Ex Parte Liu et al

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 11, 2019

14083882 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 11, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/083,882 11/19/2013
28395 7590 06/13/2019
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FG1L
1000 TOWN CENTER
22NDFLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
YiminLiu
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
83399315 1239
EXAMINER
REINHARDT, RICHARD G
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3682
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/13/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte YIMIN LIU, PERRY ROBINSON MACNEILLE and
OLEG YURIEVITCH GUSIKHIN
Appeal2018-004927
Application 14/083,882
Technology Center 3600
Before JEAN R. HOMERE, CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR.,
and ADAM J. PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judges.
HOMERE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
Final Rejection of claims 1, 7, and 13, which constitute all claims pending in
this application. 1 App. Br. 1. Claims 2-6, 8-12 and 14-18 have been
canceled. App. Br., Claims Appx. 1-2. We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 Appellants identify Ford Global Technologies, LLC, as the real party in
interest. App. Br. 2.
Appeal2018-004927
Application 14/083,882
Introduction
According to Appellants, the claimed subject matter relates to a
vehicle network social grouping system including a plurality of vehicles
(203,205,207, 209, and 211), each equipped with a vehicle computing
system (VCS) for retrieving reviews relating to merchants, goods, and
services shared within the network by fellow drivers according to driver
designation of affiliation pre-stored in a data repository (215). Spec. ,i,i 5,
55-56, and Fig. 2. In particular, upon a driver authoring a review, a list of
driver-affiliated recipients is retrieved from the data repository to identify a
recipient to whom the review is delivered when the recipient is available. Id.
Representative Claim
Claims 1, 7 and 13 are independent. Independent claim 1 is
representative, and reads as follows:
1. A computer implemented method comprising:
providing a list of driver-affiliated users, based at
least on a pre-stored driver designation of affiliation,
whose vehicle computing system (VCS)-equipped vehicles
are capable of receiving a driver input review;
receiving selection of a user;
receiving a review of a good or service from a
driver;
attempting to deliver the review to a VCS of the
selected user; and if the VCS of the selected user is
unavailable for communication, determining that the VCS
of the selected user has become available for
communication and delivering the review to the available
VCS.
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Application 14/083,882
Lewis et al.
("Lewis")
Basir
Weiland
Prior Art Relied Upon
US 2007 /0070931 Al Mar. 29, 2007
US 2011/0121991 Al May 26, 2011
US 2011/0208617 Al Aug. 25, 2011
Rejections on Appeal
Claims 1, 7, and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101 as being
directed to patent ineligible material. Final Act. 2-5.
Claims 1, 7, and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over the combination of Basir, Weiland, and Lewis. Final Act.
5-8.
ANALYSIS2
A. Patent Eligibility
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a "new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: "[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas" are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'!, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court's two-step framework, described in Mayo
2 We refer to Appellants' arguments and the Examiner's findings and
conclusions set forth in the Final Action mailed April 21, 2017 ("Final
Act."); the Appeal Brief filed November 6, 2017 ("App. Br."); the Answer
mailed February 9, 2018, ("Ans."); and the Reply Brief filed April 6, 2018,
("Reply Br.") for the respective details.
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and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18 ( citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75-77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is "directed to."
See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 ("On their face, the claims before us are drawn to
the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to
mitigate settlement risk."); see also Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 611
(2010) ("Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners' application explain the basic concept
of hedging, or protecting against risk.").
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219-20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594-95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as "molding rubber products" (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981 )); "tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores" (Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v.
Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267-68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson,
409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that "[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176, 191 ("We view
respondents' claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula."). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim "seeking patent
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protection for that formula in the abstract .... is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws,[] and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment." Id. ( citing Benson and Flook), and 187 ("It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.").
If the claim is "directed to" an abstract idea, we tum to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where "we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an 'inventive
concept' sufficient to 'transform' the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application." Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. "A claim that recites an
abstract idea must include 'additional features' to ensure 'that the [claim] is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [ abstract idea]."' Id.
( quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). "[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer
implementation[] fail[ s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention." Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
section 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. 50-57 (Jan. 7, 2019) ("2019 PEG"). Under the 2019 PEG, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
( 1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain
methods of organizing human activity such as a
fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and
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(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception
into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)-(c),
(e)-(h)). 3
See 2019 PEG, 52, and 55-56. Only if a claim: (1) recites a judicial
exceptional; and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, does the office then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception
that is not "well-understood, routine, conventional" in the
field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a
high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 PEG at 56.
We analyze the patent-eligibility rejection with the principles
identified above in mind.
Examiner's Findings and Conclusions
In the first step of the Alice inquiry, the Examiner determines
independent claims 1, 7, and 13 are directed to the abstract idea of "sending
and receiving review messages from vehicle to vehicle." Final Act. 2.
