-J
47-55 describing guidance filter operations) made up of "a database
comprising tokens relating to portions of the document" (Spec. ,-J 12). "The
term 'token' means an abstraction that represents a piece of data," and "can
be the piece of data itself; however, more commonly a token is simply a
short hand for representing the data which can be used to access statistical
information in a database. For example, a hash of a sequence of data can
represent a token" (Spec. ,-J 21 ), and "[t]he tokens can include hash values
associated with the portion of the document or neighboring portions" (Spec.
,-J 12). By analyzing many examples of common language and calculating
hash values for portions or words of a document, a database is built to allow
a guidance filter to find improper usages by comparison to a threshold which
is based on the collected statistics (see Spec. ,-J,-J 47, 48, 50-52). "A preferred
Action mailed October 25, 2017 (cover sheet, p. 1, ,-J 15); and (iii)
Examiner's Answer (see Ans. 2), only claims 1-21 stand rejected.
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embodiment of a guidance filter comprises software and a database" (Spec. ,i
51).
Claims 1 and 22 are the pending independent claims, but because
claim 22 is an exact duplicate of claim 1, 3 and only independent claim 1 and
corresponding dependent claims 2-21 stand rejected,4 we only review the
rejection of claims 1-21 on appeal. 5 We select claim 1 as representative of
claims 1-21 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101, based on Appellants' arguments
(App. Br. 12-30; Reply Br. 4-20), and pursuant to our authority under 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). Representative claim 1 reproduced below, is
illustrative of the subject matter on appeal ( emphases and bracketed lettering
added):
I. A computing system for improving accuracy or
reducing errors of a document checker by conforming a
document to common usage of a language, the
computing system comprising:
a display;
a non-transitory computer readable memory storing
software program instructions representing a guidance filter
that operates as a function of compiled statistics for a set of
documents representing common usage of a language; and
a computer processor coupled with the memory that,
upon execution of the instructions, is configured to:
3 See supra fn. 2 ( explaining claim 22 is a duplicate of claim 1 ).
4 See supra fn. 2 ( explaining only claims 1-21 stand rejected).
5 Should there be further prosecution of this application, the Examiner may
wish to review MPEP § 706.03(k), pertaining to duplicate claims. Although
a claim that does specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed in
the claim(s) it depends from should be rejected under 35 U.S.C. § l 12(d),
the proper course of action for duplicate claims in independent form is to
object to the duplicate claim under 37 CPR 1.75 after allowing the
duplicated claim. See MPEP § 706.03(k).
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[A] calculate document tokens comprising a first hash
calculated as a first function of a preceding word of a word in a
portion of a document being edited by a user, a second hash
calculated as a second function of the word, and a third hash
calculated as a third function of a following word of the word;
signal via an indicator on the display that at least one of
the document tokens deviates from the common usage of the
language based on the compiled statistics for the document
token falling above or below a threshold; and
allow the user to select an alternative structure from a list
where the alternative structure can be used in place of the
portion and conform to the common usage of the language.
REJECTIONS
(1) The Examiner rejected claims 1-21 under 35 U.S.C. § l 12(a) as
failing to provide adequate written description of the claimed invention.
Final Act. 4-6. Because the Examiner has withdrawn the§ l 12(a) rejection
(see Advisory Action mailed October 25, 2017 (p. 2); Ans. 2; see also App.
Br. 7 (noting withdrawal of the written description rejection), this rejection
is not before us on appeal. Therefore, we do not reach the merits or
otherwise review this rejection in our decision.
(2) Claims 1-21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to
patent ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 6-8; Ans. 2-19.
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
We first note " [ w ]hether a [patent] claim is drawn to patent-eligible
subject matter is an issue of law that [is] review[ed] de nova." SiRF Tech.,
Inc. v. Int'! Trade Comm 'n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (emphasis
added).
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An invention is patent eligible if it claims a "new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101. This
threshold analysis of whether a claim is directed to one of the four statutory
categories of invention, i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, is referred to as "Step l" in the patent-eligibility
inquiry under § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted
§ 101 to include implicit exceptions: "[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas" are not patentable. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012) (brackets in original) (citing
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court's two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice Corp. v. CLS Banklnt'l, 573 U.S. 208, 217-18 (2014)
( citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75-77). In accordance with that framework, we
first determine what concept the claim is "directed to." See id. at 219 ("On
their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated
settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk."); see also
Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) ("Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners'
application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against
risk.").
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219-20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594-95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
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such as "molding rubber products" (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981 )); "tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores" (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 252, 267-68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S.
at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held "[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory
does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical
formula." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 192 ("We view
respondents' claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula."). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim "seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract ... is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, ... and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment." Id. ( citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 ("It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.").
