Ex Parte Limbasia et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 21, 2017

13220882 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 21, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/220,882 08/30/2011 Sunil Limbasia 20110129 2579
7590 06/23/201725537
VERIZON
PATENT MANAGEMENT GROUP
1320 North Court House Road
9th Floor
ARLINGTON, VA 22201-2909
EXAMINER
LYONS, ANDREW M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2191
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/23/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patents @ verizon.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SUNIL LIMB ASIA, ARAVIND PERUMANDLA,
JOHN CHRISTUDASS, ABHILASH PAUL,
and RAVI PENUMATSA
Appeal 2017-001400
Application 13/220,882
Technology Center 2100
Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., JEREMY J. CURCURI, and
AMBER L. HAGY, Administrative Patent Judges.
CURCURI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1—21. Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
Claims 1, 3—6, 8, 11, 13—16, 18, 20, and 21 are rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Sprigg (US 2005/0120346 Al; June 2,
2005), Matthew (US 2012/0144382 Al; June 7, 2012), Poole (US 8,453,141
Bl; May 28, 2013), Amento (US 2011/0145427 Al; June 16, 2011), Biswas
(US 8,739,298 B2; May 27, 2014), and Chamberlain (US 6,434,744 Bl;
Aug. 13, 2002). Final Act. 2—25.
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Claims 2 and 12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over
Sprigg, Matthew, Poole, Amento, Biswas, Chamberlain, and Apple (Apple,
Inc., Dashboard Widgets, App Update, August 10, 2009, last retrieved from
http:// www. apple .com/ downloads/dashboardlstatus/appupdate .html on July
17,2013). Final Act. 25-26.1
Claims 7 and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over
Sprigg, Matthew, Poole, Amento, Biswas, Chamberlain, and Inoue (US
2011/0191770 Al; Aug. 4, 2011). Final Act. 26-27.2
Claims 9 and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over
Sprigg, Matthew, Poole, Amento, Biswas, Chamberlain, and Perera (Perera,
Gilberto J., “How to Pause App Installs on the iPhone,” originally posted
March 24, 2011, last retrieved from http://www.gilsmethod.com/how-to-
pause-app-installs-on-the-iphone on September 26, 2014). Final Act. 27—
29.3
Claim 10 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Sprigg,
Matthew, Poole, Amento, Biswas, Chamberlain, and Fox (Fox et al., “Apple
TV Now Shipping,” March 21, 2007). Final Act. 29-30.4
We affirm.
1 The formal statement of rejection omits Biswas and Chamberlain,
this error as harmless.
2 The formal statement of rejection omits Biswas and Chamberlain,
this error as harmless.
3 The formal statement of rejection omits Biswas and Chamberlain,
this error as harmless.
4 The formal statement of rejection omits Biswas and Chamberlain,
this error as harmless.
We treat
We treat
We treat
We treat
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ invention relates to “upgrading] a media manager
application in a manner that is expeditious and that requires a minimal
amount of user interaction.” Spec. ]fl 0. Claim 1 is illustrative and
reproduced below:
1. A method, comprising:
executing, by a device, a media manager application
comprising a software application for managing media content
stored by the device;
performing, by the device, a background download
operation of downloading a media manager application upgrade
independent from executing the media manager application;
caching, by the device, the media manager application
upgrade as temporary data;
notifying, by the device and at a first point in time which
is after caching the media manager application upgrade, a user
of the device that the cached media manager application
upgrade is ready for installation;
receiving, by the device and at a second point in time
which is after notifying the user of the device that the media
manager application upgrade is ready for installation, an install
command, corresponding to the cached media manager
application upgrade, from the user;
determining, by the device, that the cached media
manager application upgrade is a most recent media manager
application upgrade that is available after receiving the install
command from the user and before installing the cached media
manager application upgrade; and
installing, by the device and based on determining that
the cached media manager application upgrade is the most
recent media manager application upgrade, the cached media
manager application upgrade without the user agreeing to an
end-user license agreement for installing the cached media
manager application upgrade.
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PRINCIPLES OF LAW
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellants, and in light of the arguments and evidence
produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010)
(precedential).
The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a
secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the
structure of the primary reference; nor is it that the claimed
invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the
references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of
the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill
in the art.