According to the Examiner, the underlying steps of "providing a list of
driver-affiliated users[]; receiving selection of a user; receiving a review of a
good or service from a driver, []determining when the selected user becomes
available for communicat[ing] and delivering the review" are all steps which
can be performed by a human mentally. Id. The Examiner determines that
these concepts have all been identified as being directed to mental processes.
Id. In particular, the Examiner avers that the notions of collecting
3 All references to the MPEP are to Rev. 08.2017 (Jan. 2018).
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information, analyzing it, and notifying the user when the user is available
(e.g., FairWarning); delivering user-selected media content to portable
devices (as in Affinity Labs); collecting and comparing known information
(e.g., Classen); collecting and comparing known information (e.g.,
SmartGene); and using categories to organize, store, and transmit
information (e.g., Cyberfone), have all been identified as being directed to
mental processes, which can be performed by a human mentally or with pen
and paper. Id. at 2-3.
At Alice step 2, the Examiner determines the claims do not recite
additional elements sufficient to amount to significantly more than the
abstract idea of sending and receiving review messages. Final Act. 3.
According to the Examiner, the additional recitation of a "'vehicle
computing system (VCS)' being capable of receiving a driver input review"
merely recites the "vehicle" equipped with a "VCS", which is at a high level
of generality akin to generic computers performing well-understood, routine,
and conventional functions implementing the abstract idea. Id. Further, the
Examiner avers there is no indication that the combination of elements
improves the functionality of the computer or any other technology. Id. at 4.
Instead, the claimed steps merely describe providing/transmitting, receiving,
and delivering data over a network, which are routine functions performed
by a generic computer. Id. ( citing Spec. ,i,i 18-25).
Appellants' Contentions
Appellants argue the claimed provision of a review-recipients-list,
from which one recipient is selected to receive a review, is an uncommon
and an atypical form of review delivery that amounts to substantially more
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than the alleged abstract idea. App. Br. 6. Further, Appellants argue that the
Examiner's failure to consider the implication of the claim as a whole,
including the recited ability to provide on-demand reviews to a list of
preferred recipients upon review completion, is reversible error of the patent
eligibility rejection. Id.
Our Review
Applying the guidance set forth in the 2019 PEG, we determine
whether the Examiner has erred in rejecting the claims as being directed to
patent ineligible subject matter.
In revised step 1 of 2019 PEG, we consider whether the claimed
subject matter falls within the four statutory categories of patent-eligible
subject matter identified by 35 U.S.C. § 101: process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter. Because independent claim 1 recites
a "computer-implemented method" including a number of steps, claim 1
falls within the process category of patent-eligible subject matter. Because
independent claim 7 recites a "system" including a computer for performing
various functions, claim 7 falls within a machine category of patent-eligible
subject matter. Because claim 13 recites a "non-transitory computer-
readable storage medium" including instructions, when executed by a
computer, performs various functions, claim 13 falls within the manufacture
category of patent-eligible subject matter.
In prong 1 of revised step 2A of the 2019 PEG, we determine whether
any judicial exception to patent eligibility is recited in the claims. The
guidance identifies three judicially-excepted groupings of abstract ideas: (1)
mathematical concepts; (2) certain methods of organizing human activity
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such as fundamental economic practices; and (3) mental processes.
Independent claim 1 recites, inter alia, the following limitations:
( 1) Providing a list of driver-affiliated users,
(2) Receiving selection of a user from the list;
(3)Receiving a review of a good or service from a driver;
(4)Attempting to deliver the review to a VCS of the
selected user;
(5)Delivering the review to the VCS when the user
becomes available
At the outset, we note Appellants do not dispute the Examiner's
determination that these limitations relate to "sending and receiving review
messages from vehicle-to-vehicle," which can be performed mentally by a
human. Final Act. 2. Therefore, as correctly noted by the Examiner,
sending and receiving messages between parties is the kind of data exchange
activity that that has been identified by our reviewing court as a mental
process. See e.g., Cyberfone. Additionally, we determine these limitations
are steps of "managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions
between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or
instructions)," which the 2019 PEG provides are "[ c Jertain methods of
organizing human activity." 84 Fed. Reg. 52. Accordingly, independent
claims, 1, 7, and 13 recite the judicial exceptions of a mental process and a
method of organizing human activity. Having determined that the claims
recite a judicial exception, our analysis under the 2019 PEG turns now to
determining whether there are "additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application." See MPEP § 2106.0S(a)-(c), (e)-(h).
"Integration into a practical application" requires an additional element or a
combination of additional elements in the claim to apply, rely on, or use the
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judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the
judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed
to monopolize the exception. 84 Fed. Reg. 53.