If the claim is "directed to" an abstract idea, we tum to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where "we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an 'inventive
concept' sufficient to 'transform' the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application." Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 ( quotation marks omitted). "A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include 'additional features' to
ensure 'that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
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monopolize the [abstract idea]."' Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
"[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[ s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention." Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance in the Federal Register
concerning the application of§ 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (hereinafter, "Revised
Guidance") (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-01-07 /pdf/
2018-28282.pdf).
Under the Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim
recites:
( 1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); 6 and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)-(c), (e)-(h)). 7
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
are not "well-understood, routine, conventional" in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
6 Referred to as "Revised Step 2A, Prong l" in the Revised Guidance
(hereinafter, "Step 2A(i)").
7 Referred to as "Revised Step 2A, Prong 2" in the Revised Guidance
(hereinafter, "Step 2A(ii)").
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(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.8
See Revised Guidance.
Step 2A(i) ~Judicial Exception/Abstract Idea
Informed by judicial precedent, the recent Revised Guidance extracts
and synthesizes key concepts identified by the courts as abstract ideas to
explain that the abstract idea exception includes the following groupings of
subject matter, when recited as such in a claim limitation:
(a) Mathematical concepts-mathematical relationships,
mathematical formulas or equations, mathematical calculations;
(b) Certain methods of organizing human activity-
fundamental economic principles or practices (including
hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal
interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts;
legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or
behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior or
relationships or interactions between people (including social
activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions); and
( c) Mental processes-concepts performed in the human mind
(including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).
Under the Revised Guidance, if the claim does not recite a judicial
exception (a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or subject matter within the
enumerated groupings of abstract ideas above), then the claim is patent
8 Items (3) and (4) continue to be collectively referred to as "Step 2B" of the
Supreme Court's two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
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eligible at Step 2A(i). This determination concludes the eligibility analysis,
except in situations identified in the Revised Guidance. 9
However, if the claim recites a judicial exception (i.e., an abstract idea
enumerated above, a law of nature, or a natural phenomenon), the claim
requires further analysis for a practical application of the judicial exception
in Step 2A(ii).
Step 2A(ii) ~ Practical Application
If a claim recites a judicial exception in Step 2A (i), we determine
whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application of that exception in Step 2A(ii) by: (a) identifying whether there
are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial
exception( s ); and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and
in combination to determine whether they integrate the exception into a
practical application.
"[I]ntegration into a practical application" requires an additional
element or a combination of additional elements in the claim to apply, rely
on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit
on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the exception. See Revised Guidance, at 54.
9 In the rare circumstance in which an Examiner believes a claim limitation
that does not fall within the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas should
nonetheless be treated as reciting an abstract idea, the procedure described in
the Revised Guidance for analyzing the claim should be followed. See
Revised Guidance, Section III.C.
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The seven identified "practical application" sections of the MPEP, 10
cited in the Memorandum under Step 2 of the Memorandum, are:
(1) MPEP § 2106.05(a) Improvements to the Functioning of
a Computer or To Any Other Technology or Technical
Field
(2) MPEP § 2106.05(b) Particular Machine
(3) MPEP § 2106.05(c) Particular Transformation
(4) MPEP § 2106.05(e) Other Meaningful Limitations
(5) MPEP § 2106.05(±) Mere Instructions To Apply An
Exception
(6) MPEP § 2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity
(7) MPEP § 2106.05(h) Field of Use and Technological
Environment
If the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application as determined under one or more of the MPEP sections cited
above, then the claim is not directed to the judicial exception, and the patent-
eligibility inquiry ends. If not, then analysis proceeds to Step 2B.
ANALYSIS
Step 1
Under Step 1 of the patent-eligibility inquiry under § 101, we
determine whether a claim is directed to one of the four statutory categories
of invention, i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.
In the instant case on appeal, claim 1, as well as claims 2-21 depending
therefrom, recites "[a] computing system ... comprising: a display; a non-
10 See MPEP § 2106.05(a)-(c), (e)-(h). Citations to the MPEP herein refer to
revision [R-08.2017].
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transitory computer readable memory ... ; and a computer processor" for
performing the functions of a guidance filter "for improving accuracy or
reducing errors of a document checker" ( claim 1 ). Therefore, claim 1, as
well as claims 2-21 depending therefrom, as computing system claims,
recite at least one of the enumerated categories ( e.g., machine and/or
manufacture) of eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101.
As a result, as to claims 1-21, we continue our analysis under Step
2A(i) of the Revised Guidance to determine whether the claims (1) recite a
judicial exception (a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or subject matter
within the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas above); and (2) are patent-
eligible.
