Ex Parte LI et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardApr 14, 201511777342 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 14, 2015) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/777,342 07/13/2007 Zhong Jie Li YOR920070227US1 8400 48062 7590 04/14/2015 RYAN, MASON & LEWIS, LLP 1175 Post Road East 2nd Floor Westport, CT 06880 EXAMINER CHEN, QING ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2191 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 04/14/2015 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte ZHONG JIE LI, HE HUI LIU, NAOMI M. MITSUMORI, KRISHNA RATAKONDA, HUA FANG TAN, and JUN ZHU ____________________ Appeal 2012-002508 Application 11/777,342 Technology Center 2100 ____________________ Before DANIEL N. FISHMAN, JOHN F. HORVATH, and DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, Administrative Patent Judges. HORVATH, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–8 and 10–35. Claim 9 has been canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. Appeal 2012-002508 Application 11/777,342 SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION The invention is directed to a method for analyzing test coverage of distributed processes. Abstract. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method for analyzing test coverage of distributed processes, said method comprising the steps of: identifying at least one of said processes that is invoked by a test case by processing said test case; mapping at least a portion of said test case to a plurality of specific test paths in said at least one of said processes; and identifying given ones of said test paths as possibly relevant test paths in said at least one of said processes, if said given ones of said test paths are not infeasible, wherein one or more steps of said method are performed by a hardware device. REFERENCES Ur Nehab Quick US 2003/0110474 A1 US 2004/0103396 A1 US 2005/0028146 A1 June 12, 2003 May 27, 2004 Feb. 3, 2005 REJECTIONS Claims 1–3, 5–8, 10–30, and 32–35 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Nehab and Quick. Ans. 5–17. Claims 4 and 31 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Nehab, Quick, and Ur. Ans. 17–18. 2 Appeal 2012-002508 Application 11/777,342 ISSUES AND ANALYSIS I. Whether Nehab teaches or suggests identifying a distributed process by processing a test case developed to test that distributed process as recited in claim 1. The Examiner finds Nehab teaches or suggests identifying a process invoked by processing a test case by disclosing processing test cases defined by paths through a test tree generated from a business process. Ans. 5 (citing Nehab ¶¶ 75, 77). In particular, the Examiner finds that because the test cases are generated from the test tree, they identify the business process associated with the test tree. Id. at 20. Appellants argue Nehab has no need to identify the business processes invoked by Nehab’s test cases because the cases are derived from known business processes. App. Br. 6–7. Appellants further argue that although Nehab’s test trees are associated with business processes, Nehab fails to teach or suggest using the test trees to identify those business processes. Reply Br. 2–3. We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments. The PTO construes claim terms to have their broadest reasonable meaning in view of the Specification. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Because the Specification does not define “identifying” a process by processing a test case, the broadest reasonable meaning of that term is its plain and ordinary meaning to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of Appellants invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Examiner finds this meaning includes identifying business processes by processing test cases that have been derived from a test tree because “each 3 Appeal 2012-002508 Application 11/777,342 node of the test tree represents a test case for a business process or subprocess.” Ans. 20. Appellants have not persuasively identified any error in this finding. Consequently, we adopt it as our own, and sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 for this reason. II. Whether Nehab teaches or suggests a method for analyzing static test-case coverage of processes that choreograph distributed web- based software modules as recited in claim 6. The Examiner finds Nehab teaches or suggests analyzing static test- case coverage of processes that choreograph distributed web-based software modules by disclosing iteratively generating test cases to ensure coverage of specific test case scenarios of business processes that have been automated through the provision of web-based services. Ans. 7, 22 (citing Nehab ¶¶ 23, 62). Appellants initially contend, without explanation, that Nehab fails to teach or suggest “test coverage [that] comprises static test-case coverage,” or “distributed processes [that] choreograph distributed web-based software modules.” App. Br. 8. Appellants subsequently contend Nehab fails to teach or suggest static test-case coverage because “static test cases are test