Ex Parte Lindskog

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

May 15, 2009

10512006 (B.P.A.I. May. 15, 2009)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte KJELL LINDSKOG
____________

Appeal 2009-7425
Application 10/512,006
Technology Center 3600
____________

Decided:1 May 15, 2009
____________

Before HUBERT C. LORIN, JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, and
BIBHU R. MOHANTY, Administrative Patent Judges.

LORIN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

1 The two-month time period for filing an appeal or commencing a civil
action, as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 1.304, begins to run from the decided date
shown on this page of the decision. The time period does not run from the
Mail Date (paper delivery) or Notification Date (electronic delivery).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Kjell Lindskog (Appellant) seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of
the final rejection of claims 1-20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b) (2002).
SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM.2
THE INVENTION
The claimed invention relates to safe-storage devices for valuable
documents comprising a destructive means that, when activated by an alarm,
destroys the documents.
Sole independent claims 1 and 9, reproduced below, are illustrative of
the subject matter on appeal.
1. A method for destroying valuable documents, including bank notes,
stored within a storage space in the event of an attempt to gain access
to said valuable documents without proper authorization, the steps of
said method including:
storing said valuable documents in a collecting device (30)
comprising a drum within a storage space;
winding said valuable documents on or off said drum with the
aid of a carrier film or foil (40, 41);
housing said drum (30), at least partially, within a collecting
vessel (50);
providing a destructive agent container (60, 63) containing
a destructive agent in fluid communication with said collecting

2 Our decision will make reference to the Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“App.
Br.,” filed Jun. 2, 2008) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Oct. 10, 2008),
and the Examiner’s Answer (“Answer,” mailed Sep. 8, 2008).

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vessel;
generating an alarm signal in response to an unauthorized
attempt to access said valuable documents; and
applying said destructive agent from said destructive agent
container into said collecting vessel and onto the valuable documents
wound on said drum with the aid of said carrier film or foil in
response to said alarm signal.

6. An arrangement for destroying valuable documents, including
banknotes, stored within a storage space, said arrangement including a
collecting device within said storage space for storing said valuable
documents, said collecting device comprising a drum on which said
valuable documents are wound with the aid of a carrier film or foil;
a collecting vessel for housing, at least in part, said
collecting device;
a destructive agent container in fluid communication with
said collecting vessel;
an alarm for detecting and generating an alarm signal in
response to an attempted unauthorized access to said valuable
documents; and
means for applying a destructive agent contained within said
destructive agent container into said collecting vessel and onto
said valuable documents wound on said drum in response to said
alarm signal.
THE REJECTIONS
The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of
unpatentability:
Lundblad US 6,497,186 B1 Dec. 24, 2002
The following rejections are before us for review:
1. Claims 1-9, 12, and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being
anticipated by Lundblad.

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2. Claims 10, 11, and 14-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Lundblad.
ARGUMENTS
The Appellant has only argued the anticipation rejection of
independent claims 1 and 6. As to that rejection, the Appellant argued claims
1-9, 12, and 13 as a group (App. Br. 8-13). We select claim 1 as the
representative claim for this group, and the remaining claims 2-9, 12, and 13
stand or fall with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2007).
As to claim 1, the Examiner found that the method of claim 1 reads on
Lundblad.
Lundblad teaches both an arrangement and a method of use in a
depositing machine, including a storage space within the interior of
casing 101, the casing having plural collecting devices defined as
drums 30 for storing valuable documents on the drums with the aid of
a carrier film or foil defined by the belts of column 2, line 14. Each
drum is housed within a collecting vessel 11 -17, which collecting
vessels 11 -17 are all located within the storage space interior of
casing 101. The collecting vessel(s) receive the destructive agent
when it is released from a destructive agent container 31 or 32 by
an alarm signal. The fuses 3113 and 3213 in fig. 3 define a puncturing
means for the nets 3113 and 3212 of the container 31, 32. At least one
of the containers 31, 32 in fig. 3 is mounted above the bottom of the
collecting vessel 11 -17 in which the drum(s) is mounted. Even if the
device of fig. 3 were mounted horizontally within a vessel 11-17, at
least a portion of the container(s) 31, 32 would be above the valuable
documents and the bottom and an opening portion of the collecting
vessel 11 -17.
(Ans. 3-4).

