Ex Parte Linder

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 28, 2016

13328103 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 28, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/328, 103 12/16/2011
23446 7590 09/30/2016
MCANDREWS HELD & MALLOY, LTD
500 WEST MADISON STREET
SUITE 3400
CHICAGO, IL 60661
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Jan Linder
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
24829US01 9922
EXAMINER
AGUIAR, JOHNNY B
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2447
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/30/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
mhmpto@mcandrews-ip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JAN LINDER
Appeal2015-007423
Application 13/328, 103
Technology Center 2400
Before JENNIFER L. McKEOWN, CARL L. SILVERMAN, and
JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges.
McKEOWN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
decision to reject claims 1-20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant's invention "relates to content management in
communication networks. More specifically, certain embodiments of the
invention relate to method for sharing digital content, such as digital images
among network elements in a communication network." Spec. i-f 1.
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Application 13/328,103
Claim 1 is illustrative of the claimed invention and reads as follows:
1. A method, comprising:
handling by a network administration module,
content sharing between a first communication device and
a second communication device in a communication
network, the handling comprising:
receiving, by the network administration module, a
first type of classification information related to content
emanating from the first communication device, the first
type of classification information classifying the content;
determining where the classified content emanating
from the first communication device is located;
determining whether the classification of the
content corresponds to a second type of classification
linked with the second communication device; and
making, by the network administration module, the
content available to the second communication device
based on one or more conditions, the one or more
conditions comprising the classification of the content
corresponding to the second type of classification.
THE REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 3, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18, and 19 under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Gang et al. (US 2008/0027909; pub.
Jan. 31, 2008). Final Act. 3-7. 1
The Examiner rejected claims 2, 7, 8, 14, and 16 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Gang and Strandel et al. (US 2008/0189293;
pub. Aug 7, 2008). Final Act. 7-10.
1 Throughout this opinion, we also refer to (1) the Final Action, mailed May
29, 2014 ("Final Act."); (2) the Appeal Brief filed October 20, 2014 ("App.
Br."); (3) the Examiner's Answer mailed March 27, 2015 ("Ans."); and (4)
the Reply Brief filed May 20, 2015 ("Reply Br.").
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The Examiner rejected claims 4---6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Gang and Danzeisen et al. (US 2007 /0066318; pub. Mar.
22, 2007). Final Act. 10-12.
The Examiner rejected claim 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Gang, Strandel, and Patil et al. (US 2012/0136934; filed
Nov. 8, 2011). Final Act. 12-13.
The Examiner rejected claim 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Gang and Patil. Final Act. 13.
The Examiner rejected claims 12 and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Gang and Nair et al. (US 2006/0047830; pub. Mar. 2,
2006). Final Act. 14--16.
ANALYSIS
THE ANTICIPATION REJECTION BASED ON GANG
Claims 1, 3, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18, and 19
Based on the record before us, we are not persuaded the Examiner
erred in rejecting claims 1, 3, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18, and 19 as anticipated by
Gang.
Appellant contends that Gang fails to disclose "receiving, by [a]
network administration module, a first type of classification information
related to a content emanating from the first communication device, the first
type of classification information classifying the content," as recited in
claim 1. App. Br. 8-9; Reply Br. 4--6. According to Appellant, Gang
discloses that the IM host system only receives the content itself, not a first
type of classification information related to content. App. Br. 8-9.
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The Examiner finds that Gang teaches receiving content category or
subcategory information, i.e. a first type of classification information related
to the content. Final Act. 4; Ans. 15. Gang, at paragraphs 81 and 83,
describes that a sharing user may manually enter, through the first
communication device, the category information of the content and, then,
this category information is stored by the IM host system. See, e.g., Gang i-f
81 ("The request for classification may be a request for manual classification
by the sharing user. ... "), i-f 83 ("In one implementation, content of interest
may be manually or automatically associated with a category from a
predefined list of categories by the sharing user system 305A" and "The host
system 110 may store the content accessed by the sharing user in a data
store, along with tracking information for any category or subcategory
thereafter.")(emphasis added). As such, a skilled artisan would understand
that Gang discloses the host system receiving the category information and
storing it. We are not persuaded of error in these findings.