cases designed to test while a process is not executing.” Reply Br. 3 (citing, Software testing, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Software_testing). We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments. Once the Examiner has established a prima facie case of obviousness, “the burden of coming forward with [rebuttal] evidence or argument shifts to the applicant.” In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The 4 Appeal 2012-002508 Application 11/777,342 only argument Appellants advance to rebut the Examiner’s rejection of claim 6 is that the Examiner’s interpretation of “static test-case coverage” is inconsistent with its well-known meaning as evidenced by the Wikipedia article. Reply Br. 3. However, like the Specification, the Wikipedia article fails to define the term “static test case” or “static test case coverage,” and therefore, fails to establish the well-known meaning of either term to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Consequently, Appellants have not persuasively rebutted the Examiner’s finding that Nehab teaches or suggests the limitations recited in claim 6. We therefore sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 6 for at least this reason.1 1 Should further prosecution occur in this case, the Examiner should consider whether claim 6 patentably differentiates over claim 1, or merely recites a statement of intended use—i.e., to use the method of claim 1 to analyze a particular type of test coverage (“static test coverage”) and a particular type of distributed processes (“processes [that] choreograph distributed web-based software modules”). See Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding statements of intended use “usually will not limit the scope of the claim because such statements usually do no more than define a context in which the invention operates.”). 5 Appeal 2012-002508 Application 11/777,342 III. Whether the Examiner has equated “actual test results” with a “list of associated processes,” and whether Nehab teaches or suggests a list of associated processes for verifying desirable outcomes of test cases as recited in claim 12. The Examiner finds Nehab teaches or suggests a test plan comprising a list of desirable outcomes and a list of associated processes for verifying said desirable outcomes by disclosing a test planner for generating plural abstract tests, the expected results of those tests, and a verifier for comparing the expected results with the actual results of software under test (SUT). Ans. 9, 23 (citing Nehab ¶¶ 86–87). Appellants argue the Examiner erred by equating Nehab’s disclosure of either “actual test results” or “expected test results” with the recited “list of associated processes,” and that Nehab “does not disclose or suggest a list of associated processes for verifying said desirable outcomes.” App. Br. 8–9; Reply Br. 3–4. We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments. In particular, we disagree with Appellants’ characterization of the Examiner’s findings as equating expected or actual test results with a list of associated processes. Instead, the Examiner’s finding shows how Nehab teaches or suggests forming a test plan that includes multiple abstract tests (actionable test cases), expected results for each of those test cases (a list of desirable outcomes) and actual results for each of those test cases obtained by executing software under test (a list of associated processes for verifying the desirable outcomes). See Ans. 9, 23. Consequently, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 12. 6 Appeal 2012-002508 Application 11/777,342 IV. Whether Nehab teaches or suggests testing distributed processes that include a conceptual construct describing choreography of a service to complete a task using test cases that invoke executable realizations of the conceptual construct as recited in claim 16. The Examiner finds a person of ordinary skill in the art would interpret Nehab’s rules for business processes as conceptual constructs. Ans. 24–25 (citing Nehab ¶¶ 61, 63). The Examiner further finds a person of ordinary skill in the art would interpret Nehab’s execution of test cases that model those rules as invoking executable realizations of the conceptual constructs. Id. Appellants argue these disclosures “do[] not disclose or suggest that constructs are conceptual, and do[] not disclose or suggest that test cases define invocation of executable realizations of the conceptual constructs.” App. Br. 9–10. Appellants further argue the Examiner’s findings that a person of ordinary skill in the art would interpret Nehab’s business process rules as conceptual constructs are “suppositions that are not supported by the citations of Nehab.” Reply Br. 4. We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments, which amount to little more than attorney argument—presented without explanation or evidence—that the portions of Nehab cited by the Examiner do not teach what the Examiner finds they teach. Because “Attorney’s argument in a brief cannot take the place of evidence,” In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974), we are not persuaded of Examiner error, and sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 16 for this reason. 