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The Appellant argued that Lundblad does not teach or suggest all the
elements of the process, in the arrangement claimed, as set forth in claim 1.
Specifically, the Appellant argued that Lundblad does not teach or suggest:
1. “a collecting vessel in each storage space, arranged such that at least a
part of the collecting device ... for containing valuable documents is
received in the collecting vessel” (App. Br. 8); and,
2. “a destructive agent container in fluid communication with a
collecting vessel to apply a destructive agent to the collecting vessel
to destroy documents on the collecting device in response to a signal
indicating an unauthorized attempt to gain access to the documents
within the storage compartment” (App. Br. 8-9).
Instead, according to the Appellant, Lundblad “discloses a plurality of
storage spaces, each of which includes units (11-16) containing valuable
documents” (App. Br. 8) and
dye capsules, and detonation fuses for detonating the dye capsules to
destroy the documents contained within the storage space in response
to an unauthorized attempt to gain access to the documents within the
storage compartment (See Column 2, lines 26 - 29 and Column 2,
lines 35 - 37 of the Lundblad specification).
(App. Br. 9).
The Examiner had equated the units 11-17 of the Lundblad apparatus
to the collection vessels of claim 1. (Final Rej. 4-5). The Appellant
disagreed, arguing that “elements 11-17 of Lundblad are clearly comparable
to the collecting devices disclosed and claimed by Applicant ... and not
collecting vessels which are separate elements from the collecting devices.”

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(App. Br. 10). According to the Appellant, elements 11-17 of Lundblad are
“not collecting vessels for receiving a destructive agent in a destructive
agent container in fluid communication with the collecting vessels.” (App.
Br. 10.) .
The Appellant also argued that, even if elements 11-17 of Lundblad
could be equated to the collection vessels of claim 1, claim 1 “nonetheless
recite separate elements for the storage space, the collecting vessel, the
collecting device, and the destructive agent container in fluid
communication with the collecting vessel.” (App. Br. 10-11).
The Examiner responded by arguing that “[t]he Lundblad reference
has been relied upon by the examiner as teaching one storage space (defined
by the outer casing 101), one collecting device (defined by a drum 30) and
one collecting vessel (defined by any of elements 11-17), each of which
receives one of the drums.” (Ans. 5). According to the Examiner, this
teaches separate storage, collecting vessel, collecting device, and destructive
agent elements. (Ans. 6). The Examiner also stated that “it is resubmitted
that the containers 31 or 32 of Lundblad clearly teach a destructive container
in fluid communication with a collecting vessel, which collecting vessel is
located below an associated drum.” (Ans. 5).
The Appellant replied that “interpreting independent Claims 1 and 6
to be limited to only a single storage space is an unreasonable interpretation
of the claims.” (Reply Br. 2). “[T]he only reasonable interpretation of
appealed independent Claims 1 and 6 is that it covers one or more units,
each of said units having a storage space, a drum stored within the storage

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space, the drum itself being housed, at least partially, within a collecting
vessel.” (Reply Br. 3).
The Appellant also replied that, even if claim 1 could be interpreted as
limited to one storage space, “the arrangement disclosed by Lundblad (a
single storage 101 housing multiple drums and collecting vessels) in
accordance with the interpretation of this reference made in the Examiner’s
Answer, is clearly different in arrangement from the devices employed in the
methods defined by appealed independent Claims 1 and 6 (e.g., a single
storage space, a single drum, and a single collecting vessel) in accordance
with the interpretation of independent Claims 1 and 6 made in the
Examiner’s Answer.” (Reply Br. 3).
ISSUES
Has the Examiner given claim 1 the broadest reasonable construction
in light of the Specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary
skill in the art?
FINDINGS OF FACT
We find that the following enumerated findings of fact (FF) are
supported by at least a preponderance of the evidence. Ethicon, Inc. v.
Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining the general
evidentiary standard for proceedings before the Office).
Claim construction
1. Claim 1 calls for a “a collecting device (30) comprising a drum within
a storage space.”
2. Accordingly, claim 1 requires the presence of a storage space, within