Appellants' claims 1, 7, and 13 recite a computer-related limitation,
(e.g., Vehicle Computing System (VCS)). We do not find the computer-
related limitation is sufficient to integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application. Besides indicating that the VCS is an equipment
including a processor within each communicating vehicle for enabling the
sharing of reviews, the Specification does not provide additional details
about the VCS that would distinguish it from any generic communication
device. Id. ,-i,-i 18-22. Although we do not dispute that the VCS includes
specific logic for providing a list of driver-affiliated users from which a
particular user can be selected to receive the review, Appellants do not
persuasively explain why the claimed provision of a driver-affiliated list
improves the functioning of a VCS, or improves the communication
technology as a whole. See MPEP § 2106.0S(a). Rather, the claims merely
adapt the method of organizing human activity and mental process of
sending and receiving reviews to an execution of steps performed by a VCS
mounted in a vehicle. See Credit Acceptance, 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed.
Cir. 20 l T) ("Our prior cases have made clear that mere automation of
manual processes using generic computers does not constitute a patentable
improvement in computer technology."); see also Bancorp Services, L.L.C.
v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (A computer "'ernpfoyed only for its most basic function ... does not
impose meaningful limits on the scope of those claims."). Further,
Appellants' identified improvements are improvernents to the abstract idea,
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not improvements to a technology or computer functionality. Thus, on the
record before us, the cited claim limitations do not improve the functionality
of the VCS by performing operations to provide a list of driver-affiliated
users, nor do they achieve an improved technological result in conventional
industry practice. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc., 837 F.3d
1299, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Because claim steps 1-5, outlined above, do not ( 1) provide any
technical solution to a technical problem as required by DDR Holdings; 4 (2)
provide any particular practical application as required by BASCOM; 5 or (3)
entail an unconventional technological solution to a technological problem
as required by Amdocs, 6 we agree with the Examiner's determination that
Appellants' claims 1, 7, and 13 are directed to an abstract idea that is not
integrated into a practical application.
Alice/Mayo--Step 2 (Inventive Concept)
Turning to step 2 of the A!ice/Af ayo framework, we look to whether
the claim: (a) recites a specific limitation or combination of limitations that
are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field; or (b)
4 See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir.
2014). The Federal Circuit found DDR 's claims are patent-eligible under 35
U.S.C. § 101 because DDR 's claims: (1) do not merely recite "the
performance of some business practice known from the pre-Internet world"
previously disclosed in Bilski and Alice; but instead (2) provide a technical
solution to a technical problem unique to the Internet, i.e., a "solution ...
necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem
specifically arising in the realm of computer networks." DDR, 773 F.3d at
1257.
5 See BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
6 See Amdocs Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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simply appends vvell-understood, routine, conventional activities previously
knovvn to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception. 2019 PEG, 56. We discern no additional element or combination
of elements recited in Appellants' independent claims 1, 7, and 13 that
contains any "inventive concept" or adds anything "significantly more" to
transform the abstract concept into a patent-eligible application. Alice, 573
U.S. at 221. Appellants do not direct our attention to any portion of the
Specification indicating that the claimed processor performs anything other
than well-understood, routine, and conventional functions, such as receiving
and processing. See E'lec. Pmver Group, LLC v. Alstom SA., 830 F.3d 1350,
1355 ("Nothing in the clairns, understood in light of the [S]pecification,
requires anything other than off-the-sheH: conventional computer, network,
and display technology for gathering, sending, and presenting the desired
infon11ation."); see also buyS"'_/1FE, inc. v. Google, inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355
(Fed. Cir. 2015) ("That a computer receives and sends information over a
network-with no further specification is not even arguably inventive."); and
Alice, 573 U.S. at 224-26 (receiving, storing, sending information over
networks insufficient to add an inventive concept). Instead, Appellants'
claimed subject matter simply uses generic computer components ( e.g.,
VCS) to perform the abstract idea of "sending and receiving review
messages from vehicle-to-vehicle." App. Br. 2; see also Spec. ,-J,-J 18-32. As
noted above, the use of a generic computer ( e.g., VCS) does not alone
transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter. As
our reviewing court has observed, "after Alice, there can remain no doubt:
recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise
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ineligible claim patent-eligible." DDR, 773 F.3d at 1256 ( citing Alice, 573
U.S. at 223).
Because the discussed claim elements only recite generic computer
functions that are well-understood, routine, and conventional, the claim is
devoid of an inventive concept. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. Appellants are
reminded that "the 'inventive concept' [under step two of the Mayo/Alice
test] cannot be the abstract idea itself' and "Berkheimer . .. leave[s]
untouched the numerous cases from this court which have held claims
ineligible because the only alleged 'inventive concept' is the abstract idea."
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J.,
concurring). "It has been clear since Alice that a claimed invention's use of
the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply the inventive
concept that renders the invention 'significantly more' than that ineligible
concept." BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed.