In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981).
In considering the disclosure of a reference, “it is proper to take into
account not only specific teachings of the reference but also the inferences
which one skilled in the art would reasonably be expected to draw
therefrom.” In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826 (CCPA 1968).
ANALYSIS
The Obviousness Rejection of Claims 1,3-6, 8,11,13-16,18,20, and 21
over Sprigg, Matthew, Poole, Amento, Biswas, and Chamberlain
Claims 1, 4, 5, and 8
The Examiner finds Sprigg, Matthew, Poole, Amento, Biswas, and
Chamberlain teach all limitations of claim 1. Final Act. 3—11.
In particular, the Examiner finds Poole teaches (claim 1)
“determining, by the device, that the cached media manager application
upgrade is a most recent media manager application upgrade that is available
after receiving the install command from the user and before installing the
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cached media manager application upgrade.” Final Act. 5—7. The Examiner
reasons it would have been obvious to modify Sprigg and Matthew in view
of Poole because:
it was known to those of ordinary skill in the pertinent art to
improve a software updating method by providing a means to
determine whether file[s] to be installed are the most recent
versions of the files prior to performing the update for the
purpose of ensuring that the installation is completed with the
most recent available set of installation files.
Final Act. 8.
In particular, the Examiner further finds Poole teaches (claim 1)
“installing, by the device and based on determining that the cached media
manager application upgrade is the most recent media manager application
upgrade, the cached media manager application upgrade.” Final Act. 5—7.
In particular, the Examiner finds Biswas teaches (claim 1) “without the user
agreeing to an end-user license agreement for installing the cached media
manager application upgrade.” Final Act. 9.
Appellants present the following principal arguments:
i. Poole does not teach (claim 1) “determining, by the device, that
the cached media manager application upgrade is a most recent media
manager application upgrade that is available after receiving the install
command from the user and before installing the cached media manager
application upgrade” because, in particular, Poole does not receive an install
command. See App. Br. 9—13.
It is possible that the “installer and/or setup logic” begins
performing operations automatically or before receiving any
command. Second, even assuming “that, for the installer and/or
setup logic to begin performing operations, a command to begin
doing so must be received . . . after which it performs
installation-related tasks” is correct, merely performing
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“installation-related tasks” after receiving a command does not
disclose or suggest determining “that the media manager
application upgrade is a most recent media manager application
upgrade that is available after receiving the install command,”
as recited in claim 1 (emphasis added).
App. Br. 13; see also Reply Br. 2—5.
ii. Biswas does not teach (claim 1) “installing . . . without the user
agreeing to an end-user license agreement for installing the cached media
manager application upgrade.” See App. Br. 13—15; see also Reply Br 5—6.
We do not see any error in the contested findings and reasons of the
Examiner. We concur with the Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness.
Regarding argument (i), in the Response to Argument section of the
Examiner’s Answer, the Examiner explains
Support for [the Examiner’s] position is found in the Matthew
reference (also cited in support of the rejection of claim 1),
wherein a complete download of an update is performed, after
which the user is notified of an available update, in response to
which the user may indicate that the update should be installed,
initiating the installation process.
Ans. 33 (citing Matthew ^fl[ 19-28). We adopt this explanation as our own.
Matthew (126) discloses: “processing logic checks if the user
approves installation of all available updates (processing block 126). If so,
then processing logic commits all updates (processing block 128).” Poole
(Abstract) discloses: “The client obtains an installation package of files to be
used to install the software product and for each file, determines if there is a
later file version available.” On the record before us, we find the combined
disclosures of the references teach (claim 1) “determining, by the device,
that the cached media manager application upgrade is a most recent media
manager application upgrade that is available after receiving the install
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command from the user and before installing the cached media manager
application upgrade.” See Keller, 642 F.2d at 425. Further, the Examiner
has articulated a reason for combining the references supported by evidence
drawn from the record (see Final Act 8; see also Poole col. 2,11. 11—18 (later
versions of files are available)) that is rational on its face. Appellants have
not presented any particularized explanation as to why the articulated reason
for combining the references is in error. Thus, Appellants’ argument (i)
does not show any Examiner error.