Step 2A(i)-Judicial Exception/Abstract Idea
In the instant case before us, the Examiner finds claim 1 (i) recites "a
series of steps for evaluating a text sample" (Final Act. 6); and (ii) is
directed to the abstract ideas of (a) comparing new and stored information
and using rules to identify options (Final Act. 8), (b) "a mental activity of
forming an evaluation of sentences for the detection of errors to enhance
accuracy" (Final Act. 8), and ( c) "human behavior using personal knowledge
of grammar and vocabulary in a language" (Final Act. 8). The Examiner
determines claim 1 is not directed to an improvement to a computer system
or other technology, but to a computing system having a conventional
processor for performing the abstract idea(s) (Final Act. 8).
Appellants disagree with the Examiner's determination, arguing that
the Examiner has "oversimplified" the claim and not considered claim
elements such as a display, memory, computer processor, and document
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tokens comprising three hashes. App. Br. 13-15; Reply Br. 4-5, 7-8. We
are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments. Appellants' reliance on
features additional to the abstract idea, such as a display, memory, computer
processor, and document tokens comprising three hashes, does not address
whether the claims recite an abstract idea, such as a "mental processes,"
which includes "an observation, evaluation, judgment, or opinion." Id. at
52. We agree with the Examiner that the claims recite "a mental activity of
forming an evaluation of sentences for the detection of errors to enhance
accuracy," and ( c) "using personal knowledge of grammar and vocabulary in
a language" as part of the mental process of correcting grammar (Final Act.
8). Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Appellant's arguments that the
Examiner erred in determining that the claims recite a mental process, which
is an abstract idea.
Step 2A(ii)-Practical Application
For the reasons given below, we are persuaded that, even if claims 1-
21 recite an abstract idea ( a mental process as determined by the Examiner),
the claims recite additional steps/elements (see e.g. supra limitation [A] in
claim 1) that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, and
are, therefore, directed to patent-eligible subject matter.
In the instant case on appeal, claim 1 recites "improving accuracy or
reducing errors of a document checker by conforming to common usage of a
language" by (i) operating a guidance filter as a function of compiled
statistics for a set of documents representing common usage; (ii) calculating
document tokens comprising three hashes which are functions of words in
the document; (iii) indicating on a display "that at least one of the document
tokens deviates from the common usage of the language based on the
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compiled statistics for the document token falling above or below a
threshold;" and (iv) "allow[ing] the user to select an alternative structure
from a list where the alternative structure can be used in place of the portion
and conform to the common usage of the language."
Claim 1 recites the additional elements of"[ a] computing system"
having "a display," "a non-transitory computer readable medium," and "a
computer processor." Considering the claim as a whole, the "computer
processor" applies or uses any abstract idea in a meaningful way such that
the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize
the exception. The computer processor, taken in combination with the
computing system, display, and memory, operates to calculate document
tokens for three different hashes, each calculated as a different function of
words in the document being edited by a user, and improves the accuracy of
language usage and reduces errors in the document. The calculation of
hashes and the document token for words in the document, in particular,
allows comparison against a threshold to assist in indicating improper usage,
and provides a technological improvement and integrates the abstract idea
into a practical application.
In view of the foregoing, we find claim 1 clearly relates to the mental
process of evaluating and correcting grammar in a document. This is also
made clear by the field of Appellant's invention, "linguistics and speech
processing" (Spec. ,i 1 ), and the use of a grammar checker to correct for
common language usage (see Title; Spec. ,i,i 2, 3). However, we agree with
Appellants' contentions that (i) "the present claims do not exclusively recite
purely mental activity;" and (ii) "the Examiner's labeling of some mental
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activity in the claims, even if correct, is not the end of the analysis" (Reply
Br. 8).
We conclude that even if the claims are directed to a mental process
( e.g., evaluation of a word and judgment as to its accuracy in common
language), and therefore recite an abstract idea, claim 1 integrates such an
idea into a practical application. In particular, claim 1 recites elements/steps
that calculate hashes and a document token for words in a document so as to
allow for comparison against a threshold to assist in indicating improper
usage, which improves the accuracy of language usage and reduces errors in
a document. Our reviewing court has held that claims which recite rules that
allow automation of animation tasks using a technology-based manner that
is different than that previously performed manually were not directed to an
abstract idea. See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d
1299, 1313-15 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("The computer here is employed to
perform a distinct process to automate a task previously performed by
humans" that is "unlike [prior ineligible Supreme Court cases] where the
claimed computer-automated process and the prior method were carried out
in the same way); see also MPEP 2106.04(a). Appellant's claimed method
calculates hashes and a document token for words in a document so as to
allow for comparison against a threshold that is different from the "human
intuition" method discussed as the prior method of determining common
usage. Reply Br. 12. Like McRO, the claims here improve an existing
technology (e.g., computing systems) and are, therefore, not directed to an
abstract idea.
