Ex Parte LongDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJan 19, 201813610167 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 19, 2018) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/610,167 09/11/2012 SAPHURA SAFAVI LONG 1002U001 3322 41461 7590 Charles A. Rattner 17379 BLUEBERRY DRIVE BROOKINGS, OR 97415-9717 EXAMINER SHORTER, RASHIDA R ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3681 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/23/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): Charles. rattner @ gmail. com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte SAPHURA SAFAVI LONG Appeal 2016-001392 Application 13/610,167 Technology Center 3600 Before JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, NINA L. MEDLOCK, and ALYSSA A. FINAMORE, Administrative Patent Judges. FINAMORE, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON REQUEST FOR REHEARING STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.52, Appellant filed a Request for Rehearing on October 27, 2017 (“Req. Reh’g”), seeking reconsideration of our Decision on Appeal mailed August 28, 2017 (“Dec.”), in which we affirmed the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1—20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter.1 We have jurisdiction over the Request under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). 1 We also reversed the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1—20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Appellant seeks reconsideration of only the affirmed rejection under § 101. Req. Reh’g 1—2, 24. Appeal 2016-001392 Application 13/610,167 ANALYSIS A request for rehearing “must state with particularity the points believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked by the Board.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.52(a). Arguments not raised and evidence not previously relied upon in the briefs on appeal are not permitted, except in the limited circumstances set forth in §§ 41.52(a)(2)-(4). In particular, § 41.52(a)(2) allows an appellant to present a new argument based upon a recent relevant decision of either the Board or a Federal Court. Appellant argues the Board misapprehended or overlooked recent decisions and Office guidance affecting patent-eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Req. Reh’g 1—3. More particularly, Appellant argues the Examiner’s determination that the claims are directed to an abstract idea under the first step of the patent-eligibility analysis is improper in view of recent jurisprudence and guidance. Id. at 10-12, 23. Appellant also asserts that seven of the Board’s statements, which Appellant labels as statements (a)- (g), are incorrect in light of these recent decisions and guidance. Id. at 12— 24. We have considered Appellant’s arguments, and, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1— 20 under § 101. Appellant contends recent jurisprudence and Office guidance requires the Examiner to compare the nature of the claims to similar concepts the courts have held to be abstract ideas and to use the identified abstract ideas set forth in the guidance when determining whether the claims are directed to an abstract idea under the first step of the patent-eligibility analysis. Req. Reh’g 11. Appellant further asserts that the Examiner’s comparison of the concept of “improving customer relationship management through an 2 Appeal 2016-001392 Application 13/610,167 entity’s online community,” to which the present claims are directed, and the abstract idea of using categories to organize, store, and transmit information in Cyberfone Systems, LLC v. CNN Interactive Group, Inc., 558 F. App’x 988 (Fed. Cir. 2014) is insufficient support for the Examiner’s determination that the claims are directed to an abstract idea. Id. at 11—12. Appellant similarly argues the Board’s statement that “improving customer relationship management through an entity’s online community” is an abstract idea, i.e., statement (b), is not supported. Id. at 14. Appellant’s arguments are unconvincing. As an initial matter, we need not address whether the Examiner must compare the nature of the claims to similar concepts the courts have held to be abstract ideas and use the identified abstract ideas set forth in the Office guidance because, as Appellant acknowledges, the Examiner compares the concept of “improving customer relationship management through an entity’s online community” to the similar descriptive nature of the claims in Cyberfone. Req. Reh’g 11. We, therefore, turn to whether “improving customer relationship management through an entity’s online community” is an abstract idea. Contrary to Appellant’s argument, the Examiner’s determination that the claims are directed to an abstract idea is not premised solely on a comparison to Cyberfone. Rather, as we previously explained, the Examiner finds the claims are directed to “improving customer relationship management through an entity’s online community,” which is a method of organizing human activities. Dec. 9. As set forth in the Decision on Appeal, and unrefuted by Appellant, courts have found certain methods organizing human activities to be abstract ideas. Id. (citing Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS 3 Appeal 2016-001392 Application 13/610,167 Banklnt’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2356 (2014); buy SAFE Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1354—55 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Intellectual Ventures ILLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367—68 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). As we also explained in the Decision on Appeal, we see no meaningful distinction between methods of organizing human activity held to be the abstract ideas in the prior cases and the concept of “improving customer relationship management through an entity’s online community.” Id. Accordingly, we see no error in the Examiner’s determination that “improving customer relationship management through an entity’s online community” is an abstract idea. Appellant further argues the Board’s statement that “the