Regarding argument (ii), Biswas (col. 6,11. 1—11) discloses:
When an auxiliary software application or component 44
is initially installed on a computer system 40, the auxiliary
software application’s configuration file 52 is analyzed, and the
auxiliary software application’s license dependency rule 54 is
written to a product configuration database 48. When the
auxiliary software application is executed for the first time, or
in the case of a plug-in or add-on module, invoked from a
primary software application for the first time, the local license
manager module 46 is invoked to perform a local license
verification operation for the auxiliary software application.
Although Biswas does not specifically state that installation is
performed without the user agreeing to an end-user license agreement, one
skilled in the art would have inferred that Biswas’s performing a local
license verification when an application is first executed suggests that the
user agreeing to an end-user license agreement is something that occurs
separately from the installation. Put another way, one skilled in that art
would recognize that Biswas suggests that installation may be performed
without the user agreeing to an end-user license agreement. See Preda, 401
F.2d at 826. Thus, Appellants’ argument (ii) does not show any Examiner
error.
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We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, as well as
claims 4, 5, and 8, which are not separately argued with particularity.
Claim 3
The Examiner finds Sprigg teaches the further recited subject matter
of claim 3. Final Act. 11 (citing Sprigg || 38, 51); see also Ans. 35—36.
Appellants present the following principal argument:
Lines 1-4 of paragraph 0051 of SPRIGG disclose[] that
“if, in step 602, the check determines that the application is
executing, then the process continues, in step 606, where the
upgraded application is stored in a temporary location.” Storing
the upgraded application “in a temporary location” does not
disclose or suggest “storing the at least one software file in a
temporary directory of the operating system of the device,” as
recited in claim 3 (emphasis added). In fact, SPRIGG does not
even mention “the operating system,” let alone “a temporary
directory of the operating system,” as recited in claim 3. Thus,
lines 1-4 of paragraph 0051 of SPRIGG [do] not disclose or
suggest “storing the at least one software file in a temporary
directory of the operating system of the device,” as recited in
claim 3.
App. Br. 16; see also Reply Br. 7.
We do not see any error in the contested findings and reasons of the
Examiner. We concur with the Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness.
Sprigg (| 38) discloses: “With reference to FIG. 3, there is shown an
illustrative file structure, or data management structure, held in the API 54.
The top-level domain is ‘Files’ 60 that contains all of the discrete software
files on the computer platform 50.” See also Sprigg Fig. 2 (API 54 between
memory 56 and ASIC 52).
Sprigg (| 51) discloses: “the upgraded application is stored in a
temporary location. This temporary location may be on the device.”
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Thus, contrary to Appellants’ argument, Sprigg teaches (claim 3)
“storing the at least one software file” (Sprigg’s upgraded application) “in a
temporary directory of the operating system” (Sprigg’s API 54) “of the
device.” Because Sprigg’s API 54 controls access to ASIC 52 (hardware),
one skilled in that art would recognize that API 54 holding a file structure
suggests a temporary directory of an operating system. See Preda, 401 F.2d
at 826. In reaching our decision, we emphasize that the plain meaning of
“operating system” in the computer context is “[t]he software that controls
the allocation and usage of hardware resources such as memory, central
processing unit (CPU) time, disk space, and peripheral devices.”
MICROSOFT COMPUTER DICTIONARY 378 (5th ed. 2002).
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 3.
Claim 6
The Examiner finds Sprigg teaches the further recited subject matter
of claim 6. Final Act. 15—16 (citing Sprigg || 38, 52, 54); see also Ans. 36—
37.
Appellants present the following principal argument:
Lines 12-17 of paragraph 0038 of SPRIGG disclose[]
that the “BREW 62 files include application files 64, and one
file is game of chess 66 that has been downloaded from the
application download server 16 and is now resident on the local
database 58 of the computer platform 50 of the wireless device.
For purposes of illustration, the chess 66 application is a
resident software application of the wireless device.” That the
“BREW 62 files include application files 64, and one file is
game of chess 66 ... is now resident on the local database 58 of
the computer platform 50 of the wireless device” does not
disclose or suggest “the media manager application comprises
data stored in an execution directory of an operating system of
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the device,” as recited in claim 6 (emphasis added). In fact, as
recited above, SPRIGG does not even mention “the operating
system,” let alone “an execution directory of an operating
system,” as recited in claim 6. Thus, lines 12-17 of paragraph
0038 of SPRIGG do[] not disclose or suggest that “the media
manager application comprises data stored in an execution
directory of an operating system of the device,” as recited in
claim 6.