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which is a collecting device comprising a drum.
3. Claim 1 calls for “housing said drum (30), at least partially, within a
collecting vessel (50).”
4. Accordingly, claim 1 requires at least partially housing the drum
within a collecting vessel.
5. Claim 1 calls “providing a destructive agent container (60, 63)
containing a destructive agent in fluid communication with said
collecting vessel.”
6. Accordingly, claim 1 requires the presence of a destructive agent
container containing a destructive agent in fluid communication with
the collecting vessel.
The prior art
7. Lundblad relates to safes for safekeeping of valuable documents
comprising a device to destroy the valuable documents when an
attempt to break into the safe is indicated. (Col. 1, ll. 44-50).
8. Lundblad describes a safe 1 having a shell 101 inside of which
includes units 11-17 for accommodating valuable documents. (See
Fig. 1. Col. 1, ll. 45-47).
9. The units 11-17 include destructive devices 112-162 that have a dye-
containing part 1121-1621 and an explosive part 1122-1622. (See Fig.
2. Col. 1, ll. 61-64).
10. The destructive devices are set to ignite “in response to damage to the
shell protection means 101 and also depending on whether respective
units 11-16 contain banknotes or are empty.” (Col. 1, ll. 67-col. 2,

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l. 2).
11. With reference to Fig. 3, Lundblad describes providing destructive
devices 112, in form of stationary containers 31 and 32 fixed to the
walls of the safe on either side of a drum 30 on which valuable
documents are wound. (Col. 2, ll. 5-8).
12. The containers 31 and 32 include circular peripheral recesses 311 and
312 for accommodating destructive material. (Col. 2, ll. 10-21).
13. The recesses 311 and 312 have openings 3111 and 3211 that face the
edges of the documents. (Col. 2, ll. 21-24).
14. The recesses include destructive material in the form of dye and a
detonation fuse 3113 and 3213 “for activation of the destructive
material in the event of an attempt to break into the safe 1.” (Col. 2, ll.
28-29).
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Anticipation
“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in
the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior
art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628,
631 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Obviousness
“Section 103 forbids issuance of a patent when ‘the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said

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subject matter pertains.’” KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
(2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying
factual determinations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art,
(2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, and
(3) the level of skill in the art. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-
18 (1966). See also KSR, 550 U.S. at 407 (“While the sequence of these
questions might be reordered in any particular case, the [Graham] factors
continue to define the inquiry that controls.”) The Court in Graham further
noted that evidence of secondary considerations “might be utilized to give
light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought
to be patented.” 383 U.S. at 17-18.

ANALYSIS
The rejection of claims 1-9, 12, and 13 under §102(e) as being anticipated
by Lundblad.
Claim 1 requires the use of a particular arrangement of elements
comprising (a) a storage, (b) a collecting device, (c) a collecting vessel, and
(e) a destructive agent container containing a destructive agent. As claimed,
the storage contains the collecting device, the collecting vessel, and the
destructive agent container. The collecting device comprises a drum and the
drum is at least partially housed in a collecting vessel, the destructive agent
container is in fluid communication with the collecting vessel. (FF 1-6).
We do not find, nor does the Appellant point to anything, in the
Specification providing definitions for the claim terms “storage,” “collecting

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device,” “collecting vessel,” and “destructive agent container” such that they
should be given meanings other than their ordinary and customary meaning.
Accordingly, we look to the words of the claim as they would be interpreted
by one of ordinary skill in the art to determine whether the Examiner’s
construction of these terms was reasonable. “Claim construction begins, as it
must, with the words of the claims. See Bell Communications Research, Inc.
v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 619-20 (Fed. Cir. 1995).”
Vehicular Techs. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int'l, 141 F.3d 1084, 1088 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
Lundblad describes a safe having a shell. Inside the shell, is a unit, a
drum, and a destructive agent container. The drum and destructive agent
container are located within the unit. (FF 7-14).
The Examiner construes the claim term “storage” as broadly covering
a shell, such as the one depicted in Lundblad. Since the Lundblad shell acts
to confine the valuable documents and thereby cause the documents to be
stored within the space it defines, we find the Examiner’s construction of the
claim term “storage” to be reasonable. Accordingly, we agree with the
Examiner that the Lundblad shell meets the claimed storage element.
The Examiner further construes the claim term “collecting device” as
broadly covering a drum, such as the one depicted in Lundblad. Since the
claim states “a collecting device (30) comprising a drum,” the Examiner’s
construction of the claim term “collecting device” as broadly covering a
drum is consistent with the broad language the claim uses. Accordingly, we
agree with the Examiner that the Lundblad drum meets the claimed

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“collecting device” element. Because the Lundblad drum is located within a
storage (i.e., within the Lundblad shell), Lundblad necessarily also meets
the claim limitation “a collecting device (30) comprising a drum within a
storage space.”
Finally, the Examiner construes the claim term “collecting vessel” as
broadly covering an element that contains the drum, such as elements 11-17
depicted in Fig. 1 of Lundblad. Since the claim calls for “housing said drum
(30), at least partially, within a collecting vessel (50),” the Examiner’s
construction of the claim term “collecting vessel” as broadly covering an
element that contains the drum is consistent with the claim language.
Because the Lundblad elements 11-17 house the drum, Lundblad elements
11-17 meet the claimed “collecting vessel” element. Because the Lundblad
elements 11-17 also include destructive agent containers that ignite upon
activation such that the documents on the drum are destroyed, Lundblad
necessarily also meets the claim limitation that of “providing a destructive
agent container (60, 63) containing a destructive agent in fluid
communication with said collecting vessel.”
Accordingly, we find the Examiner’s construction of the claim terms
“storage,” “collecting device,” “collecting vessel,” and “destructive agent
container” was reasonable. “The question then is whether the PTO's
interpretation of the disputed claim language is “reasonable.” … We
conclude that the PTO's interpretation is reasonable in light of all the
evidence before the Board.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1055 (Fed. Cir.
1997).

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The Appellant disputes that the claimed “collecting vessel” element
broadly covers Lundblad elements 11-17. The Appellant would have us
construe instead the claimed “collecting device” element as broadly covering
Lundblad elements 11-17. According to the Appellant, the claimed
“collecting vessel” element could not be construed to broadly cover
Lundblad elements 11-17 because elements 11-17 of Lundblad are “not
collecting vessels for receiving a destructive agent in a destructive agent
container in fluid communication with the collecting vessels.” (App. Br. 10).
We disagree. For the reasons stated, we agree with the Examiner’s
reasonable construction of the claim term “collecting device” element as
broadly covering a drum and the claim term “collecting vessel” element as
broadly covering a housing that contains the drum, such as elements 11-17
of Lundblad.
The Appellant has also contended that the arrangement of the
elements set forth in claim 1 is such that there is employed “a single storage
space, a single drum, and a single collecting vessel” (Reply Br. 3) and this
distinguishes from Lundblad which describes “a single storage 101 housing
multiple drums and collecting vessels” (Reply Br. 3). This contention
assumes the claim is limited in scope to “a single storage space, a single
drum, and a single collecting vessel”. But it is not so limited. The claim uses
“comprising” language and, in the claim, each recited element is preceded
by the indefinite article “a”. The indefinite article “a” preceding an element
recited in a claim containing “comprising” language does not limit that
element to a single element. “This court has repeatedly emphasized that an

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indefinite article “a“ or “an” in patent parlance carries the meaning of
“one or more” in open-ended claims containing the transitional phrase
“comprising.” See Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Ebco Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d 973, 977 (Fed.
Cir. 1999); AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir.
1997); North Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571,
1575-76 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Robert C. Faber, Landis on Mechanics of
Patent Claim Drafting 531 (3d ed. 1990). Unless the claim is specific as to
the number of elements, the article “a” receives a singular interpretation only
in rare circumstances when the patentee evinces a clear intent to so limit the
article. See AbTox, 122 F.3d at 1023. “Under this conventional rule, the
claim limitation ‘a,’ without more, requires at least one.” KCJ Corp. v.
Kinetic Concepts Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
For the foregoing reasons, we find the Appellant has not shown error
in the rejection of claim 1. Because claims 2-9, 12, and 13 stand or fall with
claim 1, their rejection has also not been shown to be in error.

The rejection of claims 10, 11, and 14-20 under § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Lundblad.

The Appellant has not challenged the rejection of claims 10, 11, and
14-20. We presume the Appellant is resting on the arguments made in
challenging the rejection of independent claims 1 and 6. Since we did not
find those arguments persuasive as to error in their rejection, we reach the
same conclusion with respect to the rejection of claims 10, 11, and 14-20.

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CONCLUSIONS
We conclude that the Appellant has not shown that the Examiner
erred in rejecting claims 1-9, 12, and 13 under § 102(e) as being anticipated
by Lundblad and claims 10, 11, and 14-20 under § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Lundblad.

DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-20 is affirmed.

AFFIRMED
JRG

Mark P. Stone
50 Broadway
Hawthorne, NY 10532