Ex Parte Logan et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

May 14, 2013

11851219 (P.T.A.B. May. 14, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/851,219 09/06/2007 Victor W. Logan P000568-FCA-CHE 8890
65798 7590 05/14/2013
MILLER IP GROUP, PLC
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
42690 WOODWARD AVENUE
SUITE 200
BLOOMFIELD HILLS, MI 48304
EXAMINER
ALGAHAIM, HELAL A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3665
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/14/2013 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte VICTOR W. LOGAN and
DAVID A. MASTEN
____________

Appeal 2011-002480
Application 11/851,219
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before MICHAEL L. HOELTER, LYNNE H. BROWNE and
REMY J. VANOPHEM, Administrative Patent Judges.

BROWNE, Administrative Patent Judge

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appeal 2011-002480
Application 11/85,219

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Victor W. Logan and David A. Masten (Appellants) appeal under 35
U.S.C. § 134 from the Examiner’s decision finally rejecting claims 1-9 and
14-17. App. Br. 10. Claims 10-13 have been withdrawn from consideration.
Id. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.

THE INVENTION
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on
appeal.
1. A method for initiating a performance mode of
a fuel cell system in a vehicle, said performance
mode causing a fuel cell stack in the fuel cell
system to deliver power quicker than during
normal fuel cell system operation, said method
comprising:
providing a command that puts the vehicle
in the performance mode;
preloading a plurality of vehicle sub-systems
that act to reduce the time it takes the fuel cell
stack to provide a predetermined high power; and
providing a performance request where the
fuel cell stack does deliver the high power in
response to the command that puts the vehicle in
the performance mode.

App. Br. 17.
PRIOR ART
Kurosaki US 2002/0022161 A1 Feb. 21, 2002
Raiser US 2002/0064695 A1 May 30, 2002
Kolodziej US 2006/0063048 A1 Mar. 23, 2006
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Application 11/85,219

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Buck US 2006/0102397 A1 May 18, 2006
Yoshida US 2007/0088483 A1 Apr. 19, 2007
Hwang US 2007/0275279 A1 Nov. 29, 2007

GROUNDS OF REJECTION
1. Claim 1 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Yoshida and Raiser.
2. Claims 1-3, 5, 7 and 9 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Yoshida and Kurosaki.
3. Claims 4 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Yoshida, Kurosaki and Hwang.
4. Claim 6 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Yoshida, Kurosaki and Kolodziej.
5. Claim 8 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Yoshida, Kurosaki and Buck.
6. Claims 14-17 stand rejected “using the same prior art and same
rationales as claims 1-9.”1 Ans. 9

1 We note that this is not a proper statement of the grounds of rejection for
claims 14-17 in that it does identify which of the different combinations of
references are relied upon to reject these claims. “[T]he PTO carries its
procedural burden of establishing a prima facie case when its rejection
satisfies 35 U.S.C. § 132 . . . . That section ‘is violated when a rejection is so
uninformative that it prevents the applicant from recognizing and seeking to
counter the grounds for rejection.’” In re Jung, 637 F. 3d 1356, 1362 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (citing Chester v. Miller, 906 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed.Cir.1990).
Appeal 2011-002480
Application 11/85,219

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OPINION
Yoshida and Raiser - Claim 1:
The Examiner finds that Yoshida discloses all of the method steps of
claim 1. Ans. 3-4. The Examiner additionally finds that Raise also discloses
the second “preloading” step. Ans. 4. Based on these findings the Examiner
concludes that claim 1 would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in
the art at the time of the invention. Id.
Appellants argue that “Yoshida basically teaches an opposite system
operation than that recited in Appellants' claims. Particularly, Yoshida
discloses a fuel cell system that is put into a low performance mode, i.e., the
intermitted operation mode, from the normal fuel cell system operation,
which is not a high performance mode.” App. Br. 12. Appellants further
argue
since the method of Yoshida discloses switching to
a secondary battery when a high load request is
made, there is simply no way that Yoshida can
teach or suggest preloading the vehicle sub-
systems so that they act to reduce the time it takes
a fuel cell stack to provide high power in response
to a high performance mode command.
App. Br. 13 (emphasis added). We agree.
Even assuming, that the time period in Yoshida’s method during
which power is received only from the second battery can be fairly read as a
performance mode; the Examiner fails to identify where Yoshida discloses
“preloading a plurality of vehicle sub-systems” during this mode as claimed.
Furthermore, Raiser does not cure this deficiency in the rejection. Rather,
Raiser was relied upon for disclosing the steps taken to place the fuel cell
system in normal operation mode. Ans. 4, Raiser, para. 0050.
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For these reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim
1.
Yoshida and Kurosaki – Claims 1-3, 5, 7 and 9:
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-3, 5, 7 and 9 based on Yoshida
and Kurosaki suffers from the same deficiencies discussed supra. Kurosaki
does not cure these deficiencies as it is also relied upon for its teachings
directed to the normal operation mode of the fuel cell. Ans. 5-6, Kurosaki,
paras. [0009] – [0011]. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 1 or claims 2, 3, 5, 7 and 9 which depend directly or
indirectly therefrom.
Yoshida,Kurosaki and Hwang – Claim 4:
Claim 4 depends indirectly from claim 1. The Examiner’s rejection of
claim 4 suffers from the same deficiencies discussed supra. According, we
do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 4.
Yoshida,Kurosaki and Kolodziej – Claim 6:
Claim 6 depends from claim 1. The Examiner’s rejection of claim 6
suffers from the same deficiencies discussed supra. According, we do not
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 6.
Yoshida, Kurosaki and Buck – Claim 8:
Claim 8 depends from claim 1. The Examiner’s rejection of claim 8
suffers from the same deficiencies discussed supra. Accordingly, we do not
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 8.
Claims 14-17:
The Examiner did not specify which of the different grounds of
rejection involving different combinations of prior art apply to claims 14-17.
Ans. 9. Nevertheless, as each of the grounds of rejection relies primarily
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Application 11/85,219

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upon Yoshida, we assume that the Examiner intended to reject claims 14-17
based on Yoshida in combination with at least one of the other prior art
references relied upon to reject claims 1-9. Claim 14 is similar to claim 1
and also requires the step of “preloading a plurality of vehicle sub-systems.”
Accordingly, any rejection of claim 14 relying upon Yoshida to meet this
limitation suffers from the same deficiencies discussed supra. Accordingly,
we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 14 or claims 15-17
which depend therefrom.
DECISION
We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-9 and 14-17.

REVERSED

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