7 Appeal 2012-002508 Application 11/777,342 V. Whether Nehab teaches or suggests identifying test paths that are limited to test paths that can be traced back to enterprise requirements as recited in claim 19. The Examiner finds Nehab discloses analyzing business model language (“BML”) graphs to determine states, transitions, and priorities, and using graph analysis algorithms to calculate paths through these BML graphs using priorities and other input attributes. Ans. 11 (citing Nehab ¶ 73). The Examiner further finds a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand these disclosures teach or suggest identifying test paths that can be traced back to enterprise requirements. Ans. 11, 26. Appellants acknowledge these disclosures, but argue they do not teach or suggest test paths that are limited to those that can be traced back to enterprise requirements. App. Br. 10; Reply Br. 5. We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments, which amount to little more than attorney argument—presented without explanation or evidence—that the portions of Nehab cited by the Examiner do not teach what the Examiner finds they teach. Because we do not find these arguments persuasive of Examiner error, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 19 for this reason. See In re Pearson, 494 F.2d at 1405 (“Attorney’s argument in a brief cannot take the place of evidence.”). 8 Appeal 2012-002508 Application 11/777,342 VI. Whether Nehab teaches or suggests identifying test paths that facilitate test coverage of all feasible combinations of decision points and branches specified in a Business Process Execution Language as recited in claim 21. The Examiner finds Nehab’s disclosures of defining a business process via a Business Process Execution Language (BPEL), generating a test tree for the process such that test cases are defined by paths through the test tree, and pruning the test tree, teaches or suggests identifying test paths that facilitate test coverage of all feasible combinations of decision points and branches as recited in claim 21. Ans. 12 (citing Nehab ¶¶ 40, 78). Appellants acknowledge these disclosures, but argue they do not teach or suggest identifying test paths that facilitate test coverage of all feasible combinations of decision points and branches. App. Br. 10–11; Reply Br. 5–6. We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments. First, because Appellants’ arguments amount to little more than attorney argument that the portions of Nehab cited by the Examiner do not teach what the Examiner finds they teach, we find them unpersuasive of Examiner error and sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 21 for this reason. See In re Pearson, 494 F.2d at 1405 (“Attorney’s argument in a brief cannot take the place of evidence.”). Second, because Nehab teaches pruning a test tree to remove portions not relevant to a particular test, Nehab necessarily teaches pruning a larger test tree having more test structures. For example, Nehab teaches modeling a business process using BPEL or BML. Id. ¶¶ 40–41. Nehab further 9 Appeal 2012-002508 Application 11/777,342 teaches generating and analyzing BML graphs to determine states and transitions, and to extract test primitives from the transitions. Id. ¶¶ 73–74. Finally, Nehab teaches forming a test tree from the test primitives, where “[e]ach node is preferably a test primitive, such that the nodes preferably represent and/or are at least related to the transitions of the previously described transition state diagram.” Id. ¶ 75. Thus prior to pruning, Nehab’s test tree represents all decision points and branches specified in the BPEL. And as the Examiner found, after pruning, “the ‘pruned’ test tree contains only relevant portions for tests. Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would readily comprehend that the ‘pruned’ test tree can be used to identify all feasible combinations of all branches (or paths) of all decision points of the test script.” Ans. 27. We therefore sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 21 for this reason as well. CONCLUSION For the reasons explained supra, we find the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1, 6, 12, 16, 19, and 21 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Nehab and Quick, and sustain the rejections. Moreover, because Appellants do not separately argue for the patentability of independent claims 23, 25, 26, and 28, or of dependent claims 2–5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13–15, 17, 18, 20, 22, 24, 27, and 29–35, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2–5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13–15, 17, 18, 20, and 22–35 for the same reasons. 10 Appeal 2012-002508 Application 11/777,342 DECISION For the reasons indicated above, the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1– 8 and 10–35 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED rwk 11 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation