Ex Parte LI

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Mar 12, 2010

10926621 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 12, 2010)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
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Ex parte WEIDONG LI

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Appeal 2009-006699
Application 10/926,621
Technology Center 2600
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Decided: March 12, 2010
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Before KENNETH W. HAIRSTON, MAHSHID D. SAADAT,
And ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, Administrative Patent Judges.

MANTIS MERCADER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appeal 2009-006699
Application 10/926,621

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Final Rejection
of claims 1-57. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.
INVENTION
Appellant’s claimed invention is directed to a method and system for
reducing power consumption of Infrared Data Association (IrDA) enabled
devices such as handsets by turning ON/OFF an IrDA port dynamically.
(Spec. 3:[08]). According to the invention an IrDA Transceiver 108 receives
a first signal indicating that IrDA data is received and, in response to
receiving the first signal, a second signal may be generated by the Interrupt
Controller 106 which causes a processor 104 to wakeup from a low power
state (Spec. 3:[08] and Fig. 1). Thereafter, the processor receives and
processes IrDA data when it wakes up from the low power state. (See Spec.
3:[08]).
Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on
appeal:
1. A method for reducing power consumption of IrDA enabled
devices, the method comprising:
receiving a first signal indicating received IrDA data; and
generating a second signal in response to receiving said first signal
that causes a processor to wakeup from a low power state.

THE REJECTIONS
The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of unpatentability:
Walczak US 5,907,418 May 25, 1999

Tourunen US 6,810,216 B1 Oct. 26, 2004
(filed Jul. 2, 1999)
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Appeal 2009-006699
Application 10/926,621

The following rejections are before us for review:
1. The Examiner rejected claims 1-10, 20-29, and 39-48 under 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Tourunen.1
2. The Examiner rejected claims 11-19, 30-38, and 49-57 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Tourunen in view of Walczak.

ISSUE
The pivotal issue is whether Tourunen’s high-speed receiver
preamplifier constitutes a “processor.”

FINDING OF FACT (FF)
The following finding of fact is supported by a preponderance of the
evidence:
1. Appellant’s Specification defines the “processor” as “an ARM
processor . . . fully synthesizable 32-bit RISC processor which
monitors the activity at the IrDA port to check if any data is being
received” (Spec. 7:[25]).

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in
the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior
art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628,
631 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

1 We consider the Examiner’s rejection under 102(b) instead of 102(e) as
harmless error. The issue remains as to whether the cited reference of
Tourunen anticipates Appellant’s invention.
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Appeal 2009-006699
Application 10/926,621

The claim terms should be given their broadest reasonable meaning in
their ordinary usage as such claim terms would be understood by one skilled
in the art by way of definitions and the written description. In re Morris,
127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
The claims, of course, do not stand alone. Rather, they are
part of a ‘fully integrated written instrument’ . . . consisting
principally of a specification that concludes with the claims. For
that reason, claims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of
which they are a part.’ . . . . [T]he specification ‘is always highly
relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is
dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed
term.’

Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

ANALYSIS
Anticipation
Appellant argues inter alia that the high-speed preamplifier 220 is not
equivalent to a “processor” (App. Br. 8). Appellant’s Specification defines
the “processor” as “an ARM processor . . . fully synthesizable 32-bit RISC
processor which monitors the activity at the IrDA port to check if any data is
being received” (FF 1). The Examiner reasoned that Tourunen’s high speed
preamplifier 220 constitutes a “processor” because “it amplifies the received
IR signal” and thereby processes the signal by shaping, forming, and
improving the electrical signal (Ans. 7). We do not agree with the
Examiner’s reasoning because Appellant’s Specification is the single best
guide to the meaning of the disputed term “processor” which is described as
a computer processor. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315.
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Appeal 2009-006699
Application 10/926,621

Accordingly, we will reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-10,
20-29, and 39-48 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by
Tourunen.
Obviousness
The additional reference of Walczak does not cure the above cited
deficiency. Accordingly, we will also reverse the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 11-19, 30-38, and 49-57 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Tourunen in view of Walczak.

CONCLUSION
Tourunen’s high-speed receiver preamplifier does not constitute a
“processor.”

ORDER
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-57 is reversed.

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Appeal 2009-006699
Application 10/926,621

REVERSED

ELD

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