In this light, we agree with Appellants' contention that "claim 1 is not
directed to an abstract idea but rather to an improvement to computer
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functionality itself, namely improved accuracy, reduced errors, and
increased flexibility of a conventional document checker, for example, spell
and grammar check functionalities of a word processor and/or a natural
language processor system" (Reply Br. 9). We also agree with Appellants
that (i) correcting for common language usage in a document using a
computing system "is a challenge that is particular to computer-based
spelling and grammar checking systems" (Reply Br. 12); and (ii) "it is
precisely the fact that a human has no difficulty recognizing a 'common
usage' error, while a computer-based system has difficulty doing so, that
makes the present claimed solution 'necessarily rooted in computer
technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm
of computer networks"' (Reply Br. 12).
Based upon Appellants' arguments and the written support provided
by Appellant's Specification, we conclude claim 1 integrates the abstract
idea into a practical application as determined under at least one of MPEP
§ 2106.0S(a) "Improvements to the Functioning of a Computer or to Any
Other Technology or Technical Field" or§ 2106.0S(e) "Other Meaningful
Limitations." Specifically, we find Appellants' arguments (see App. Br. 29-
30) persuasive that the recited function of finding common usage errors in
documents (using document tokens based on three hashes and making a
threshold comparison) is an improvement in the technical field of document
checkers and/or spelling and grammar checking systems. See MPEP
§ 2106.0S(a) "Improvements to the Functioning of a Computer or to Any
Other Technology or Technical Field." As a result, under Step 2A(ii), claims
1-21 provide improvements to the functioning of computing systems, and
more particularly the technology or technical field of improving accuracy or
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reducing errors of a document checker by conforming a document to
common usage of a language. See MPEP § 2106.05(a).
And, concerning the "other meaningful limitations," we find guidance
in the Manual for Patent Examining Procedure section 2106.05(e), which
summarizes and relies upon our reviewing court's holding in Classen
Immunotherapies Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
( decision on remand from the Supreme Court, which had vacated the lower
court's prior holding of ineligibility in view of Bilski v. Kappas).
In Classen, the Court held that, although the analysis step was an
abstract mental process that collected and compared known information, the
[practical application] immunization step was meaningful because it
integrated the results of the analysis into a specific and tangible method that
resulted in the method "moving from abstract scientific principle to specific
application." MPEP § 2106(e) (citing Classen, 659 F.3d at 1066-68).
In the instant case, even if claim 1 recites the abstract mental process
of correcting grammar and common language usage, the document token
calculation step (limitation [A], supra), indication of a deviation from
common usage, and selection of an alternative grammatical structure to
conform to common language usage integrate the results of the calculation
into a specific and tangible computing system, "moving from abstract
scientific principle to specific application." See id. As a result, under Step
2A(ii), claims 1-21 provide "other meaningful limitations" that provide a
specific application to a computing system to integrate any abstract idea into
a practical application. See MPEP § 2106.05(e).
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Accordingly, we conclude, when claim 1 is considered as a whole, the
recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application as
determined under either MPEP §§ 2106.06(a) or 2106.05(e) cited above,
such that the claim is patent eligible. This determination (Step 2A(ii) -
Practical Application) concludes the eligibility analysis. Because we
conclude that Appellants' claims include additional elements that integrate
the judicial exception (a mental process) into a practical application (see
MPEP §§ 2106.05(a), (e) discussed above), we do not reach and address
Appellants' arguments pertaining to Step 2B (see App. Br. 29-30; Reply Br.
17-19).
In view of the foregoing, under the Revised Guidance, and informed
by our governing case law concerning 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Examiner erred
in concluding claims 1-21 are directed to a judicial exception, i.e., an
abstract idea, without significantly more, and thus are patent-ineligible under
§ 101. Under Step 2A, we conclude the claims recite additional elements
(namely, the display, memory, and computer processor) that integrate the
judicial exception (the abstract idea of a mental process including evaluation
of a word and judgment as to its accuracy in common language) into a
practical application, and thus claims 1-21 are patent-eligible.
Accordingly, we cannot sustain the Examiner's§ 101 rejection of
independent claim 1, as well as the Examiner's rejection of dependent
claims 2-21, which fall with independent claim 1 from which they depend.
DECISION
We reverse the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1-21 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.
REVERSED
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