App. Br. 17; see also Reply Br. 7—8.
We do not see any error in the contested findings and reasons of the
Examiner. We concur with the Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness.
Contrary to Appellants’ argument, Sprigg teaches (claim 6) “the
media manager application comprises data stored in an execution directory
of an operating system of the device.” Because Sprigg’s API 54 controls
access to ASIC 52 (hardware), one skilled in that art would recognize that
API 54 holding a file structure suggests an execution directory of an
operating system. See Preda, 401 F.2d at 826.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 6.
Claims 11, 13, 15, 16, and 18
The Examiner finds Sprigg, Matthew, Poole, Amento, Biswas, and
Chamberlain teach all limitations of claim 11. Final Act. 16.
Appellants present the following principal arguments:
i. “[T]he Examiner does not address the feature of a processor to
‘execute a media manager application comprising a software program for
streaming media content from the user device to a set-top-box (STB),’ as
recited in claim 11 (emphasis added), which is not included in independent
claim 1.” App. Br. 18; see also Reply Br. 8—10.
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ii. The references do not teach “a processor to ‘determine that the
media manager application upgrade is a most recent media manager
application upgrade that is available after receiving the install command
from the user and before installing the media manager application upgrade, ’
as recited in claim 11.” App. Br. 18.
iii. Chamberlain does not teach (claim 11) “install. . . the media
manager application upgrade without requiring any input that includes a
location for installing the cached media manager application upgrade.” See
App. Br. 18—19; see also Reply Br. 10-11.
We do not see any error in the contested findings and reasons of the
Examiner. We concur with the Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness.
Regarding argument (i), in the Response to Argument section of the
Examiner’s Answer, the Examiner explains:
With respect to the first argument, Examiner cited to
Amento, in particular the Abstract and 1 46, to disclose the
media manager application with respect to claim 1. Further
discussion and clarification regarding the content of these cited
portions can be found at, e.g., 1 13 of Amento, wherein it is
disclosed that “endpoint devices 102-107 may comprise
customer end point devices, such as personal computers, laptop
computers, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), mobile phones,
smart phones, and the like.” Further, exemplary || 17, 20
provide that “The Media Server (MS) 125 is a server that
typically handles and terminates media streams to provide
services ... As discussed above, broadcast television operators
typically send video content to be viewed by end users on
several channels. . Given the foregoing, Examiner submits
that the media manager application disclosed in Amento and
cited as disclosing the feature of claim 1 (and therefore
incorporated into the rejection of claim 11) can be used for
streaming media content from the user device to one or more
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consumer end point devices, of which a set-top-box (STB) is
exemplary [].
Ans. 38—39. We adopt this explanation as our own. On the record before
us, we find Amento, in combination with the other cited references, teaches
“execute a media manager application comprising a software program for
streaming media content from the user device to a set-top-box (STB).” See
Final Act. 8, Ans. 38—39; see also Final Act. 3 (finding Sprigg teaches an
application on a wireless device). Thus, Appellants’ argument (i) does not
show any Examiner error.
Regarding argument (ii), argument (ii) does not show any Examiner
error for reasons discussed above when addressing claim 1.
Regarding argument (iii), the Examiner finds Chamberlain teaches
(claim 11) “install... the media manager application upgrade without
requiring any input that includes a location for installing the cached media
manager application upgrade.” See Final Act. 10 (citing Chamberlain col. 8,
1. 14—col. 10,1. 27). According to the Examiner, Chamberlain “makes no
indication that user input regarding installation location is required; instead,
it discusses application of patch operations to files already installed without
requiring user input regarding location.” Final Act. 10; see also Ans. 39-40.
Chamberlain (col. 12,11. 50-59 (emphasis added)) discloses:
At step 804, if desired, the installer program 201 may
prompt the user for installation configuration information, such
as a desired installation folder or whether to install particular
features of the application. The options presented by the prompt
are defined within the modified installation file 701 and may be
the same as in the original installation file 233; or may have
been added by the patch. Alternatively, the installer program-
201 may be configured to avoid prompting the user for input,
and simply apply the patch without user intervention.
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We agree with and adopt the Examiner’s finding based on Chamberlain as
our own. That is, Chamberlain’s applying the patch without user
intervention teaches the argued limitations. Thus, Appellants’ argument (iii)
does not show any Examiner error.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 11, as well as
claims 13, 15, 16, and 18, which are not separately argued with particularity.
See App. Br. 20 (arguing claim 13 is patentable for the reasons given for
claims 3 and 11), App. Br. 21 (arguing claim 15 is patentable for the reasons
given for claims 5 and 11), and App. Br. 21—22 (arguing claim 16 is
patentable for the reasons given for claims 6 and 11).
Claim 14
The Examiner finds Sprigg, Matthew, Poole, Amento, Biswas, and
Chamberlain teach all limitations of claim 14. Final Act. 16.
Appellants present the following principal argument:
[T]he Examiner does not address the features of a processor to
“identify a version associated with the media manager
application upgrade” and “communicate, based on the version,
with an upgrade server to determine that another media
manager application upgrade is available that is more recent
than the media manager application upgrade,” as recited in
claim 14 (emphasis added), which are not included in claims 3-
6.
App. Br. 21; see also Reply Br. 11—12.
We do not see any error in the contested findings and reasons of the
Examiner. We concur with the Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness.
In the Response to Argument section of the Examiner’s Answer, the
Examiner explains:
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Step 610 of Fig. 6 [of Poole] discloses “[cjreate inventory of all
files in the install medium, including names, versions, and/or
time/date stamps.” Further, step 620 discloses “[s]end inventory
to server.” In view of this citation, Examiner submits Poole
teaches or suggests that a version is identified, and
communication with the server is based on the file inventory,
including version information. The application update method
disclosed in Poole and cited as disclosing the feature of claim 4
(and therefore incorporated into the rejection of claim 11)
further shows that versions of the files representing the
application update are communicated to the server as required
by the language of claim 14.
Ans. 41 42. We adopt this explanation as our own. On the record before
us, we find Poole teaches the argued limitation. See Final Act. 16, Ans. 41—
42; see also Final Act. 11—13 (finding Poole teaches determining a more
recent upgrade is available). Thus, Appellants’ argument does not show any
Examiner error.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 14.
Claim 20
The Examiner finds Sprigg, Matthew, Poole, Amento, Biswas, and
Chamberlain teach all limitations of claim 20. Final Act. 17—24; see also
Ans. 44-45.
Appellants present the following principal arguments:
i.
[L]ines 12-17 of paragraph 0038 of SPRIGG disclose[] that the
“BREW 62 files include application files 64, and one file is
game of chess 66 that has been downloaded from the
application download server 16 and is now resident on the local
database 58 of the computer platform 50 of the wireless device.
For purposes of illustration, the chess 66 application is a
resident software application of the wireless device.” That the
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“BREW 62 files include application files 64, and one file is
game of chess 66 ... is now resident on the local database 58 of
the computer platform 50 of the wireless device” does not
disclose or suggest “a first version of the first media manager
application being stored as first data files in an execution
directory of an operating system of the device,” as recited in
claim 20 (emphasis added). In fact, as recited above, SPRIGG
does not even mention “the operating system,” let alone “an
execution directory of an operating system,” as recited in claim
20. Thus, lines 12-17 of paragraph 0038 of SPRIGG do[] not
disclose or suggest “a first version of the first media manager
application being stored as first data files in an execution
directory of an operating system of the device,” as recited in
claim 20.
App. Br. 22—23; see also Reply Br. 13—14.
ii.
[LJines 1-4 of paragraph 0051 of SPRIGG disclose[] that “if, in
step 602, the check determines that the application is executing,
then the process continues, in step 606, where the upgraded
application is stored in a temporary location.” Storing the
upgraded application “in a temporary location” does not
disclose or suggest caching “the second media manager
application as second data files in a temporary directory of the
operating system,” as recited in claim 20 (emphasis added). In
fact, SPRIGG does not even mention “the operating system,”
let alone “a temporary directory of the operating system,” as
recited in claim 20. Thus, lines 1-4 of paragraph 0051 of
SPRIGG do not disclose or suggest at least one processor to
“cache the second media manager application as second data
files in a temporary directory of the operating system,” as
recited in claim 20.
App. Br. 23; see also Reply Br. 14.
We do not see any error in the contested findings and reasons of the
Examiner. We concur with the Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness.
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Contrary to argument (i), Sprigg teaches (claim 20) “a first version of
the first media manager application being stored as first data files in an
execution directory of an operating system of the device.” Because Sprigg’s
API 54 controls access to ASIC 52 (hardware), one skilled in that art would
recognize that API 54 holding a file structure suggests an execution
directory of an operating system. See Preda, 401 F.2d at 826.
Contrary to argument (ii), Sprigg teaches (claim 20) “cache the
second media manager application as second data files in a temporary
directory of the operating system.” Because Sprigg’s API 54 controls access
to ASIC 52 (hardware), one skilled in that art would recognize that API 54
holding a file structure suggests a temporary directory of an operating
system. See Preda, 401 F.2d at 826.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 20.
Claim 21
Claim 21, in pertinent part, recites “replace at least one of the first
data files, associated with the first media manager application, with at least
one of the second data files associated with the second media manager
application.” The Examiner finds Poole teaches the further recited subject
matter of claim 21. Final Act. 25 (citing Poole col. 4,11. 18—46).
Appellants present the following principal argument:
This section of POOLE [(Poole col. 4,11. 18-46)] discloses that
“[s]nce links 361-367 have been created in temporary folder
360, setup logic 305 may execute installation of the associated
software product, following the links to the more recent file
versions to be used for installation.” “[FJollowing the links to
the more recent file versions to be used for installation” does
not disclose or suggest replacing “at least one of the first data
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files, associated with the first media manager application, with
at least one of the second data files associated with the second
media manager application,” as recited in claim 21 (emphasis
added). Thus, col. 4, lines 18-46, of POOLE does not disclose
or suggest at least one processor to “replace at least one of the
first data files, associated with the first media manager
application, with at least one of the second data files associated
with the second media manager application,” as recited in claim
21.
App. Br. 25—26; see also Reply Br. 15.
We do not see any error in the contested findings and reasons of the
Examiner. We concur with the Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness.
In the Response to Argument section of the Examiner’s Answer, the
Examiner explains:
Poole, in the portions cited, shows that first versions of
files may be replaced with second versions of files if the second
versions are newer than the first versions, wherein the newest
set of files is used to update or patch the application (Figs. 2-4,
col. 4, 11. 18-46; see also, more generally, col. 3, 1. 20 - col. 6,
1. 12, describing installation of the newest files). Furthermore,
other references cited in the combination provide teachings or
suggestions supporting the rejection. For example, Sprigg
discloses that “the application may be upgraded with the newly
requested application by overwriting the existing application
with the newly requested application in the file location where
the existing (i.e., previous or different) application is located on
the device” (Sprigg, | 50). Accordingly, the combination of
references teaches or suggests “replace at least one of the first
data file, associated with the first media manager application,
with at least one of the second data files associated with the
second media manager application” as recited in claim 21, and
Examiner submits that the rejection of claim 21 should be
affirmed.
Ans. 46. We adopt this explanation as our own.
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Appeal 2017-001400
Application 13/220,882
Sprigg (| 50) discloses an application upgrade where the existing
application is overwritten with the new application. Poole (col. 4,11. 18-46)
discloses installation using the most recent versions of files. Taken together,
these teachings in the prior art suggest, to one of ordinary skill, upgrading an
application, and during the upgrading, using the most recent versions of
files. On the record before us, we find the combined teachings of the
references teach (claim 21) “replace at least one of the first data files,
associated with the first media manager application, with at least one of the
second data files associated with the second media manager application.”
See Keller, 642 F.2d at 425.
Further, the Examiner has articulated a reason for combining the
references supported by evidence drawn from the record (see Final Act 21—
22; see also Poole col. 4,1. 47—col. 5,1. 39, col. 6,11. 13—41 (describing
software installation mechanism using latest versions of files)) that is
rational on its face. Appellants have not presented any particularized
explanation as to why the articulated reason for combining the references is
in error. Thus, Appellants’ argument does not show any Examiner error.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 21.
The Obviousness Rejection of Claims 2 and 12 over Sprigg, Matthew,
Poole, Amento, Biswas, Chamberlain, and Apple
The Examiner finds Sprigg, Matthew, Poole, Amento, Biswas,
Chamberlain, and Apple teach all limitations of claims 2 and 12. Final Act.
25—26; see also Ans. 47.
Appellants argue claims 2 and 12 are patentable for the same reasons
as claims 1 and 11. App. Br. 26.
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Appeal 2017-001400
Application 13/220,882
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2 and 12 for
the same reasons discussed above when addressing claims 1 and 11.
The Obviousness Rejection of Claims 7 and 17 over Sprigg, Matthew,
Poole, Amento, Biswas, Chamberlain, and Inoue
The Examiner finds Sprigg, Matthew, Poole, Amento, Biswas,
Chamberlain, and Inoue teach all limitations of claims 7 and 17. Final Act.
26—27 (citing Inoue 125); see also Ans. 48-49 (citing Inoue 25, 198—203,
256-264).
Appellants present the following principal argument:
i. Claims 7 and 17 are patentable for the same reasons as claims 1
and 11. App Br. 27.
ii. “[T]he Examiner does not address the features of a processor to
‘decompress the compressed data file prior to the transfer of the media
manager application upgrade to the execution directory,’ as recited in claim
17 (emphasis added), which are not included in claim 7.” App. Br. 27; see
also Reply Br. 16—17.
We do not see any error in the contested findings and reasons of the
Examiner. We concur with the Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness.
Regarding argument (i), this argument does not show any error for the
same reasons discussed above when addressing claims 1 and 11.
Regarding argument (ii), this argument also does not show any error.
Claim 17 recites, in pertinent part, “decompress the compressed data file
prior to the transfer of the media manager application upgrade to the
execution directory.”
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Appeal 2017-001400
Application 13/220,882
Inoue (125) discloses:
The download section may download an executable file
(EXE file) that contains a compressed file and an
(uncompressed) self-extracting program that self-extracts the
compressed file. The extraction section may execute the self-
extracting program as the process of extracting the compressed
file. The compressed file is automatically extracted by
executing the self-extracting program.
Thus, Inoue teaches (claim 17) “decompress the compressed data
file.”
For reasons discussed above when addressing claim 6, because
Sprigg’s API 54 controls access to ASIC 52 (hardware), one skilled in that
art would recognize that API 54 holding a file structure suggests (claim 17)
“the transfer of the media manager application upgrade to the execution
directory.” See Preda, 401 F.2d at 826; see also Final Act. 15—16 (rejection
of claim 6, which we sustained).
On the record before us, we find the combined teachings of the
references teach (claim 17) “decompress the compressed data file prior to
the transfer of the media manager application upgrade to the execution
directory.” See Keller, 642 F.2d at 425. Further, the Examiner has
articulated a reason for combining the references supported by evidence
drawn from the record (see Final Act 27; see also Inoue (125)) that is
rational on its face. Appellants have not presented any particularized
explanation as to why the articulated reason for combining the references is
in error.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 7 and 17.
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Appeal 2017-001400
Application 13/220,882
The Obviousness Rejection of Claims 9 and 19 over Sprigg, Matthew,
Poole, Amento, Biswas, Chamberlain, and Perera
The Examiner finds Sprigg, Matthew, Poole, Amento, Biswas,
Chamberlain, and Perera teach all limitations of claim 9 and 19. Final Act.
27—29; see also Ans. 49.
Appellants argue claims 9 and 19 are patentable for the same reasons
as claims 1 and 11. App. Br. 27—28.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 9 and 19 for
the same reasons discussed above when addressing claims 1 and 11.
The Obviousness Rejection of Claim 10 over Sprigg, Matthew, Poole,
Amento, Biswas, Chamberlain, and Fox
The Examiner finds Sprigg, Matthew, Poole, Amento, Biswas,
Chamberlain, and Fox teach all limitations of claim 10. Final Act. 29—30.
Appellants argue claim 10 is patentable for the same reasons as claim
1. App. Br. 28.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 10 for the
same reasons discussed above when addressing claims 1.
DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—21 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1).
AFFIRMED
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