Additionally, Appellant argues that Gang's IM host system is not a
network administration module because Gang does not disclose the IM host
system handling any sharing of content between the first and second
communication devices. App. Br. 8; Reply Br. 4. We disagree. Gang
discloses "a communications system 400 including a sharing user system
305A communicating with a recipient system 305B and an IM host system
310 through a communication link 115." Gang i-f 54; Final Act. 4. Gang
describes that "the IM host system 310 may allow users to send and receive
IMs ... [and] may support associated services" and that "[b ]y accessing the
IM host system, a sharing user can use the IM client application to ... trade
files such as pictures, invitations or documents." Gang i-fi-1 47--48. Gang's
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IM host system, thus, handles sharing of content between communication
devices. See also Final Act. 4.
Appellant next asserts that Gang does not disclose "determining
whether the classification of the content corresponds to a second type of
classification linked with the second communication device," as recited in
claim 1. App. Br. 9--10; Reply Br. 6-7. For example, Appellant maintains
that "Gang only describes, as noted even by the Examiner, selecting the
recipients of the shared content based on the content classification and/or
information relating to the recipients. Nothing in Gang describes any
matching with classification relating to the receiving devices." App. Br. 10;
see also App. Br. 10 ("The paragraphs in Gang which the Examiner cites
describe at most that Gang's sharing is based on the recipient rather than
classification information relating to electronic devices to which the content
is made available."); App. Br. 11 (presenting similar arguments with respect
to claim 19).
We find this argument unpersuasive. The Examiner points out that
Gang's "[ c ]lassified content is shared with recipients based on interest of
recipients in the classified content, sharing history of recipients based on
content classification, and/or recipients' category (e.g., family, work,
friends, etc.)." Ans. 15-16 (citing Gang, i-fi-184--87, 89--90). In other words,
Gang determines whether the content category matches or corresponds, for
example, with a recipient's interest in that category or with the recipient's
category (e.g. content photos classified as family photos will be shared with
recipient classified as family).
Gang's recipient classifications are also linked with the second
communication device. For example, Gang's recipients use a second
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communication device to receive or view any received content. Moreover,
the Examiner finds that
[ s ]ince appellant [sic] has indicated that the second type of
classification may be a contact classification and/or a user
classification and Gang teaches identifying content recipients by
matching the content classification with recipient classification,
Gang does in fact teach the claimed limitations.
Ans. 16. We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in finding that Gang
discloses this limitation.
According to Appellant, with respect to independent claim 19, since
Gang fails to disclose receiving any classification information, Gang also
fails to disclose sending such classification information. App. Br. 11; Reply
Br. 9. For the reasons discussed above, we find this argument unavailing.
Namely, Gang's sharing user manually enters the content classification and,
then, provides that information to the host system to be saved along with the
content. Ans. 16 (citing Gang i-fi-181, 83).
Similarly unpersuasive is Appellanf s argument, regarding claim 3,
that Gang's second type of classification "would constitute classification
linked to the user not the device." App. Br. 12-13; Reply Br. 11. As
discussed above, Gang's recipient would receive the recited content through
use of the second communication device. As such, the recipient
classification would at least be "linked with the second communication
device."
We also note that claim 3 broadly recites that one possible
classification is "a contact classification of an address book." This is
precisely one type of classification disclosed by Gang. Moreover, the
Examiners interpretation is consistent with the Specification's disclosure
that "different end user devices 103 may be tagged or classified. Different
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classifications are available, such as private, friends or family. Several sub-
classifications are also available, such as friendsA, friends8 and so forth."
Spec. i-f 26. As such, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in
finding that Gang discloses the recited second classification linked to the
second communication device.
With respect to claim 15, Appellant maintains that Gang lacks
"determine[ing] at least one contact classification, in at least one of an
address book of the first communication device and an address book of the
second communication device, and comparing the at least one contact
classification to the content classification." App. Br. 14. According to
Appellant, the Examiner fails to explain how Gang discloses the recited
address book and any comparing of contact classification with shared
content classification. App. Br. 14--15; Reply Br. 13-14.
We disagree. Contrary to Appellant's assertions, the Examiner
explains that "Gang on pages 7-8, [0084] - [0087], [0090] discloses
determining recipients placed in a particular category in the sharing user's
buddy list. Recipients of content are determined/selected by matching the
content classification with recipient classification." Ans. 19. In other
words, Gang discloses an address book, i.e. buddy list, that includes at least
one contact classification, i.e. recipient category, and, further, Gang
determines whether to share the content based on whether the content
classification matches the recipient classification. See, e.g., Gang i-f 90 ("For
example, recipients may be placed in a particular category (e.g., family,
work, friends) in the sharing user's buddy list, and may therefore be
interested in the particular content by reason of this grouping.").
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With respect to dependent claims 10, 11, and 18, Appellant merely
recites certain claim limitations without explaining how the Examiner erred
in finding Gang discloses these limitations. See App. Br. 13-14. We find
these blanket, unsupported assertions unpersuasive. Moreover, "[a]
statement which merely points out what a claim recites will not be
considered an argument for separate patentability of the claim." 3 7 C.F .R. §
41.37( c )(1 )(vii).
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above and by the Examiner,
we sustain the rejection of claims 1, 3, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18, and 19 as
anticipated by Gang.
THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION BASED ON GANG AND STRANDEL
Claims 2, 7, 8, 14, and 16
With respect to claims 2 and 14, Appellant contends that the
combination of Gang and Strandel fails to teach receiving "'an indication
from the first communication device that the content is available,'
particularly 'before making the content available."' App. Br. 19.
Specifically, "Strandel only describes that the user 102 uploads (using one or
both of the user devices 110 and 112) the media items 138 onto the server
132. The Appellant notes the clear distinction between uploading content
and about transmitting messages (e.g., indications) relating to the content."
App. Br. 19; see also Reply Br. 18.
We find this argument unpersuasive. Strandel describes uploading a
contact list and media items to the server before sharing the media items
with people on the contact list. See, e.g., Strandel i-f 45 ("After the users'
media items 138 are uploaded to the server, the user 102 can then share the
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media items to the people present in the contact list 134 .... "). As the
Examiner further explains,
claim 2 merely recites that the network administration module
receives an indication from the first communication device that
the content is available. Claim 2 does not clearly specify that the
indication is a message as argued by appellant. Therefore, in
Strandel, the indication from the first communication device that
the content is available is made when the sharing user uploads
media items to a server because by uploading media items that
will be shared with other users, the sharing user is indicating to
the server that content is available."
Ans. 20. In other words, the updating indicates (or is an indication received
by the server) that the content is available before the separate step of sharing
or transmitting the content with other people. As such, we agree with the
Examiner that the combination of Gang and Strandel teaches the disputed
limitation of claims 2 and 14.
With respect to dependent claims 7, 8, and 16, Appellant merely
recites certain claim limitations without explaining how the Examiner erred
in finding the combination of Gang and Strandel teaches limitations. See
App. Br. 13-14. These blanket, unsupported assertions are not persuasive.
Moreover, as noted above, "[a] statement which merely points out what a
claim recites will not be considered an argument for separate patentability of
the claim." 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(vii). We also note that the Examiner
sufficiently explains how the combination of Gang and Strandel teaches the
recited limitations. See, e.g., Ans. 21.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above and by the Examiner,
we sustain the rejection of claims 2, 7, 8, 14, and 16 as unpatentable over the
combination of Gang and Strandel.
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THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION BASED ON GANG AND DANZEISEN
Claims 4-6
With respect to claims 4---6, Appellant argues that the Examiner fails
to sufficiently support the combination of Gang and Danzeisen. In
particular,
Nothing in Gang indicates or implies that security of content
delivery is a concern or consideration when practicing the
invention disclosed thereby. Thus, a person practicing the
invention disclosed by Gang would not have any reason to
incorporate Danzeisen's teaching directed at security of content
delivery and improvement thereof other than to implement the
invention to which claim 4 is directed. In other words, the only
plausible motivation for combining Gang and Danzeisen appears
to be the need to render claim 4 unpatentable-i.e., hindsight
prejudice.
App. Br. 21-22; see also App. Br. 22-24, (presenting similar arguments for
claims 5 and 6).
We disagree. As the Examiner reasons,
It would have been obvious to a person with ordinary skill in
the art at the time the invention was made to incorporate
controlling data delivery based on a device classification to Gang
because Gang discloses controlling media sharing based on
content classification and recipient classification and Danzeisen
suggests controlling data delivery based on multiple conditions
including device classification.
One of ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to utilize
the teachings of Danzeisen in the Gang system in order to add an
additional level of security to content delivery.
Therefore, since both Gang and Danzeisen describe methods
of controlling data delivery to authorized recipients, the
combination of Gang and Danzeisen is proper and hindsight has
not been employed.
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Ans. 24. We determine that the Examiner articulates reasoning with some
rational underpinning to sufficiently support the legal conclusion of
obviousness. See KSR Int 'l. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).
Additionally, Appellant asserts that Gang and Danzeisen combined
fails to teach "determining by the network administration module, at least
one contact classification, in one or both of an address book of the first
communication device and an address book of the second communication
device, and comparing the at least one contact classification to the content
classification," as recited in claim 6. App. Br. 23-24. We disagree. As
discussed above, Gang discloses determining a contact classification in an
address book, i.e. categorized recipient listed in a buddy list of the sharing
user system, and comparing the content classification or category with the
contact classification, i.e. recipient category. See, e.g., Gang i-f 90 ("For
example, recipients may be placed in a particular category (e.g., family,
work, friends) in the sharing user's buddy list, and may therefore be
interested in the particular content by reason of this grouping."); see also
Ans. 24--25.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above and by the Examiner,
we sustain the rejection of claims 4--6 as unpatentable over the combination
of Gang and Danzeisen.
THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION BASED ON GANG AND NAIR
Claims 12 and 20
With respect to claims 12 and 20, Appellant contends that it would not
have been obvious to combine Gang and Nair. In particular, Appellant
allege that
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Nothing in Gang indicates or implies that any uploading
of content by the element (Gang's sharing system 305A) that the
Examiner equates with the Appellant's (first) communication
device depends on or is predicated on particular considerations,
including power. For example, nothing in Gang's disclosure
describes or suggests that compromising (or not) power is a
relevant consideration when undertaking or controlling content
uploads. Thus, a person practicing the invention disclosed by
Gang would not have any reason to incorporates Nair's alleged
teaching with respect to location-specific uploads into Gang's
invention embodiments. In other words, the only plausible
motivation for combining Gang and Nair appears to be the need
to render claims 12 and 20 unpatentable-i.e., hindsight prejudice.
App. Br. 26-27.
Appellant's argument is unpersuasive. As the Examiner finds, "Nair
on page 2, [0025] and Fig. 2 discloses a device automatically uploads
content to a pre-defined location based on network connection speed,
battery level, etc." Ans. 26. Further,
It would have been obvious to a person with ordinary skill
in the art at the time the invention was made to incorporate
controlling automatic data uploading based on device/network
conditions to Gang because Gang discloses a sharing user system
automatically uploading media to a host system for sharing and
Nair suggests controlling automatic data uploading based on
device/network conditions.
One of ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to
utilize the teachings of Nair in the Gang system in order to allow
a user device to upload content to a storage location without
comprom1smg power.
Therefore, since both Gang and Nair describe methods of
automatically uploading content from a user device to a
predetermined location, the combination of Gang and Nair is
proper and hindsight has not been employed.
Ans. 26-27. We agree with the Examiner's determination.
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Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 12 and 20 as
unpatentable over the combination of Gang and Nair.
THE REMAINING OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS
Claims 9 and 17
With respect to dependent claims 9 and 17, Appellant merely recites
certain claim limitations without explaining how the Examiner erred in
finding the combination of Gang, Strandel, and Patil and Gang and Patil
teaches limitations. See App. Br. 24--25. These blanket, unsupported
assertions are not persuasive. As noted above, "[a] statement which merely
points out what a claim recites will not be considered an argument for
separate patentability of the claim." 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(vii). Moreover,
we note that the Examiner sufficiently explains how the combination of
Gang and Strandel teaches the recited limitations. See, e.g., Ans. 25.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above and by the Examiner,
we sustain the rejection of claims 9 and 17 as unpatentable over the cited
combinations of prior art.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's decision to reject claims 1-20.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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