specific limitations are tied to the abstract idea and simply suggest that the Examiner’s characterization is at a high level of abstraction, which is not persuasive of error,” i.e., statement (c), is unsupportable under recent jurisprudence. Req. Reh’g 14—15. According to Appellant, recent cases require that we express a claim’s fundamental concept at a level of generality or abstraction consistent with the level of generality or abstraction expressed in the claims themselves, and that we consider each claim as whole. Id. at 14. Appellant asserts that the Examiner’s characterization of the claims as “improving customer relationship management through an entity’s online community” overlooks key elements of the claims, namely the “generating,” “displaying,” “receiving,” and “initiating” steps in response to the electronic request. Id. at 14—15. Appellant’s argument is not persuasive of error. Although we appreciate that recent cases may provide additional guidance for determining whether the claims are directed to an abstract idea 4 Appeal 2016-001392 Application 13/610,167 under the first step of the patent-eligibility analysis, the additional guidance does not apprise us of error in the Examiner’s characterization of the claims. In the Decision on Appeal, we explain that the specific limitations of the claims, including the steps in response to the electronic request, do not separate the claims from the abstract idea of “improving customer relationship management through an entity’s online community.” Dec. 7. For the same reasons, characterizing the claims as “improving customer relationship management through an entity’s online community” is consistent with the level of generality expressed in the claims themselves and reflects the character of the claims as whole. Appellant also takes issue with the Board’s statements regarding the recited generic computing components, i.e., statements (a), (d), and (e). Req. Reh’g 13—15. More specifically, Appellant contends that Appellant is not relying on generic computing components, but rather the specially-programmed, unique, and non-obvious functions, to confer patent-eligibility pursuant to recent jurisprudence and guidance. Id. Appellant’s argument does not apprise us of error. Admittedly, the Supreme Court has explained that “the § 101 patent- eligibility inquiry and, say, the § 102 novelty inquiry might sometimes overlap.” Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1304 (2012). The question in the second step of the patent-eligibility analysis, however, is not whether a claim element is novel, but rather whether the implementation of the abstract idea involves “more than performance of ‘well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activities previously known to the industry.’” Content Extraction & Transmission LLCv. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 776 F.3d 1343, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 5 Appeal 2016-001392 Application 13/610,167 (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359); see also Uliramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[Njovelty in implementation of the idea is a factor to he considered only in the second step of the Alice analysis/’). Here, the recited functions may he unique and non-obvious, but there is no indication that the implementation of these functions requires something apart from generic computing components performing routine and conventional computer functions, such as retrieving, processing, and displaying data. Although software-programmed functions can confer patent-eligibility when they provide an improvement to functioning of the computer itself or other technological improvement, the claimed invention is simply the generic computer implementation of an improved business practice, which is insufficient for patent-eligibility. Appellant additionally argues the Board’s statements explaining that the claimed invention is not a technical improvement, he,, statements (f) and (g), are incorrect. Req. Reh’g 15-16. According to Appellant, the claimed invention is an improvement to conventional technology. Id. at 15—16. Appellant further contends that, in accordance with recent precedent, the Specification, not the technical details recited in the claims, controls the inquiry under the first step of the patent-eligibility analysis, and that the Specification provides the necessary details for technical implementation of the claimed invention. Id. at 16. Appellant’s arguments are not convincing. At the outset, Appellant’s assertion that the Specification controls the analysis under the first step is inapposite because we considered the technical aspects of the invention under the second step. See, e.g., Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357—59 (explaining that the claims fail to transform the 6 Appeal 2016-001392 Application 13/610,167 abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention under the second step of the analysis because the claims do not, for example, effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field). That notwithstanding, even in view of Appellant’s Specification, we fail to see how the claimed invention is a technical improvement. For example, enabling only a vendor, as opposed to a customer or owner-operator of the vendor-centric network, to determine the privileges and options available to customers and employees of the vendor is not a technical improvement, but rather a business improvement. In view of the foregoing, Appellant’s arguments do not affect our determination that the Examiner did not err in determining that the claims are patent-ineligible, i.e., judicially-excepted from statutory subject matter. We, therefore, decline to modify our decision affirming the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1—20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. DECISION We have reconsidered our Decision on Appeal in light of Appellant’s Request for Rehearing, and we deny Appellant’s request to modify our original Decision. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). DENIED 7 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation