Ex Parte Litvinov

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 30, 2018

14615101 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 30, 2018)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/615,101 02/05/2015 Maxim Litvinov P2011-01-39.PCT(UA).US.l 7846
84577 7590 02/01/2018
Lowe Graham Jones PLLC
701 Fifth Avenue
Suite 4800
Seattle, WA 98104
EXAMINER
HANCE, ROBERT J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2423
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/01/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patentdocketing@lowegrahamjones.com
IPDEPT @ dish, com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MAXIM LITVINOV
Appeal 2017-000872
Application 14/615,101
Technology Center 2400
Before ERIC S. FRAHM, KRISTEN L. DROESCH, and
TERRENCE W. McMILLIN, Administrative Patent Judges.
FRAHM, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1—5 and 7—17. Claims 18—20 have been canceled. Claim 6 stands
allowed.1 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm.
Exemplary Claims
Claims 1 and 15 are independent and similarly recite a method and
media device for performing pre-operations at a media device. Exemplary
1 Advisory Action mailed February 5, 2016, p. 2, box 15; Ans. 9.
Appeal 2017-000872
Application 14/615,101
independent claims 1 and 15 under appeal, with emphases added to disputed
portions of the claims, read as follows:
1. A method of performing pre-operations at a media
device in anticipation of an occurrence of an initial user action
to operate the media device that is controllable by a remote
control and that is configured to receive an in-use signal from
an electronic device, the method comprising:
operating the media device in a powered-down mode,
wherein at least one component of the media device is not
powered prior to the initial user action to operate the media
device;
receiving, at the media device, the in-use signal from the
electronic device that is remote from the media device, wherein
the received in-use signal corresponds to a user interaction
with the electronic device; and
performing a pre-operation at the media device in
response to receiving the in-use signal from the electronic
device,
wherein the pre-operation is performed prior to receiving
the initial user action to operate the media device,
wherein the pre-operation is providing power to the at
least one component of the media device such that the at least
one powered component is operational when the initial user
action to operate the media device occurs, and
wherein the media device becomes operable to respond
to the initial user action to operate the media device in
response to providing power to the at least one component of
the media device.
15. A media device configured to communicatively couple to an
electronic device, comprising:
an electronic device interface configured to receive an in-use
signal from the electronic device that is remote from the media device,
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Application 14/615,101
wherein the received in-use signal corresponds to a user interaction
with the electronic device;
a remote interface configured to receive wireless signals from a
remote control; and
a processor system configured to perform at least one pre­
operation of the media device in response to receiving the in-use
signal from the electronic device,
wherein, prior to receiving the in-use signal from the electronic
device, the media device is operated in a powered-down mode such
that at least one component of the media device is not powered,
wherein the at least one pre-operation is performed prior to
receiving an initial user action to operate one of the media device and
the media presentation device,
wherein the pre-operation is providing power to the at least one
component of the media device, wherein the at least one powered
component is operational when the initial user action to operate the
media device occurs, and
wherein the initial user action to operate the media device is
received in a wireless signal received from the remote control within
a predefined duration after the in-use signal is received from the
electronic device.
The Examiner’s Rejections
(1) The Examiner rejected claims 1, 2, 4, and 7—17 as being
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Jing (US 2011/0032423 Al,
published Feb. 10, 2011) and Yoshida (US 2005/0257006 Al, published
Nov. 17, 2005). Final Act. 2—8; Ans. 2—7.2
2 Separate patentability is not argued for claims 2, 4, 7—14, 16, and 17, and
Appellant presents arguments primarily to independent claims 1 and 15 (see
Br. 6—16). Independent claims 1 and 15 recite similar features related to a
method of performing pre-operations at a media device in response to
receiving an in-use signal from an electronic device (claim 1), and a media
device with a processor system to perform a pre-operation (claim 15).
Accordingly, we will decide the outcome of the rejection of dependent
claims 2, 4, and 7—14 on the basis of independent claim 1, and the outcome
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Application 14/615,101
(2) The Examiner rejected dependent claim 3 as being unpatentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Jing, Yoshida, and Singh (US 2007/0255464
Al, published Nov. 1, 2007).* * 3 Final Act. 8—9.
(3) The Examiner rejected dependent claim 5 as being unpatentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Jing, Yoshida, and Bonasia (US 6,901,439
Bl, issued May 31, 2005).4 Final Act. 9.
Principal Issue on Appeal
Based on Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief (App. Br. 4—14)
and the Reply Brief (Reply Br. 4—20), the following principal issue is
presented on appeal:
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 1, 2, 4, and 7—17 as being
obvious over the base combination of Jing and Yoshida because the base
combination fails to teach or suggest a method of performing pre-operations
at a media device, as recited in independent claims 1 and 15?
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections (Final Act. 2—8; Ans. 2—
7) in light of Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief (App. Br. 4—14;
of the rejection of dependent claims 16 and 17 on the basis of independent
claim 15.
3 Appellant does not present separate arguments with regard to dependent
claim 3 rejected under § 103(a) over Jing, Yoshida, and Singh. Based on
Appellant’s failure to present arguments, we will summarily sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 3.
4 Appellant does not present separate arguments with regard to dependent
claim 5 rejected under § 103(a) over Jing, Yoshida, and Bonasia. Based on
Appellant’s failure to present arguments, we will summarily sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 5.
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Application 14/615,101
Reply Br. 4—20) that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellant’s
contentions. With regard to independent claims 1 and 15, we adopt as our
own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Final
Office Action from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 2—4, 6—7) as well
as the Advisory Action mailed February 5, 2016 (Adv. Act. 2), and (2) the
reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer (Ans. 2—7) in
response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief. We concur with the conclusions
reached by the Examiner. More specifically, we agree with the Examiner’s
findings regarding Yoshida’s paragraph 639 (as illuminating the meaning of
paragraph 341 of Yoshida, and thus teaching or suggesting the disputed
limitations of claim 1), and paragraph 37 of Jing (as teaching or suggesting
the disputed “predefined duration” limitation of claim 15).
With regard to independent claim 1, Appellant argues that the
combination of Jing and Yoshida:
does not disclose, teach, or suggest the features of “operating
the media device in a powered-down mode, wherein at least one
component of the media device is not powered prior to the
initial user action to operate the media device; receiving, at the
media device, the in-use signal from the electronic device that
is remote from the media device, wherein the received in-use
signal corresponds to a user interaction with the electronic
device; and performing a pre-operation at the media device in
response to receiving the in-use signal from the electronic
device ... wherein the pre-operation is providing power to the at
least one component of the media device such that the at least
one powered component is operational when the initial user
action to operate the media device occurs, and wherein
the media device becomes operable to respond to the initial user
action to operate the media device in response to providing
power to the at least one component of the media device” as
recited in Claim 1.
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Application 14/615,101
App. Br. 4—5.
With regard to independent claim 15, Appellant argues that the
combination of Jing and Yoshida:
does not disclose, teach, or suggest the feature of “an electronic
device interface configured to receive an in-use signal from the
electronic device that is remote from the media device, wherein
the received in-use signal corresponds to a user interaction with
the electronic device .... wherein the at least one pre-operation
is performed prior to receiving an initial user action to operate
one of the media device and the media presentation device,”
and “wherein the pre-operation is providing power to the at
least one component of the media device, wherein the at least
one powered component is operational when the initial user
action to operate the media device occurs” as recited in Claim
15.
App. Br. 5.
Appellant’s contentions regarding claims 1 and 15 (App. Br. 6—12) are
based on the assertion that the Examiner erred in finding that Yoshida’s
paragraph 341, taken with paragraph 639, teaches or suggests the limitations
of claims 1 and 15 concerning an electronic device receiving an in-use signal
signifying a user input/interaction to cause a media device to perform a pre­
operation.
Notably, Appellant admits, “we appreciate how the Examiner might
conclude that this disclosure of Yoshida at Paragraphs 0341 and 0639 might
be so broadly interpreted so as to disclose the features recited in Claims 1
and 15 which are absent from the Jing disclosure” (Reply Br. 6).
Nonetheless, Appellant insists the Examiner has “misconstrued the Yoshida
disclosure” (Id.). To the contrary, we agree with the Examiner’s application
of Yoshida, in combination with Jing, as teaching or suggesting the
limitations recited in claims 1 and 15.
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Application 14/615,101
Specifically, we agree with the Examiner (Adv. Act. 2; Ans. 2—6) that
Yoshida’s disclosure in paragraphs 341 and 639 teaches or suggests the
disputed limitations of claims 1 and 15, and Jing’s paragraph 37 teaches or
suggests the disputed “predefined duration” limitation of claim 15.
Paragraph 341 of Yoshida discloses applying known user “usage times for a
digital door key operation event upon coming home, tuming-ON the lights
of the house, tuming-ON the power of the television and air conditioner, and
so on” makes is “possible to perform an event-dependent type of linked
control such as performing the linked activation of devices within the
household, in time with the coming home event.” And, paragraph 639 of
Yoshida discloses that when the digital door key signal is detected and the
operating pattem/history (such as that discussed in paragraph 341) is
extracted, “it is possible to carry out an event-dependent type of linkage
control such as the automatic completion of operations involved in going out
or coming home by merely operating the key of the door 506.” Thus, “the
automatic completion of operations involved in going out or coming home
by merely operating the key of the door” (| 639) teaches or suggests the
“pre-operation” and the digital door key 506 teaches or suggests the
“electronic device” recited in claims 1 and 15.
We also agree with the Examiner (Final Act. 6—7; Ans. 6) that Jing’s
disclosure at paragraph 37, taken with Yoshida’s disclosure, teaches or
suggests the “predefined duration” recited in claim 15. Jing discloses that
receiving user actions from a remote control 40 (| 20) within a predefined
learning period that occurs after an in-use signal flflf 17, 37; see also Fig. 7
showing mode establishment, i.e., a learning mode). Thus, Jing teaches
receiving an initial user action to operate a media device (TV 12 shown in
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Application 14/615,101
Figure 1 and described in paragraph 20) from a remote control (remote
control shown in Figure 1 and described in paragraph 20) during a learning
mode/period (see 17, 37; see also Fig. 7), and Yoshida (see 341, 639)
teaches receiving an in-use signal from an electronic device (digital door key
506).
In this light, we agree with the Examiner’s determination that the
combination of Jing and Yoshida teaches or suggests receiving an initial user
action to operate a media device from a remote control within a predefined
duration after an in-use signal is received, as recited in claim 15.
Appellant’s argument (Reply Br. 20) that Jing’s “predetermined time
window is not the same as the recited predefined duration (that is used after
receipt of an in-use signal from the electronic device)” is not persuasive,
because this argument does not address the combination of Jing with
Yoshida.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s contentions (App. Br. 12—15;
Reply Br. 16—19) that (i) the Examiner failed to present a prima facie case of
obviousness for claim 15, and (ii) the Examiner’s rejection of claim 15 (see
Final Act. 6—7; Adv. Act. 2; Ans. 6—7) citing paragraph 37 of Jing as
disclosing receiving an initial user action signal within a predefined duration
after receiving a prior in-use signal constitutes a new ground of rejection.
And, even if the rejection of claim 15 was a new ground of rejection in the
Advisory Action and/or Examiner’s Answer, Appellant’s proper recourse
would have been to petition the Director of Technology Center 2400.5 No
5 See, e.g., MPEP 1207.03(b); 37 CFR 14.40; 37 CFR 1.181. As MPEP
1207.03 states, the appropriate venue for Appellant to object to any new
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Application 14/615,101
such petition has been filed in the instant case. Therefore, the obviousness
rejection of claim 15 under 5 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over
Jing and Yoshida is properly before us on appeal.
In view of the foregoing, we sustain the rejection of independent
claims 1 and 15 as being obvious over the combination of Jing and Yoshida,
grounds of rejection of claim 15 under § 103(a) was by petition to the
Director:
37 CFR 41.40 sets forth the exclusive procedure for an
appellant to request review of the primary examiner’s failure to
designate a rejection as a new ground of rejection via a petition
to the Director under 37 CFR 1.181. This procedure should be
used if an appellant feels an answer includes a new ground of
rejection that has not been designated as such and wishes to
reopen prosecution so that new amendments or evidence may
be submitted in response to the rejection. However, if appellant
wishes to submit only arguments, the filing of a petition under
37 CFR 1.181 would not be necessary because appellant may
submit the arguments in a reply brief. Any such petition under
37 CFR 1.181 must be filed within two months from the entry
of the examiner’s answer and prior to the filing of a reply brief.
MPEP 1207.03(b) (Rev. 11, 2013). And, 37 CFR 41.40 states:
Any request to seek review of the primary examiner's failure to
designate a rejection as a new ground of rejection in an
examiner's answer must be by way of a petition to the Director
under § 1.181 of this title filed within two months from the
entry of the examiner's answer and before the filing of any reply
brief. Failure of appellant to timely file such a petition will
constitute a waiver of any arguments that a rejection must be
designated as a new ground of rejection.
37 CFR 41.40(a) (2012).
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as well as claims 2, 4, and 7—14, 16, and 17 depending respectively
therefrom.
Claims 3 and 5
Based on Appellant’s failure to address the Examiner’s prima facie
case of obviousness, Appellant has failed to show that the Examiner erred in
determining that the remaining combinations additionally applying Singh or
Bonasia teaches or suggests the methods recited in claims 3 and 5.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of these
claims summarily. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (requiring a statement in
the briefs as to each ground of rejection presented by Appellant for review
and stating that arguments not presented in the briefs will be refused
consideration).
CONCLUSIONS
(1) The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1, 2, 4, and 7—17 as
being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Jing and Yoshida.
(2) Appellant has not shown the Examiner erred in rejecting
dependent claim 3 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Jing,
Yoshida, and Singh.
(3) Appellant has not shown the Examiner erred in rejecting
dependent claim 5 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Jing,
Yoshida, and Bonasia.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1—5 and 7—17 are affirmed.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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