Cir. 2018). We, therefore, agree with the Examiner that the computer
functions recited in the claims were, in fact, generic, and are met by
numerous case law establishing that using a generic computer to expedite
and automate processes traditionally performed manually, or that are
otherwise abstract, is a well-understood, routine, and conventional use of
such computers. Final Act. 3; see also, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (utilizing an
intermediary computer to forward information); and Bancorp Services,
L.L.C., 687 F.3d at 1278 ("The computer required by some ofBancorp's
claims is employed only for its most basic function, the performance of
repetitive calculations, and as such does not impose meaningful limits on the
scope of those claims.").
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To the extent Appellants argue the claims necessarily contain an
"inventive concept" based on their alleged novelty or non-obviousness over
the cited references, Appellants misapprehend the controlling precedent.
Although the second step in the Alice/Mayo framework is termed a search
for an "inventive concept," the analysis is not an evaluation of novelty or
non-obviousness, but, rather, a search for "an element or combination of
elements that is 'sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself."' Alice,
573 U.S. at 217-218. A novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely
abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90.
Appellants are further reminded that, in many cases, "relying on a
computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or more accurately is
insufficient to render a claim patent eligible." OIP Techs., Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Alice,
573 U.S. at 224) ("[U]se of a computer to create electronic records, track
multiple transactions, and issue simultaneous instructions" is not an
inventive concept.); see also, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital
One Bank, 792 F.3d 1363, 1370 ("[M]erely adding computer functionality to
increase the speed or efficiency of the process does not confer patent
eligibility on an otherwise abstract idea."). Therefore, the functions recited
in independent claims 1, 7, and 13 do not add any meaningful limitations
beyond generally linking the abstract idea to the particular technological
environment. See Final Act 3-5.
Because Appellants' claims 1, 7, and 13 are directed to a patent-
ineligible abstract concept and do not recite something "significantly more"
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under the second prong of the Alice analysis, we sustain the Examiner's
rejection of claims 1, 7 and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Obviousness Rejection
A claim is unpatentable for obviousness if, to one of ordinary skill in
the pertinent art, "the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made." KSR Int 'l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)). The
question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual
determinations, including "the scope and content of the prior art;"
"differences between the prior art and the claims at issue"; and "the level of
ordinary skill in the pertinent art."7 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas
City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
A patent claim "is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that
each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art." KSR,
550 U.S. at 418. An obviousness determination requires finding "both 'that
a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the
prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled
artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so."'
Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359,
1367-68 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); see also KSR, 550 U.S. at 418
(For an obviousness analysis, "it can be important to identify a reason that
7 Additionally, secondary considerations, such as "commercial success, long
felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light
to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to
be patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries
may have relevancy." Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18.
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would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to
combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does.").
We analyze the obviousness rejection with the principles identified
above in mind.
Appellants argue that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 7 and
13 as obvious over the combination of Basir, Weiland, and Lewis because
none of the cited references teaches or suggests providing a list of driver-
affiliated users whose VCS-equipped vehicles are capable of receiving a
review. App. Br. 7. In particular, Appellants argue that while Basir
discloses a plurality of vehicles capable of sending/receiving text or email
messages to/from individuals in a contact list, it does not teach presenting a
list of affiliated drivers whose vehicles are equipped with a VCS for inter-
vehicle communication, nor does it teach presenting the list of contact for
user selection. Id. at 7-8. According to Appellants, the list recited in the
claim is a list identifying the capability of driver recipients whose vehicles
are equipped with a VCS for inter-vehicle communication, as opposed to a
generic list of email contacts. Id. at 8. Further, Appellants contend that
Weiland's disclosure of users providing digital reviews of goods, products or
services does not cure the noted deficiencies in Basir, and neither does
Lewis's disclosure. Id. These arguments are not persuasive.
As correctly noted by the Examiner, "Basir ... specifically teaches a
vehicle-to-vehicle communication system for sending messages to other
vehicles." Ans. 9 ( citing Final Act. 6-9; Basir, Abstract). "While Basir
does not specifically state that the content of these messages are 'reviews,'
the system in Basir is certainly 'capable' of sending and receiving review
messages." Id. ( citing See Basir, ,-J,-J 49, 59-60). As detailed expansively in
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the Answer, Basir' s entire disclosure is about inter-vehicle communication
between drivers/vehicles displayed in contact list, each vehicle equipped
with a communication device for exchanging email/text messages with other
drivers. Id. at 9-16. We find no reversible error in these Examiner's
findings, and adopt them as our own.
DECISION
For the above reasons, we affirm the Examiner's patent ineligibility
and obviousness rejections of claims 1, 7, and 13.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § l .136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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